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Summary 
The  judicial  settlement  of  international  disputes  is  an  important  requirement 
for  peace  in  the  international  community.  Therefore,  creating  judicial  organs 
within  regional  or  international  organisations  finds  support  among  states  and  the 
majority  of  international  lawyers.  The  present  thesis  deals  with  the  projected  Arab 
Court  of  Justice  (ACJ)  as  a  regional  international  court,  expected  to  be  created 
within  the  League  of  Arab  States  system.  The  present  thesis  dealing  with  the 
projected  ACJ,  consists  of  five  chapters  and  final  conclusions. 
Chapter  one  deals  mainly  with  the  basic  structure  of  the  League  of  Arab 
States  itself,  its  membership,  its  organs,  the  settlement  of  disputes,  and  the  reasons 
that  are  delaying  the  creation  of  the  ACJ  and  the  role  it  will  be  expected  to  play  in 
settling  inter-Arab  disputes.  In  the  second  chapter  comprehensive  information  on 
the  function  of  the  judicial  power  in  Islamic  Shariah  is  presented,  including  the 
status  of  judges  in  Islam,  their  appointment,  qualifications,  independence  and 
other  issues  related  to  them.  Chapter  three  concentrates  on  the  organisation  of  the 
projected  ACJ,  comparing  its  draft  Statute  with  the  Statute  of  the  International 
Court  of  Justice  (ICJ)  and  other  regional  international  courts.  The  chapter  will 
also  show  how  far  the  Arab  draftsmen  have  been  influenced  by  principles  and 
rules  of  Islamic  Shariah,  especially  in  matters  relating  to  the  qualification  of 
judges.  Furthermore,  the  chapter  will  discuss  other  points  related  to  the 
organisation  of  the  bench  such  as  nomination  of  candidates,  system  of  election, 
constituting  chambers,  appointing  ad  hoc  judges  etc.  The  fourth  chapter  explains vii 
in  detail  at  the  level  of  theory  as  well  as  of  practice  the  role  of  Islamic  Shariah  as  a 
source  to  be  applied  by  the  projected  ACJ.  The  chapter  points  to  the  need  to 
discuss  the  origins  and  fundamental  conceptions  of  Islamic  Shariah  as  a  law 
capable  to  be  applied  by  the  projected  ACJ.  Chapter  five  continues  with  a 
discussion  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ACJ,  and  makes  detailed  reference  to  the 
concepts  of  jurisdiction  ratione  personae,  ratione  materiae  and  the  function  of  the 
ACJ  to  give  advisory  opinions.  The  thesis  considers  whether  the  Arab  drafters 
have  developed  the  above  terms  or  have  simply  adopted  them  as  they  exist  in  the 
Statute  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice.  The  conclusions  summarise  the 
findings  of  the  Thesis,  and  are  accompanied  by  some  critical  remarks. viii 
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The  League  of  Arab  States,  created  in  1945,  is  one  of  the  oldest  international 
regional  organisations.  Its  aim  is  to  strengthen  relations  between  Arab  states, 
which  alone  are  permitted  to  be  its  members.  The  Arab  League  has  proclaimed 
that  the  settlement  of  disputes  between  its  members  should  be  resolved  by 
peaceful  means.  The  use  of  force  is  prohibited. 
The  international  community  has  at  its  disposal  peaceful  methods  by  which 
states  can  settle  their  disputes.  States  either  can  choose  political  means  for 
resolving  political  disputes  or  judicial  means  for  justiciable  disputes.  Art.  33  (1) 
of  United  Nations  Charter,  the  best  basic  reference  to  consult  on  dispute 
resolution,  provides  that  "the  parties  to  any  dispute,  the  continuance  of  which  is 
likely  to  endanger  the  maintenance  of  international  peace  and  security,  shall,  first 
of  all,  seek  a  solution  by  negotiation,  enquiry,  mediation,  conciliation,  arbitration, 
judicial  settlement,  resort  to  regional  agencies  or  arrangements,  or  other  peaceful 
means  of  their  own  choice.  " 
When  considering  the  system  of  the  League  of  Arab  States  with  respect  to  the 
settlement  of  disputes,  it  appears  that,  unlike  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations, 
the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  has  adopted  just  one  kind  of  political  method,  namely, 
mediation,  although  to  a  restricted  extent  member  states  can  also  have  recourse  to 
arbitration.  Despite  the  importance  of  the  judicial  method,  the  founding  Arab 
states  failed,  for  many  reasons,  to  include  a  relevant  provision  in  the  1945  Pact  of 
the  Arab  League.  The  only  reference  to  an  Arab  Court  of-Justice  (ACJ)  occurs  in Inlroduction  2 
Art.  19,  which  provides  for  the  creation  of  inter  alia  an  ACJ  if  sufficient 
amendments  are  made  to  the  Pact  with  the  approval  of  a  two-thirds  majority  of 
member  states.  Subsequently,  member  states  of  the  League  have  realised  the 
importance  of  a  judicial  organ  within  their  organisation.  Several  attempts  have 
been  made  to  create  such  a  judicial  organ  since  the  early  fifties;  but  unfortunately, 
none  of  these  efforts  have  had  any  chance  of  success  except  that  of  being  shelved. 
However,  a  recent  proposal,  approved  by  a  great  majority  of  member  states,  was 
drafted  in  1990.  Arab  draftsmen  took  into  consideration  the  previous  drafts  for 
the  ACJ  and  tried  to  prepare  an  acceptable  draft  to  secure  the  approval  of  the 
member  states.  The  1990  draft  Statute  needed  to  be  approved  by  the  Heads  of 
member  states,  for  which  purpose,  a  summit  meeting  was  needed,  but  the  invasion 
of  Iraq  in  Kuwait  in  1990  prevented  such  a  summit  taking  place.  Since  then,  the 
draft  Statute  has  been  awaiting  the  leaders'  approval.  Between  1990  and1995  the 
reconsideration  of  the  draft  Statute  was  continued  in  order  to  create  a  first  class 
model,  hoping  to  find  the  acceptance  of  all  Arab  states.  The  present  study  will 
concentrate  on  the  latest  draft  Statute,  the  1995  draft,  which  also  has  been 
approved  by  the  great  majority  of  the  member  states.  The  draft  Statute  and  the 
draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ  are  written  in  Arabic  therefore,  a  non-official  translation  of 
both  had  to  be  made  by  the  present  author.  '  The  previous  drafts  will  also  be 
referred  and  discussed  whenever  necessary. 
It  would  have  been  very  complicated  to  discuss  in  detail  every  Article  of  the 
draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ;  therefore  selected  issues  have  been  chosen  because  of 
1  See  Annexes  2  and  3. Introduction  3 
their  importance  and  controversial  nature.  It  is  also  necessary  to  refer  to  the 
historical  background  relating  to  the  creation  and  the  function  of  the  League  of 
Arab  States.  This  will  aid  the 
. 
understanding  of  the  special  nature  and 
characteristics  of  the  League  which  are  reflected  also  in  the  draft  Statute  of  the 
ACJ. 
In  addition,  the  study  deals  with  the  principles  and  roles  of  Islamic  Shariah  as 
a  legal  system,  in  order  to  clarify  two  major  points:  (1)  Islamic  opinion  on  the 
judicial  power,  with  particular  reference  to  the  nature  of  this  power,  the  system  of 
the  judges  and  their  qualifications;  and  (2)  the  legal  sources  for  litigation  of 
Islamic  Shariah  as  Islamic  international  law,  in  order  to  know  whether  Islamic 
Shariah  can  be  applied  by  the  projected  ACJ  and  if  so,  what  would  be  the  scope  of 
its  application.  The  reason  why  these  two  points  are  discussed  is  because  the 
application  of  Islamic  Shariah  is  included  in  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  in  two 
respects.  Firstly,  according  to  Art.  6  of  the  draft  Statute,  an  Arab  judge  holding  a 
position  in  the  Court  has  to  be  qualified  in  international  law  as  well  as  Islamic 
Shariah.  Secondly,  according  to  Art.  23  (1),  Islamic  Shariah  shall  be  one  of  the 
sources  that  may  be  applied  to  disputes  by  the  projected  ACJ. 
The  main  purpose  of  the  study  is  to  answer  the  following  questions:  Why 
was  the  League  of  Arab  states  established?  Why  have  the  founding  states 
disregarded  the  creation  of  a  judicial  organ  within  the  League  system?  After  more 
than  fifty  years  since  the  creation  of  the  Arab  League,  is  there  still  a  need  to 
establish  such  a  Court?  What  will  be  the  role  of  the  Court  in  promoting  inter- 
Arab  relations?  What  will  be  the  position  of  Islamic  Shariah  in  the  Court,  and Introduction  4 
how  will  it  be  applied?  What  will  be  the  scope  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court? 
Does  the  draft  Statute  develop  sufficient  grounds  for  the  concepts  of  jurisdiction 
ratione  personae  and  ratione  materiae,  and  the  advisory  jurisdiction  of  the  Court, 
especially  when  these  concepts  are  compared  with  these  found  in  the  provisions  of 
the  Statute  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice? 
Since  the  establishment  of  the  League  of  Arab  States,  huge  amounts  of 
detailed  literature  have  been  generated  to  cover  its  various  aspects,  whether  in 
Arabic,  English  or  French.  Unfortunately,  the  projected  ACJ  has  not  enjoyed  the 
same  attention.  This  poses  difficulties  when  looking  for  references  relating  to  the- 
ACJ.  Only  three  published  works  exist  on  the  subject  and  they  have  accordingly 
been  relied  on  in  the  present  thesis: 
1.  Foda,  Ezzeldin,  The  Projected  Arab  Court  of  Justice:  a  study 
in  regional  jurisdiction  with  specific  reference  to  the  Muslim 
law  of  nations,  The  Hague:  Martinus  Nijhoff,  (1957). 
2.  Ben  Miled  Hela,  La  Competence  de  la  Cour  Arabe  de 
Justice:  Selon  L'Avant-Projet  de  Statut,  (The  Competence  of 
the  Arab  Court  of  Justice:  According  to  the  Draft  Statute), 
Tunisia:  Memoire  Pour  la  D.  E.  A.  de  Droit  International  Public, 
(1982). 
3.  Dachraoui  Achouak,  La  Cour  Arabe  de  Justice:  Etude  de 
L'Avant-Projet  de  Statut,  (Arab  Court  of  Justice:  Study  of  the 
Preliminary  Draft  Statute),  Tunisia:  Memoire  Pour  le  D.  E.  A. 
en  Sciences  Politiques,  (1982). 
In  addition,  some  documents  (all  of  them  in  Arabic)  relating  to  the 
establishment  of  the  projected  ACJ  have  been  compiled  from  different  places. 
First  visits  to  Egypt  and  to  the  Secretariat  General  of  the  Arab  League  were 
necessary  to  obtain  the  draft  Statute  and  draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ.  The  present 
author  has  obtained  the  most  recent  unpublished  documents  relating  to  the 
establishment  of  the  projected  ACJ  namely,  "Minutes  of  the  Permanent  Legal Introduction  S 
Committee  of  the  League  of  Arab  States,  Cairo  5-9  November  1995".  These 
documents  contain  correspondence  between  member  states  of  the  Arab  League 
regarding  their  views  on  the  1995  draft  Statute  of  the  projected  Arab  Court.  They 
will  be  referred  in  the  present  thesis  as  the  unpublished  letter.  The  library  of  the 
Arab  League  has  also  been  consulted  as  well  as  the  libraries  of  University  of  Ain 
Shams  and  University  of  Cairo.  Some  other  documents  were  found  in  the  League 
of  Arab  States  (Tunis  office)  when  a  second  visit  to  Tunis  was  made  for  the  same 
purpose.  The  London  office  of  the  Arab  League  also  helped  the  present  author  to 
find  other  documents,  out  of  print  Arabic  books  and  Articles  relating  to  the  Arab 
League  and  the  projected  ACJ.  Because  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  is  based  on 
the  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  it  has  been  helpful  to  refer  to  the  judgments  and  opinions  of 
the  ICJ,  and  its  predecessor  the  PCIJ,  as  well  as  to  the  opinions  and  views  of 
international  lawyers  on  specific  issues. 
This  study  is  divided  into  five  chapters: 
Chapter  One:  The  Place  of  the  Arab  Court  of  Justice  in  the 
League  Arab  States. 
Chapter  Two:  Judicial  Power  in  Islamic  Shariah. 
Chapter  Three:  The  Organisation  of  the  Court. 
Chapter  Four:  Application  of  Islamic  Shariah  by  the  Arab 
Court  of  Justice. 
Chapter  Five:  Jurisdiction  of  the  Court. 
The  conclusions  summarise  the  findings  of  the  Thesis,  and  are  accompanied 
by  some  critical  remarks. Chapter  I 
The  Place  of  the  Arab  Court  of  Justice 
in  the  League  of  Arab  States 
Before  discussing  the  expected  judicial  function  of  the  Arab  Court  of  Justice,  ' 
it  is  necessary  to  give  some  general  information  about  the  League  of  Arab  States2 
as  a  regional  organisation  in  the  Arab  world.  The  present  chapter  is  going  to 
clarify  why  the  Arab  League  was  established;  how  membership  in  it  is.  obtained; 
and  what  its  organs  are;  how  member  states  settle  their  disputes;  what  are  the 
available  methods;  and  lastly,  why  the  ACJ  has  not  been  established  within  the 
Arab  League  system  despite  its  importance  and  necessity. 
1.1.  The  Establishment  of  the  Arab  League  3 
Arab  nationalism  (al  Qawmiyyah  al  Arabiyyah)  may  be  considered  as  one  of 
the  strongest  in  the  world,  because  Arabs  believe  they  constitute  one  nation, 
embracing  the  same  religion  (Islam),  speaking  the  same  language,  living  in  a 
connected  territory,  with  common  interests,  tradition,  history  and  ancestry.  4 
1  Hereinafter  cited  as:  The  ACJ. 
2  Hereinafter  cited  as:  The  Arab  League. 
3  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  Arab  League  is  one  of  the  oldest  organisations  in  the  world  created  after 
the  second  world  war,  even  older  than  the  United  Nations  (hereinafter  cited  as:  UN)  because  the 
signing  and  ratifying  of  its  Pact  was  on  22ad  March  1945,  whereas  the  signature  of  the  Charter  of 
the  UN  was  in  26`h  June  1945.  It  is  also  older  than  the  Organisation  of  the  American  States  (1949) 
and  the  European  Community  (1952).  See,  Ball,  Margaret,  The  Organisation  of  American  States 
and  the  Council  of  Europe,  XXVI  BYbIL  (1949)  p.  p.  150-176;  Simma,  Bruno,  The  Charter  of  The 
United  Nations:  A  Commentary,  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  (1995)  p.  10. 
4  Haim,  Sylvia  G.,  Arab  Nationalism:  An  Anthology,  Los  Angeles:  University  of  California  Press, 
(1974)  p.  p.  120-127;  Gomaa,  Ahmed  M.,  The  Foundation  of  the  League  of  Arab  States:  Wartime 
Diplomacy  and  Inter-Arab  Politics  1941  to  1945,  London:  Longman  Group  Ltd.,  (1977)  p.  3. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  Gomaa,  The  Foundation  of  the  Arab  League). Chapter  One  7 
The  Arabs  as  an  ethnic  entity  have  suffered  several  kinds  of  domination 
which  started  with  the  Tartarian  invasion  in  the  thirteenth  century  of  the  Abbasids 
Caliphate,  5  and  ended  with  the  rule  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  in  most  Islamic  Arab 
states  during  some  four  centuries  (15-16-1917).  From  the  beginning  of  the  19`h 
century,  European  states  were  prepared  to  dominate  some  Arab  states  still  under 
the  weakening  rule  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  European  powers  knew  that  Arab 
states  enjoyed  a  strategic  position,  had  a  great  wealth  of  natural  and  economic 
resources,  especially  after  the  discovery  of  oil  in  some  of  them.  The  importance 
of  the  Suez  Canal  too  should  not  be  forgotten.  6 
During  the  first  World  War  (1914-1918),  resistance  against  Ottoman  rule 
increased,  especially  when  Britain  promised  Prince  Hussain,  the  Sheriff  of  Mecca, 
the  leader  of  Arab  resistance,  to  support  him  in  order  to  gain  his  independence  in 
return  for  using  his  troops  in  the  war  against  Germany  which  was  supported  by 
Ottoman  forces.  7  Unfortunately,  this  promise  did  not  materialise  and  Britain  did 
S  In  fact,  after  the  death  of  the  Prophet  Muhammad  on  632  A.  D.,  there  were  two  main  successive 
dynasties  in  Islamic  state:  the  Umayyads  (661-750),  which  ruled  from  Damascus,  and  the  Abbasids 
(750-1258),  which  ruled  from  Baghdad.  For  further  details  see  Robinson,  Neal,  Islam:  A  Concise 
Introduction,  Surrey:  Curzon  Press,  (1999)  p.  22. 
6  For  example,  France  dominated  Algeria  in  1830,  Tunisia  in  1881,  and  Morocco  in  1912.  Britain 
dominated  Egypt  in  1882.  Italy  dominated  Libya  in  1912.  Then  after  the  first  World  War  both  of 
France  and  Britain  shared  Arab  states  between  themselves,  so  Syria  and  Lebanon  were  put  under 
the  French  mandate,  Iraq,  Palestine  and  Jordan  under  the  British  mandate,  at  the  same  time  those 
countries  in  the  Arabian  Gulf  (Persian  Gulf)  were  put  under  British  colonialism.  For  more  details 
see  Shihab,  Mufeed  Muhamad,  Jami'at  al  Duwal  a!  'Arabiyyah:  Mithaquha  wa  Injazatuha,  (The 
League  of  Arab  States:  its  Charter  and  its  Implementations),  al  Qahirah:  Ma'had  al  Buhuth  wal 
Dirasat  al  'Arabiyah,  (1978)  p.  4.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Shihab,  The  Arab  League);  Hasou, 
Tawfig  Y.,  The  Struggle  for  the  Arab  World:  Egypt's  and  Nasser  and  the  Arab  League,  London: 
Kegan  Paul  plc,  (1985)  p.  p.  4-5.  Hassuna,  Hussein  A.,  The  League  of  Arab  States  and  Regional 
Disputes:  A  Study  of  Middle  East  Conflicts,  New  York:  Oceana  Publications  INC,  (1975)  p.  3. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  Hassuna,  The  League  ofArab  States). 
7  See  Letter  from  Sir  Henry  MacMahon  to  Sheriff  Hussain,  140'  December  1915,  (Correspondence 
between  Sir  Henry  MacMahon  and  the  Sheriff  Hussein  of  Mecca,  in  Great  Britain),  Parliamentary 
Papers,  Miscellaneous  No.  3  (1939),  Cmd.  5957,  London,  1939,  Letter  No.  6,  p.  12;  Mansfield, Chapter  One  8 
not  recognise  the  independence  of  Arab  states.  Rather,  Britain  and  France  acted  in 
accordance  with  the  Lausanne  Treaty  of  1923,  and  even  before  that,  under  the 
Sykes  Picot  Agreement  at  the  San  Remo  conference  of  1916,8  decided  to 
distribute  the  majority  of  Ottoman  territory  between  themselves,  and  help  Jews  to 
settle  in  the  Palestine  region  according  to  the  Balfour  declaration  of  2nd  November 
1917.9 
The  situation  between  the  two  World  Wars  did  not  change.  Most  Arab  states 
struggled  against  foreign  domination  in  order  to  reacquire  their  independence, 
enjoy  their  right  to  self  determination,  and  declare  their  condemnation  of  foreign 
colonialism  and  the  attempted  division  of  the  Arab  nation.  1°  The  struggle  has  not 
stopped  since  then;  popular  resistance  has  remained  strong,  and  the  rejection  of 
foreign  influence  on  Arab  territory  has  become  very  important. 
The  situation  in  the  region  became  very  critical  in  World  War  II  after  1939. 
British  Government,  in  its  first  declaration  of  29  May  1941  announced  its  support 
Peter,  The  Middle  East:  A  Political  and  Economic  Survey,  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press, 
(1980)  p.  p.  14-15. 
a  For  more  information  about  Lausanne  Treaty  and  Sykes  Picot  Agreement  see,  Khalil,  Muhamad, 
The  Arab  States  and  the  Arab  League:  A  Documentary  Record,  vol.  2,  Beirut:  Khayats,  (1962) 
p.  p.  304-307  and  p.  p.  295-298.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Khalil,  Documentary  Record). 
9  The  Balfour  Declaration  refers  to  Arthur  James  Balfour  who  was  Foreign  Secretary  in  the  British 
Government.  The  declaration  was  a  letter  prepared  in  March  1916  and  issued  in  November  1917, 
expressed  British  government  approval  of  establishing  in  Palestine,  a  national  home  for  the  Jewish 
people.  See  the  British  (Balfour)  Declaration  of  sympathy  with  Zionist  Aspirations,  Khalil, 
Documentary  Record,  supra  note  8,  p.  p.  483-484. 
10  For  example  there  was  the  1919  Egyptian  Public  Revolution  against  British  occupation,  Iraqis 
revolution  in  1920  against  the  British  mandatory,  Syrian  and  Lebanon  Revolution  in  1925  against 
the  French  mandatory,  the  first  Revolution  of  Palestine  in  1920,  and  the  second  in  1936  against  the 
British  strategy  of  establishing  a  national  home  for  the  Jewish  people  in  Palestine,  and  Libyan 
Revolution  against  Italian  colonialism  in  1923. Chapter  One  9 
for  Arab  movements  aimed  at  gaining  independence.  The  declaration  made  at  the 
Mansion  House  by  Mr.  Eden"  declared: 
"The  Arab  world  has  made  great  strides  since  the  settlement  reached 
at  the  end  of  the  last  War,  and  many  Arab  thinkers  desire  for  the  Arab 
peoples  a  greater  degree  of  unity  than  they  now  enjoy.  In  reaching 
out  towards  this  unity  they  hope  for  support.  No  such  appeal  from 
our  friends  should  go  unanswered.  It  seems  to  me  both  natural  and 
right  that  the  cultural,  and  economic  ties,  too,  should  be  strengthened. 
His  Majesty's  Government  for  their  part  will  give  their  full  support  to 
any  scheme  that  commands  general  approval.  "  2 
After  less  than  two  years,  Mr  Eden  reiterated  his  promise  for  the  support  of 
Arab  unity  in  an  answer  to  a  Parliamentary  question,  when  he  announced:  13 
"As  they  have  already  made  plain,  His  Majesty's  Government  would 
view  with  sympathy  any  movement  among  Arabs  to  promote  their 
economic,  cultural  or  political  unity.  But  clearly  the  initiative  in  any 
scheme  would  have  to  come  from  the  Arabs  themselves,  and  so  far  as 
I  am  aware  no  such  scheme,  which  would  command  general  approval, 
has  yet  been  worked  out.  " 
It  is  unfair  to  ascribe  the  creation  of  the  Arab  League  only  to  British  support 
and  disregard  other  motives.  No  doubt  various  declarations  were  followed  by 
great  tangible  results  in  the  region,  because  they  informed  the  Arab  states,  when 
most  of  them  were  under  British,  French  or  Italian  mandate,  that  Britain  did  not 
oppose  Arab  unity,  but  also  it  is  worth  saying  that  the  declarations  in  question 
were  made  as  a  consequence  of  a  strong  struggle  and  absolute  rejection  of  all 
kinds  of  foreign  presence  in  the  region.  Great  Britain  found  it  was  best  to 
11  Eden,  Robert  Anthony,  (1897-1977)  British  Statesman,  served  as  General-Staff  during  World 
War  I  (1914-1918),  then  elected  as  a  Conservative  Party  member  to  the  House  of  Commons  (1926- 
1929),  was  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  (1940-1945),  and  finally,  Prime  Minister  (1955-1957). 
12  The  Times,  "Mr.  Eden  Defines  the  problems",  Friday,  30`h  May  1941,  Col.  6,  p.  5;  Izzeddin, 
Nejla,  The  Arab  World:  Past,  Present,  and  Future,  Chicago:  Henry  Regnery  Company,  (1953) 
p.  321;  Seton-Williams,  M.  V.,  Britain  and  the  Arab  States:  A  Survey  of  Anglo-Arab.  Relations 
1920-1948,  London:  Luzac  &  Company,  LTD,  (1983)  p.  221.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Seton- 
Williams,  Britain  and  the  Arab  States). 
17  Parliamentary  Debates,  House  of  Commons,  vol.  387,  Col.  139,  Wednesday,  24th  February 
1943. Chapter  One  10 
neutralise  Arab  pressure  demanding  freedom  and  unity,  and  obtain  Arab  support 
by  giving  some  hope  with  promises  of  support.  British  declarations  helped  bar 
German  access.  Germany  too  had  declared  its  sympathy  toward  Arab  unity.  The 
British  Government  later  found  itself  facing  new  powers  in  the  Middle  East  in 
competition  with  its  interests,  especially  when  the  United  States  of  America 
gained  oil  concessions  in  the  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  Union  of  Soviet 
Socialist  Republics  started  to  propagate  communist  ideas.  14 
The  British  Government  was  one  of  the  first  to  express  sympathy  and  support 
when  the  Arab  League  become  active.  Mr.  Law,  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign- 
Affairs  said  in  the  House  of  Commons:  15 
"His  Majesty's  Government  have  welcomed  the  successful  formation 
of  the  League  of  Arab  States.  They  will  await  with  sympathy  and 
interest  the  results  of  the  detailed  conversations  which  are  now  to  be 
begun  for  reducing  the  various  barriers  which  divide  the  Arab  peoples 
and  for  promoting  cooperation  between  them.  They  hope  that  these 
discussions  will  yield  useful  and  practical  results.  " 
Several  possibilities  to  achieve  this  desired  Arab  unity  appeared.  The  first 
was  a  plan  for  creating  what  could  be  called  Great  Syria  consisting  of  Syria, 
Lebanon,  Jordan  and  Arab  Palestine.  A  second  plan  concerned  the  Fertile 
Crescent,  consisting  of  Syria,  Jordan,  Arab  Palestine,  Iraq  and  Lebanon.  The  third 
was  a  project  which  would  bring  all  Arab  states,  independent  at  that  time,  into  one 
union  consisting  of  the  above  mentioned  states  plus  Saudi  Arabia,  Yemen  and 
Egypt.  16 
14  For  more  details  see  Bashir,  al  Shafiee  M.,  at  Tanzim  ad  Dawli,  (The  International 
Organisations),  al  Mansorah:  Maktabat  al  Jala'  al  Jadidah,  (1980)  p.  p.  464-465.  (hereinafter  cited 
as:  Bashir,  The  International  Organisations). 
Is  Parliamentary  Debates,  House  of  Commons,  vol.  410,  Col.  1885,  Wednesday,  9"  May  1945. 
16  al  Shuqayri,  Ahmed,  al  Jami'ah  a!  'Arabiyah:  Kayf  takun  Jami'ah  wa  Kayf  takun  'Arabiyyah, 
(The  Arab  League:  How  it  could  be  League  and  How  it  could  be  Arabic),  Tunis:  Dar  Bu  Salamih Chapter  One  11 
The  prospects  took  a  very  important  place  in  Arabic  public  opinion. 
Therefore,  to  avoid  any  conflict  which  could  emerge  as  a  result  of  a  difference  in 
ideas,  and  to  unify  the  Arabs'  position,  the  Egyptian  Government  invited  the 
prime  ministers  of  the  then  independent  Arab  states  to  discuss  various  proposals 
with  them.  The  invitations  took  place  as  follows:  Iraq,  13  July-6  August  1943; 
Jordan,  28  August-1  September  1943;  Saudi  Arabia,  11  October-2  November 
1043;  Syria,  26  October-3  November  1943;  Lebanon,  9-13  January  1944  and 
South  Yemen  6-9  February  1944.  During  these  meetings  the  representatives 
exchanged  ideas  on  several  Arab  concerns,  on  ways  to  strengthen  relations  in 
different  fields  between  Arab  states,  and  they  discussed  how  they  could  create  an 
Arab  union.  17 
Later  an  invitation  from  the  Egyptian  government  to  the  leaders  of  the 
independent  Arab  states  prepared  the  way  to  participation  in  a  conference  at  the 
Antoniadis  Palace  in  Alexandria  from  25`h  September  till  7`h  October  1944; 
attending  this  Conference  were  representatives  from  Egypt,  Iraq,  Jordan,  Lebanon, 
Syria;  Saudi  Arabia  and  South  Yemen  sent  observers.  The  idea  of  establishing  the 
Arab  League  was  approved,  and  a  protocol  known  as  the  "Alexandria  Protocol" 
lil  Nashir,  (1979)  p.  p.  35-39;  Khadduri,  Majid,  The  Arab  League  as  a  Regional  Arrangement,  40 
AJIL  (1956)  p.  p.  763-764.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Khadduri,  The  Arab  League);  see  also  al  Jabburi, 
Jamil,  Minutes  of  the  Preparatory  Committee  of  the  Plenary  Arab  Conference,  Alexandria,  Part  1, 
31  JAA  (1983)  p.  p.  149-153.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  at  Jabburi,  Preparatory  Committee). 
17  al  Ghunaimi,  Muhamad  Talat,  a!  ahkam  al  'Ammhfi  Qanun  al  Omam,  (General  Principals  in 
the  Law  of  Nations),  Alexandria:  Munsha'at  al  Ma'arif,  (1972)  p.  1006.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  al 
Ghunaimi,  The  Law  of  Nations);  Philip,  W.  Ireland,  The  Pact  of  the  League  of  Arab  States,  39 
AJIL  (1945)  p.  798;  see  also  Gomaa,  The  Foundation  of  the  Arab  League,  supra  note  4, 
p.  p.  153-187. Chapter  One  12 
was  adopted  by  all  those  attending.  18  It  included  the  main  and  general  principles 
of  the  formation  of  the  projected  Arab  League.  Later  the  prime  ministers  of  the 
seven  states  met  again  in  Cairo  on  22  March  1945  and  unanimously  approved  the 
Pact  of  the  Arab  League,  as  drafted  by  the  Political  Sub-Committee  which  formed 
for  this  purpose.  19 
1.1.1.  Alexandria  Protocol  20 
This  protocol  is  the  first  official  document  drafted  for  the  Arab  League.  It 
contained  the  main  principles  on  the  form  of  this  regional  organisation,  and 
covered  other  subjects  of  great  importance  for  the  Arab  states.  Its  preamble 
started  by  making  clear  the  determination  of  the  Arab  states  attending  the  meeting 
of  the  Preliminary  Committee  of  the  General  Arab  Conference  to  unite  Arab 
public  opinion  to  establish  the  Arab  League  and  strengthen  the  ties  between  the 
Arab  states.  Independent  Arab  states  that  gathered  and  agreed  to  establish  the 
Arab  League  decided  to  treat  the  Alexandrian  Protocol  as  expressing  their  main 
aims  and  desire  to  achieve  the  establishment  of  the  League.  Five  main  points 
were  covered  by  the  Protocol  as  follows:  (1)  The  establishment  of  the  League  of 
18  Except  by  the  Saudi  Arabia  and  Yemenis  representatives  who  did  not  sign  the  protocol, 
declaring  that  they  had  to  submit  it  to  their  governments  for  approval  before  signature.  Later  on 
they  got  their  government's  approval  and  signed  it.  See,  Khadduri,  The  Arab  League,  supra 
note  16,  p.  765;  al  Jabburi,  Preparatory  Committee,  supra  note  16,  p.  p.  160-163. 
19  al  Jabburi,  Jamil,  Minutes  of  the  Preliminary  Committee  of  the  Plenary  Arab  Conference, 
Part  2,32  JAA  (1983)  p.  p.  110-126. 
20  For  the  full  text  of  Alexandria  Protocol  see  Khalil,  Documentary  Record,  supra  note  8, 
p.  p.  53-56. Chapter  One  13 
Arab  states;  (2)  Economic,  cultural  and  social  cooperation;  (3)  The  future 
strengthening  of  bonds;  (4)  Lebanon;  (5)  Palestine.  21 
1.1.2.  The  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  22 
By  virtue  of  the  signature  of  the  Pact,  the  Arab  League  as  a  regional,  political 
organisation  acquired  international  legal  personality  just  like  other  international 
organisations,  such  as  the  United  Nations,  Council  of  Europe,  the  Organisation  of 
American  states,  the  Organisation  of  African  Unity  and  the  Organisation  of 
Islamic  Conference.  3  All  the  members  of  the  Arab  League  are  at  present 
members  of  the  UN;  there  is  no  incompatibility  between  these  memberships,  as 
the  Charter  of  the  UN  allows  the  creation  of  regional  agencies  if  their  activities  are 
consistent  with  the  principles  of  the  UN.  24 
It  is  possible  to  amend  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  with  the  consent  of  two- 
thirds  majority  of  the  member  states,  especially  to  promote  firmer  and  stronger  ties 
between  the  states  belonging  to  the  League,  to  create  an  ACJ,  and  to  regulate  the 
relations  of  the  League  with  international  bodies  created  to  guarantee  security  and 
peace.  25  The  Pact  consists  of  a  Preamble,  twenty  Articles,  and  three  Appendices. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  even  though  Islam  is  the  official  religion  in  most  of  the 
21  For  further  details  see  Arab  Unity  Declaration:  Minutes  Regarding  the  Discussions  and 
Ratification  of  Alexandria  Protocol,  Reprinted  in  43  JAA  (1985)  p.  p.  283-313;  44  JAA  (1985) 
p.  p.  226-265;  46  JAA  (1986)  p.  p.  251-277. 
22  For  full  text  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League,  70  UNTS  (1950)  p.  p.  248-262;  Khalil, 
Documentary  Record,  supra  note  8,  p.  p.  56-61;  also  see  Annex  1. 
23  Abu  al  Saud,  Ameenah  H.,  Jami`at  at  Dowal  al  `Arabiyyah  wa  Imkanat  al  Tatwir,  (The  League 
of  Arab  States  and  the  Availability  of  Developing),  89  JAA  (1997)  p.  7.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Abu 
al  Saud,  The  League  of  Arab  States);  al  Jamal,  Yahya,  ash  Shakhsiyah  al  Qanuniyah  ad  Dawliyah 
li  Jami`at  ad  Dowal  al  `Arabiyyah,  (International  Legal  Personality  of  the  League  of  Arab 
States),  28  JAA  (1983)  p.  133. 
2'  Art.  52  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN. 
25  Art.  19  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League. Chapter  One  14 
members  of  the  Arab  League  neither  the  Alexandria  Protocol  nor  the  Arab  League 
Pact  refer  directly  or  indirectly  to  Islam.  This,  however,  did  not  prevent  the  Arab 
draftsmen  from  including  principles  of  Islamic  Shariah  in  the  draft  Statute  of  the 
26  ACJ. 
1.2.  Organs  of  the  Arab  League 
There  are  two  types  of  organ  in  the  Arab  League.  The  first  type  created  on  the 
basis  of  the  Arab  League's  Pact,  includes:  the  League's  Council;  the  Permanent 
Secretary-General  and  the  Permanent  Committees.  The  second  type  was  created 
under  the  Treaty  of  Joint  Defence  and  Economic  Cooperation  adopted  by  the 
member  states  of  the  Arab  League.  27  It  includes:  the  Joint  Defence  Council 
(JDC);  Consultative  Military  Organisation  (CMO);  the  Permanent  Military 
Commission  (PMC);  the  Arab  Unified  Command  (AUC)  and  the  Economic 
Council  (EC).  28 
1.2.1.  Organs  Created  under  the  Pact 
1.  The  League's  Council 
The  Council  of  the  Arab  League  which  consists  of  representatives  of  member 
states29  is  the  highest  authority  within  the  League's  system.  The  Pact  of  the  Arab 
League  and  the  internal  regulations  30  define  its  constitution,  competence  and 
voting  system.  Although  the  Pact  and  the  Rules  do  not  specify  the  level  to  which 
26  The  judge  should  be  qualified  in  Islamic  Shariah  and  International  Law,  also  Islamic  Shariah  is 
considered  as  one  of  the  sources  to  be  applied  by  the  Court.  See  Arts.  6  and  23  (1113)  of  the  draft 
Statute  of  the  ACJ.  These  questions  are  discussed  at  length  infra. 
27  Hereinafter  cited  as:  Collective  Security  Treaty. 
2&  Shihab,  The  Arab  League,  supra  note  6,  p.  99. 
29  Art.  3  (1)  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League;  Art.  I  of  the  Rules  of  the  League  Council. 
10  Hereinafter  cited  as:  Rules  of  the  League  Council. Chapter  One  IS 
the  representatives  should  belong;  since  the  establishment  of  the  Arab  League,  the 
Council  representatives  of  member  states  are  prime  ministers31  or  foreign 
ministers  and  sometimes  permanent  deputies  to  the  League  or  ambassadors  of  the 
members  states  at  Cairo. 
Since  1964,  when  Egyptian  President  Gamal  Abdel  Naser  convened  the 
assembly  of  the  League  Council  at  the  level  of  heads  of  states,  sessions  have  been 
held  twice  a  year,  one  at  the  level  of  ministers  of  foreign  affairs,  and  the  other  at 
the  level  of  heads  of  states  as  the  Arab  Summit  Conference.  32  It  has  been  accepted 
that  this  Summit  Conference  shall  meet  once  a  year  in  ordinary  session  during  the 
month  of  September;  it  is  possible  for  it  to  meet  at  any  time  in  an  extraordinary 
session.  Until  1996  twenty  three  summit  conferences  have  been  held,  some  of 
them  in  ordinary  but  most  in  extraordinary  sessions.  33 
31  That  was  only  at  the  beginning  of  the  creation  of  the  Arab  League. 
32  Ghali,  Boutros  B.,  The  Arab  League  (1945-1970),  25  Revue  Egyptienne  (1969)  p.  76. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  Ghali,  The  Arab  League);  Sarhan,  Abdul  Aziz  M.,  Azmat  at  Munazzmat  at 
'Arabiyah  wal  Islaeiyah  ft  'Asr  at  Haimanah  at  Americiyah  at  Israeliyah,  (Stalemates  of  Islamic 
Arabic  Organisations  in  the  Era  of  the  American  and  Israeli  Supremacy),  al  Qahirah:  Dar  an 
Nahdah  at  'Arabiyah,  (1994)  p.  p.  143-144;  Ghanem,  Muhammad  H.,  Muhadrat  'An  Jami'at  ad 
Dowa!  at  'Arabiyah,  (Lectures  on  the  League  of  Arab  States),  at  Qahirah:  Ma'had  at  Buhuth  wad 
Dirasat  at  'Arabiyah,  (1966)  p.  p.  18-119.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Ghanem,  Lectures  on  the  Arab 
League).  It  is  to  be  noted  that  draft  amendment  to  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League,  which  is  still  under 
study,  proposes  that  representation  to  the  League  Council  should  be  on  two  levels,  one  at  the 
Ministerial  level  and  the  other  higher  Council  at  the  level  of  head  states.  For  more  details  see  at 
Bahama,  Husain,  Mithaq  at  Jami'ah  bain  al  Qutriyah  wal  Qawmiyah  wat  Ta'dilat  at  Muqtaraha, 
(The  Pact  of  the  League  between  the  Regionalism  and  Nationalism  and  the  Proposed  Amendments, 
in  Markaz  Dirasat  at  Wihdah  at  'Arabiyyah  (ed.  ),  Jami'at  at  Dowal  at  'Arabiyyah:  at  Waqi'  wa  at 
Tumuh,  (The  League  ofArab  States:  Reality  and  Aspiration),  Beirut:  Markaz  Dirasat  at  Wihdah  at 
'Arabiyyah,  (1992)  p.  117. 
33  Jabur,  Nahlah  M.  A.,  Jami'at  ad  Dowal  at  'Arabiyah:  Nash'atuha  wa  Tatwuraha  wa  Dawruha  at 
Mustaqbali,  (The  League  of  Arab  States:  its  Creation,  Development  and  Future  Role),  82  JAA 
(1995)  p.  248.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Jabur,  The  League  of  Arab  States);  see  also  Minutes  of  the 
Summit  Conference  of  1996  can  be  found  in  XXXV  ILM(1996)  p.  p.  1280-1290. Chapter  One  16 
The  voting  procedures  included  in  the  Arab  League's  Pact  provide  that 
unanimity  shall  be  the  general  rule,  so  those  decisions  taken  by  unanimous  votes 
shall  bind  all  member  states,  whereas,  decisions  taken  by  majority  vote  shall  bind 
only  those  members  which  have  accepted  them.  Each  member  state  has  only  one 
vote  in  the  Council,  irrespective  of  the  number  of  its  representatives.  34  The  Arab 
League Council  meets  in  ordinary  session  twice  a  year,  in  March  and  September, 
An  extraordinary  session  is  possible  upon  the  request  of  at  least  two  members 
states  whenever  the  need  arises;  the  session  shall  be  considered  valid  if  attended 
by  representatives  of  the  majority  of  the  member  states.  35  Council  meetings  are 
convened  at  the  invitation  of  the  Secretary-General,  and  representatives  of 
member  states  alternately  assume  the  presidency  of  the  Council  at  each  of  its 
ordinary  sessions  according  to  the  alphabetical  order  of  the  list  of  the  states.  36 
Council  resolutions  require  approval  by  a  majority  of  member  states  or  by 
two-thirds  majority,  37  or  unanimity  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Pact, 
while  decisions  on  necessary  measures  to  repulse  aggression  against  a  member 
state  can  only  be  taken  unanimously;  the  vote  of  the  aggressor  is  not  counted  if  it 
is  a  League  member.  38 
34  Arts.  3  (1)  and  7  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League. 
35  Art.  1I  of  the  League's  Pact;  Art.  11  of  the  Rules  of  the  League  Council.  Amendment  made  to 
Art.  II  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  by  Res.  No.  1457/29  on  27th  April  1958  in  which  this 
Resolution  provides:  "The  Council  of  the  League  will  meet  in  ordinary  session  twice  a  year  in  the 
month  of  March  and  October.  "  According  to  this  amendment  September  become  the  second 
ordinary  session  of  the  League  Council  instead  of  October. 
36  Art.  15  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League;  Art.  14  of  the  Rules  of  the  Arab  League  Council. 
37  Two-thirds  means  here  two-thirds  or  more  than  two-thirds  when  unanimity  is  lacking.  (This 
footnote  appears  in  the  original  Arabic  text). 
36  Art.  6  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League;  Art.  II  of  the  Rules  of  the  League  Council. Chapter  One  17 
Cairo  is  the  permanent  seat  of  the  Arab  League-Secretariat  General, 
nevertheless,  the  League's  Council  may  convene  at  any  other  agreed  place.  39 
According  to  the  decision  of  the  Council  held  in  Baghdad  in  March  1979,  Tunisia 
was  chosen  to  be  the  temporary  headquarters  of  the  Arab  League  during  the 
suspension  of  Egypt's  membership.  In  1990,  the  headquarters  returned  to  Cairo 
when  the  suspension  was  removed.  40 
The  Pact  grants  the  Council  several  competences.  These  include:  appointing 
the  Secretary  General,  amending  the  Pact,  expelling  members  from  the  League, 
accepting  new  members,  mediating  in  disputes  that  arise  between  members  or 
between  members  and  non-members.  In  addition  the  Council  has  to  promote  the 
realisation  of  the  objectives  of  the  League  and  supervise  the  execution  of 
agreements  which  the  member  states  have  concluded,  also  it  has  to  decide  upon 
the  means  by  which  the  League  is  to  cooperate  with  international  bodies  in  order 
to  guarantee  security  and  peace,  and  regulate  economic  and  social  relations.  4' 
2.  The  Permanent  Secretariat  General 
The  Secretariat-General  consists  of  the  Secretary-General,  at  ambassadorial 
level,  a  number  of  assistant  Secretaries,  at  the  level  of  ministerial 
plenipotentiaries,  and  a  suitable  number  of  principal  officials.  The  Secretary- 
General  is  nominated  by  the  League's  Council  and  is  appointed  for  a  renewable 
19  Art.  10  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League. 
30  Hatta,  Nasif,  Athar  Intigal  al  Maqar  `Ala  Dawr  at  Jami'ah  at  `Arabiyah,  (The  Effect  of  Moving 
the  Headquarters  on  the  Role  of  the  Arab  League),  in  Markaz  Dirasat  at  Wihdah  at  `Arabiyyah 
(ed.  ),  Jami'at  al  Dowal  a!  'Arabiyyah:  al  Wagi'  wa  a!  Tumuh,  (The  League  ofArab  States:  Reality 
and  Aspiration),  Beirut:  Markaz  Dirasat  at  Wihdah  al  `Arabiyyah,  (1992)  p.  p.  651-654. 
"  Arts.  3,5,12  (2),  and  19  (1)  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League;  For  further  details  see  Obaidallah, 
Abdullah,  H.,  The  League  of  Arab  States  and  Arab  Unity,  A  thesis  submitted  in  partial  fulfilment Chapter  One  18 
five  year  term  42  A  majority  of  two-thirds  of  member  states  of  the  League  is 
needed  for  the  appointment  to  be  valid.  The  Assistant  Secretaries  and  principal 
officials  are  nominated  by  the  Secretary-General,  subject  to  approval  by  the 
43  League's  Council. 
The  responsibilities  of  the  Secretary-General  include  several  functions:  to 
enforce  the  resolutions  of  the  Council  in  the  name  of  the  Arab  League;  take 
financial  actions  within  the  limits  of  the  budget  approved  by  the  Council  and  the 
Committee;  carry  out  any  other  assignment  entrusted  to  him  by  these  bodies;  in 
general  he  is  responsible  for  all  acts  of  the  Secretariat-General  on  behalf  of  the 
League  Council  44 
3.  The  Permanent  Committees 
There  are  11  Committees  created  in  accordance  with  Arts.  2  and  4  of  the  Pact 
of  the  Arab  League:  the  Political  Committee,  the  Social  and  Cultural  Affairs 
Committee,  the  Communication  Committee,  the  Information  Committee,  the  Oil 
Experts  Committee,  the  Committee  for  Meteorology,  the  Health  Committee,  the 
Administrative  and  Financial  Affairs  Committee,  the  Human  Rights  Committee 
of  the  requirements  for  the  degree  of  Master  of  Arts  at  Mankato  State  University,  Mankato, 
Minnesota,  (1984)  p.  p.  35-36. 
'2  There  are  no  conditions  which  prohibit  member  states  from  nominating  one  of  their  citizens  to 
hold  the  position  of  the  Secretary-General.  However,  since  the  creation  of  the  Arab  League  all 
who  have  been  appointed  for  this  office  are  Egyptians  except  when  the  headquarters  of  the  Arab 
League  were  removed  to  Tunis.  We  think  it  is  better  to  allow  other  member  states  in  the  Arab 
League  to  nominate  one  of  their  citizens  to  hold  this  position.  For  further  details  about  the 
conditions  required  in  the  person  to  hold  this  position  see  El  Saket,  Muhamad  Abdul  Wahhab,  at 
Amin  at  'Am  li  Jami'at  at  Duwa!  at  'Arabiyyah,  (The  Secretary-General  of  the  League  of  Arab 
States),  al  Qahirah:  Dar  at  Fikr  al  `Arabi,  (1973-1974)  p.  p.  105-116.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  El 
Saket,  The  Secretary  General). 
13  Art.  12  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League;  Art.  2  of  the  Rules  of  the  Secretary  General. 
"  For  more  details  about  the  competence  of  the  Secretary-General  see  El  Saket,  The  Secretary 
General,  supra  note  42,  p.  271. Chapter  One  19 
and  the  Conference  of  Liaison  Officers  of  the  Regional  Offices  for  the  Boycott  of 
Israel.  45 
The  main  task  of  the  committees  is  to  formulate  the  principles  and  extent  of 
cooperation  between  member  states,  and  draft  international  agreements  for 
discussion  and  approval  by  the  League's  Council.  They  convene  at  the  permanent 
seat  of  the  League  (Cairo);  however,  it  is  possible  with  the  approval  of  the 
Secretary-General,  to  meet  in  another  member  state.  The  quorum  in  each 
committee  is  constituted  by  the  attendance  of  the  representatives  of  the  majority  of 
the  member  states,  and  resolutions  are  passed  by  a  majority  of  those  present.  In 
addition,  Chairmen  are  appointed  from  the  Council  for  each  of  the  Committees  for 
a  period  of  two  years.  46 
1.2.2.  Organs  Created  under  the  Collective  Security  Treaty 
The  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  does  not  embody  in  its  Articles  provisions  on 
collective  security  for  the  member  states,  so  five  years  after  the  creation  of  the 
Arab  League,  the  Council  decided  to  conclude  a  Collective  Security  Treaty  in 
order  to  deal  with  what  the  Pact  neglected.  This  Treaty  was  adopted  on  13`h  April 
1950,  and  approved  by  member  states  on  17`h  June  1950.47  The  Treaty  set  up  the 
following  organs: 
'S  Shihab,  Mufeed,  The  League  of  Arab  States,  1  EPIL  (1992)  p.  p.  204-205. 
46  Arts.  5,7,  and  9  of  the  Rules  of  the  Committees;  see  also  Abdul  Munim,  Ahmed  F.,  Jami'at  a! 
Duwal  al  'Arabiyah  1945-1985:  Dirasah  Tarikhiyah  Siyas  yah,  (The  League  of  Arab  States  1945- 
1985:  Historical,  Political  Study),  Beirut:  Markaz  Dirasat  al  Wihdah  al  'Arabiyah,  (1986) 
p.  p.  21-23. 
47  All,  Muhamad  I.,  a!  Wajiz  ft  al  Munazzmat  ad  Daivliyah,  (Summary  in  International 
Organisations),  al  Qahirah:  Dar  al  Kitab  al  Jami'i,  (1982)  p.  439.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  All, 
International  Organisations);  Abu  Heef,  All  Sadeq,  al  Qanun  al  Dawli  a!  'Am,  (Public 
International  Law),  Alexandria:  Munsha'at  al  Ma'arif,  (1995)  p.  688. Chapter  One  20 
1.  The  Joint  Defence  Council  (JDC) 
By  Art.  6  of  the  Collective  Security  Treaty,  the  JDC  consists  of  the  foreign 
ministers  and  the  defence  ministers  of  the  contracting  states  or  their 
representatives;  it  exercises  its  competence  under  the  supervision  of  the  League 
Council.  With  regard  to  Arts.  2,3  and  4  of  the  Collective  Security  Treaty,  the 
Council  must  take  all  the  available  and  necessary  actions  to  repel  any  possible 
aggression  against  any  of  the  contracting  states.  48 
2.  The  Consultative  Military  Organisation  (CMO) 
The  CMO  was  created  by  the  Protocol  supplementary  to  the  Collective 
Security  Treaty  on  2d  February,  1951.  It  consists  of  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  of  the 
contracting  states,  superintends  the  Permanent  Military  Commission  and  guides  it 
in  all  its  duties,  considers  all  its  reports  and  proposals  before  submitting  them  to 
the  Joint  Defence  Council.  The  CMO  has  to  submit  its  reports  and  proposals 
'8  Art.  2  provides:  "The  Contracting  states  shall  consider  that  an  armed  aggression  committed 
against  any  one  or  more  of  them,  or  against  their  forces,  to  be  an  aggression  against  them  all.  For 
this  reason,  and  in  accordance  with  the  right  of  legitimate  self-defence,  both  individual  and 
collective,  they  undertake  to  hasten  to  the  aid  of  the  state  or  states  against  whom  an  aggression  is 
committed,  and  to  take  immediately,  individually  and  collectively,  all  measures  and  to  utilise  all 
means  available,  including  the  use  of  armed  force,  to  repulse  the  aggression  and  to  restore  security 
and  peace.  And,  in  application  of  Art.  6  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  and  Art.  51  of  the  UN 
Charter,  the  Council  of  the  Arab  League  and  the  UN  Security  Council  shall  be  immediately 
notified  of  the  act  of  aggression  and  of  the  measures  and  procedures  adopted  concerning  same.  " 
Art.  3  provides:  "The  contracting  states  shall  consult  together  at  the  request  of  any  one  of  them, 
whenever  the  territorial  integrity,  independence  or  security  of  any  of  them  is  threatened.  In  the 
event  of  the  danger  of  an  impending  war,  or  of  the  emergence  of  an  international  contingency  the 
danger  of  which  is  apprehended,  the  contracting  states  shall  immediately  proceed  to  unify  their 
plans  and  efforts  for  adopting  such  preventive  and  defensive  measures  as  the  situation  requires.  " 
Art.  4  provides:  "In  a  desire  to  discharge  fully  the  above  mentioned  obligations,  the  contracting 
states  shall  cooperate  with  each  other  for  consolidating  and  strengthening  their  military  power. 
They  shall  participate,  according  to  their  resources  and  needs,  in  preparing  the  individual  and 
collective  means  of  defence  to  resist  any  armed  aggression.  " Chapter  One  21 
regarding  its  functions  to  the  JDC  which  considers  them  and  may  take  any 
necessary  action.  49 
3.  The  Permanent  Military  Commission  (PMC) 
This  consists  of  representatives  of  the  General  Staffs  of  the  Armies  of 
contracting  states.  Its  main  duty  to  draw  up  plans  for  joint  defence  and  their 
implementation.  All  its  reports  and  proposals  are  submitted  to  the  JDC.  5° 
4.  The  Arab  Unified  Command  (AUC) 
By  Art.  5  of  the  Military  Annex  to  the  Collective  Security  Treaty  it  is 
provided  that  the  Chief  command  of  all  the  forces  in  the  field  shall  be  vested  in 
the  state  whose  forces  operating  in  the  field  are  greater  in  number  and  equipment 
than  those  of  each  of  the  other  states,  unless  the  commander-in-chief  is  elected  in 
a  manner  different  with  the  consensus  of  the  governments  of  the  contracting 
states.  The  Commander-in-Chief  shall  be  assisted  in  the  direction  of  military 
operations  by  a  joint  council  of  chiefs  of  staff.  Accordingly,  the  League  Council 
s  in  1964  agreed  to  create  the  AUC  to  achieve  Arab  collective  aims. 
5.  The  Economic  Council 
The  Economic  Council  created  by  the  contracting  states,  comprises  the 
ministers  involved  in  economic  affairs  or  their  representatives,  to  present 
recommendations  for  the  fulfilment  of  all  aims  coordinated  with  the  development 
'9  For  the  full  text  of  the  supplementary  Protocol  see  Khalil,  Documentary  Record,  supra  note  8, 
p.  p.  105-106. 
50  Art.  5  of  the  Collective  Security  Treaty;  see  also  Shihab,  Mufeed  M.,  a!  Munazzmat  a! 
Dawliyah,  (The  International  Organisations),  al  Qahirah:  Dar  al  Nahdah  at  `Arabiyah,  (1990) 
p.  449.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Shihab,  The  International  Organisations). 
S1  Khalil,  Documentary  Record,  supra  note  8,  p.  104-105;  Shihab,  The  Arab  League,  supra 
note  6,  p.  113. Chapter  One  22 
of  the  economies  of  Arab  states,  to  exploit  their  natural  resources,  to  facilitate  the 
exchange  of  their  respective  agricultural  and  industrial  products,  to  organise  and  to 
coordinate  their  economic  activities  and  generally  conclude  any  necessary  inter- 
Arab  agreements  serving  given  adjectives.  52 
1.3.  Membership  in  the  Arab  League 
As  a  result  of  limiting  membership  in  the  Arab  League  to  only  Arab  states, 
the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  also  provides  that  only  Arab  states,  as  a  general  rule, 
can  be  parties  to  the  Statute  of  the  Court,  and  non  Arab  states  are  thus  prevented 
from  being  parties  to  this  Statute.  Art.  2  of  the  draft  Statute  provides  'Member- 
states  of  the  League  of  Arab  states  are  ipso  facto  parties  to  the  present  Statute.  ' 
Therefore,  discussing  membership  in  the  Arab  League  becomes  necessary.  Art.  I 
of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  provides: 
"The  League  of  Arab  states  is  composed  of  the  independent  Arab 
states  which  have  signed  this  Pact. 
Any  independent  Arab  state  has  the  right  to  become  a  member  of  the 
League.  If  it  desires  to  do  so,  it  shall  submit  a  request  which  will  be 
deposited  with  the  Permanent  Secretariat-General  and  submitted  to 
the  Council  at  the  first  meeting  held  after  submission  of  the  request.  " 
Thus  the  Arab  League  comprises  those  independent  Arab  states  which  signed 
and  ratified  the  Pact  in  1945.53  It  is  also  possible  for  any  other  independent  Arab 
state  to  become  associated  with  the  Arab  League  and  become  a  member  by 
depositing  a  membership  application  with  the  Permanent  Secretariat-General  and 
accepting  the  obligations  mentioned  in  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  and  respect  for 
52  Jabur,  The  League  of  Arab  States,  supra  note  33,  p.  228. 
33  Those  states  are  known  as  founding  members  are  as  follows:  Egypt,  Iraq,  Jordan,  Lebanon, 
Saudi  Arabia,  Syria  and  North  Yemen. Chapter  One  23 
its  Rules  without  any  reservation.  54  There  are  currently  twenty  two  members. 
Therefore,  it  becomes  necessary  to  talk  in  brief  about  the  possibilities  of 
acquisition  of  membership  and  loss  of  membership  in  accordance  with  the  Arab 
League  Pact. 
1.3.1.  Acquisition  of  Membership 
Any  entity  which  desires  as  a  state  become  a  League  member  should  enjoy 
certain  qualifications  and  follow  certain  procedures  for  acquiring  membership  as 
provided  for  by  Art.  1  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League.  The  qualifications  in 
question  concern: 
1.  Statehood 
States  are  the  most  important  subjects  of  international  law.  The  attributes  of 
statehood  are  population,  defined  territory,  government  and  capacity  to  enter  into 
relations  with  other  states.  55  Therefore,  membership  of  the  Arab  League  is  open 
only  to  states  possessing  these  attributes. 
54  As  soon  as  any  Arab  state  acquires  its  independence,  the  first  thing  its  government  does  is  apply 
for  membership  in  the  Arab  League,  which  is  considered  as  the  Home  of  Arabs.  The  twenty  two 
members,  including  the  founding  ones,  are  as  follows:  (the  following  arrangement  of  member  states 
names  will  be  made  according  to  their  date  of  association)  Libya  28/3/1953  (Res.  497),  Sudan 
19/1/1957  (Res.  1107),  Morocco  1/10/1958  (Res.  1496),  Tunisia  1/10/1958  (Res.  1497),  Kuwait 
20/7/1961  (Res.  1777),  Algeria  16/8/1962  (Res.  1584),  South  Yemen  12/12/1967  (Res.  2374),  but 
regarding  the  unification  of  North  and  South  Yemen  on  22  May  1990  only  one  state  has  appeared 
as  a  member  in  the  Arab  League  named  Republic  of  Yemen.  Bahrain  11/9/1971  (Res.  2793), 
Qatar  11/9/1971  (Res.  2794),  Oman  29/9/1971  (Res.  2860),  United  Arab  Emirates  26/12/1971 
(Res.  2864),  Mauritania  26/22/1973  (Res.  62/d6),  Somalia  14/2/1974  (Res.  3112),  Palestine 
9/9/1976  (Res.  3462),  Djibouti  4/9/1977  (Res.  3614),  and  Comorros  20/11/1993  (Res.  5327).  The 
numbers  of  these  resolutions  have  been  obtained  from  the  League  of  Arab  States:  London  office. 
55  Barry,  E.  Carter  and  Phillip,  R.  Trimble,  International  Law,  Canada:  Little,  Brown  and 
Company,  (1991)  p.  p.  411-418;  Crawford,  James,  The  Criteria  for  Statehood  in  International  Law, 
XLVIII  BYbIL  (1976-77)  p.  p.  111-119. Chapter  One  24 
2.  Independence 
It  is  necessary  that  any  state  which  aspires  to  apply  for  membership  to  any 
international  organisation  should  be  independent,  because  it  will  otherwise  not  be 
able  to  carry  out  the  obligations  of  membership.  Additionally,  independence 
under  international  law  has  a  very  special  meaning.  It  consists  of  a  number  of 
rights  and  duties  that  a  state  should  exercise,  for  example,  the  right  to  exercise  full 
jurisdiction  over  its  territory  and  population,  or  the  right  to  protect  and  secure  its 
territory  and  population  from  any  foreign  aggression  even  by  using  force  in  self- 
defence.  56 
Since  the  establishment  of  the  Arab  League,  several  arguments  have  been 
considered  by  its  Council  regarding  the  possession  of  independence  by  a  state 
which  wants  to  apply  for  membership.  Should  the  Council  refuse  a  state 
membership  of  the  Arab  League  simply  because  it  is  not  considered  to  be  an 
independent  state?  At  1954  the  League  Council  decided  not  to  accept  Oman  as 
member  of  the  Arab  League  because  it  allegedly  did  not  fulfil  the  requirements,  57 
despite  the  fact  that  most  of  the  founding  members  of  the  Arab  League  such  as 
Egypt,  Lebanon,  Syria  and  Transjordan(Jordan)  were  not  at  that  time  enjoying  full 
independence  in  the  legal  meaning  of  the  term.  58  It  is  to  be  noted  that  a  wide 
interpretation  has  been  applied  by  the  League  Council  to  the  meaning  of  the  term 
56  Shaw,  M.  N.,  International  Law,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  (1997)  p.  149; 
Amerasinghe,  Chittharanjan.  F.,  Principles  of  the  Institutional  Law  of  International  Organisations, 
Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  (1996)  p.  111.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Amerasinghe, 
Principles  of  International  Organisations). 
S'  Shihab,  The  International  Organisations,  supra  note  50,  p.  427. 
98  Gomaa,  The  Foundation  of  the  Arab  League,  supra  note  4,  p.  242;  Khadduri,  The  Arab 
League,  supra  note  16,  p.  p.  766-768. Chapter  One  2S 
`independence'.  It  was  argued  that  it  is  not  necessary  a  state  to  enjoy  full 
independence  to  qualify  for  Arab  League  membership,  but  it  is  required  that  state 
must  at  least  enjoy  a  limited  scope  of  self-government  and  enjoy  international 
recognition  from  a  number  of  other  states.  The  Council  is  competent  to  decide  if 
this  condition  is  fulfilled.  59 
3.  To  be  an  Arab  State 
The  Arab  League's  Pact  excludes  non-Arab  states  from  membership,  which 
means  only  Arab  states  can  be  accepted  as  a  member  of  the  organisation  in  order 
to  retain  very  strongly  and  clearly  the  Arab  nature  of  the  League.  Being  an  Arab 
state  although  an  important  provision,  is  not  defined  by  the  Pact  of  the  Arab 
League.  A  wide  discussion  was  carried  out  by  the  founding  states  before  drafting 
the  Pact  in  1944  in  order  to  reach  a  suitable  interpretation  of  the  word  `Arab'.  It 
was  understood  that  this  denoted  a  matter  of  civilisation,  common  language, 
common  culture,  common  destiny  and  common  aspiration  to  qualify  as  an  Arab 
Nation.  Despite  that  differences  have  appeared  as  some  writers  have  said  this 
condition  is  fulfilled  merely  if  the  population  speaks  Arabic,  whereas  others  have 
said  that  it  is  not  enough  only  to  speak  Arabic,  but  that  candidates  must  also  prove 
that  they  have  a  strong  relation  with  Arabism,  and  to  feel  as  if  they  are  part  of  the 
Arab  Nation.  60  The  practice  followed  is  that  the  League's  Council  has  the 
responsibility  to  discuss  the  satisfactory  existence  of  this  condition  when  a 
59  at  Daqqaq,  Muhamad  al  Saed,  a!  Tanzim  at  Dawli,  (The  International  Organisations),  at 
Qahirah:  Dar  at  Jami'ah  al  Jadidah  lil  Nashir,  (1990)  p.  p.  626-628.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  at 
Daqqaq,  The  International  Organisations). 
60  For  more  details  see  Ali,  International  Organisations,  supra  note  47,  p.  p.  419-421;  Ghali,  The 
Arab  League,  supra  note  32,  p.  70. Chapter  One  26 
particular  state  applies  for  membership,  and  to  take  its  decision  accordingly. 
Political  motives  usually  play  a  very  important  role  in  the  Council's  decision.  61 
4.  Approval  by  the  League  Council 
Even  though  the  Pact  mentions  that  every  independent  Arab  state  has  the 
right  to  become  a  member  in  the  Arab  League,  membership  does  not  follow 
automatically  without  an  application  by  the  state  concerned.  When  a  state  desires 
to  become  an  Arab  League  member  it  must  submit  its  written  request  to  the 
Permanent  Secretariat-General,  thereupon  the  League  Council  will  consider  the 
application  at  the  first  meeting  after  the  submission  of  the  request.  It  is  also 
possible  to  arrange  an  extraordinary  session  to  consider  an  application.  62 
Regarding  the  Pact  requirements,  membership  is  deemed  to  be  a  right  for  any 
independent  Arab  state.  This  fact  has  led  the  League  Council  in  most  cases  to 
avoid  finding  whether  an  application  fails  to  fulfil  the  conditions,  unless  the 
question  affects  the  security  of  the  Arab  League.  63  Unfortunately,  the  Pact  in  this 
point  does  not  specify  the  number  of  votes  required  for  the  League  Council's 
approval  of  a  new  member.  64  This  has  led  to  differences  in  opinion  between  Arab 
61  The  League  Council  did  not  face  any  problems  to  make  its  decision  with  regard  to  some 
membership  applications,  because  most  of  the  applicants  have  possessed  the  Arabism  requirement, 
but  when  particular  states  applied  for  membership  like  Djibouti,  Mauritania  and  Somalia,  the 
Council  found  itself  in  a  serious  confusion,  but  finally,  the  decision  was  made  to  give  them  full 
membership  in  the  Arab  League,  which  demonstrated  the  political  role  in  this  matter.  For  more 
details  of  these  arguments,  see  Ali,  International  Organisations,  supra  note  47,  p.  p.  419-421. 
62  Ibid.,  p.  p.  421-423. 
63  1  think  there  is  a  great  difference  between  membership  in  the  Arab  League  and  membership  in 
the  UN.  "Membership  in  the  United  Nations  is  open  to  all  other  Peace  Loving  States  which  accept 
the  obligations  contained  in  the  present  Charter.  "  Art.  4  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN.  Whereas 
membership  in  the  Arab  League  by  virtue  of  Art.  1  (2)  of  the  Pact  is  considered  as  a  Right  for  any 
independent  Arab  state.  See  also  Shihab,  The  Arab  League,  supra  note  6,  p.  63. 
61  Cf.  the  Charter  of  the  UN  in  which  Art.  18  (2)  provides: Chapter  One  27 
jurists;  some  of  them  claim  a  unanimous  vote  is  required  in  accordance  with  the 
general  principle  for  voting  in  the  Arab  League's  Pact,  whereas,  others  argue  that 
only  a  majority  vote  is  necessary  for  the  League  Council  to  take  a  decision  to 
accept  a  new  member.  65 
The  second  opinion  is  preferable.  It  is  supported  by  the  League  Council's 
practice.  Numerous  states  have  been  accepted  as  members  in  the  Arab  League  by 
a  majority  vote,  such  as  Kuwait  despite  the  objection  of  Iraq,  South  Yemen  in 
spite  of  the  reservation  of  Saudi  Arabia,  Oman  despite  the  reservation  of  Saudi 
Arabia  and  North  Yemen,  and  United  Arab  Emirates  despite  the  abstention  of  the 
Saudi  Arabia  in  the  vote  while  Iraq  expressed  reservations  and  North  Yemen 
objected.  All  these  decisions  mean  that  the  League's  Council  has  applied  in  its 
practice  with  regard  to  membership  majority  instead  of  unanimity  voting.  66 
Furthermore,  the  League  Council  resolution  (2718)  on  2nd  March  1971  could 
be  used  as  another  evidence  to  support  the  idea  that  only  a  majority  vote  is 
necessary  for  the  League  Council  to  take  a  decision  to  accept  a  new  member. 
Although  this  resolution  did  not  explicitly  provide  that  a  majority  vote  is  required 
in  the  case  of  membership,  it  does  demonstrate  that  the  unanimous  vote  required 
in  Art.  6  concerns  only  matters  dealing  with  the  sovereignty  of  member  states.  In 
"Decisions  of  the  General  Assembly  on  important  questions  shall  be  made  by  a  two 
thirds  majority  of  the  members  present  and  voting.  These  questions  shall  include: 
the  admission  of  new  member  to  the  United  Nations.  " 
65  All,  International  Organisations,  supra  note  47,  p.  p.  422-425;  al  Ghunaimi,  Muhamad  T., 
Jami'at  a!  Duwal  a!  'Arabiyyah:  Dirasah  Qanuniyah  Siyasyah,  (The  League  of  Arab  States: 
Legal,  Political  Study),  Alexandria:  Munsha'at  at  Ma'arif,  (1974)  p.  83.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  al 
Ghunaimi,  The  Arab  League). 
66  For  more  details  about  voting  procedures  for  the  League  Council  see  Macdonald,  Robert  W., 
The  League  of  Arab  States:  A  Study  in  the  Dynamics  of  Regional  Organisation,  New  Jersey: 
Princeton  University  Press,  (1965)  p.  p.  56-61. Chapter  One  28 
view  of  the  fact  that  membership  is  not  considered  as  a  matter  of  sovereignty,  Art. 
6  of  the  Pact  accordingly,  cannot  be  applied  on  matters  of  membership.  67 
1.3.2.  Loss  of  Membership  68 
The  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  has  granted  its  members  the  right  to  withdraw 
from  the  League  if  their  respective  interest  demands  such  withdrawal.  69  The 
League  Council  has  the  right  to  expel  any  member  failing  to  fulfil  its  obligations 
under  the  Pact.  70  Thus,  two  main  kinds  of  loss  of  membership  should  be 
considered  below,  withdrawal  and  expulsion,  without  forgetting  loss  of 
international  legal  personality,  suspension  and  how  they  may  effect  membership.  71 
1.  Withdrawal 
Most  international  organisations  permit  in  their  Charters  members  to 
withdraw  after  a  period  of  notice  given  in  advance.  72  This  is  the  case  with  the 
Arab  League.  It  is  permitted  for  any  member  to  withdraw  from  it  at  any  time,  the 
only  condition  being  to  inform  the  League's  Council  one  year  before  withdrawal  is 
67  For  further  discussion  see  al  Daqqaq,  The  International  Organisations,  supra  note  59, 
p.  p.  629-632. 
66  Ghali,  Botrus  B.,  Fuqdan  al  `Udwiyah  fi  Jami'at  al  Duwal  at  `Arabiyyah,  (Loss  of  membership 
in  the  League  of  Arab  States),  11  Revue  Egyptienne  (1955)  p.  p.  123-135. 
69  Art.  18  (1)  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  provides:  "If  a  member  state  contemplates 
withdrawal  from  the  League,  it  shall  inform  the  Council  of  its  intention  one  year  before  such 
withdrawal  is  to  go  into  effect.  "  Art.  19  (3)  on  the  other  hand,  provides:  "If  a  state  does  not  accept 
such  an  amendment  (to  the  Pact)  it  may  withdraw  at  such  time  as  the  amendment  goes  into  effect, 
without  being  bound  by  the  Provisions  of  the  preceding  Art.  18  (1).  " 
70  Art.  18  (2)  provides:  "The  Council  of  the  League  may  consider  any  state  which  fails  to  fulfil  its 
obligation  under  the  Pact  as  having  become  separated  from  the  League.  " 
71  One  of  the  main  points  which  is  going  to  be  clarified  when  discussing  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
ACJ  is  whether  losing  membership  from  the  Arab  League  for  any  reason  will  affect  the  state's  right 
to  appear  before  the  Court  or  not. 
'2  There  was  disagreement  between  delegations  who  drafted  the  UN  Charter  regarding  to  the  right 
of  withdrawal  from  this  Organisation,  but  at  the  end  of  considerations  it  was  agreed  not  to  mention 
it  in  the  Charter.  For  more  details  see,  Schwelb,  Egon,  Withdrawal  from  the  United  Nations:  The 
Indonesian  Intermezzo,  23  CLP  (1979)  p.  145;  Feinberg,  N.,  Unilateral  Withdrawal  from  an 
International  Organisation,  XXXIX  BYb1L  (1963)  p.  p.  199-202. Chapter  One  29 
to  take  effect.  73  The  necessity  for  this  condition  is  to  inform  other  members  of  the 
organisation  in  advance  and  to  give  the  League's  Council  enough  time  to  discuss 
the  situation  with  the  member  concerned,  possibly  eliminating  causes  underlying 
the  intention  to  withdraw  and  to  reach  a  suitable  resolution.  The  Pact  is  deficient 
in  dealing  with  withdrawal  in  comparison  with  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations.  Art.  1  (3)  of  the  Covenant  provided  for  withdrawal  from  the  League  and 
required  the  member  to  inform  the  League's  Council  two  years  in  advance  before 
such  withdrawal,  and  also  that  a  state  must  fulfill  all  the  obligations  toward  the 
League  before  the  withdrawal  could  take  effect.  No  similar  requirement  is  found 
in  the  Arab  League  Pact.  74 
The  relationship  between  members  in  a  regional  organisation  is  supposed  to 
be  stronger  than  in  a  universal  organisation,  so  it  is  submitted  that  the  period  for 
informing  the  League  Council  of  an  intention  to  withdraw  should  be  more  than 
one  year  or  more  than  the  period  mentioned  in  the  League  of  Nations  Covenant, 
because  of  the  special  nature  of  the  structure  of  the  Arab  League.  75 
Historically,  since  the  establishment  of  the  Arab  League  no  member  state  has 
attempted  to  withdraw  from  it  despite  the  fact  that  there  have  been  many 
disagreements  and  disputes  between  the  members.  However,  the  League  Council 
73 
al  Ghunaimi,  The  Law  of  Nations,  supra  note  17,  p.  1015. 
Cf.  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  in  which  Art.  1  (3)  provides: 
"Any  member  of  the  League  may,  after  two  years  notice  of  its  intention  so  to  do, 
withdraw  from  the  League,  provided  that  all  its  international  obligations  and  all  its 
obligations  under  this  covenant  shall  have  been  fulfilled  at  the  time  of  its 
withdrawal.  " 
Ghanem,  Lectures  on  the  Arab  League,  supra  note  32,  p.  44. 
74 
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has  faced  a  lot  of  boycotting  of  its  sessions  by  some  member  states.  76  Art.  19  of 
the  Pact  provides  that  it  is  possible  for  any  member  to  withdraw  from  the  Arab 
League  if  it  does  not  favor  an  amendment  made  to  the  Pact.  In  such  a  situation  a 
year's  notice  is  not  required.  77 
2.  Expulsion 
The  League's  Council  has  the  authority  to  expel  any  member  state  which  fails 
to  fulfil  its  obligations  under  the  Pact.  78  The  decision  does  not  take  effect  unless 
adopted  by  unanimity,  not  counting  the  vote  of  the  member  concerned.  Since  the 
creation  of  the  Arab  League,  the  League  Council  has  not  used  this  competence. 
However,  the  most  important  practice  in  this  matter  is  Resolution  (292/12) 
adopted  on  ist  April  1960,  which  states  that:  79 
"Any  member  state  entering  into  negotiations  with  Israel  with  a  view 
of  the  conclusion  of  a  unilateral  political  military  or  economic 
agreement  will  immediately  be  excluded  from  the  League  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Art.  18  of  the  Pact.  " 
3.  Suspension  80 
Initially,  the  League's  Pact  did  not  provide  for  suspension  in  its  Articles.  81 
Nevertheless,  a  Resolution  was  adopted  by  the  League's  Council  during  the 
76  Some  examples  of  such  boycotting  sessions  are  Jordan  in  June  1950,  Tunisia  in  1958,  Iraq, 
Jordan  and  Tunisia  in  December  1959,  and  Egypt  in  1962.  For  more  details  see  Ghali,  The  Arab 
League,  supra  note  32,  p.  72;  Shihab,  The  International  Organisations,  supra  note  50,  p.  429. 
77  al  Ghunaimi,  The  Law  of  Nations,  supra  note  17,  p.  1015. 
78  The  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  had  the  right  to  expel  any  member  from  the  League. 
Art.  16  (4)  provided  that:  "Any  member  of  the  League  which  has  violated  any  covenant  of  the 
League  may  be  declared  to  be  no  longer  a  member  of  the  League  by  a  vote  of  the  Council 
concurred  in  by  the  representatives  of  all  the  other  members  of  the  League  represented  thereon.  " 
79  For  further  details  see  Ghali,  The  Arab  League,  supra  note  32,  p.  73. 
e°  South  Yemen  was  the  first  member  state  of  the  Arab  League  to  have  its  membership  suspended. 
That  was  in  July  1978  but  after  just  few  months  it  started  to  attend  the  session  of  the  League's 
Council  again  and  became  an  active  member,  see  Shihab,  The  International  Organisations,  supra 
note  50,  p.  431. 
81  Cf.  Art.  5  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN. Chapter  One  31 
Conference  of  the  Arab  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  Economy,  held  in  Iraq 
from  27-31  March  1979  to  suspend  Egypt's  membership  and  to  terminate  all  its 
rights  and  privileges  subsequent  to  the  signature  of  the  peace  treaty  with  Israel.  82 
In  addition  to  suspension,  political  and  economic  measures  were  taken,  such  as  the 
discontinuation  of  economic  contributions,  interruption  of  diplomatic  relations 
83  and  the  removal  of  the  League's  permanent  seat  from  Cairo  to  Tunisia. 
No  doubt,  the  League's  Council  has  no  legal  authority  to  take  such  action 
against  any  of  its  members.  The  only  measures  which  can  be  taken  is  expulsion 
under  Art.  18  (2),  which  means  that  the  Resolution  breached  the  Pact,  but,  as- 
usual,  political  reasons  always  play  their  role.  84 
4.  Loss  of  International  Legal  Personality 
If  any  member  state  in  the  Arab  League  loses  its  international  legal 
personality  as  a  result  of  unification  with  another  state,  or  for  any  other  reason,  its 
membership  immediately  terminates.  This  is  a  general  principle  of  international 
law  of  state  succession.  85  In  the  history  of  the  Arab  League,  member  states  have 
twice  lost  their  membership  as  a  result  of  unification.  The  first  was  upon  the 
82  Eighteen  member  states  and  Palestine  Liberation  Organisation  attended  this  Conference,  Egypt, 
Oman  and  Sudan  were  absent.  For  more  details  about  this  treaty  and  other  related  documents  see 
17  1LM(1978)  p.  p.  1463-1474;  18ILM(1979)  p.  p.  362-393. 
87  Bashir,  The  International  Organisations,  supra  note  14,  p.  p.  479-480;  Shihab,  The 
International  Organisations,  supra  note  50,  p.  431.  Egypt's  membership  was  suspended  for 
around  ten  years.  When  it  started  to  practise  its  activities  as  a  member  in  the  Organisation  of 
Islamic  Conference  (OIC)  diplomatic  relations  had  been  resumed  by  most  of  Arab  states.  This 
helped  to  clear  the  way  for  it  to  regain  membership  in  the  Arab  League.  In  1989  an  invitation  sent 
to  the  Egyptian  Government  to  attend  the  extraordinary  Conference  of  Head  of  States  which  was  to 
be  held  in  Casablanca,  and  by  this  attendance  its  suspension  was  terminated. 
"  For  more  details  see  Abul  Wafa,  Ahmed,  al  Wasit  ft  a!  Munazzmat  al  Dawliyah,  (Intermediary 
in  International  Organisations),  al  Qahirah:  Dar  at  Nahdah  al  `Arabiyah,  (1996)  p.  p.  493-493. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  Abul  Wafa,  International  Organisations);  al  Daqqaq,  The  International 
Organisations,  supra  note  59,  p.  p.  637-638. 
85  Amerasinghe,  Principles  of  International  Organisations,  supra  note  56,  p.  p.  111-113. Chapter  One  32 
unification  of  Egypt  and  Syria  in  1958  to  form  the  United  Arab  Republic  (UAR), 
and  the  second  in  1990  when  North  and  South  Yemen  formed  the  Republic  of 
Yemen.  Should  the  unified  states  subsequently  dissolve,  each  resulting  state  can 
resume  its  original  membership.  This  has  happened  with  the  dissolution  of  the 
86  UAR  in  1961. 
1.4.  The  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  and  the  Settlement  of  Disputes 
Settling  disputes  by  peaceful  means  between  states  is  a  very  important  issue 
in  the  international  community.  87  All  the  regional  or  international  organisations 
refer  to  it  in  their  constitutions.  88  The  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  commends  the  use* 
of  peaceful  methods  and  prohibits  the  use  of  force  to  settle  international  disputes 
between  its  members.  In  this  connection,  the  Iraqi  delegation  stated  in  the 
Preparatory  Committee  of  the  Plenary  Arab  Conference:  89 
"we  hope  that  the  use  of  force  will  be  prohibited  for  the  settlement  of 
such  disputes  as  will  arise  between  one  State  and  another.  This  we 
further  hope,  should  be  so  expanded  as  to  make  it  compulsory  for 
86  Shihab,  The  Arab  League,  supra  note  6,  p.  67. 
97  at  Rashidi,  Ahmed  H.,  Jami`at  ad  Dowal  at  `Arabiyah  wa  fad  at  Munaz'at  Silmiyyan:  Dirasah 
Muqaranah  lit  Khibrah  at  Tarikhiyah,  (The  League  of  Arab  States  and  Settling  Disputes  by 
Peaceful  Meaning:  Comparison  Study  to  the  Historical  Practice),  37  JAA  (1984)  p.  p.  148-166;  at 
Majzub,  Muhamad,  Observation  on  the  Role  of  the  Arab  League  in  the  Settlement  of  Inter-Arab 
Disputes,  1  Arab  Affairs  (1986)  p.  p.  138-145.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  at  Majzub,  Arab  League  and 
Settlement  of  Inter-Arab  Disputes);  Shukri,  Muhamad  Aziz,  Preventive  and  Conflict  Resolutions 
by  the  Arab  League,  (A  paper  Presented  to  the  Conference  on  the  Golden  Jubilee  of  the  League), 
London,  5t'  April  1995  p.  p.  5-6. 
88  The  UN  as  the  greatest  international  organisation  in  the  present  time  promotes  the  use  of 
peaceful  means  in  settling  international  disputes.  Art.  33  (1)  of  its  Charter  enumerates  all  the 
available  methods  to  which  any  party  to  a  dispute  can  resort  "The  parties  to  any  dispute,  the 
continuance  of  which  is  likely  to  endanger  the  maintenance  of  international  peace  and  security, 
shall,  first  of  all,  seek  a  solution  by  negotiation,  enquiry,  mediation,  conciliation,  arbitration, 
judicial  settlement,  or  resort  to  regional  agencies  or  arrangements,  or  other  peaceful  means  of  their 
own  choice.  "  See  Van  Dervort,  Thomas  R., International  Law  and  Organization:  An  Introduction, 
London:  SAGE  Publications  Ltd.,  (1998)  p.  426. 
89  The  League  of  Arab  States,  Minutes  of  the  Preparatory  Committee  of  the  Plenary  Arab 
Conference  (hereinafter  cited  as:  MPCPAC),  Alexandria,  (1944)  p.  42.  Translation  quoted  form 
Foda,  Ezzeldin,  The  Projected  Arab  Court  of  Justice:  a  study  in  regional  jurisdiction  with  specific 
reference  to  the  Muslim  law  of  nations,  The  Hague:  Martinus  Nijhoff,  (1957)  p.  3.  (hereinafter 
cited  as:  Foda,  The  Projected  Arab  Court). Chapter  One  33 
member  States-in  certain  matters-to  adopt  no  plans  that  are,  at  least, 
inconsistent  with  the  general  plan  unanimously  agreed  upon.  " 
It  is  to  be  understood  that  when  the  Arab  League  was  created,  the  respected 
ideology  in  the  Arab  world  was  the  `rule  of  law'.  This  led  delegations  of  the 
original  states  to  support  the  idea  of  settling  inter-Arab  disputes  by  peaceful 
means,  and  to  prohibit  the  use  of  force.  90  This  approach  is  apparent  in  the 
Minutes  of  the  Preparatory  Committee  meetings  which  drafted  the  proposal  of  the 
Pact  of  the  Arab  League.  Delegations  accepted  unanimously  the  use  of  arbitration 
as  a  peaceful  method  in  settling  disputes  between  member  states.  However  some 
of  them,  such  as  Egypt  and  Saudi  Arabia,  supported  the  idea  of  compulsory. 
arbitration  as  the  best  means  for  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  security  in  the  Arab 
region,  whereas  others  such  as  Lebanon  and  Iraq  opposed  this  idea  and  argued  for 
only  voluntary  arbitration.  It  is  however  to  be  noted  that  the  most  notable 
disagreement  between  the  delegations  in  the  Preparatory  Committee  was  whether 
the  power  of  compulsory  or  voluntary  arbitration  should  be  given  to  the  League 
Council  to  settle  such  disputes  as  may  arise  between  member  states.  Differences 
in  ideas  lead  to  the  postponement  of  the  creation  of  the  ACJ  as  a  judicial  organ  in 
the  Arab  League  system.  91 
The  Egyptian  attitude  toward  compulsory  arbitration  intended  to  give  the 
League  Council  full  powers  to  intervene  in  any  dispute  that  might  arise  between 
90  tzz  at  Rijal,  Omar,  Jami'at  at  Dowal  at  `Arabiyyah  wa  Munaz`at  al  Hudud  at  `Arabiyyah,  (The 
League  of  Arab  States  and  the  Arab  Boundaries  Disputes),  111  a!  Siyasah  a!  Daw!  yah  (1993) 
p.  p.  201-202;  Ghali,  The  Arab  League,  supra  note  32,  p.  81;  at  Majzub,  Arab  League  and 
Settlement  of  Inter-Arab  Disputes,  supra  note  88,  p.  138. 
91  al  Rashidi,  Ahmed  H.,  at  Tahkim  at  Dawli  fi  at  Khibrah  at  `Arabiyah  al  Mu'asirah,  (The 
International  Arbitration  in  the  Arabian  Contemporary  Practice),  62  JAA  (1990)  p.  121;  at 
Kadhem,  S.  J.,  The  Role  of  the  League  of  Arab  States  in  Settling  inter-Arab  Disputes,  32  Revue 
Egyptienne  (1976)  p.  p.  16-17.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  al  Kadhem,  The  Role  of  the  League). Chapter  One  34 
member  states,  otherwise  their  peace  and  security  would  be  endangered.  Its 
proposal  to  the  Preparatory  Committee  insisted  upon  this  idea: 
"the  Council  should,  in  the  common  interest,  intervene  before  a 
situation  reaches  the  stage  of  using,  or  of  threatened  use  of,  force, 
since  any  dispute,  if  left  unsettled,  might  be  aggravated  to  such  an 
extent  that  a  remedy  would  be  impossible.  "92 
The  Saudi  Arabian  delegation  strongly  supported  the  idea  of  compulsory 
arbitration  proposed  by  the  Egyptian  delegation.  In  January  1945  it  sent  a 
memorandum  to  the  Egyptian  delegation  expressing  support.  It  was  as  follows: 
"War  is  prohibited  among  Arab  States.  Any  dispute  between  two 
parties  of  the  Arab  group,  [or]  any  negligence  by  either  party  in 
complying  with  its  commitments  under  the  Pact  shall  be  settled  by 
conciliation,  mediation  or  arbitration  on  a  just  and  equitably  fraternal 
basis,  so  that  the  dispute  involved  may  be  settled  and  any  unexecuted 
commitments  carried  out.  Should  either  party  decline  to  accept 
arbitration  or  abide  by  any  award  given,  the  other  Arab  States  should 
advise  him  and  guide  him  to  the  righteous  path.  If  such  a  party  turns 
the  advice  down  and  continues  to  be  aggressive,  they  may,  in 
consultations  between  them,  decide  on  such  action  as  would  stop 
aggression  and  establish  justice  and  equity  among  the  Arab 
nations.  "93 
It  should  be  understood  that  the  Saudi  proposal  on  compulsory  arbitration 
was  influenced  by  the  Islamic  notion  of  the  proper  way  of  settling  disputes  even 
before  the  creation  of  the  Arab  League.  94  This  led  Saudi  Arabia  to  take  early 
92  MPCPAC,  p.  42.  Translation  quoted  from  Foda,  The  Projected  Arab  Court,  supra  note  90, 
P.  P.  10-11. 
93  The  League  of  Arab  States,  Minutes  of  Political  Sub-Committee,  (Cairo  February  1945),  Cairo, 
(1946)  p.  17.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  MPSC).  Translation  quoted  from  Foda,  The  Projected  Arab 
Court,  supra  note  90,  p.  12. 
94  Islam  as  a  religion  and  legal  system  also  supports  the  use  of  peaceful  methods  in  settling  all 
disputes  which  may  arise  in  the  Muslim  community,  in  order  to  protect  Muslim  brotherhood,  and  to 
obey  Allah's  commandments.  Allah  said  in  the  Holy  Quran:  "The  believers  are  nothing  else  than 
brothers  (in  the  Islamic  religion).  So  make  reconciliation  between  your  brothers,  and  fear  Allah, 
that  may  receive  mercy".  Quran,  49:  10.  So  if  any  dispute  arises  between  Muslims,  the  others  have 
to  intervene  between  the  disputants  in  order  to  solve  the  conflict.  Allah  said  in  the  Holy  Quran: 
"And  if  two  parties  or  groups  among  the  believers  fall  into  fighting,  then  make  peace  between  them 
both.  But  if  one  of  them  rebels  against  the  other,  then  fight  you  (all)  against  the  one  that  rebels  till 
it  complies  with  command  of  Allah;  then  if  it  complies,  then  make  reconciliation  between  them 
justly,  and  equitably.  Verily!  Allah  loves  those  who  are  equitable".  Quran,  49:  9.  In  this  thesis  the 
translation  used  of  the  meaning  of  Quran  is  al  Hilali,  Muhammad  T.,  and  Khan,  Muhammad  M., Chapter  One  35 
action  in  this  direction  by  concluding  several  treaties  with  its  neighbours  such  as 
Transjordan  (Jordan),  Yemen,  and  Iraq.  These  treaties  embodied  the  idea  of 
compulsory  arbitration  as  an  effective  method  for  settling  disputes  arising  between 
them.  95 
The  Lebanese  attitude  towards  compulsory  arbitration  was  to  reject  it.  The 
Lebanese  government  believed  that  compulsory  arbitration  affected  states' 
independence  and  sovereignty.  So,  during  the  Preliminary  Sub-Committee 
meeting,  the  Lebanese  delegation  announced  that  its  government  would  not  accept 
any  proposal  on  compulsory  arbitration  in  general,  or  any  kind  of  arbitration  at  all- 
in  disputes  related  to  the  independence,  sovereignty,  and  territorial  integrity  of 
member  states.  It  agreed  that  any  other  disputes  were  to  be  settled  by  voluntary 
arbitration  if  the  parties  accepted,  whether  before  the  League  Council  or  before  the 
ACJ.  96 
The  Iraqi  delegation  believed  that  the  best  way  of  settling  inter-Arab  disputes 
was  to  resort  to  peaceful  methods  such  as  arbitration,  but  it  accepted  only 
Interpretation  of  the  Meanings  of  the  Noble  Quran  in  the  English  Language:  A  Summarised 
version  of  At  Tabari,  Al  Qurlubi,  and  Ibn  Kathir  with  comments  from  Sahih  at  Bukhari, 
(Summarised  in  one  volume),  Riyadh:  Maktabat  Dar-us-Salam,  (1994).  (hereinafter  cited  as: 
Quran). 
93  The  first  Treaty  was  concluded  with  Transjordan  in  27`h  July  1933,  known  as  the  Treaty  of 
Friendship  and  Good  Neighbourliness,  together  with  a  protocol  on  Arbitration  and  a  Schedule 
appended  to  the  Treaty.  The  second  was  the  Treaty  of  Islamic  Friendship  and  Brotherhood  with 
Yemen,  known  as  Taif  Treaty,  20th  May  1934,  appended  to  this  Treaty  Arbitration  Convention 
of  29th  May  1934.  The  Third  Treaty  known  as  The  Treaty  of  Arab  Brotherhood  and  Alliance  with 
Iraq,  2nd  April  1936.  The  full  text  of  these  Treaties,  Khalil,  Documentary  Record,  supra  note  8, 
p.  p.  212-224;  Seton-Williams,  Britain  and  the  Arab  States,  supra  note  12,  p.  p.  298-301. 
96  MPSC,  p.  23;  MPCPAC,  p.  35. Chapter  One  36 
voluntary  arbitration.  Its  memorandum  to  the  Preliminary  Sub-Committee  on  24"' 
February  1945  stated  that:  97 
"it  is  possible  for  the  Iraqi  government  to  accept  any  provision  that 
would  render  the  Arab  League  Council  competent  to  intervene  for  the 
settlement  of  disputes,  especially  those  arising  over  previous 
agreement  and  conventions,  where  the  disputants  have  accepted  such 
intervention.  " 
Another  memorandum  submitted  to  the  Political  Sub-Committee  on  26 
February  1945  explained  the  reason  why  the  Iraqi  delegation  rejected  compulsory 
arbitration.  It  stated:  98 
"The  League  Council  would  be  composed  of  representatives  of  Arab 
States,  hence  a  political  organ.  Its  authority  to  intervene  for  the 
settlement  of  such  disputes  as  may  arise  between  member  States, 
without  the  consent  of  the  two  disputant  parties,  would  create  a 
serious  situation  threatening  the  whole  structure  of  the  League. 
Furthermore,  it  would  put  some  of  the  League  members  in  such 
critical  situations  that  they  would  be  compelled  to  avoid  being 
implicated  in  matters  that  are  not  consistent  with  the  interests  of  those 
States.  It  is  not  proper  that  we  should  enter  into  an  organisation 
which  aims,  through  continued  cooperation,  at  the  realisation  of 
unsound  bases  which  would  produce  corruption,  contrary  to  the 
organisation's  objectives.  " 
The  final  agreement  between  original  states  in  the  projected  Arab  League  was 
to  give  its  Council  optional  jurisdiction  with  voluntary  methods  for  the  settlement 
of  disputes  between  member  states.  This  appears  in  two  places,  Art.  5  of  the  Pact 
of  the  Arab  League  and  Art.  I  of  the  Collective  Security  Treaty.  Unfortunately, 
neither  Art.  5  nor  Art.  1  enumerate  specific  methods  that  should  be  followed  by 
member  states  if  any  dispute  arises  between  them,  and  at  the  same  time  do  not 
bind  members  states  to  resort  to  the  League  Council  to  ask  for  intervention  before 
referring  their  dispute  to  another  regional  or  international  organisation.  99 
97  MPSC,  p.  63.  Translation  quoted  form  Foda,  The  Projected  Arab  Court,  supra  note  90,  p.  13. 
98  MPSC,  p.  64.  Translation  quoted  form  Foda,  The  Projected  Arab  Court,  supra  note  90,  p.  14. 
99  Abu  al  Saud,  The  League  of  Arab  States,  supra  note  23,  p.  18. Chapter  One  37 
Furthermore,  it  should  be  understood,  as  it  appears  in  Art.  5  of  the  Pact  of  the 
Arab  League,  that  only  two  kinds  of  peaceful  settlement  methods  are  available  to 
member  states,  namely,  mediation  and  arbitration,  considered  as  voluntary 
methods,  and  the  Council  of  the  League  has  no  compulsory  jurisdiction  as  a 
mediator  or  arbitrator.  All  its  interventions  require  the  request  and  consent  of  the 
parties.  100  It  has  the  authority  to  intervene  as  an  arbitrator  in  any  dispute  arising 
between  member  states  on  condition  that  a  disputant  has  asked  for  intervention 
and  the  dispute  does  not  relate  to  a  state's  independence,  sovereignty  or  territorial 
integrity.  Its  decision  shall  be  made  by  majority  vote,  shall  be  compulsory  and 
binding  on  the  disputant,  who  should  not  take  part  in  the  deliberations  or 
voting.  101  On  the  other  hand,  the  League  Council  has  the  right  to  mediate  in  any 
dispute  that  could  lead  to  a  war  between  two  or  more  member  states,  or  between  a 
member  state  and  third  state,  in  order  to  reach  proper  reconciliation  whether  the 
disputant  has  asked  for  mediation  or  not.  Its  decisions  shall  be  taken  by  majority 
vote,  not  counting  the  vote  of  the  disputant;  they  do  not  bind  the  disputing 
parties.  102 
100  It  is  to  be  noted  that  even  the  League  Council  granted  limited  competence  to  intervene  as  an 
arbitrator,  this  does  not  mean  it  is  considered  as  a  judicial  organ  within  the  Arab  League  system. 
In  this  regard  Foda  argued: 
"As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Council  of  the  Arab  League  is  not  a  tribunal  and  cannot  be 
a  tribunal  in  the  strict  sense.  It  might  not  include  a  sufficient  number  of  competent 
international  jurists.  Moreover,  the  fact  that  the  Arab  States  are  obligated  under 
Article  5  to  execute  the  arbitral  decision  of  the  Council  passed  by  majority  vote, 
does  not  give  the  Council  the  character  of  a  tribunal.  "  See  his  The  Projected  Arab 
Court,  supra  note  92,  p.  43. 
101  al  Ghunaimi,  The  Arab  League,  supra  note  66,  p.  p.  54-56. 
102  Ghanem,  Lectures  on  the  Arab  League,  supra  note  32,  p.  p.  47-49;  al  Ghunaimi,  The  Arab 
League,  supra  note  66,  p.  56.  Despite  the  non  binding  decision  of  the  League  Council, 
nevertheless,  it  is  recommended  that  the  parties  have  to  accept  its  mediation  to  avoid  tension  which 
could  lead  to  war,  such  as  the  second  Gulf  War,  1990  between  Iraq  and  Kuwait.  This  is  one  of 
several  examples  which  prove  the  inability  of  the  League  of  Arab  states  to  solve  its  disputes 
between  members,  because  there  are  not  any  organs  available  for  this  purpose. Chapter  One  38 
Three  kinds  of  disputes  are  considered  under  Art.  5  of  the  Arab  League's 
Pact:  (1)  disputes  relating  to  a  state's  independence,  its  sovereignty  or  its 
territorial  integrity;  (2)  disputes  which  could  lead  to  war;  and  (3)  disputes  not 
relating  to  the  above  matters.  Unfortunately,  regarding  the  first  group  of  disputes, 
Art.  5  does  not  define  the  meaning  of  `independence',  `sovereignty',  or  `territorial 
integrity'.  This  ambiguous  situation  has  led  to  disagreement  between  writers, 
some  of  whom  argue  that  the  League  Council  can  define  any  of  these  terms.  103 
Regarding  the  second  group  of  disputes,  the  Pact  again  does  not  designate  who  has 
the  authority  to  decide  whether,  or  not,  such  a  dispute  may  lead  to  war.  Therefore, 
the  League  Council  only  may  be  competent  to  consider  disputes  as  not  falling 
under  the  other  categories.  In  other  words,  it  has  competence  as  to  disputes  not 
related  to  states'  independence,  sovereignty  or  its  territorial  integrity.  104 
This  however  gives  an  indication  that  the  system  of  the  settlement  of  disputes 
in  the  Arab  League  is  not  adequate  to  settle  inter-Arab  disputes.  Since  the 
creation  of  the  Arab  League,  many  inter-Arab  disputes  have  arisen  and  this 
organisation  failed  to  settle  them  because  of  the  incapability  of  the  present  system 
of  settlement  of  disputes.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  reconsider  the  existing 
system  and  reform  the  Pact  by  following  the  system  that  the  UN  has  adopted,  by 
including  the  judicial  organ  as  one  of  the  main  organs  of  the  Arab  League.  '05 
103  Pogany,  Istvan,  The  Arab  League  and  Peacekeeping  in  the  Lebanon,  England:  Avebury  Gower 
Publishing  Company  Limited,  (1987)  p.  12;  Foda,  The  Projected  Arab  Court,  supra  note  90, 
p.  38. 
104  al  Kadhem,  The  Role  of  the  League,  supra  note  92,  p.  20. 
'05  For  more  details  about  disputes  which  the  Arab  League  failed  to  solved  within  its  system  see, 
for  example,  Hilal,  Ali  Addeen,  Jami`at  ad  Dowal  al  `Arabiyah  wan  Nizam  al  `Arabi:  Tarh  li 
Ishkalat  al  Tatweer,  (The  League  of  Arab  States  and  the  Arabic  Regime:  presenting  to  the 
developing  ambiguities),  69 
.  )AA  (1992)  p.  p.  13-16. Chapter  One  39 
1.5.  The  Necessity  of  the  ACJ  within  the  Arab  League  System 
One  may  ask  if  is  it  necessary  to  establish  a  regional  international  court  while 
the  ICJ  at  The  Hague  exists?  The  answer  to  this  question  has  generated 
disagreement  between  international  lawyers.  Some  have  rejected  the  idea,  such  as 
Jenks,  arguing  that  two  major  legal  problems  will  arise  when  such  a  Court  is 
established.  Firstly,  a  conflict  regarding  jurisdiction  between  the  two  Courts,  the 
international  and  the  regional.  Secondly,  the  future  unity  of  international  law  may 
be  adversely  influenced  by  regional  legal  conceptions  in  respect  of  matters  where 
it  is  thought  desirable  that  uniform  rules  of  world-wide  validity  should  exist.  106 
The  majority  of  international  lawyers  have  recognised  the  importance  of  regional 
international  courts,  and  supported  the  reasons  which  call  for  the  creation  of  such 
Courts.  107 
It  seems  to  be  necessary  for  any  regional  or  international  organisation  to  have 
a  judicial  organ  just  as  its  needs  legislative,  executive  and  administrative 
organs.  108  The  practice  of  many  regional  organisations  has  adopted  the  idea  of 
creating  judicial  organs  within  their  respective  systems  in  order  to  settle 
106  Jenks,  C.  Wilfred,  Regionalism  in  International  Judicial  Organisation,  37  AJIL  (1943) 
p.  p.  314-316. 
107  For  example,  see  Hudson,  Manley  0.,  International  Tribunals:  Past  and  Future,  Washington: 
Brookings  Institution,  (1944)  p.  p.  245-249;  Bedennan,  David  J.,  The  Glorious  Past  and  Uncertain 
Future  of  International  Claims  Tribunals,  in  Jains,  Mark  W.  (ed.  ),  The  International  Courts  for  the 
Twenty-First  Century,  The  Netherlands:  Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers,  (1992)  p.  171;  Shihab,  The 
Arab  League,  supra  note  6,  p.  116;  Abul  Wafa,  International  Organisations,  supra  note  84, 
p.  p.  610-611. 
108  al  Rashidi,  Ahmed  H.,  Hawl  Dharorat  al  Jihaz  al  Qadai  fi  Nitaq  Jami'at  ad  Dowal  al  `Arabiyah: 
Dirasah  fi  Dho'  Ahkam  al  Qanun  ad  Dawli,  (About  the  Necessity  of  the  Judicial  Organ  in  the 
League  of  Arab  States:  A  study  on  the  Light  of  the  Principles  of  Public  International  Law),  59  JAA 
(1989)  p.  7.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  al  Rashidi,  About  the  Necessity  of  the  Judicial  Organ.  );  see  also 
Bilder,  Richard,  International  Disputes  Settlement  and  the  Role  of  International  Adjudication,  in 
Lori  F.  Damrosch  (ed.  ),  The  International  Court  of  Justice  at  a  Crossroads,  New  York: 
Transnational  Publishers,  Inc.,  (1987)  p.  p.  158-162. Chapter  One  40 
international  disputes  between  their  members,  thus  imitating  the  UN  model.  109 
Unlike  the  Charter  of  the  UN,  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  does  not  provide, 
however,  for  the  creation  of  an  ACJ  as  one  of  its  organs.  '  10  The  only  reference  to 
the  ACJ  in  the  1954  Pact  is  in  Art.  19  (1)  when  member  states  agreed  to  amend 
the  Pact  for  various  reasons,  comprising,  inter-alia,  the  creation  of  the  Court.  Art. 
19  (1)  provides: 
"The  present  Pact  may  be  amended  with  the  consent  of  two  thirds  of 
the  states  belonging  to  the  League,  especially  in  order  to  make  firmer 
and  stronger  the  ties  between  the  member  states,  to  create  an  Arab 
Court  of  Justice,  and  to  regulate  the  relations  of  the  League  with  any 
international  bodies  to  be  created  in  the  future  to  guarantee  security 
and  peace.  " 
Below  two  main  points  will  be  considered:  the  expected  role  of  the  ACJ  in 
settling  inter-Arab  disputes;  and  the  previous  attempts  to  reform  the  Pact  of  the 
Arab  League  in  order  to  include  a  judicial  organ  within  its  system. 
1.5.1.  The  Expected  Role  of  the  ACJ 
Many  international  lawyers  have  rightly  argued  that  international  courts  and 
tribunals  can  play  an  important  role  and  serve  organisations  and  their  members  in 
109  For  example,  according  to  the  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights  of  4d'  November  1950, 
and  then  to  the  American  Convention  of  Human  Rights  of  22"d  November  1969,  the  European 
Court  of  Human  Rights  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Inter-American  Court  of  Human  Rights  on  the 
other  hand,  were  created  and  granted,  both,  competence  in  matters  relating  to  Human  Rights 
violations  in  connection  with  provisions  of  these  conventions;  The  Court  of  Justice  of  European 
Communities  was  established  according  to  the  convention  of  25ih  March  1957  which  created 
institutions  common  to  the  European  Communities.  This  Court  was  granted  jurisdiction  in  matters 
concerning  the  European  Economic  Community,  European  Coal  and  Steal  Community,  and  the 
European  Atomic  Energy  Community.  There  is  also  the  Treaty  concerning  the  creation  and  the 
Statute  of  the  Benelux  Court  of  Justice  of  March  1965;  The  Treaty  creating  the  Court  of  Justice  of 
the  Cartagena  Agreement  of  28th  May  1976.  See  Office  of  Legal  Affairs  Codification  Division, 
Handbook  on  the  Peaceful  Settlement  of  Disputes  Between  States,  New  York:  United  Nations 
Publications,  (1992)  p.  p.  68-69. 
110  At  present  only  three  organs  are  available  within  the  Arab  League  system,  the  ACJ  is  not  one  of 
them,  they  are  as  follows:  The  League  Council  (Art.  3);  The  Secretariat-General  (Art.  12);  and 
The  Permanent  Committees  (Arts.  2  and  3).  Also  see  above  p.  p.  14-19. Chapter  One  41 
the  settlement  of  disputes,  interpretation  and  application  of  conventions  and 
treaties;  and  the  progressive  development  of  international  law.  We  can  assume 
that  the  ACJ  too  can  fulfill  the  same  functions  in  the  Arab  region. 
1.  Settlement  of  Disputes 
International  disputes  can  be  settled  in  three  ways:  use  of  force,  diplomatic 
methods,  or  judicial  settlement.  According  to  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League,  the  use 
of  force  is  prohibited,  and  in  most  circumstances  political  methods  are  not 
satisfactory  to  solve  justiciable  disputes.  Therefore,  the  remaining  alternative  is 
recourse  to  judicial  settlement  by  submitting  conflicts  between  member  states  to 
the  ACJ  as  a  factor  in  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  securityin  the  Arab  region. 
Most  if  not  all  Arab  states  have  disputes  with  neighbors  and  all  of  them  can  be 
considered  as  justiciable,  independent  from  their  political  background. 
Furthermore,  it  could  be  said  that  Arab  states  are  at  the  present  quite  willing  to  use 
judicial  methods  in  settling  their  disputes,  at  least  in  limited  cases,  when  they  feel 
that  political  methods  cannot  solve  given  conflicts.  This  was  the  case,  for 
example,  in  the  Western  Sahara  dispute  when  the  case  was  submitted  to  the  ICJ 
through  the  General  Assembly,  and  Morocco  was  one  of  those  states  involved  in 
"'  al  Majzub,  Arab  League  and  Settlement  of  Inter-Arab  Disputes,  supra  note  88,  p.  p.  138-139; 
al  Rashidi,  About  the  Necessity  of  the  Judicial  Organ,  supra  note  109,  p.  p.  19-20;  Cf.  Couvreur, 
Ph.,  The  Effectiveness  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice  in  the  Peaceful  Settlement  of  Disputes, 
in  A.  S.  Muller,  D.  Raid`  and  J.  M.  Thuränszky  (eds.  ),  The  International  Court  of  Justice:  Its 
Future  Role  After  Fifty  Years,  The  Hague:  Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers,  (1997)  p.  p.  83-84. Chapter  One  42 
this  dispute;  '  12  so  did  Tunisia  and  Libya  for  their  continental  shelf  dispute;  113  and 
Qatar  and  Bahrain  in  a  maritime  dispute.  114  Furthermore,  if  we  assume  that  in  a 
dispute  between  two  Arab  states  its  contents  are  related  to  a  breach  of 
international  obligation  in  the  Arab  part  of  the  world,  the  dispute  could  be  settled 
conveniently  by  the  ACJ,  as  political  organs  cannot  deal  comprehensively  with 
justiciable  disputes  when  a  breach  of  any  international  legal  obligation  is  one  of 
the  aspects  of  the  dispute.  In  addition,  disputes  may  arise  not  only  between 
member  states  of  the  Arab  League,  but  also  between  its  organs,  be  they  those 
created  under  the  Pact  or  under  the  Collective  Security  Treaty,  regarding  the 
contents  and  scope  of  their  duties.  In  such  a  situation,  the  only  organ  capable  to 
settle  disputes  could  be  a  judicial  organ.  '  15 
2.  Interpretation  of  Treaties 
No  doubt  the  interpretation  of  treaties  as  a  legal  matter  is  most  suitable  for 
treatment  by  a  judicial  body.  116  Accordingly,  the  ACJ  could  be  expected  to  play  a 
very  valuable  judicial  role  within  the  scope  of  its  competence  including  the 
interpretation  of  both  conventions  and  treaties.  It  could  interpret,  for  example, 
112  Western  Sahara,  Advisory  Opinion,  !  CJ  Rep.,  (1975)  p.  p.  12-13.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  case 
was submitted  to  the  Court  according  to  resolution  3292  (XXXIX)  of  the  General  Assembly  of  the 
UN  dated  13's  December  1974  requesting  the  Court  to  give  an  advisory  opinion  on  several 
questions.  The  Moroccan  government  appeared  before  the  Court  with  other  four  states  namely, 
Mauritania,  Zaire,  Algeria  and  Spain.  Ibid.,  p.  p.  16-17. 
113  Continental  Shelf,  (Tunisia  v.  Libyan  Arab  Jamahiriya),  ICI  Rep.,  (1982)  p.  18. 
￿4  Maritime  Delimitation  and  Territorial  Questions  between  Qatar  and  Bahrain  (Qatar  v. 
Bahrain),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1991)  p.  50. 
115  For  example,  when  a  conflict  arose  between  the  Security  Council  and  the  General  Assembly  of 
the  UN  regarding  the  conditions  of  admission  of  a  state  to  membership  in  the  UN,  the  Security 
Council  asked  the  Court  for  advisory  opinion.  See  Conditions  of  Admission  of  a  State  to 
Membership  in  the  United  Nations  (Article  4  of  the  Charter),  ICJ  Rep,  (1947-1948)  p.  57. 
116  This  however,  does  not  mean  other  organs  in  any  organisation  cannot  practice  interpretation. 
For  example,  the  Security  Council  and  the  General  Assembly  of  the  UN,  may  interpret  the  Charter Chapter  One  43 
ambiguous  Articles  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  and  of  the  Collective  Security 
Treaty,  and  provisions  in  any  other  bilateral  or  multilateral  treaties  in  force 
concluded  between  two  or  more  member  states  of  the  Arab  League  or  between  a 
member  state  and  non-member  states,  if  such  treaties  provide  that  in  any  disputes 
arising  between  its  parties  regarding  the  interpretation  or  application  of  a 
provision,  the  parties  shall  refer  the  matter  to  the  ACJ.  1  7 
With  regard  to  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League,  there  are  many  Articles  that  are 
not  sufficiently  clear  and  need  to  be  interpreted,  for  example,  the  terms 
`independent',  `force',  `aggression',  `measures',  `self  defense',  that  appear  in  Arts. 
1,5,  and  6.118  Furthermore,  the  question  of  the  number  of  votes  required  for  the 
League  Council's  approval  for  a  new  member  needs  clarification  as  to  whether 
this  is  a  majority  or  unanimity  vote.  119 
of  the  UN,  but  these  interpretations  are  without  binding  force.  For  further  discussion  in  this  matter 
see  UNCIO,  vol.  13  (1945)  p.  p.  708-709. 
117  The  ACJ  will  be  not  the  first  international  court  to  deal  with  such  matters;  many  cases  have 
been  referred  to  the  ICJ  relating  to  treaty  law,  and  the  Court  has  played  an  excellent  role  in  this 
respect.  For  example,  see  the  question  of  authentic  interpretation  of  a  treaty  addressed  in  1951, 
Ambatielos  case,  (Greece  v.  United  Kingdom),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1951)  p.  10;  the  issue  concerning 
reservations  settled  by  the  Court  in  the  case  on  Reservations  to  the  Genocide  convention, 
Reservations  to  the  Convention  on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  the  Crime  of  Genocide,  ICJ 
Rep.,  (1951)  p.  15;  the  capacity  to  conclude  a  treaty  which  was  dealt  with  by  the  Court  in  the  1949 
Reparations  for  injuries  case,  Reparations  for  Injuries  Suffered  in  the  Service  of  the  United 
Nations,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1949)  p.  172;  the  definition  of  a  treaty  dealt  with  in  the  Anglo-Iranian  Oil 
Company  case,  Anglo-Iranian  Company  case,  (Iran  v.  United  Kingdom),  (Preliminary  Objection), 
ICJ  Rep.,  (1952)  p.  93;  the  intertemporal  rule  dealing  with  assignment  of  a  particular  meaning  of  a 
term  used  in  treaty  addressed  by  the  Court  in  the  Anglo-Norwegian  Fisheries  case,  Fisheries  case, 
(United  Kingdom  v.  Norway),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1951)  p.  116;  and  lastly,  when  the  Court  found  itself 
competent  to  deal  with  the  conclusion  of  treaty  by  discussing  the  nature  of  the  text  which  may 
present  to  it  whether  it  is  a  treaty  or  not  in  the  case  between  Qatar  and  Bahrain,  Maritime 
Delimitation  and  Territorial  Questions  Between  and  Bahrain,  (Qatar  v.  Bahrain),  Jurisdiction  and 
Admissibility,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1994)  p.  112. 
118  al  Rashidi,  About  the  Necessity  of  the  Judicial  Organ,  supra  note  109,  p.  p.  24-25;  and  his 
Hawl  ad  Dawr  al  Mutawaqqa'  li  Mahkamat  al  `Adl  al  `Arabiyah  fi  Ta'ziz  al  `Amal  al  `Arabi  al 
Mushtarak,  (About  the  Expected  Role  of  the  Arab  Court  of  Justice  in  Strengthening  Joint  Arabic 
Actions),  82  JAA  (1995)  p.  25. 
1"  For  general  reading  in  this  matter  see  Pollux,  The  Interpretation  of  the  Charter,  BYbIL  (1946) 
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Some  bilateral  and  multilateral  treaties  include  a  provision  to  refer  to  the  ACJ 
if  any  dispute  arises  between  the  parties  regarding  the  interpretation  or  application 
of  a  provision,  for  example  in  the  `United  Convention  for  Arabic  Capital 
Investment  in  the  Arab  Countries',  approved  by  the  twelfth  Summit  in  November 
1981.  By  Art.  25,  any  dispute  regarding  the  interpretation  and  application  of  the 
convention  is  to  be  solved  by  either  conciliation,  arbitration,  or  recourse  to  the 
ACJ.  120  The  ACJ  can  also  play  an  important  role  if  granted  a  competence  to  give 
advisory  opinions  on  any  legal  question  in  any  conflict  between  member  states  or 
between  organs  of  the  Arab  League  as  to  their  respective  competences.  121  In  this 
connection,  Pomerance  has  emphasized  the  importance  of  the  advisory 
competence  of  international  courts  or  tribunals:  '  22 
"In  several  municipal  systems,  it  was  noted,  advisory  jurisdiction  was 
deemed  judicial  and  was  `of  undoubted  utility';  and  the  new  general 
organisation  will  undoubtedly  require  `authoritative  legal  advice'- 
more  authoritative  than  what  might  emanate  from  ad  hoc  committees 
of  jurists-on  the  interpretation  of  its  constitution.  Empowering  states 
to  request  opinions  would  afford  them  the  opportunity  of  clarifying 
their  legal  rights  before  differences  `ripened  into  an  issue  or  definite 
dispute';  of  aiding  them  to  reach  a  firm  basis  for  negotiations;  and  of 
achieving  all  this  without  inuring  the  hostility  often  imputed  litigant 
states  in  contentious  proceedings.  " 
3.  Development  of  International  Law 
With  regard  to  the  progressive  development  of  international  law,  the  ACJ  is 
expected  to  give  a  new  impetus  to  the  development  of  the  Arab  conception  of 
120  For  further  details  see  below  chapter  V,  p.  264. 
121  Madani,  al  Sayed  Muhammad,  at  Hajah  Ila  Insha'  Mahkamat  'Adl  `Arabiyah  ft  Itar  Jami'at  ad 
Dowal  al  'Arabiyah,  (The  Necessity  of  Establishing  an  Arab  Court  of  Justice  within  the  League  of 
Arab  States  System),  67  MMUS  (1970)  p.  p.  58-59.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Madani,  The  Necessity 
of  the  Arab  Court). 
'''  Pomerance,  Michla,  The  Advisory  Role  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice  and  its  `Judicial' 
Character:  Past  and  Future  Prisms,  in  A.  S.  Muller,  D.  Raid  and  J.  M.  Thuri  nszky  (eds.  ),  The 
International  Court  of  Justice:  Its  Future  Role  After  Fifty  Years,  The  Hague:  Martinus  Nijhoff 
Publishers,  (1997)  p.  286. Chapter  One  45 
international  law,  especially  customary  Arab  international  law.  Beyond  it,  the 
ACJ  could  then  deal  with  various  aspects  of  international  law.  Concerning  the 
law  of  treaties,  it  could  make  pronouncements  on  the  basic  principles  governing 
the  relevant  conduct  of  states;  it  could  also  deal  inter  alia  with  customary  rules 
concerning  maritime  matters.  123  Furthermore,  because  it  is  one  of  the  sources  that 
may  be  applied  by  the  ACJ,  Islamic  Shariah  may  have  a  chance  to  help  redefine 
the  real  and  true  concept  of  Muslim  international  law.  Foda  argues  in  this 
regard:  124 
"the  Arab  Court  would  understand  Arab  custom  Islamic  legal 
conception,  the  psychology  of  the  social  groups  of  the  Arab  world  and 
their  habitual  ways  of  behaving.  Arab  Court  is  undoubtedly  more 
capable  of  applying  Arab  custom  or  Islamic  principles  of  law,  if  this 
seems  the  most  appropriate  law  to  be  applied  in  settling  a  dispute.  A 
satisfactory  settlement  of  this  kind  would  result,  naturally,  in 
increasing  confidence  in  the  role  of  the  judiciary  as  an  agency  for 
peace.  " 
1.5.2.  Attempts  of  Inclusion  of  a  Judicial  Organ  in  the  Pact  of  the  Arab 
League 
Reference  to  the  previous  attempts  to  create  the  ACJ  as  a  judicial  organ 
within  the  Arab  League  system  has  to  start  with  an  analysis  of  concrete  realities  in 
the  Arab  world.  For  such  a  purpose  mention  has  to  be  made  of  history.  However, 
123  These  kinds  of  subjects  are  dealt  by  the  ICJ  as  well  and  it  has  played  a  considerable  role  in  this 
matter.  For  more  details  see  Eduardo  Jimenez  de  Arechaga,  The  Work  and  Jurisprudence  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  1947-1986,  LVIII  BYbIL  (1987)  p.  p.  2-8. 
124  Foda,  The  Projected  Arab  Court,  supra  note  90,  p.  73;  see  also  Madani,  The  Necessity  of  the 
Arab  Court,  supra  note  122,  p.  p.  64-66;  Cf.  How  the  ICJ  since  its  creation  helped  in  the 
development  of  international  Law  in  Partan,  Daniel  G.,  Increasing  the  Effectiveness  of  the 
International  Court,  in  Richard  F.,  Friedrich  K.,  &  Saul  H.  M.  (eds.  ),  International  Law:  A 
Contemporary  Perspective,  London:  Westview  Press,  (1985)  p.  384;  Jennings,  Robert  Y.,  The 
Proper  Work  and  Purposes  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  in  A.  S.  Muller,  D.  Raid  and  J.  M. 
Thuränszky  (eds.  ),  The  International  Court  of  Justice:  Its  Future  Role  After  Fifty  Years,  The 
Hague:  Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers,  (1997)  p.  42. Chapter  One  46 
some  factors  have  contributed  to  the  failure  of  all  previous  attempts.  It  is  also 
obvious  that  the  disappearance  or  the  persistence  of  the  same  factors  may 
determine  the  future  of  the  actual  project  for  establishing  the  ACJ.  A  short  survey 
of  the  history  of  the  proposed  Court  reveals  the  existence  of  apparent  as  well  as 
latent  reasons  specific  to  the  Arab  states.  Such  reasons  have  determined  the 
failure  of  previous  attempts.  125 
1.5.2.1.  Apparent  Reasons  for  the  Failure 
The  Arab  states  have  felt  the  necessity  to  create  an  ACJ  for  two  reasons: 
Firstly,  to  be  able  to  settle  through  a  judicial  organ  some  disputes  which  may  arise 
between  them.  Secondly,  to  fulfil  the  organisation's  intention  in  the  application  of 
Art.  19  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League.  All  of  the  attempts  to  create  a  Court,  from 
the  beginning  of  the  fifties,  were  contemplated  within  the  efforts  to  reform  the 
whole  original  Pact  of  the  Arab  League.  126  However,  the  Court  has  been  the 
subject  of  only  three  detailed  projects  with  all  efforts  ending  in  failure.  The 
failure  could  be  related  to  two  major  facts:  political  disorder  in  the  Arab  World, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  diverging  opinion  on  legal  matters  between  the  Arab  states 
regarding  the  contents  of  the  projects  on  the  other. 
125  Dachraoui  Achouak,  La  Cour  Arabe  de  Justice:  Etude  de  L'avant-Projet  de  Statut,  (Arab 
Court  of  Justice:  Study  of  the  Preliminary  Draj?  Statute),  Tunisia:  Memoire  Pour  le  D.  E.  A.  en 
Sciences  Politiques,  (1982)  p.  p.  8-9.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Dachraoui,  Arab  Court  of  Justice). 
126  It  is  outside  the  scope  of  this  study  to  go  in  more  details  about  the  necessity  of  amend  the 
present  Pact,  but  most  Arab  jurists  who  still  dream  that  the  Arab  League  become  an  active 
organisation  in  settling  inter-Arab  disputes  support  the  idea  of  that  amendment.  Furthermore, 
establishing  the  ACJ  as  the  principal  judicial  organ  within  the  Arab  League  system  means  such  an 
amendment  becomes  important.  For  more  details  in  this  point  see  Shaban,  Sadiq,  Dukhool  Ta'deel 
al  Mithaq  Hayyez  al  Tanfeeth,  (The  Entrance  of  the  Amendment  of  the  Pact  into  Force),  9  JAA 
(1981)  p.  p.  34-41. Chapter  One  47 
1.  Political  Disorder  in  the  Arab  World 
Political  instability  in  some  member  states  of  the  Arab  League,  the  Zionist 
challenge  as  a  considerable  factor,  the  Arab-Israeli  wars,  inter-Arab  conflicts,  the 
reactions  of  some  Arab  states  toward  Egypt  and  the  will  of  some  states  as  Syria, 
Iraq  and  Egypt  to  assume,  each,  the  leadership  of  the  Arab  World;  the  first  Gulf 
War  between  Iran  and  Iraq  in  the  1980s,  the  second  Gulf  War  involving  the 
invasion  of  Kuwait  by  Iraq  in  1990,  have  all  prevented  Arab  leaders  to  meet  and 
discuss  the  major  problems  that  the  Arab  League  faces.  In  addition,  many  other 
internal  problems  in  various  member  states  contributed  to  the  failure  of  attempts 
to  reform  the  Pact  and  at  the  same  time  create  the  ACJ.  127  The  analysis  of  the 
different  reform  projects  show  how,  more  or  less  obviously,  all  these  historic 
factors  have  influenced  developments  and  conditioned  the  failures. 
A.  The  Syrian  Attempt  in  1951 
After  the  defeat  of  1948  in  the  Arab-Israeli  armed  confrontation,  the  Arabs 
called  for  the  first  time  for  reform.  The  defeat  showed  the  intrinsic  weakness  of 
the  Arab  League  which  became  then  the  subject  of  violent  critique  so  much  so  that 
it  was  going  to  collapse  were  it  not  for  intervention  of  certain  Arab  states  to 
support  and  to  reinforce  it.  Some  suggestions  were  made  by  Syria.  Indeed,  in 
January  1951  Mr  Nazim  al  Qudsi,  president  of  the  Syrian  delegation  presented  to 
the  League  Council  *a  project  for  the  reform  of  the  Pact.  The  Council  submitted  it 
to  the  governments  of  the  member  states  to  study  it  and  to  comment  on  it.  128 
127  Diyab,  Muhammad  Abdul  Hakam,  Ihya'  Mashru'  Mahkamat  al  `Adl  al  `Arabiyah  Dharori  wa 
Mulih,  (Animation  of  the  Draft  Statute  of  the  Arab  Court  of  Justice  is  Necessary  and  Urgent),  I 
Arrabitah  (1998)  p.  4;  Dachraoui,  Arab  Court  of  Justice,  supra  note  126,  p.  9. 
128  Res.  No.  377/13,  on  2nd  February  1951. Chapter  One  48 
Responses  were  to  be  given  in  three  months  and  submitted  to  a  commission 
formed  by  delegates  from  all  Arab  states  under  the  presidency  of  the  Foreign 
Minister  of  Syria.  The  project  remained  shelved  because  of  political  instability  in 
Egypt  before  the  revolution  of  July'23,1952.129 
B.  The  Iraqi  Attempt  in  1954 
Three  years  later,  on  10`h  January  1954,  the  Iraqi  government  presented 
through  its  Foreign  Minister,  Mr  Fadhel  al  Jamali,  a  new  project  of  reform  for  the 
Pact  of  the  Arab  League.  It  was  discussed  within  the  League's  Council  and 
transmitted  to  the  member  states  for  comments,  130  but  the  conflict  between  Iraq 
and  other  member  states,  concerning  the  Baghdad  Pact,  led  to  the  postponement 
sine  die  of  further  consideration  of  the  project.  131 
C.  The  Secretary-General's  Attempt  in  1955 
With  reference  to  what  was  presented  to  the  reform  commission  in  December 
1954,  and  to  suggestions  sent  by  the  Arab  states  in  July  1955,  with  the  aim  to 
create  a  new  organ  as  a  General  Assembly  to  modify  the  unanimity  rule,  to 
reinforce  the  Collective  Security  Treaty  and  to  create  the  ACJ  within  the  Arab 
League  system,  the  League  Council  decided  to  form  a  new  commission  with  the 
representatives  of  member  states  of  the  Arab  League  in  order  to  discuss  the 
suggestions  proposed  in  April  1954,  but  the  commission  did  not  have  the 
129  Ghali,  The  Arab  League,  supra  note  32,  p.  114. 
13°  Res.  No.  667/13,  on  27`s  January  1954. 
131  Dachraoui,  Arab  Court  of  Justice,  supra  note  126,  p.  10. Chapter  One  49 
opportunity  to  meet  because  of  the  political  situation  in  Egypt  concerning  Suez 
Canal.  132 
D.  Projects  for  Reform  between  1959  and  1964 
Another  project  for  the  reform  of  the  Pact  was  submitted  by  the  Moroccan 
government  after  its  admission  to  the  Arab  League.  In  September  1959  in  his 
.  speech  before  the  League's  Council  in  Casablanca  during  the  32nd  session,  King 
Mohammed  V  called  for  certain  reforms  to  the  Arab  League.  The  King's 
suggestion  was  to  organise  a  meeting  of  the  Arab  countries  to  consider  new 
attributions  of  the  Arab  League  and  to  study  the  means  which  would  help  it  to 
resolve  eventual  internal  and  external  problems.  133  A  detailed  memorandum, 
presented  before  the  political  commission,  developed  the  King's  point  of  view 
through  the  following  two  ideas:  (1)  revision  of  the  legal  and  political  links  which 
united  the  Arab  states;  (2)  creation  of  an  ACJ,  but  disagreements  between  certain 
Arab  countries  and  Egypt  led  to  the  boycott  of  the  Organisation's  meetings  by  the 
former.  There  was  indeed  a  disagreement  between  Tunisia  and  Egypt  because  of 
Egyptian  intervention  in  Tunisian  internal  affairs.  At  the  same  time  there  was  a 
dangerous  escalation  in  the  disagreement  between  Egypt  and  Iraq  after  the  support 
given  by  the  Egyptian  government  to  the  military  rebellion  (in  1959)  against 
Abdulkarim  Qasim.  134 
132  ibid. 
133  Ghali,  The  Arab  League,  supra  note  32,  p.  114;  Dachraoui,  Arab  Court  of  Justice,  supra 
note  126,  p.  11. 
134  For  further  details  see  Ghali,  Botrus  B.,  Jami'at  ad  Dowal  al  'Arabiyah  wa  Taswiyat  a! 
Munaz'at  al  Mahaliyah,  (The  League  of  Arab  States  and  the  Settlement  of  Regional  Disputes),  al 
Qahirah:  Dar  At  Tiba'ah  al  Hadithah,  (1977)  p.  93.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Ghali,  The  Arab  League 
and  Settlement  of  Disputes);  al  Majzub,  Arab  League  and  Settlement  of  Inter-Arab  Disputes, 
supra  note  88,  p.  142. Chapter  One  50 
After  Tunisia  and  Iraq  started  participating  in  the  Arab  League  the 
commission's  project  was  finally  discussed  during  the  meeting  of  the  League 
Council  in  June  1961.  By  Art.  8,  of  the  commission  project,  the  creation  of  an 
ACJ  was  planned  as  a  principal  judicial  organ  within  the  Arab  League. 
Discussions  went  on  until  5`h  July  1961,  without  any  positive  results.  During  this 
time,  Tunisia  and  Iraq  also  presented,  individually,  a  reform  proposal  to  the 
Project,  but,  the  inter-Arab  crisis  due  to  the  failure  of  the  union  between  Syria  and 
Egypt  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  disagreements  between  Iraq  and  other  Arab 
countries  on  the  other,  prevented  a  successful  implementation  of  the  reform.  135 
E.  The  Attempt  of  the  Arab  Summit  in  1966  and  1974 
A  few  years  later,  during  the  third  Arab  Summit  of  the  Kings  and  Heads  of 
states  held  in  September  1965,  the  idea  of  a  reform  to  the  Pact  was  revived  to 
fulfil  the  wish  formulated  by  the  Iraqis  when  the  Arab  Foreign  Ministers  met  to 
prepare  the  summit.  With  joint  efforts,  Algeria,  Iraq  and  Syria  elaborated  a 
common  project  for  the  revision  of  the  Pact.  The  project  foresaw  the  creation  of  a 
conciliation  and  arbitration  commission  and  the  establishment  of  the  ACJ  for  the 
pacific  settlement  of  inter-Arab  disputes.  The  reason  of  the  failure  or  delay  of  this 
attempt  was  the  Arab-Israeli  war  of  1967. 
Nothing  happened  till  1972,  when  the  League's  Council  in  its  meeting 
decided  the  creation  of  a  commission  for  the  Pact's  revision.  136  On  29`'  October 
1974,  during  the  seventh  Arab  Summit,  the  Kings  and  Heads  of  Arab  states  gave 
135  Dachraoui,  Arab  Court  of  Justice,  supra  note  126,  p.  p.  11-12. 
136  Res.  No.  2962,  and  2936,  on  12'h  September  1972. Chapter  One  51 
their  consent  to  make  a  revision.  The  commission  met  on  27`h  January  1975  to 
discuss  the  following  points:  collective  security,  political  cooperation,  economic 
and  cultural  cooperation,  co-ordination  between  the  different  organs  of  the 
League,  settlement  of  disputes  within  the  League,  recourse  to  diplomatic  means  of 
settlement  before  an  eventual  judicial  recourse  before  an  ACJ,  the  creation  of  an 
ACJ.  The  commission  presented  its  final  report  in  1976,  but  the  normalisation  of 
relations  between  Egypt  and  Israel  and  the  suspension  of  Egypt's  membership 
within  the  Arab  League  blocked  the  reforms.  137 
All  these  attempts  to  reform  the  constitutive  Pact  of  the  League  foresaw 
without  any  exception  the  creation  of  an  Arab  Court  of  Justice, 
2.  Juridical  Disagreements 
These  disagreements  may  be  seen  to  be  the  expression  of  the  so  to  speak 
political  under-development  of  the  whole  Arab  nation.  In  fact,  all  reform  projects 
reflect  subjective  and  individualistic  visions  of  the  interests  of  the  Arab  world. 
The  particularistic  interests  of  the  different  Arab  countries  are  contradictory. 
These  contradictions  appeared  during  the  discussion  of  the  four  main  projects  of 
the  ACJ  presented  in  1950,1964,1975  and  1979.138 
The  first  idea  of  creating  the  ACJ  was  suggested,  however,  in  1944  by  the 
Political  Sub-Committee,  when  some  delegations  proposed  to  grant  to  such  a 
judicial  organ  limited  jurisdiction  to  settle  disputes  between  members  states  and 
137  Dachraoui,  Arab  Court  of  Justice,  supra  note  126,  p.  p.  12-13. 
138  For  further  details  see  Shukri,  Muhammad  Aziz.,  Nahwa  Mahkamat  `Adl  `Arabiyah  Jadidah, 
(Towards  a  New  Arab  Court  Justice),  2  Qadaya  Arabiyah,  (1980)  p..  p.  5-8.  (hereinafter  cited  as: 
Shukri,  Towards  a  New  Arab  Court). Chapter  One  S2 
any  related  cases  in  inter-Arab  relations,  as  well  as  in  any  disputes  between 
members  and  third  states.  The  states  were  to  choose  whether  to  resort  to  the 
League Council  as  an  arbitrator  or  to  the  World  Court  (the  ICJ)  at  The  Hague.  139 
Unfortunately,  this  suggestion  failed  to  move  forward  because  of  the  major 
disagreement  in  opinions  regarding  the  powers  of  compulsory  arbitration  to  be 
granted  to  the  League  Council  under  the  pretense  that  the  League  Council,  as  a 
political  organ  in  the  Arab  League  system,  was  not  qualified  to  settle  international 
disputes,  especially  legal  ones.  140 
When  the  Political  Sub-Committee  drafted  the  Collective  Security  Treaty  in 
1950,  the  idea  of  creating  the  ACJ  arose  again  as  an  important  requirement, 
especially  when  member  states  noticed  the  weakness  and  inapplicability  of  Art.  5 
of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  concerning  the  settlement  of  inter-Arab  disputes. 
On  11t1i  April  1950  the  Lebanese  representative  presented  to  the  Secretary-General 
of  the  Arab  League  the  following  proposal:  141 
"Art.  19  of  the  Arab  League  Pact  provides  its  amendment  with  the 
approval  of  a  two  thirds  majority  of  the  member  States,  especially  for 
the  purpose  of  strengthening  inter-Arab  relations  and  of  creating  an 
Arab  Court  of  Justice.  The  establishment  of  an  Arab  Court  of  Justice 
will  undoubtedly  complete  the  fulfilment  of  the  objectives  of  the  Pact 
which  the  member  States  have  accepted  to  consolidate  their  strong 
bonds,  and  to  create  an  atmosphere  of  confidence,  justice  and  peace 
throughout  the  Arab  World.  When  the  Political  Committee  studied 
the  draft  of  Joint  Defence  and  Economic  Cooperation  Treaty  between 
member  States  of  the  Arab  League,  and  discussed  the  first  Article 
thereof  which  affirms  the  determination  of  these  States  to  settle  all 
disputes  by  peaceful  means,  the  need  was  felt  for  the  establishment  of 
that  Court  with  a  view  to  fulfilling  the  objectives  of  the  provision 
referred  to  above. 
"'  MPSC,  p.  p.  18-19. 
"0  MPSC,  p.  19;  see  also  Abazah,  Disoqi  T.,  Nahwa  Mahkamat  `Adl  `Arabiyah,  (Towards  Arab 
Court  of  Justice),  16  MAFQ  (1994)  p.  442. 
141  Foda,  The  Projected  Arab  Court,  supra  note  90,  p.  75. Chapter  One  53 
For  the  above  reasons,  I  beg  to  request  that  this  question  be  included 
in  the  agenda  for  the  current  Session  of  the  League  Council,  and 
would  recommend  the  appointment  of  a  special  commission  to  draft 
the  Statute  of  an  Arab  Court  of  Justice  for  submission  to  the  next 
Session  of  the  Council  of  the  League.  " 
Accordingly,  a  special  commission  was  appointed  to  draft  the  Statute  of  the 
projected  ACJ.  It  was  known  as  the  Three-Man  commission.  It  met  for  the  first 
time  on  3`d  Jun  1950,  finished  the  draft  of  the  projected  ACJ  and  submitted  it  to 
the  League  Council  during  its  21st  session.  142  Unfortunately,  the  draft  Statute  did 
not  meet  the  approval  of  member  states  because  of  disagreement  about  the  nature 
of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court.  The  draft  Statute  was  shelved.  143 
In  1963  another  attempt  was  made  by  the  legal  department  of  the  Secretariat- 
General  of  the  Arab  League.  It  adopted  a  new  draft  Statute  for  the  ACJ.  Before 
any  action  was  taken,  the  Secretariat-General  made  a  survey  to  get  the  views  of 
member  states  on  three  main  points:  the  Court's  jurisdiction  (compulsory  or 
voluntary);  the  competence  of  the  Court,  namely,  whether  it  should  have  judicial 
and  advisory  functions  or  be  granted  only  judicial  functions;  and  the  enforceability 
of  the  Court's  judgments,  in  particular,  which  League  organ  was  to  be  involved 
with  this  task  and  how  ?  144  Ten  member  states  gave  their  views  on  the  above 
points;  of  these,  three  member  states  did  not  want  to  establish  the  Court;  six 
welcomed  the  establishment  of  the  Court  on  condition  that  it  be  granted  just  an 
optional  jurisdiction;  and  the  remaining  one  member  state  accepted  the  idea  of 
142  It  is  to  be  noted  that  this  commission  was  appointed  according  to  the  League  Council 
Res.  316/12,  of  13th  April  1950. 
143  For  full  text  of  this  draft  Statute  see  Khalil,  Documentary  Record,  supra  note  8,  p.  p.  72-79. 
104  Shukri,  Muhammad  Aziz,  Mahkamat  al  `Adl  al  `Arabiyah  al  Murtaqabah,  (The  Expected  Arab 
Court  of  Justice),  4  JAA  (1981)  p.  71.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Shukri,  The  Expected  the  Arab 
Court);  Dachraoui,  Arab  Court  ofJustice,  supra  note  126,  p.  18. Chapter  One  54 
creating  a  Court  with  compulsory  jurisdiction.  Not  all  member  states  approved 
the  advisory  function  of  the  Court  in  addition  to  its  judicial  function.  A  few  of 
them  accepted  such  a  proposal  whereas  the  majority  approved  the  judicial  function 
only.  With  regard  to  the  enforceability  of  the  Court's  judgments,  the  League 
Council  was  suggested  as  an  organ  responsible  for  enforcement  by  the  majority  of 
states  that  had  responded  to  the  survey,  whereas  the  remaining  member  states 
failed  to  express  their  views.  145 
On  the  basis  of  these  replies  the  Permanent  Legal  Committee  prepared  a  draft 
Statute  for  the  ACJ  in  five  chapters:  the  constitution  of  the  Court;  the  Court's 
jurisdiction;  the  Court's  procedure;  the  advisory  competence  of  the  Court;  and 
general  rules.  However,  this  proposal  too.  was  not  supported  by  the  member  states 
and  was  shelved.  146 
New  appeals  were  made  in  1972/73  in  order  to  reconsider  the  question  of  the 
creation  of  an  ACJ,  and  so  the  former  Secretary-General  Mr  Mahmoud  Riyad  and 
some  member  states  tried  to  implement  this  objective  and  presented  new  projects 
(governmental  on  the  one  hand  and  personal  but  under  official  authorisation  on 
the  other  hand).  The  most  noteworthy  of  these  projects  was  Hamad  Sultan's, 
which  was  inspired  by  the  Charter  of  the  UN  and  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  but  he  did  not 
discuss  the  subject  of  the  Court's  competence.  147  This  project  was  adopted  by  the 
expert  commission  created  at  the  end  of  the  seventh  Summit  conference  in  Rabat 
"'  See  Report  of  the  Permanent  Legal  Committee  on  13th  June  1964. 
146  Shukri,  Towards  a  New  Arab  Court,  supra  note  139,  p.  7. 
147  Shukri,  The  Expected  Arab  Court  of  Justice,  supra  note  145,  p.  72. "  Chapter  One  SS 
from  30`x'  October-2"d  November  1974,  which  opted  for  the  obligatory  competence 
of  the  Court.  In  its  final  report  it  stated:  '48 
a.  that  the  Arab  Court  of  Justice  is  the  principal  judicial  organ  of  the 
Arab  League  and  it  has  to  work  according  to  the  Statute  annexed  to 
the  Pact. 
b.  that  the  Arab  Court  of  Justice  will  have  an  obligatory  competence 
and  all  the  member  states  will  be  parties  to  the  Statute. 
c.  that  its  decision  will  be  compulsory  and  have  to  be  enforced  in 
good  faith.  In  case  of  non  agreement  of  one  party,  the  other  one  could 
be  able  to  refer  to  the  League's  Council  which  would  take  the 
necessary  measures. 
d.  that  the  Arab  Court  of  Justice  have  the  consultative  competence. 
So  each  principal  organ  or  specialised  organism  of  the  League  could 
ask  for  an  opinion  from  the  Court  regarding  all  juridical  questions 
confronted. 
The  project  appeared  to  be  the  most  suitable.  It  corresponded  to  the 
aspirations  and  personal  convictions  of  its  draftsmen,  but  it  did  not  reflect  the 
concrete  reality  of  the  Arab  World  and  its  aspirations  regarding  the  independence 
and  sovereignty  of  its  states.  That  is  why  the  project  was  deferred  from  one 
session  to  another,  and  finally  did  not  succeed  to  gain  the  member  states'  attention 
when  the  Arab  League  head  office  was  transferred  to.  Tunis  after  the  Camp  David 
accords.  149  Apart  from  these  apparent  reasons,  other  latent  reasons  inherent  to  the 
Arab  states  and  to  their  organisation  were  behind  the  cause  of  the  failure  of  the 
creation  of  the  ACJ. 
When  the  headquarters  of  the  Arab  League  were  moved  from  Egypt  to 
Tunisia,  the  League  Council  issued  its  Res.  3843  of  28  June  1979  that  included 
proposals  to  make  major  amendments  to  the  Arab  League  Pact  in  order  to  face 
new  political  and  legal  developments.  A  special  committee  was  appointed  for  this 
148  Dachraoui,  Arab  Court  of  Justice,  supra  note  126,  p.  p.  15-16;  Shukri,  The  Expected  Arab 
Court,  supra  note  145,  p.  73. 
149  See  above  p.  p.  26-27. Chapter  One  56 
purpose,  known  as  the  `Committee  for  developing  the  Arab  League  and  amending 
its  Pact'.  The  Commission  held  several  meetings  3-12  November  1979.  The 
meetings  resulted  in  a  unanimous  agreement  to  establish  an  ACJ  as  one  of  the 
Arab  League  organs,  similar  to  the  ICJ  within  the  UN,  with  its  Statute  forming  an 
integral  part  of  the  Arab  League  Pact.  It  was  to  have  compulsory  jurisdiction  over 
the  member  states  that  accepted  it.  No  further  actions  were  taken  because  of 
disagreement  between  member  states,  again,  regarding  the  question  of  compulsory 
jurisdiction.  '50 
The  League  Council,  at  the  annual  meeting  of  1987,  decided  to  take  positive 
action  to  make  major  amendments  to  the  Arab  League  Pact  and  create  the  ACJ, 
but  the  second  Gulf  war  (the  invasion  of  Kuwait  by  Iraq  in  1990)  postponed  any 
action  until  1996  when  the  Secretary-General  of  the  Arab  League  presented  to  the 
League  Council  a  final  proposal  on  the  projected  ACJ.  151  The  only  unsettled 
argument  between  member  states  concerned  the  compulsory  jurisdiction  of  the 
ACJ  and  this  still  need  the  approval  by  the  heads  of  member  states  at  an  Arab 
summit  conference.  The  draft  Statute  was  prepared  by  the  Permanent  Legal 
Committee  created  for  this  purpose  by  the  Secretariat-General  of  the  Arab 
150  Markaz  at  Dirasat  wal  Buhuth  wal  Nashir  (ed.  ),  Masalat  Tadil  Mithaq  Jamiat  at  Dowal  al 
'Arabiyah,  (The  matter  of  Amending  the  Pact  of  the  League  of  Arab  States),  Tunis:  Kulliyat  at 
Huquq  wal  Ulum  at  Siyasiyah  wal  Iqtisadiyah  bi  Tunis,  (1981)  p.  p.  44-45. 
'S'  In  his  speech,  Ahmed  Esmat  Abdul  Majeed,  the  Secretary-General  of  the  Arab  League 
preferred  just  to  make  the  necessary  amendment  to  the  Arab  League  Pact  because  according  to  his 
view,  it  is  difficult  to  make  major  reforms  to  the  Pact,  and  therefore,  he  admitted  that,  at  present, 
the  most  important  step  for  member  states  was  to  agree  to  create  the  ACJ  as  the  principal  judicial 
organ  of  the  Arab  League.  See  his  lecture  before  the  Egyptian  Institute  of  International  Law  on 
22nd  November  1992,  Jamiat  at  Dowal  al  Arabiyah  wal  Qadaya  at  Muasirah,  (The  League  of  Arab 
States  and  Present  Issues),  reprinted  in  73  JAA  (1993)  p.  p.  10-11. Chapter  One  57 
League.  152  The  draft  comprised  53  Articles  divided  into  seven  chapters  as 
follows:  (1)  Organisation  of  the  Court.  (Arts.  1-5);  (2)  The  Judges.  (Arts.  6- 
20);  (3)  Judicial  Competence  of  the  Court.  (Arts.  21-23);  (4)  Procedures. 
(Arts.  24-49);  (5)  Advisory  Opinions.  (Art.  50);  (6)  Privileges  and 
Immunities.  (Arts.  51-52);  (7)  Amendments.  (Art.  53).  The  present  thesis  will 
concentrate  on  this  draft  Statute.  '53 
1.5.2.2.  Latent  Reasons  for  the  Failure 
These  reasons,  even  if  not  expressly  declared,  have  deeply  determined  the 
Arab  Sates'  comportment  towards  the  attempts  to  establish  an  ACJ.  In  fact, 
attitudes  reveal  a  lack  of  effective  will  to  create  such  an  organ.  This  can  be 
explained  by  the  preference  of  the  Arab  states  to  have  a  political  settlement  for 
their  disputes  rather  than  a  judicial  settlement,  in  addition  to  their  mistrust  towards 
a  settlement  system  within  the  framework  of  the  Arab  League.  154 
1.  Arab  Preference  for  Political  Settlement 
Generally,  judicial  settlement  is  pushed  into  the  background  in  the  pacific 
settlement  of  disputes.  Reference  to  it  is  only  after  made  the  exhaustion  of 
diplomatic  efforts.  This  common  attitude  by  states,  including  Arab  states,  reveals 
a  preference  for  political  settlement  for  several  reasons:  (1)  the  view  that  certain 
152  Report  and  Recommendations  of  the  Permanent  Legal  Committee,  5-9  November  1995. 
(unpublished  report  from  the  Secretariat-General  of  the  Arab  League/Cairo);  Minutes  of  the 
Permanent  Legal  Committee  of  the  League  of  Arab  States,  Cairo,  5-9  November  1995,  p.  p.  1-3. 
(unpublished  Minutes  from  the  Legal  Department  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs/Bahrain). 
153  For  full  text  of  this  draft  Statute  and  the  Rules  of  the  ACJ,  with  the  author's  translation  into 
English,  see  Annexes  2  and  3. 
154  at  Majzub,  Arab  League  and  Settlement  of  Inter-Arab  Disputes,  supra  note  88,  p.  41;  Ghali, 
The  Arab  League  and  Settlement  of  Disputes,  supra  note  135,  p.  p.  186-188. Chapter  One  S8 
disputes  by  virtue  of  their  nature  cannot  dealt  with  by  judicial  settlement  and  a 
need  more  political  or  diplomatic  settlement;  (2)  the  fear  of  a  definitive,  binding 
and  compulsory  settlement  and  lastly  (3)  the  view  that  recourse  to  a  judicial 
settlement  detaches  the  dispute  from  the  domestic  jurisdiction.  '  55  In  his  speech 
before  the  ASIL  Rogers  declared:  '56 
"The  basic  problem  is  the  reluctance  of  states  to  refer  international 
disputes  to  the  Court.  States  have  not  been  willing  to  accept  the  idea 
of  going  to  the  Court  on  a  regular  basis,  expecting  to  win  some  cases 
and  lose  others.  If  the  legal  advisor  of  the  foreign  ministry  is  not 
confident  of  victory,  he  recommends  against  litigation.  " 
Another  reason  inherent  in  the  jurisdictional  system  of  the  Arab  League  has 
led  its  member  states  to  orient  their  choice  towards  political  settlement.  Indeed, 
the  archaic  imperfections  of  the  jurisdictional  settlement  of  disputes  scheduled  by 
the  Arab  League  has  favoured  such  an  orientation  since  the  Pact  did  not 
institutionalise  an  ACJ.  Also  if  its  eventual  creation  was  envisaged  by  Art.  5,  the 
Pact  did  not  schedule  more  than  a  possibility  of  the  voluntary  arbitration  of 
disputes  and  has  excluded  disagreements  linked  to  "the  sovereignty,  the 
independence  and  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  states.  "  What  does  then  remain  of 
inter-state  disputes?  This  system's  inadequacy  in  the  Arab  League  has  driven 
Arab  states  toward  political  settlement  to  the  detriment  of  judicial  resources.  157 
This  has  been  facilitated  all  the  more  by  the  fact  that  Arab  states  have  a 
personal  and  personalised  conception  of  political  power.  Indeed,  a 
155  Rovine,  Arthur  W.,  The  National  Interest  and  the  World  Court,  in  Leo  Gross  (ed.  ),  The  Future 
of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  vol.  1,  New  York:  Oceana  Publications,  INC.,  (1976) 
p.  p.  316-317. 
156  Rogers,  William  P.,  The  Rule  of  Law  and  the  Settlement  of  International  Disputes,  64  Proc 
ASIL,  (1970)  p.  286. 
157  Dachraoui,  Arab  Court  of  Justice,  supra  note  126,  p.  17. Chapter  One  59 
psychosociological  study  of  Arab  political  regimes  has  shown  the  identification  of 
political  power  with  the  monarch  or  Head  of  state.  Consequently,  inter-Arab 
disagreement  is  considered  as  a  conflict  between  two  persons.  A  judicial 
settlement  compromises  the  prestige  of  the  sovereigns  concerned  insofar  as  it 
supposes  the  existence  of  a  loser.  A  political  settlement  allows  the  avoidance  of 
such  a  situation  and  the  ability  to  handle  with  tact  the  sensitivity  of  the  heads  of 
state  in  disputes.  Therefore,  it  is  not  surprising  that  disputes  have  nearly  always 
been  settled  on  the  occasion  of  a  summit  meeting. 
All  these  considerations  shows  why  the  Arab  states  have  a  weak  inclination 
to  create  an  ACJ.  They  are  used  to  resolve  their  disputes  politically  and  do  not 
have  confidence  in  their  organisation  as  an  instrument  for  the  pacific  settlement  of 
disputes.  158 
2.  Arab  States'  Mistrust  Concerning  the  Settlement  of  Disputes  within 
the  Arab  League 
The  lack  of  confidence  of  Arab  states  in  the  role  which  their  organisation 
would  play  as  an  instrument  for  the  pacific  settlement  of  disputes  follows  from  the 
incapacity  of  the  Arab  League  to  resolve  the  conflicts  which  have  marked  Arab 
history.  This  incapacity  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  Arab  League  has 
never  been  a  supranational  organisation  invested  with  real  powers.  Furthermore, 
the  Egyptian  hegemony  within  the  Arab  World,  the  fact  that  the  headquarters  of 
the  Arab  League  have  always  been  in  Cairo  and  all  the  secretaries-general  have 
been  without  exception  Egyptians  has  contributed  additionally  to  its 
158  Ibid.,  p.  18. Chapter  One  60 
inefficiency.  159  Indeed,  different  examples  show  that  Egypt  has  done  everything 
to  paralyse  the  action  of  the  League  and  to  hamper  its  organs  when  the  League's 
intervention  has  been  against  its  political  interests.  For  example,  during  the  civil 
war  in  Yemen,  when  Egypt  was  on  the  side  of  the  revolutionary  Yemenites,  the 
Arab  League,  when  the  case  was  submitted  to  it,  did  not  undertake  any  attempt  nor 
submit  any  suggestion  to  resolve  the  dispute.  Its  role  was  limited  simply  to  the 
creation  of  a  commission  of  a  technical  character  sent  to  Yemen  to  establish  the 
facts.  160  In  fact  Mr.  Botrus  Ghali  argued  then  that  the  non-effectiveness  of  the 
Arab  League  in  this  case  consisted  in  Yemen  in  treating  the  conflict  as  an  internal 
and  not  as  an  international  dispute.  When  conflicts  between  member  states  of  the 
Arab  League  arise  the  intervention  of  the  Arab  League  becomes  a  very  sensitive 
matter. 
16  1 
This  also  manifested  itself  on  the  occasion  of  the  border  conflict  between 
Egypt  and  Sudan  in  1958.  When  the  Sudanese  delegate  made  a  request  to  the 
Arab  League,  the  Secretary-General  did  not  try  to  call  together  the  Ministers  of 
Foreign  Affairs  Council  to  study  the  situation.  But  it  could  be  concluded, 
according  to  Mr.  Botrus  Ghali's  view  that  the  actual  reason  for  it  was  that  the 
Secretary-General  received  promises  from  the  Egyptian  government  to  settle  the 
dispute  peacefully.  162 
159  Ibid. 
160  Hassuna,  The  League  of  Arab  States,  supra  note  6,  p.  28;  Dachraoui,  Arab  Court  of  Justice, 
supra  note  126,  p.  19. 
161  Ghali,  The  Arab  League  and  Settlement  of  Disputes,  supra  note  135,  p.  29. 
162  Ibid.,  p.  61. Chapter  One  61 
The  disagreement  of  Jordan  and  Lebanon  with  the  United  Arab  Republic  may 
equally  reveal  how  the  Arab  League  was  hindered  from  acting.  Indeed,  after 
having  removed  the  case  from  the  Security-Council's  agenda  in  application  of  Art. 
52  (1)  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN,  the  Arab  League  failed  to  settle  the  dispute 
regarding  the  root  of  the  dispute  because  the  meetings  of  the  League  Council  were 
delayed  and  it  did  not  take  the  necessary  measures  in  order  to  put  an  end  to  the 
dispute.  It  was  expected  that  the  League  Council,  just  as  the  UN  Security  Council, 
was  to  sent  at  least  observers  to  Lebanon,  but  this  however  did  not  happen.  '63 
This  inefficiency  of  Arab  League  intervention  has,  as  a  consequence, 
orientated  the  Arab  states  towards  other  organisations  such  the  UN  or  OAU  for  the 
settlement  of  disputes.  Dachraoui  concludes  that  in  the  major  part  of  Arab 
conflicts,  the  states  which  submitted  their  case  to  the  UN  and  not  to  the  Arab 
League  were  conflicts  either  with  Egypt  itself  or  with  one  of  its  allies.  '"  Thus,  in 
the  dispute  in  1958  between  Lebanon  and  the  United  Arab  Republic,  the  former 
refused  to  submit  the  dispute  to  the  Arab  League  through  its  Council  and  preferred 
instead  to  refer  it  to  the  UN  Security-Council.  165  The  same  reaction  was  seen 
during  the  dispute  between  Algeria  and  Morocco  in  1963.  The  latter  refused  the 
mediation  offered  by  the  League's  Council  of  the  Arab  League  fearing  its 
partiality  in  view  of  the  manifest  Egyptian  support  for  Algeria.  The  offer  for  an 
163  Dachraoui,  Arab  Court  of  Justice,  supra  note  126,  p.  p.  19-20;  Ghali,  The  Arab  League  and 
Settlement  of  Disputes,  supra  note  135,  p.  p.  73,79. 
164  Dachraoui,  Arab  Court  of  Justice,  supra  note  126,  p.  20. 
165  For  more  information  see  Hassuna,  The  League  ofArab  States,  supra  note  6,  p.  p.  61-83. Chapter  One  62 
OAU  commission  for  mediation  was  accepted.  The  commission  was  charged  to 
investigate  the  conflict's  source  and  submit  a  proposition  for  settlement.  166 
All  attempts  and  all  projects  reflect  a  declared  non-effective  willingness  to 
establish  the  ACJ.  Vague  impulses  have  not  had  the  necessary  strength  to  create 
the  ACJ.  Furthermore,  most  of  the  projects  presented  were  either  governmental  or 
projects  made  with  official  support.  They  did  not  reflect  the  preoccupation  of  all 
the  member  states  of  the  organisation  but  the  expression  of  a  member  state's 
opinion.  However,  the  last  draft  Statute,  the  subject  of  the  present  thesis,  can  be 
excluded  from  the  above  critical  remarks,  because  all  member  states  have 
expressed  their  views  on  its  Articles.  It  may  be  said  the  time  for  establishing  the 
ACJ  has  approached,  and  Arab  states  have  to  overcome  their  political  disputes  and 
all  their  minor  disagreements  in  order  to  create  this  judicial  organ  as  a  necessity,  at 
present,  for  all  Arabs.  167 
166  Ghali,  The  Arab  League,  supra  note  32,  p.  p.  82-83. 
167  In  the  Arab  Summit  Conference  which  held  in  Cairo  21-23  June  1996,  it  was generally  resolved 
the  establishment  of  the  Arab  Court  of  Justice.  See  XXXV  ILM  (1996)  p.  1289;  see  also  speech 
of  the  Secretary-General  before  the  League  Council  (session  110)  in  96  JAA  (1998)  p.  250. Chapter  One 
Concluding  Remarks 
63 
The  Arab  League  as  a  regional  international  organisation  can  play  a 
considerable  role  in  the  settlement  of  inter-Arab  disputes  if  the  Arab  states  grant  it 
their  support  and  respect.  More  then  fifty  years  have  passed  since  the  League's 
creation;  many  events  have  happened  during  that  time  in  the  Arab  World;  all  the 
Arab  states  have  become  independent,  and  some  have  decided  to  enter  into  a 
union.  In  addition,  the  international  political  strategy  of  Arab  states  members  in 
the  Arab  League  has  changed,  especially  toward  Israel,  and  a  new  approach  to  the 
peace  process  is  needed  which  is  different  to  that  adopted  when  the  original  Pact 
of  the  Arab  League  was  drafted  which  should  therefore  be  reformed  in  order  to 
face  the  new  political  and  legal  international  situation. 
However,  the  settlement  of  inter-Arab  disputes  within  the  Arab  League  is  a 
most  important  point  the  Arab  states  have  to  reconsider.  The  creation  of  the  ACJ 
as  a  judicial  organ  within  the  Arab  League  system  becomes  not  only  a  political 
requirement  but  also  an  Arab  national  and  legal  requirement.  This  requirement 
cannot  become  a  fact  unless  Arab  states  outline  their  common  aim,  understand  the 
exact  function  of  the  Court,  and  agree  unanimously  that  the  decision  of  this  Court 
should  be  respected  and  applied  in  good  faith.  The  procedures  which  involve  the 
creation  of  the  Courtshould  be  accelerated. 
As  it  is  clear  that  all  the  previous  attempts  to  draft  the  Statutes  of  the  ACJ 
failed  to  find  the  support  of  the  Arab  states,  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  1995  draft 
Statute  will  get  the  approval  of  Arab  states  as  soon  as  the  chance  for  a  Summit Chapter  One  64 
meeting  offers  itself.  It  is  clear  that  the  draft  Statute  is  influenced  by  the  Statute  of 
the  ICJ  at  The  Hague.  This  must  not  become  a  reason  to  neglect  the  specific 
nature  of  the  ACJ  as  an  the  Arab  Court  for  settling  inter-Arab  disputes  according 
to  the  Arab  conception  of  Islamic  and  international  law. 
Article  6  of  the  draft  Statute  required  that  the  judges  of  the  ACJ  must  be 
qualified  in  Islamic  Shariah  as  well  as  in  international  law.  The  ACJ  is  considered 
as  a  regional  international  court  applying  principles  and  rules  of  international  law 
as  well  as  Islamic  Shariah.  Therefore,  it  is  logical  to  require  that  the  judges  in  this 
Court  must  possess  qualifications  in  both  international  law  and  Islamic  Shariah. 
The  question  rises  at  this  point,  does  the  application  of  these  two  different  legal 
systems,  international  law  and  Islamic  Shariah,  need  a  difference  in  expertise?  If 
so,  do  we  need  every  judge  to  be  qualified,  at  the  same  time,  in  both  international 
law  and  Islamic  Shariah,  or  should  the  Court  as  a  whole  be  comprised  of  judges, 
some  of  whom  are  qualified  in  international  law  and  others  in  Islamic  Shariah. 
The  next  chapter,  accordingly,  will  discuss  the  main  points  related  to  the  judicial 
power  in  the  Islamic  Shariah  with  a  concentration  on  the  requirements  of  judiciary 
in  Islam.  That  is  because  an  understanding  of  the  exact  meaning  of  the  term 
`qualification  in  Islamic  Shariah'  as  a  necessary  requirement  for  the  ACJ  judges 
cannot  be  achieved  without  knowing  the  real  concept  of  the  judicial  power  under 
Islamic  Shariah,  and  whether  "qualification  in  Islamic  Shariah"  has  different 
meaning  in  international  law. Chapter  II 
Judicial  Power  in  Islamic  Shariah 
The  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  requires  that  the  judge  should  be  qualified  in 
international  law  as  well  as  in  Islamic  Shariah.  Art.  6  of  the  draft  Statute 
provides: 
"The  Court  shall  be  composed  of  a  body  of  independent  judges  who 
are  citizens  of  member  states,  and  are  persons  of  high  moral  character, 
who  possess  the  qualifications  required  in  their  respective  countries 
for  appointment  to  the  highest  judicial  office,  or  are  jurisconsults  of 
recognised  competence  in  Islamic  Shariah  and  international  law.  " 
The  present  chapter  will  outline  the  Islamic  Shariah  view  on  the  judicial 
power  in  order  to  find  out  whether  Arab  draftsmen  have  really  been  influenced  by 
principles  of  Islamic  Shariah  when  drafting  the  Statute  of  the  proposed  ACJ  or 
not,  particularly,  with  regard  to  the  qualifications  required  of  judges.  It  is 
necessary  to  say  here  that  the  judgeship  in  Islam  is  an  especially  complex 
question,  so  I  have  chosen  the  most  important  issues  to  compare  with  the  system 
of  judges  in  the  ACJ.  Accordingly,  five  major  issues  are  going  to  be  discussed 
here  as  follows:  the  legality  of  the  judicial  power,  qualifications  of  judges,  their 
appointment,  removal  and  independence. 
2.1.  The  Legality  of  the  Judicial  Power  in  Islam 
The  judiciary  has  been  given  a  very  special  and  intensive  attention  by  Islamic 
Shariah,  the  same  as  it  has  in  positive  law.  However,  the  interest  in  Islamic 
Shariah  is  great,  because  the  office  of  the  judge  is  considered  to  be  a  sacred  and 
superior  job,  on  account  of  its  relation  to  religious  belief,  and  for  seeking  reward 
from  Allah.  Muslim  jurists  believe  that  judgeship  is  a  task  of  the  Prophets  in  all Chapter  Two  66 
divine  religions,  ordered  by  Allah  to  settle  and  solve  disputes  between  people  on 
the  basis  of  faith  and  justice.  '  Some  verses  from  Quran  and  some  Hadiths  from 
Sunnah  regarding  this  subject  should  be  reviewed  to  make  the  idea  more  clear, 
without  neglecting  the  consensus  opinion  of  the  jurists  (ijma).  2 
Firstly,  in  the  Quran:  that  judgments  between  people  should  be  settled  by 
justice  is  shown  in  the  Quran  when  Allah  said;  "Verily!  Allah  commands  that  you 
should  render  back  the  trust  to  those,  to  whom  they  are  due;  and  that  when  you 
judge  between  men,  you  judge  with  justice.  ,3  There  are  many  other  verses  which 
attest  that  judges  have  the  position  of  Prophets,  and  that  Allah  ordered  them  to 
judge  between  people.  Here  are  some  of  them:  "Surely,  we  have  sent  down  to 
you  (0  Muhammad)  the  Book  (this  Quran)  in  truth  that  you  might  judge  between 
individuals  by  that  which  Allah  has  shown  you  (i.  e.,  has  taught  you  through 
Divine  inspiration),  so  be  not  a  pleader  for  the  treacherous.  "4  Also  "And  for  every 
Ummah  (a  Community  or  a  Nation),  there  is  a  Messenger;  when  their  Messenger 
comes  the  matter  will  be  judged  between  them  with  justice,  and  they  will  not  be 
1  Azad,  Ghulam  Murtaza,  Conduct  and  Qualities  of  Qadi,  24  Isl.  Stud.,  (1985)  p.  51;  for  further 
discussion  about  the  judges  in  Islam  see  Schacht,  Joseph,  An  Introduction  to  Islamic  Law,  Oxford: 
Oxford  University  Press,  (1996)  p.  p.  188-189.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Schacht,  Introduction  to 
Islamic  Law). 
2  It  is  however  to  be  noted  that  the  injunctions  of  Islamic  Shariah  as  a  legal  system  are  based  on 
two  types  of  sources.  Primary  sources  such  as  the  Quran  and  the  Sunnah,  and  secondary  sources 
such  as  ijtihad  (reasoning)  and  ijma  (consensus).  The  Quran  is  the  word  of  Allah  revealed  to  His 
Prophet  Muhammad.  It  is  the  only  non-disputable  source  between  Islamic  schools.  The  Sunnah 
comes  at  the  second  stage  after  the  Quran,  which  includes  the  sayings,  deeds  and  approvals  of  the 
Prophet.  It  is  treated  as  the  explanation  of  the  scared  text  (the  Quran)  and  giving  further  direction. 
Ijma  may  be  defined  as  the  jurists'  consensus  after  the  death  of  the  Prophet  on  particular  cases. 
The  present  thesis  will  concentrate  comprehensively  on  the  sources  of  Islamic  Shariah.  See  below 
chapter  IV,  p.  181. 
3  Quran,  4:  58. 
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wronged.  "5  Finally,  "0  David!  Verily!  We  have  placed  you  as  a  successor  on 
earth,  so  judge  you  between  men  in  truth  (and  justice)  and  follow  not  your  desire 
for  it  will  mislead  you  from  the  path  of  Allah.  "6 
Secondly,  in  the  Sunnah:  to  demonstrate  that  the  judicial  function  is  a  very 
serious  task,  it  is  reported  by  Abu  Hurairah  that  the  Prophet  said;  "He  who  has 
been  appointed  as  a  judge  (Qadi)  is  as  if  he  has  been  slaughtered  without  a  knife.  " 
In  another  Hadith  Abu  Hurairah  also  reported  that  the  Prophet  said;  "Judges  are 
of  three  types,  one  of  whom  will  go  to  paradise  and  two  to  Hell.  The  one  who  will 
go  to  Paradise  is  a  man  who  knows  what  is  right  and  gives  judgment  accordingly; 
but  a  man  who  knows  what  is  right  and  acts  tyrannically  in  his  judgment  will  go  to 
Hell;  and  a  man  who  gives  judgment  for  people  when  he  is  ignorant  will  go  to 
Hell.  "7  This  does  not  mean  that  the  Sunnah  discourages  people  to  accept  the 
office  of  judge,  especially  those  who  are  qualified,  but  this  Hadith  makes  clear 
that  there  is  great  responsibility  for  the  person  who  accepts  this  position.  He  has 
to  bear  in  mind  the  fairness  of  Allah,  without  any  benefits  in  the  present  life.  This 
is  supported  as  `Amr  bin  al  `As  is  reported  to  have  said  that  he  heard  the  Prophet 
say;  "If  a  Qadi  gives  a  verdict  according  to  the  best  of  his  knowledge  and  his 
verdict  is  correct  (i.  e.  agrees  with  Allah  and  His  Messenger's  verdict)  he  will 
receive  a  double  reward,  and  if  he  gives  a  verdict  according  to  the  best  of  his 
Quran,  10:  47. 
b  Quran,  38:  26. 
Sunan  Abu  Dawud,  supra  note  7,  vol.  3,  Hadith  No.  3566,  p.  1013. Chapter  Two  68 
knowledge  and  his  verdict  is  wrong  (i.  e.  against  that  of  Allah  and  His  Messenger's 
verdict)  even  then  he  will  get  a  reward.  "8 
In  addition,  the  Sunnah  provides  some  principles  to  be  implemented  by 
judges.  It  is  prohibited  for  the  Qadi  to  make  his  decision  between  two  litigants 
while  he  is  angry.  It  is  also  reported  that  'Abdirahman  bin  Abu  Bakra  wrote  to  his 
son  who  was  in  Sijistan:  Do  not  judge  between  two  persons  when  you  are  angry, 
for  I  heard  the  Prophet  saying:  "A  Qadi  should  not  judge  between  two  persons 
while  he  is  an  angry  mood.  i9  Over  and  above,  the  practice  of  the  Prophet 
confirmed  the  legality  of  justice  when  He  appointed  some  of  His  companions  to 
this  position,  and  sent  them  to  different  places  of  the  Islamic  state.  10 
Thirdly,  consensus  opinion  (ijma):  all  Muslim  jurists  have  agreed 
unanimously  that  the  judiciary  has  the  authority  to  settle  disputes,  and  to 
pronounce  judgments  that  bind  the  litigants.  "  They  have  characterised  the 
8  Khan,  Muhammad  Muhsin  (trans.  ),  at  Lu'!  '  wal-Marjan  fima  Ittafaq  'Alayh  Ash  Shaykhan  (A 
Collection  of  Agreed  upon  Ahadith  from  Al  Bukhari  and  Muslim),  vol.  2,  Riyadh:  Dar  us  Salam 
Publications,  (1995)  Hadith  No.  1118,  p.  p.  82-83. 
9  al  Shawkani,  Nail  at  Awtar,  supra  note  7,  vol.  8,  p.  306;  at  Bukhari,  Mohammed  bin  Esmail, 
Sahih  at  Bukhari,  (194-256),  Mohammed  Muhsin  Khan  (trans.  ),  Medina:  Dar  al  Fikr,  vol.  9, 
Riyadh:  Dar-us-Salam  Publishers  and  Distributors,  (1997)  Hadith  No.  7158,  p.  169.  (hereinafter 
cited  as:  Sahih  at  Bukhari). 
10  For  example  His  appointment  to  Ali  bin  Abi  Talib,  Muadh  bin  Jabal,  `Utab  bin  Sayyid,  Abu 
Musa  at  Ash'ari,  and  Ma'qal  bin  Ysar.  See  at  Bakir,  Muhammad  Abdul  Rahman,  as  Sultah  at 
Qadayah  Wa  Shakhsyat  at  Qadi  ft  an  Nidham  at  Islami,  al  Qahirah:  al  Zahraa  lil  Islam  wan 
Nashir,  (1988)  p.  p.  74-77.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  at  Bakir,  as  Sultah  at  Qadayah);  Ibn  at 
Ukhuwwa,  Diya'  ad  Din  Muhammad  ibn  Muhammad  at  Qurashi  at  Shafi'i,  The  Ma'alim  at  Qurba 
fr  Ahkam  at  Hisba,  Reuben  Levy  (ed.  ),  London:  Cambridge  University  Press,  (1938)  p.  78. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  Ibn  at  Ukhuwwa,  Ma'alim  at  Qurba).  Furthermore  Ibn  `Abbas  reported  that 
Allah's  Messenger  judged  on  the  basis  of  an  oath  by  the  defender,  and  in  other  cases  He  judges  on 
the  basis  of  an  oath  and  a  witness  (by  the  plaintiff).  See  two  Hadiths  in  this  matter  in  Muslim  bin  at 
Hajjaj,  Sahih  Muslim,  Siddiqi,  Abdul  Hamid  (trans.  ),  vol.  III.  A,  Lahore:  Sh.  Muhammad  Ashraf 
Publishers,  (1990)  Hadiths  No.  1711  and  1712,  p.  294. 
11  at  Mirsifawi,  Jamal  Sadiq,  Nidham  at  Qada'  fi  at  Islam  (Islamic  Judiciary  System):  Selections 
of  Papers  Presented  to  the  Conference  on  Islamic  Jurisprudence  Organised  by  The  Islamic 
University  of  Imam  Muhammad  Ibn  Sa'ud,  Riyadh:  Imam  University  Press,  (1984)  p.  10. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  at  Mirsifawi,  Islamic  Judiciary  System). Chapter  Two  69 
eligibility  of  office  of  the  judge  in  five  types  as  follows:  (1)  collective  obligation 
(Fard  Kifayah);  (2)  specified  obligation  (Fard  `Ain);  (3)  compulsory  obligation 
(Wajib);  (4)  recommended  (Mandub);  (5)  forbidden  (Haram).  12 
Firstly,  collective  obligation  (Farad  Kifayah)  which  is  general,  means  that  the 
fulfilment  of  such  an  obligation  by  a  sufficient  number  of  individuals  excuses 
other  individuals  from  fulfilling  it.  Therefore,  Muslim  jurists  agree  that  accepting 
the  position  of  the  judge  among  Muslim  nations  means  that  if  one  of  the  qualified 
people  has  accepted  the  position  and  assumed  the  charge  of  it,  the  commandment 
of  Allah  will  be  unenforceable  among  the  rest  of  the  others.  Secondly,  judicial 
office  is  a  specified  obligation  (Fard  `Ayn)  for  the  caliph,  as  one  of  his  main 
duties,  therefore  he  has  to  exercise  it  on  his  own  or  find  an  expert  person  for  this 
position.  Thirdly,  it  is  considered  to  be  a  compulsory  obligation  (Wajib),  for  any 
qualified  Muslim  who  has  been  asked  by  the  caliph  to  hold  this  position, 
especially  when  there  is  no  one  else  who  possesses  the  same  qualifications.  For 
that  reason,  jurists  have  agreed  among  themselves  that,  if  any  qualified  person 
refuses  to  accept  the  office  of  judge,  the  caliph  has  the  authority  to  force  him 
according  to  the  extent  of  public  interest.  Fourthly,  it  becomes  only  recommended 
(Mandub)  for  him  if  there  is  another  person  has  more  knowledge  for  this  position. 
Lastly,  it  is  forbidden  (Haram)  for  him  to  accept  the  job  if  he  knows  that  he  is  not 
competent  for  it.  13 
12  For  further  information  about  the  concept  of  the  scale  of  these  five  religious  qualifications  in 
Islamic  Shariah  see,  Schacht,  Introduction  to  Islamic  Law,  supra  note  1,  p.  p.  120-121. 
13  at  Simnani,  abi  at  Qasim  Ali  bin  Muhammad,  Rawdat  al  Qudat  wa  Tariq  al  Najat,  Salah  at  Din 
at  Nahi  (ed.  ),  vol.  1,  Beirut:  Muassasat  Ari  Risalah,  (1984)  p.  p.  82,85.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  at 
Simnani,  Rawdat  al  Qudat);  at  Kasani,  Ala'  al  Din  abi  Bakir  (d.  587  A.  H.  ),  Bda'i'  as  Sana'i'fi 
Tartib  ash  Shara'i',  vol.  7,  Beirut:  Dar  al  Kutub  al  `llmiyah,  (1986)  p.  2.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  at Chapter  Two  70 
2.2.  The  Judge's  Qualifications 
Before  a  person  is  appointed  as  a  Qadi,  he  should  fulfil  eight  conditions.  The 
possession  of  the  first  three  is  unanimously  agreed  by  jurists.  These  are  as 
follows:  Islam,  adulthood,  and  sanity.  Jurists  disagree  about  the  other  five:  some 
of  them  consider  them  necessary  for  a  person  to  be  qualified  as  Qadi,  while  others 
consider  them  unnecessary.  These  are  as  follows:  freedom,  defect-free  senses 
(able  bodied),  attainment  of  independent  reasoning  (ijtihad),  manhood,  and 
probity. 
14 
2.2.1.  Islam 
Islam  is  considered  as  the  most  important  requirement  for  the  Qadi  in  Islamic 
Shariah  because  the  fundamental  duty  for  him  is  to  apply  the  rules  and  principles 
of  Shariah  which  are  deemed  to  be  divine  legislation,  and  a  part  of  his  faith  and 
belief.  So  a  non-Muslim  judge  will  face  conflicting  interests  when  he  is  appointed 
to  this  job  (especially  when  he  judges  between  Muslim  litigants),  because  he  has 
to  give  his  judgment  according  to  Islamic  Shariah,  while  he  does  not  believe  in 
Islam.  For  that  reason  he  cannot  implement  these  rules  and  principles. 
Kasani,  Bda'i'  as  Sana'i  );  Bin  Qudama,  Muwaffaq  at  Din  Ali  (541-620  A.  H.  ),  a!  Mughni  (The 
Sufficient),  Abdullah  bin  Abdul  Muhsin  at  Turki  &  Abdul  Fattah  Muhammad  at  Hilu  (eds.  ), 
vol.  14,  at  Qahirah:  Hajar  lit  Tiba'ah  wan  Nashr  wat  Tawzi',  (1990)  p.  p.  5-9.  (hereinafter  cited  as: 
Bin  Qudama,  at  Mughni);  Bin  Farhun,  Burhan  at  Din  abi  at  Wafa,  Tabsirat  al  Hukkamfi  Usul  a! 
Aqdia  wa  Manahý  al  Ahkam,  vol.  1,  Beirut:  Dar  at  Kutub  at  `Ilmiyah,  p.  p.  11-12.  (hereinafter 
cited  as:  Bin  Farhun,  Tabsirat  a!  Hukkam);  at  Mawardi,  abi  at  Hassan  Ali  bin  Muhammad  (d.  450 
A.  H.  ),  Adab  al  Qadi,  Muhi  Hilal  at  Sarhan  (ed.  ),  vol.  1,  Baghdad:  Matba'at  at  Irshad,  (1971) 
p.  p.  142-145.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  at  Mawardi,  Adab  al  Qadi);  at  Bakir,  as  Sultah  a!  Qadayah, 
supra  note  11,  p.  p.  83-86. 
14  Azad,  Ghulam  Murtaza,  Qualifications  of  Qadi,  23  Isl.  Stud.,  (1984)  p.  p.  249-263.  (hereinafter 
cited  as:  Azad,  Qualifications  of  Qadi);  Ibn  at  Ukhuwwa,  Ma'alim  al  Qurba,  supra  note  11, 
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All  Muslim  jurists  agree  that  it  is  prohibited  to  appoint  a  non-Muslim  as 
judge  to  give  his  decision  in  a  dispute  between  Muslims,  and  if  this  happens,  all 
his  judicial  decisions  are  null  and  void,  because  the  judicial  office  is  a 
guardianship,  and  there  is  no  guardianship  by  non-Muslims  upon  Muslims.  15 
Allah  said;  "And  never  will  Allah  grant  to  the  disbelievers  a  way  (to  triumph) 
over  the  believers.  "  16  But  if  the  responsible  person  has  designated  a  non-Muslim 
as  a  judge,  in  this  case,  and  to  avoid  any  delay  in  people's  interests,  and  according 
to  the  principle  `Necessities  know  no  Law',  he  will  act  as  a  temporary  judge.  This 
means  his  decision  can  be  effective;  nevertheless,  his  appointment  is  unlawful.,  7 
However,  does  the  situation  change  if  the  litigation  is  between  non-Muslims?  In 
another  words,  is  it  possible  to  select  a  non-Muslim  judge  to  settle  disputes  justly 
between  non-Muslims?  Only  the  Hanafis  permitted  the  appointment  of  a  non- 
Muslim  judge  if  his  jurisdiction  is  just  between  non-Muslims,  because  litigation  is 
a  guardianship  like  the  capacity  to  bear  witness,  and  non-Muslims  may  have  such 
ability  in  relation  to  non-Muslims  as  between  themselves  (dhimmis).  The 
evidence  used  to  support  this  idea  is  that  when  `Umar  bin  at  Khattab  heard  that 
15  For  example,  Sunni  jurists  who  support  this  idea  are:  al  Mawardi,  Adab  a!  Qadi,  supra  note  14, 
p.  631;  Bin  Qudama,  a!  Mughni,  supra  note  14,  p.  12;  al  Simnani,  Rawdat  al  Qudat,  supra 
note  14,  vol.  1,  p.  52;  Bin  Farhun,  Tabsirat  a!  Hukkam,  supra  note  14,  p.  18;  lbn  Hazm,  abi 
Muhammad  All  bin  Ahmed  (d.  456  A.  H.  ),  a!  Muhalla,  Ahmed  Muhammad  Shaker  (ed.  ),  vol.  9,  at 
Qahirah:  Dar  at  Turath,  p.  363.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Ibn  Hazm,  a!  Muhalla).  On  the  other  hand, 
Shi'i  jurist  such  as:  al'Amili,  Muhammad  bin  at  Hassan  at  Hur  (d.  1104  A.  H.  ),  Wasa'i!  ash  Shiah 
ila  Tahsil  Masail  ash  Shariah,  Muhammad  al  Razi  (ed.  ),  vol.  18,  Beirut:  Dar  Ihia'  at  Turath  at 
Arabi,  p.  p.  2-3.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  al  'Amili,  Wasa'il  ash  Shi'ah).  It  is  to  be  noted  that  Shi'is 
school  has  their  own  requirements  on  the  person  who  may  be  appointed  as  a  judge.  These 
conditions  are  not  required  in  Sunni  schools.  For  more  details  see  the  same  reference  of  at  'Amili 
p.  p.  6-17,20-52,89-154. 
16  Quran,  4:  141. 
17  at  Mawardi,  Abu  at  Hassan  (d.  450  A.  H.  ),  al  Ahkam  as  Sultaniyah,  (The  Laws  of  Islamic 
Governance),  Asadullah  Yate  (trans.  ),  London:  Ta-Ha  Publication  Ltd.,  (1996)  p.  99.  (hereinafter 
cited  as:  al  Mawardi,  a!  Ahkam  as  Sultaniyah). Chapter  Two  72 
`Umar  bin  al  `Ass  had  appointed  a  judge  from  the  Egyptian  Coptic  Christians  to 
settle  disputes  just  between  Coptic,  he  approved  that  appointment.  18  Nevertheless, 
the  majority  of  jurists  do  not  accept  such  judgeship  and  prohibit  such  an 
appointment  in  all  matters,  even  if  his  jurisdiction  is  between  non-Muslims.  19 
2.2.2.  Adulthood 
It  is  normal  to  disqualify  those  who  are  not  of  full  age,  both  in  Islamic 
Shariah  and  in  positive  Law  (man-made  law).  In  Shariah,  if  that  happened,  the 
appointment  as  well  as  the  decision  given  by  non-adult  judge  would  be  null  and 
void,  because  as  children  do  not  possess  legal  capacity  for  themselves,  how  can 
they  have  that  capacity  for  others?  Ali  bin  Abi  Talib  said  to  `Umar  bin  al  Khattab 
that,  as  narrated  by  `Aisha:  The  Prophet  said:  "The  deeds  of  the  following  three 
persons  are  not  recorded  by  the  pen  and  are  not  responsible  for  what  they  do;  an 
insane  person  till  he  becomes  sane,  a  child  till  he  grows  to  the  age  of  puberty,  a 
sleeping  person  till  he  wakes  up.  "20 
Accordingly,  one  may  ask  whether  there  is  any  particular  age  required  for  a 
person  before  he  is  appointed  as  a  judge?  In  Islamic  Shariah  there  is  not  any 
particular  age  required  for  the  person  to  be  Qadi,  it  is  enough  for  him  to  be  a 
mature  and  adult.  It  is  reported  that  al  Ma'mun  (a  Muslim  caliph)  had  appointed 
Yahya  ibn  Aktharn  as  a  judge  in  al-Basra  when  he  was  only  eighteen.  Some 
18  at  Nawawi,  Abdul  Khaliq,  a!  Qada'fi  al  Islam,  at  Qahirah:  [S.  N],  (1976)  p.  p.  113-116. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  at  Nawawi,  a!  Qada'fi  a!  Islam);  al  Mirsifawi,  Islamic  Judiciary  System, 
supra  note  12,  p.  13. 
19  al  Mawardi,  Adab  a!  Qadi,  supra  note  14,  p.  631;  Ibn  Hazm,  a!  Muhalla,  supra  note  16,  p.  363; 
at  Simnani,  Rawdat  a!  Qudat,  supra  note  14,  vol.  1,  p.  52. 
20  Sahih  a!  Bukhari,  supra  note  10,  vol.  8,  Hadith  No.  6814,  p.  421. Chapter  Two  73 
people  were  not  satisfied  with  this  appointment  and  declared  their  objections  to  it. 
Al  Ma'mun  wrote  to  Yahya  and  asked:  How  old  should  the  judge  be?  Yahya 
answered;  (and  he  knew  what  the  caliph  meant  by  his  question)  "I  am  the  same 
age  of  `Utab  bin  'Usaid  when  he  was  appointed  by  the  Prophet  as  a  judge  in 
Mecca.  "  Despite  this  fact,  the  older  the  judge  is,  the  more  respectable  his 
character,  21  and  if  the  judge  is  very  old  and  his  age  has  not  affected  his  capacity  to 
do  the  duties  of  judgeship  properly,  he  can  continue  his  term  of  office  until  he  dies 
or  asks  for  retirement.  This  means,  in  other  words,  that  there  is  no  age  limit  and 
compulsory  retirement  for  the  judge  in  Islamic  Shariah.  22 
2.2.3.  Sanity 
The  judge  should  be  legally  competent,  so  it  is  prohibited  to  appoint  the 
insane,  or  the  mentally  deranged,  because  such  persons  are  not  legally  responsible 
for  their  actions,  and  they  cannot  distinguish  between  right  or  wrong.  Besides, 
they  cannot  fulfil  the  legal  office  proficiently.  In  brief  the  judge  should  be  in  his 
full  capacity,  otherwise,  his  appointment  together  with  his  decisions  will  be  null 
and  void  and  produce  no  legal  effect.  23 
2.2.4.  Freedom 
In  the  past  when  slavery  was  widespread,  the  argument  on  this  condition  was 
important.  This  has  now  become  just  a  historical  issue,  because  the  system  of 
slavery  has  come  to  an  end.  However,  when  the  qualifications  of  judges  are 
discussed,  this  condition  is  still  counted  as  one  of  them. 
21  al  Bakir,  as  Sultah  al  Qadaiyah,  supra  note  11,  p.  p.  324-325. 
22  al  Nawawi,  al  Qada'fi  al  Islam,  supra  note  19,  p.  p.  1I  1-112. 
23  al  Mawardi  discussed  this  condition  in  depth  in  his  Adab  al  Qadi,  supra  note  14,  p.  p.  618-625. Chapter  Two  74 
There  are  two  main  opinions  with  regard  to  it.  First,  freedom  is  required  in 
the  person  to  be  qualified  for  the  position  of  the  judgeship.  The  supporters  of  this 
opinion  used  the  following  text  from  Quran  as  an  evidence.  Allah  said;  "And 
take  for  witness  two  just  persons  from  among  you  (Muslims)  and  establish  the 
witness  for  Allah.  "24  The  first  school  interpreted  the  term  `just  persons'  in  this 
verse  as  a  freeman.  On  the  contrary,  the  second  opinion  allowed  the  appointment 
of  a  slave  as  a  judge.  Their  evidence  was  quoted  from  another  text  of  the  Quran 
when  Allah  said:  "Verily!  Allah  commands  that  you  should  render  back  the  trusts 
to  those,  to  whom  they  are  due;  and  that  when  you  judge  between  men,  you  judge 
with  justice.  s25  The  interpretation  of  this  verse  was  that  it  was  a  commandment 
from  Allah  to  all  kinds  of  people,  without  any  distinction  between  men,  women, 
slaves  or  free.  26 
2.2.5.  Defect-free  Senses  (able  bodied) 
First  of  all,  a  distinction  must  be  made  between  two  different  expressions: 
lack  of  defects  as  to  the  senses,  and  lack  of  defects  as  to  physical  organs.  Lack  of 
defects  relating  to  the  senses  means  that  the  candidate  is  not  dumb,  deaf,  or  blind, 
i.  e.  he  should  be  able  to  speak,  hear,  and  see,  whereas  the  lack  of  defects 
concerning  physical  organs  means  that  the  appointee,  for  example,  is  not  one- 
eyed,  lame,  or  humpbacked.  There  is  no  disagreement  between  jurists  about  the 
second  point.  They  agree  that  it  is  not  prohibited  to  appoint  a  judge  if  he  is 
24  Quran,  65:  2. 
25  Quran,  4:  58. 
26  al  Mawardi,  al  Ahkam  as  Sultaniyah,  supra  note  18,  p.  p.  98-99;  and  in  his  Adab  al  Qadi,  supra 
note  14,  p.  p.  629-630;  at  Bakir,  as  Sultah  a!  Qadaiyah,  supra  note  11,  p.  p.  334-336;  al  Kasani, 
Bda'i'  a!  Sana'i',  supra  note  14,  vol.  7,  p.  3;  at  Nawawi,  al  Qada'  fi  al  Islam,  supra  note  19, Chapter  Two  75 
physically  disabled,  because  this  defect  does  not  prevent  him  from  doing  his  job 
properly.  However  if  he  is  not,  he  will  have  more  dignity  and  veneration.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  senses  should  be  found  in  the  Qadi  without  any  defect,  so  if  a  deaf 
person  was  appointed,  he  would  not  be  able  to  hear  the  parties  to  a  dispute;  the 
same  could  be  said  about  the  blind  and  the  dumb  as  they  would  not  be  able  to 
distinguish  between  the  claimant  and  the  defender,  or  would  not  be  able  to  express 
views  and  most  of  the  people  would  not  understand  his  indications.  So,  no  doubt, 
the  selection  of  such  persons  might  cause  injustice,  and  therefore,  their  decision  is 
not  effective.  27 
2.2.6.  Independent  Reasoning  (Ijtihad) 
Ijtihad  as  a  secondary  source  in  Islamic  Shariah  will  be  discussed  in  detail 
later  in  chapter  four.  Here  we  want  to  clarify  the  conditions  which  a  person 
should  fulfil  in  order  to  be  considered  as  mujtahid,  and  then  to  review  jurists' 
arguments  on  the  appointment  of  mujtahid  and  non-mujtahid  as  a  judge.  In 
general,  mujtahid  means  `the  person  who  has  the  capability  of  extraction.  '  There 
are  cumulative  requirements  which  should  be  found  in  the  person  in  order  to 
consider  him  as  mujtahid.  These  are  as  follows:  28 
p.  p.  125-126;  Bin  Farhun,  Tabsirat  a!  Hukkam,  supra  note  14,  p.  18;  al  Simnani,  Rawdat  a! 
Qudat,  supra  note  14,  p.  52;  Bin  Qudama,  al  Mughni,  supra  note  14,  p.  12. 
27  al  Mawardi,  Adab  al  Qadi,  supra  note  14,  p.  p.  621-624;  al  Bakir,  as  Sultah  a!  Qadaiyah,  supra 
note  11,  p.  p.  330-333;  al  Nawawi,  al  Qada'fi  al  Islam,  supra  note  19,  p.  p.  126-127. 
28  Bin  Farhun,  Tabsirat  al  Hukkam,  supra  note  14,  p.  p.  18-19;  al  Mawardi,  a!  Ahkam  as 
Sultaniyah,  supra  note  18,  p.  p.  100-101. Chapter  Two  76 
1.  He  must  have  full  knowledge  of  the  Quran  and  Sunnah  injunctions,  and 
understand  their  meaning,  and  when  and  how  to  use  them  to  make  his  extraction 
in  a  particular  case  in  order  to  issue  a  decision  accordingly. 
2.  He  must  know  the  abrogation  (Naskh)  of  text  from  the  Quran  and  Sunnah, 
which  is  very  substantial,  in  order  to  avoid  using  any  abrogated  (Mansukh)  verse 
from  the  Quran  or  a  Hadith  from  the  Sunnah  in  his  judgment.  29 
3.  He  must  be  really  qualified  in  the  principles  of  Islamic  jurisprudence  (Usul 
al  Fiqh),  because  he  cannot  extract  a  judgment  without  the  science  of  Shariah 
based  on  a  deep  knowledge  of  Usul  al  Fiqh. 
4.  He  must  know  all  the  previous  consensus  rulings  to  avoid  making  any  new 
decision  which  might  conflict  with  the  unanimous  resolutions  (ijma)  of  Islamic 
jurists. 
5.  He  must  also  be  a  master  in  Arabic,  both  grammatically  and  linguistically, 
so  he  can  understand  the  exact  meaning  of  every  expression  of  the  Quran  or  the 
Sunnah.  In  this  matter  Allah  said;  "Verily  we  have  sent  it  down  as  an  Arabic 
Quran  in  order  that  you  may  understand.  "3° 
On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  difficult  to  give  a  definite  answer  regarding  the 
possession  of  ijtihad  by  the  judge,  because  Muslim  jurists  disagree  about  the 
necessity  of  this  condition.  Some  of  them  argue  that  it  is  permissible  and  a  valid 
condition,  while  others  hold  that  it  is  only  a  praiseworthy  condition.  Those  who 
29  For  more  details  about  abrogation  in  Islamic  Shariah  see  al  Shawkani,  al  Hafiz  Muhammad  bin 
All,  Irshad  a!  Fuhul  ila  Tahqeeq  a!  Haq  min  'Ilm  a!  Usul,  vol.  2,  Maser:  Dar  al  Kutbi,  (1990) 
p.  p.  71-122;  Burton,  John,  The  Sources  of  Islamic  Law:  Theories  of  Abrogation,  Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh  University  Press,  (1990)  p.  p.  1-8. 
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have  said  ijtihad  is  permissible  and  a  valid  condition  are  the  majority  of  Muslims 
jurists  "Hanbali,  Shafi`i,  Maliki,  and  some  of  Hanafi,  "  who  argue  that  if  the  judge 
is  not  qualified  as  mujtahid,  the  selection  shall  be  invalid  and  any  judgments 
would  not  have  effect  . 
31  This  means  they  do  not  permit  the  appointment  of  the 
imitating  persons  (Muqalideen),  those  who  simply  repeat  the  rulings  of  other 
jurists,  because  they  do  not  possess  the  ability  of  ijtihad  and  this  is  important  for 
the  performance  of  judicial  duties.  So  the  appointment  of  such  a  person  is 
inoperative  if  he  is  elected  and  his  judgments  are  not  binding.  This  idea  is 
supported  and  evidenced  in  the  Quran  and  Sunnah.  From  the  Quran,  this  is  shown 
when  Allah  said;  "0  you  who  believe!  Obey  Allah  and  obey  the  Messenger 
Muhammad,  and  those  of  you  (Muslims)  who  are  in  authority.  (And)  if  you  differ 
in  anything  amongst  yourselves,  refer  it  to  Allah  and  his  Messenger,  if  you  believe 
in  Allah  and  the  last  day.  "32  The  destination  of  the  word  `refer',  according  to  their 
interpretation  of  this  verse,  is  that  "to  Allah"  means  to  the  Quran,  and  "to  the 
Messenger"  means  to  the  Sunnah.  In  other  words,  no  one  could  make  such  a 
reference  unless  he  has  a  deep  knowledge  and  the  qualifications  which  enable  him 
to  be  mujtahid,  because  only  a  mujtahid  has  the  ability  to  interpret  the  Quran  and 
Sunnah.  As  to  the  Sunnah,  it  has  been  reported  that  the  Prophet  sent  Mu'adh  ibn 
Jabal,  as  a  governor  to  Yemen;  The  Prophet  asked  him:  "How  will  you  decide  the 
cases  that  will  be  brought  before  you?  Mu'adh  replied;  I  shall  decide  them 
31  Bin  Qudama,  a!  Mughni,  supra  note  14,  p.  p.  14-16;  al  Mawardi,  Adab  a!  Qadi,  supra  note  14, 
p.  637;  al  Simnani,  Rawdat  a!  Qudat,  supra  note  14,  p.  54;  Bin  Farhun,  Tabsirat  a!  Hukkam, 
supra  note  14,  p.  p.  18-19;  al  Qasimi,  Dhafir,  Nidam  al  Hukm  fi  ash  Shariah  wat  Tarikh:  as  Sultah 
a!  Qadaiyah,  Beirut:  Dar  an  Nafa'is,  (1978)  p.  100.  (hereinafter  cited  as.  al  Qasimi,  as  Sultah  a! 
Qadaiyah). 
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according  to  the  book  of  Allah  (Quran).  He  asked  (what  will  you  do)  if  you  find 
nothing  concerning  (a  particular  matter)  in  the  book  of  Allah?  He  replied:  I  shall 
decide  it  according  to  the  Sunnah  of  the  Apostle  of  Allah.  He  asked:  (what  will 
you  do)  if  you  find  nothing  about  it  in  the  Sunnah  of  the  Apostle  of  Allah?  Then 
replied  Mu'adh:  I  shall  exercise  my  own  judgment,  (ajtahidu  bi  ra'yi)  without  the 
least  hesitation.  Thereupon  the  Prophet  slapped  him  upon  the  chest  and  said; 
praised  be  to  Allah  who  helped  the  messenger  of  Allah's  Messenger  to  find  a  thing 
which  pleases  the  latter!  "33  On  the  basis  of  this  Hadith,  the  supporters  of  this 
opinion  claim  that  ijtihad  is  deemed  to  be  the  most  important  condition  that 
should  be  found  in  the  judge. 
The  second  view  was  adopted  by  the  majority  of  Hanafi,  some  of  the  Malikis, 
and  Zaydi  who  permitted  the  appointment  of  imitates.  Their  opinion  is  based  on 
the  Hadith  reported  by  Ali  bin  Abi  Talib  when  he  was  sent,  by  the  Prophet,  as  a 
judge  to  Yemen.  He  is  reported  to  have  said:  "When  Allah's  Messenger  intended 
to  sent  me  to  the  Yemen  as  judge,  I  asked  him:  Oh  Messenger  of  Allah:  You  are 
sending  me  and  I  am  young,  and  I  have  no  knowledge  of  the  duties  of  a  judge?  He 
replied:  Allah  will  guide  your  heart  and  keep  your  tongue  firmly  (attached  to  the 
truth).  When  two  litigants  sit  in  front  of  you,  do  not  decide  until  you  hear  what 
the  other  has  to  say  the  way  you  heard  from  the  first;  for  it  is  more  suitable  for  the 
correct  judgement  to  become  clear  to  you.  Later  on  Ali  said;  best  that  you  should 
have  a  clear  idea  of  the  best  decision.  He  said:  I  had  been  a  judge  (for  long);  or 
￿  Cf  the  translation  with  Sunan  Abu  Dawud,  supra  note  7,  vol.  3,  Hadith  No.  3585,  p.  1019. Chapter  Two  79 
he  said:  I  have  no  doubts  about  a  decision  afterwards.  i34  Accordingly,.  it  is 
supposed  that  there  is  no  cause  to  insist  that  the  judge  should  be  mujtahid,  because 
the  Prophet  appointed  Ali  bin  Abi  Talib  while  he  was  young  and  unqualified  to  be 
mujtahid,  and  this,  in  their  view,  is  clear  evidence  to  disregard  the  ability  of  ijtihad 
in  the  judge.  However,  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  the  person  who  was 
appointed  was  Ali  bin  Abi  Talib  under  the  responsibility  of  Allah's  Messenger, 
who  could  know  what  others  could  not,  which  means  the  analogy  in  this  case  is 
not  right.  In  addition,  the  group  of  jurists  also  argued  by  pointing  to  another 
evidence  by  saying  that  a  non-mujtahid  judge  can  practice  his  judicial  job  without 
any  problems,  because  he  can  settle  disputes  and  solve  them  between  litigants 
according  to  other  jurists'  independent  reasoning  (ijtihad).  35 
2.2.7.  Manhood 
Jurists  have  agreed  unanimously  that  men  may  be  appointed  as  judges,  but 
they  have  differed  in  opinion  about  the  appointment  of  women.  The  jurists  can  be 
divided  into  three  main  groups.  A  very  strict  group  that  does  not  allow  women  to 
be  selected  as  judges  in  any  circumstances;  others  who  have  some  flexibility  in 
their  opinion,  and  allow  the  appointment  in  limited  circumstances;  and  lastly, 
there  are  those  who  are  considered  to  be  very  tolerant  and  permit  the  appointment 
of  women  without  any  conditions. 
34  Ibid.,  Hadith  No.  3575,  p.  1016. 
35  al  Kasani,  Bada'i'  as  Sana'i',  supra  note  14,  p.  3;  Bin  Farhun,  Tabsirat  al  Hukkam,  supra 
note  14,  p.  19;  al  Nawawi,  a!  Qada'fi  al  Islam,  supra  note  19,  p.  p.  166-170;  a!  Bakir,  as  Sultah 
a!  Qadaiyah,  supra  note  11,  p.  p.  343-348;  al  Mirsifawi,  Islamic  Judiciary  System,  supra  note  12, 
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The  first  opinion,  of  the  majority  of  jurists  who  adopt  an  absolute  prohibition 
in  selecting  women  as  judges,  admit  that  if  the  appointment  is  made,  it  will  be 
invalid  and  any  judgments  will  be  void.  36  The  evidence  for  it  is  taken  from  the 
Quran  and  Sunnah.  From  the  Quran,  Allah  said;  "Men  are  the  protectors  and 
maintainers  of  Women,  because,  Allah  has  made  the  one  of  them  to  excel  the 
other,  and  because  they  spend  (to  support  them)  for  their  means.  i37  The  other 
proof  is  that  narrated  by  Abu  Bakra:  During  the  days  (of  the  battle)  of  Al  Jamal 
(the  camel),  Allah  benefited  me  with  a  word  I  had  heard  from  Allah's  Messenger 
after  I  had  been  about  to  join  the  companions  of  Al  Jamal  and  fight  along  with 
them.  When  Allah's  Messenger  was  informed  that  Persians  had  crowned  the 
daughter  of  Kisra  (Caesar)  as  their  ruler,  He  said:  "Such  people  as  ruled  by  a  lady 
will  never  be  successful.  08 
The  second  opinion  was  expressed  by  Hanafi,  who  permitted  women  to  be 
appointed  as  judges  only  in  matters  where  they  are  competent  to  testify,  for 
example,  concerning  pregnancy  and  related  matters,  monthly-period,  childhood, 
virginity  and  all  matters  common  only  to  women,  because  women  have  more 
knowledge  than  men  in  such  matters,  and  men  cannot  bear  witness  in  them 
because  there  is  no  access  for  them  in  such  matters  under  Islamic  Shariah.  39  They 
also  argue  that  the  judiciary  is  some  sort  of  a  guardianship  and  similar  to 
16  Bin  Farhun,  Tabsirat  at  Hukkam,  supra  note  14,  p.  19;  al  Mawardi,  Adab  at  Qadi,  supra 
note  14,  p.  625;  al  Simnani,  Rawdat  at  Qudat,  supra  note  14,  vol.  1,  p.  p.  62-63;  Bin  Qudama,  at 
Mughni,  supra  note  14,  p.  p.  12-13.  Shi'i'  jurists  also  prohibit  the  appointment  of  women  as  judge 
for  the  same  reasons.  See  al  'Amili,  Wasa'il  ash  Shi'ah,  supra  note  16,  p.  6. 
37  Quran,  4:  34. 
39  Sahih  at  Bukhari,  supra  note  I  O,.  vol.  5,  Hadith  No.  4425,  p.  436. 
39  al  Kasani,  Bada'i'  as  Sana'i',  supra  note  14,  p.  3. Chapter  Two  81 
testimony,  so  whenever  a  woman  can  give  testimony,  she  can  be  a  judge.  This 
means  in  matters  of  crimes  and  punishment  (Hudud  and  Qasas),  she  cannot  be  a 
judge  because  her  testimony  is  not  accepted.  So  if  she  is  appointed  as  a  judge  and 
her  jurisdiction  (walaya)  is  in  crimes  and  punishment,  her  decision  will  not  have 
ao  effect  and  her  appointment  will  be  invalid  as  well. 
The  last  opinion  was  held  by  ibn  Hazm,  who  allows  women  to  be  appointed 
as  judges  in  all  circumstances  without  any  conditions  or  exceptions,  even  in 
matters  of  crimes  and  punishment.  His  analogy  was  made  on  the  formal  and  legal 
opinion  (Fatwa)  which  can  be  produced  by  women  in  particular  cases.  So  as  long 
as  she  can  deliver  a  legal  opinion,  by  analogy  she  can  be,  and  has  the  ability  to  be, 
a  judge 
. 
41  No  doubt  there  are  some  differences  between  a  judgment  and  legal 
opinion.  Chief  amongst  these  is  that  a  Fatwa  is  non  obligatory  whereas  judicial 
decisions  are  final  and  obligatory.  42 
At  present,  in  most  Arab  states  women  play  a  considerable  role  in  modern 
development  and  have  become  an  active  person  parallel  with  men  in  different 
social,  political  and  commercial  fields.  Above  all,  they  have  proved  their  ability 
to  exceed  all  difficulties.  Therefore,  and  without  going  in  much  details  in 
discussing  the  evidence  of  each  group  relating  to  the  appointment  of  women  as  a 
judge,  we  can  state  that  no  explicit  text  from  the  Quran  and  Sunnah  prohibits  such 
an  appointment.  Every  jurist  in  the  different  Islamic  schools  applies  his  own 
40  al  Mirsifawi,  Islamic  Judiciary  System,  supra  note  12,  p.  25. 
41  Ibn  Hazm,  a!  Muhalla,  supra  note  16,  p.  p.  429-230. 
42  For  more  details  see  al  Bakir,  as  Sultah  a!  Qadaiyah,  supra  note  11,  p.  p.  97-106;  Tanzil-ul- 
Rahman,  Adab  al  Qadi,  5  Isl.  Stud.,  (1966)  p.  p.  201-202. Chapter  Two  82 
reasoning  (ijtihad)  in  this  matter  by  presenting  his  evidence  from  either  the  Quran 
or  the  Sunnah  and  interpreting  the  given  evidence  according  to  his  knowledge. 
Accordingly,  it  is  believed  that  it  is  not  necessarily  the  case  that  the  non- 
appointment  of  women  as  judges  is  related  to  Islamic  Shariah  but  it  could  be 
related  to  the  Arab  custom  which  in  most  Arab  states  still  retains  some 
reservations  regarding  the  appearance  of  women  in  particular  jobs.  For  example, 
in  Egypt,  or  the  Gulf  States  women  have  still  not  been  appointed  as  judges  even  in 
civil  courts  which  apply  positive  (man-made)  law.  This  is  not  because  the  law  in 
Egypt  or  in  the  Gulf  States  prohibits  this  appointment  but  because  custom  still 
plays  its  rule  there,  while  in  Tunisia  women  have  been  appointed  as  judges 
because  the  custom  there  is  more  liberal. 
2.2.8.  Probity 
Justice  (Adalah)  in  Islamic  Shariah  is  a  very  accurate  conception  based  on 
general  principles.  A  person  who  might  be  elected  as  a  judge  should  be  faithful, 
truthful,  sincere,  patient,  honourable,  and  has  to  show  high  principles  and  good 
character.  Furthermore,  he  has  to  avoid  perpetrating  the  great  sins  (al  Kaba'ir) 
such  as  murder,  adultery,  sodomy,  drinking  of  intoxicants,  running  away  from  the 
battlefield,  giving  false  evidence,  delaying  the  performance  of  obligatory  prayer  at 
the  due  time,  slandering  with  commission  of  adultery,  and  gambling.  He  is  also 
supposed  not  to  persist  in  doing  venial  sins  (al  Sagha'ir)  such  as  laughing  during 
prayer,  or  sitting  with  sinners.  43 
41  at  Mawardi,  al  Ahkam  as  Sultanyah,  supra  note  18,  p.  99;  al  Bakir,  as  Sultah  al  Qadaiyah, 
supra  note  11,  p.  337;  Azad,  Qualification  of  Qadi,  supra  note  15,  p.  257. Chapter  Two  83 
Jurists  are  divided  into  two  main  opinions  on  the  nomination  of  a  sinner 
(Fasiq)  not  meeting  the  legal  requirements  as  a  judge.  The  first  opinion  from  a 
majority  of  jurists  stipulated  justice  as  a  condition  which  must  be  found  in  a 
person  in  order  for  him  to  be  judge,  accordingly,  it  is  not  permissible  to  select  a 
Fasiq  who  does  not  fulfil  the  above  stated  qualities.  44  This  is  based  on  the  verse 
that  states;  "0  you  who  believe!  If  a  rebellious  evil  person  comes  to  you  with 
news,  verify  it,  lest  you  harm  people  in  ignorance,  and  afterwards  you  be  come  to 
regret  full  what  you  have  done.  "45  Moreover,  as  a  result  of  rejecting  the  sinners' 
testimony,  by  this  group  of  jurists,  an  analogy  was  made  to  reject  him  as  a  judge  as 
well. 
The  second  opinion  was  held  by  Hanafi  and  some  of  Maliki,  who  allowed  the 
appointment  of  sinner  as  a  judge  and  accepted  his  judgment.  The  testimony  of 
unjust  person,  in  their  views,  was  acceptable.  So  a  person  who  can  give  testimony 
can  also  be  appointed  as  a  judge.  46 
2.3.  Judge's  Appointment 
The  caliph  is  in  charge  of  the  appointment  of  judges.  In  fact,  this  is  one  of 
the  main  duties  that  he  should  exercise  personally  or  deputise  someone  else  to 
exercise  it.  Jurists  have  agreed  unanimously  that  it  is  his  personal  responsibility, 
and  he  will  be  held  to  account  by  Allah  about  it  in  the  last  day  if  he  practises  it 
with  negligence.  The  Prophet  did  practise  the  judicial  authority  personally;  at  the 
44  at  Mawardi,  Adab  al  Qadi,  supra  note  14,  p.  p.  634-636. 
45  Quran,  49:  6. 
46  at  Kasani,  Bada'i'  as  Sana'i',  supra  note  14,  p.  3;  Bin  Farhun,  Tabsirat  al  Hukkam,  supra 
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same  time  He  appointed  some  of  His  companions  as  judges  and  sent  them  to  the 
far  regions.  The  same  thing  happened  with  His  successor  Abu  Bakir  in  the  first 
period  of  his  ruling,  when  later  on  when  found  himself  very  busy  and  could  not 
practice  the  office  of  judge  and  the  presidential  duties  simultaneously,  so  he 
deputised  it  to  'Umar  bin  al  Khattab.  47  This  was  when  the  Islamic  state  was  still 
small  and  the  duties  of  the  caliph  were  not  that  extensive.  However,  the  situation 
changed  when  the  Islamic  state  became  bigger  and  the  ruler's  duties  increased.  So 
the  Imam  started  to  transfer  most  of  his  functions,  including  the  judgeship,  to  his 
representative  who  was  called  Wazir  at  Tafwid.  48 
In  addition  to  the  caliph  or  his  representative  who  have  the  right  to  appoint 
the  judge,  jurists  gave  influential  people  in  power,  in  conditions  of  necessity,  the 
authority  to  select  judges.  This  could  be  if  the  caliph  or  his  representative  were 
killed,  lost  or  taken  as  prisoners  of  war.  In  such  cases  the  appointment  would  be 
lawful  and  when  the  Imam  or  his  representative  reappeared,  all  the  judges 
appointed  in  their  absence  would  have  to  resign  and  a  new  set  of  judges  would  be 
elected.  49 
Relating  to  the  same  subject,  when  the  Imam  or  the  caliph  seeks  to  delegate 
any  person  as  a  judge,  first  of  all  he  has  to  be  sure  that  the  person  in  question 
satisfies  all  the  qualifications  required  for  the  position.  This  could  be  in  two  ways, 
47  al  Qasim,  as  Sultah  al  Qadaiyah,  supra  note  31,  p.  117;  al  Nawawi,  al  Qada'fi  al  !  slam,  supra 
note  19,  p.  p.  94-98;  al  Bakir,  as  Sultah  al  Qadaiyah,  supra  note  11,  p.  p.  404-406. 
48  It  is  has  to  be  mentioned  that  this  position  of  the  representative  corresponds  to  the  position  of 
the  prime  minister  in  parliamentary  government.  For  more  details  see  al  Tamawi,  Sulayman 
Muhammad,  as  Sultat  a!  Thalath  fr  ad  Dasatir  a!  Arabiyah  wa  fi  al  Fikr  as  Siyasi  al  Islami: 
Dirasah  Muqaranah,  al  Qahirah:  Matba'at  Jami'at  `Ain  Shams,  (1986)  p.  469. 
49  al  Mawardi,  Adab  al  Qadi,  supra  note  14,  p.  139.  al  Bakir,  as  Sultah  a!  Qadaiyah,  supra 
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either  by  previous  personal  knowledge  or  by  examination.  50  Personal  knowledge 
means  that  the  Imam  already  knows  whether  the  person  to  be  appointed  is 
qualified  for  the  office  of  judge  or  not.  51  Generally,  however,  the  caliph  does  not 
know  the  candidates.  Therefore,  an  examination  becomes  necessary  to  show  to 
the  Imam  the  candidate's  legal  ability,  and  depending  on  the  result,  a  decision  will 
be  taken.  52 
Once  the  decision  on  the  appointment  is  taken,  it  should  be  declared  to  the 
public  to  avoid  any  uncertainty  that  a  particular  person  has  been  selected  as  judge. 
The  declaration  must  also  include  the  territorial  jurisdiction  to  inform  the 
appointee  as  well  as  the  people  as  to  where  he  is  going  to  exercise  his  judicial 
power.  Furthermore  the  caliph  has  to  determine  the  subject  matter  of  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  judge  as  well,  because  in  Islam,  unless  the  competence  of  judge 
is  defined,  he  is  considered  to  be  qualified  to  determine  all  cases.  53 
2.4.  Judicial  Vacancy 
Different  reasons  could  lead  the  judge  to  leave  his  position,  or  the  judicial 
office  could  be  vacant  for  different  reasons,  such  as  resignation,  transgression, 
apostasy  etc. 
so  al  Qasimi,  as  Sultah  a!  Qadayah,  supra  note  32,  p.  p.  131-135. 
51  This  is  what  happened  to  Ali  bin  Abi  Talib  when  he  was  appointed  as  a  judge  for  Yemen.  So 
according  to  the  previous  knowledge  the  Prophet  had  of  Ali,  He  just  advised  him  what  to  do  if 
litigants  come  before  him.  See  al  Mawardi,  a!  Ahkam  as  Sultaniyah,  supra  note  18,  p.  67;  Bin 
Farhun,  Tabsirat  a!  Hukkam,  supra  note  14,  p.  22.  Bin  Qudama,  a!  Mughni,  supra  note  14, 
vol.  11,  p.  378.  al  Mirsifawi,  Islamic  Judiciary  System,  supra  note  12,  p.  43. 
52  This  is  what  happened  to  Mu'adh  bin  Jabal  when  the  Prophet  asked  him  several  questions 
before  sending  him  as  a  judge  to  Yemen  to  be  sure  that  he  was  a  fully  qualified  person  for  this 
position.  For  more  details  see  Bin  Farhun,  Tabsirat  a!  Hukkam,  supra  note  14,  p.  22.  al  Mawardi, 
Adab  a!  Qadi,  supra  note  14,  p.  175. 
53  al  Mawardi,  al  Ahkam  as  Sultaniyah,  supra  note  18,  p.  106;  and  his  Adab  a!  Qadi,  supra 
note  14,  p.  p.  153,155,160,164,166. Chapter  Two  86 
2.4.1.  Resignation 
Some  jurists  have  said  that  it  is  permissible  for  the  judge  to  resign  during  his 
term  of  office  at  any  time  he  likes  and  his  resignation  is  valid  without  the 
agreement  of  the  caliph  or  his  representative.  54  Whereas  al  Mawardi  has  argued 
that  a  judge's  resignation  is  not  effective  until  the  caliph  or  his  representative  has 
approved  it  as  the  latter  is  the  authority  responsible  for  the  judge's  appointment.  55 
However,  others  like  Abu  Ya'la  have  said  that  without  any  excuse,  the  judge 
cannot  resign  from  his  job.  Accordingly,  the  Qadi  has  to  have  a  serious  reason  to 
relinquish  his  position  and  the  Imam  has  to  be  satisfied  before  accepting  his 
resignation.  56  Others  have  said  that  the  judge  is  considered  as  a  representative  of 
the  nation  (Ummah)  and  he  accordingly  has  not  the  right  to  resign  by  his  own 
decision.  This  means  that  under  no  circumstance  can  he  resign  from  his  job  as  a 
judge.  57 
2.4.2.  Transgression 
This  condition  has  been  discussed  in  the  section  on  the  appointment  of  the 
rebellious  evil  person  as  a  Qadi.  All  that  can  be  said  here  is  that  jurists  who  reject 
the  appointment  of  a  sinner  also  argue  that  if  the  judge  commits  a  sin  during  his 
term  of  office,  he  has  to  resign.  Those  who  claim  that  a  sinner  can  be  elected  as  a 
54  al  Simnani,  Rawdat  a!  Qudat,  supra  note  14,  p.  127. 
ss  al  Mawardi,  Adab  a!  Qadi,  supra  note  14,  vol.  2,  p.  401. 
56  at  Mawardi,  al  Ahkam  as  Sultaniyah,  supra  note  18,  p.  59. 
57  at  Bakir,  as  Sultah  al  Qadaiyah,  supra  note  11,  p.  572;  al  Nawawi,  a!  Qada'  fr  al  !  s/am,  supra 
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judge  do  not  stipulate  that  the  judge  should  be  discharged  from  his  term  of  office 
if  he  commits  a  sin.  58 
2.4.3.  Apostasy 
Some  jurists  consider  that  apostasy  is  a  reason  to  discharge  a  judge  from  his 
judicial  office,  because  how  can  he  make  his  decision  according  to  Shariah  while 
he  does  not  fully  believe  in  Islam.  Others  like  Hanafis  have  said  that  apostasy 
does  not  count  as  a  reason  for  resignation,  especially  if  the  judge  reverts,  to  Islam 
and  turns  to  Allah  in  repentance.  59 
2.4.4.  Other  Reasons 
It  is  axiomatic  that  the  death  of  the  judge  makes  his  position  vacant,  or  if  he 
loses  his  legal  capacity  i.  e.,  becomes  insane,  or  he  loses  his  freedom  according  to 
those  who  do  not  accept  the  appointment  of  slaves.  This  also  occurs  if  he  loses 
some  of  his  senses,  without  which  he  cannot  master  his  job,  like  losing  his  sight, 
hearing  or  power  of  speech.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  administrating  justice  is 
considered  as  one  of  the  important  conditions  that  a  judge  should  be  found  to 
fulfil,  most  jurists  have  decided  that  it  is  necessary  to  dismiss  him  if  it  is  found 
that  he  is  unjust  in  his  judgment,  does  not  exercise  his  authority  properly,  abstains 
from  judging  between  litigants,  or  behaves  inadequately.  Also  judges  appointed 
as  temporary  judges  during  the  absence  of  the  caliph  or  his  representative,  should 
also  resign  and  new  judges  should  be  appointed  when  the  caliph  or  the  legal 
Islamic  governmental  rule  is  restored  in  the  state.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Qadi  is 
58  Bin  Farhun,  Tabsirat  a!  Hukkam,  supra  note  14,  p.  78;  al  Mawardi,  a!  Ahkam  as  Sultaniyah, 
supra  note  18,  p.  84. 
59  al  Mirsifawi,  Islamic  Judiciary  System,  supra  note  12,  p.  p.  51-52. Chapter  Two  88 
allowed  to  recuse  himself  temporarily  if  he  has  any  interest  in  a  particular  case  or 
if  one  of  the  parties  to  a  dispute  is  one  of  his  relatives  or  friends.  60 
2.5.  Independence  of  Judges 
As  should  be  now  apparent,  there  is  a  strong  tie  between  the  office  of  a  judge 
and  religion  in  Islam,  because  the  judge  is  to  make  decisions  according  to  the 
Shariah.  This  is  based  on  the  verses  that;  "And  whosoever  does  not  judge  by 
what  Allah  has  revealed,  such  are  the  Kafirun  (i.  e.  disbelievers-of  a  lesser  degree 
as  they  do  not  act  on  Allah's  laws) 
., 
561  "And  whosoever  does  not  judge  by  what 
Allah  has  revealed,  such  are  the  Zalimun  (polytheists  and  wrong-doers-of  a  lesser 
degree) 
. 
5562  "And  whosoever  does  not  judge  by  what  Allah  has  revealed  (then) 
such  (people)  are  the  Fasiqun  (the  rebellious)  i.  e.  disobedient  (of  lesser  degree)  to 
Allah.  "63 
Independence  of  judges  means  that  they  should  be  protected  during  their  term 
of  office  from  any  influence,  and  they  should  enjoy  stable  and  comfortable 
conditions  of  work  in  order  to  help  them  make  their  decision  independently 
without  any  fear,  worry,  or  intervention.  Islam  requires  that  these  conditions  be 
secured  and  that  a  fair-minded  judge  in  the  an  Islamic  state  be  guaranteed  that  no 
one,  even  the  caliph,  will  intervene  in  his  job.  On  the  contrary,  he  will  get  the 
caliph's  support  as  long  as  he  makes  his  decision  within  the  Shariah,  and  also 
because  both  the  caliph  and  the  judge  have  agreed  to  achieve  the  particular  aim  of 
60  al  Qasimi,  as  Sultah  at  Qadaiyah,  supra  note  32,  p.  p.  176-177. 
61  Quran,  5:  44. 
62  Quran,  5:  45. 
63  Quran,  5:  47. Chapter  Two  89 
"establishing  justice",  and  are  to  please  Allah  who  will  judge  them  if  they  neglect 
their  duties. 
Throughout  the  ages  of  Islamic  history,  judicial  power  has  been  held  in  high 
esteem  by  most  if  not  all  Muslims  whether  governors  or  people,  as  it  is  strongly 
believed  that,  when  the  judge  settles  disputes  between  individuals,  he  not  only 
intends  to  perform  legal  actions  but  also  seeks  Allah's  satisfaction.  Therefore,  it  is 
to  be  said  that  in  Muslim  jurists'  view  the  judicial  function  in  Islam  may  be 
described  as  the  best  form  of  worship.  After  faith  in  Allah,  there  is  nothing  more 
obligatory  than  a  just  decision. 
This  belief  has  led  Muslims,  in  general,  not  to  intervene  in  any  case  that  may 
be  brought  before  the  Qadi,  to  avoid  Allah's  anger  and  punishment.  Furthermore, 
intervention  in  judicial  affairs  conflicts  with  principles  of  justice.  Allah  said; 
"Verily!  Allah  commands  that  you  should  render  back  the  trusts  to  those,  to  whom 
they  are  due;  and  that  when  you  judge  between  men,  you  judge  with  justice.  "64 
All  these  things  ensure  that  the  Qadi  in  the  Muslim  community  enjoys  a  high 
standard  of  independence. 
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Concluding  Remarks 
We  conclude  from  the  foregoing  discussion  that  the  office  of  the  judge  has 
been  given  special  protection  and  enjoyed  particular  care  in  Islam,  because  it  is 
considered  to  be  a  divine  office,  and  whoever  accepts  it  will  be  held  to  account  to 
Allah  if  he  neglects  his  judicial  duties.  As  a  result  of  the  importance  of  this 
position,  the  qualifications  of  judges  have  been  discussed  comprehensively  by 
Muslim  jurists,  and  it  has  been  held  a  high  standard  of  qualifications  in  the 
candidate  is  required. 
According  to  the  present  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  judges  of  this  Court  should 
be  qualified  in  Islamic  Shariah.  The  next  chapter  will  examine  the  organisation  of 
the  ACJ  and  the  system  of  judges,  and  while  discussing  other  points  in  this  regard, 
a  special  consideration  of  the  qualification  of  judges  in  the  ACJ  will  be 
undertaken  in  order  to  find  out  how  far  the  Arab  draftsmen  were  influenced  by  the 
principles  of  Islamic  Shariah  in  this  matter,  and  whether  every  principle  and  rule 
in  this  draft  Statute  will  be  rooted  in  Islamic  Shariah  or  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  or 
both.  In  addition,  some  important  questions  have  to  be  put  into  consideration 
during  our  discussion,  did  the  Arab  draftsmen  expressly  provide  that  the  judges  of 
the  ACJ  should  be  Muslim?  That  is  because  there  is  a  contentious  opinion  (ijma) 
between  Muslim  jurists  regarding  the  prohibition  on  the  appointment  of  a  non- 
Muslim  as  a  judge  especially  when  he  is  granted  competence  to  apply  the 
principles  and  rules  of  Islamic  Shariah.  Another  important  question  is,  what  about 
the  appointment  of  women  as  a  judge  in  the  projected  ACJ?  Will  Arab  states Chapter  Two  91 
accept  such  an  appointment?  Will  their  acceptance  or  refusal  relate  to  Arab 
custom,  politics  or  principles  of  Islamic  Shariah?  The  next  chapter  will  focus  on 
those  and  other  related  questions. Chapter  III 
The  Organisation  of  the  Court 
The  aim  of  the  present  chapter  is  to  discuss  the  main  points  of  the 
organisation  of  the  ACJ,  such  as  the  qualification  of  the  judges,  system  of 
election,  ad  hoc  judges,  chambers  and  other  related  subjects.  During  the 
consideration  of  these  subjects  we  will  indicate  how  far  Arab  draftsmen  were 
influenced  by  political  circumstances  on  the  one  hand,  and  principles  and  rules  of 
Islamic  Shariah  and  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  on  the  other  hand.  In  general,  principles 
and  procedures  governing  the  organisation  of  the  ACJ  are  contained  in  chapters 
one  and  two,  (Articles  1-20)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ.  These  principles  and 
procedures  are  mostly  the  same  as  Articles  2-23  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ. 
The  general  points  contained  in  these  Articles  are  that  the  ACJ  comprises 
seven  judges  elected  among  candidates  nominated  by  states  that  are  parties  to  the 
Court's  Statute,  no  two  of  whom  may  be  nationals  of  the  same  state:  the  League 
Council  is  responsible  for  the  election  of  the  judges,  which  is  run  by  secret  ballot 
from  a  list  of  qualified  persons,  prepared  by  the  Secretary-General  in  alphabetical 
order  of  all  persons  nominated:  they  serve  for  a  term  of  six  years  and  they  may  be 
re-elected:  the  terms  of  three  judges  who  are  elected  at  the  first  election  expire  at 
the  end  of  the  first  three  years,  and  the  term  of  the  remaining  four  expire  at  the  end 
of  six  years:  the  Court  elects  its  President  and  Vice-President  for  a  period  of  two 
years;  they  are  eligible  for  re-election:  incidental  vacancies  of  the  Court 
occurring  by  resignation,  removal  or  death  are  filled  by  the  same  method;  thus,  a Chapter  Three  93 
person  elected  at  an  incidental  election  to  replace  a  member  whose  term  of  office 
has  expired  for  any  of  the  above  reasons,  should  only  hold  office  for  the  remainder 
of  his  predecessor's  term. 
3.1.  The  Judges'  Qualifications 
The  reputation  of  any  judiciary,  whether  national  or  international,  depends 
upon  the  quality  of  its  judges.  Whenever  they  possess  high  standards  of 
qualifications,  this  means  the  reputation  of  the  Court  itself  will  remain  high. 
Art.  6  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  lays  down,  in  general,  the  qualifications 
which  will  be  required  of  its  judges.  It  provides: 
"The  Court  shall  be  composed  of  a  body  of  independent  Judges,  who 
are  citizens  of  member  states,  and  are  persons  of  high  moral  character, 
who  possess  the  qualifications  required  in  their  respective  countries 
for  appointment  of  the  highest  judicial  office,  or  are  jurisconsults  of 
recognised  competence  in  Islamic  Shariah  and  international  law.  " 
The  formulation  of  this  Article  follows  closely,  with  minor  changes,  the 
wording  of  Art.  2  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  which  also  states  the  personal  and 
professional  requirement  for  its  judges:  high  moral  character,  eligibility  to  highest 
judicial  office,  or  recognised  competence  in  international  law.  ' 
It  has  to  be  mentioned  that  neither  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  nor  the  draft 
Statute  nor  the  draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ  include  any  indications  of  how  to  establish 
the  existence  of  judges'  qualifications.  This  is  also  true  of  the  ICJ.  Accordingly, 
there  is  no  international  machinery  responsible  to  investigate  whether  candidates 
This  Article  provides: 
"The  Court  shall  be  composed  of  a  body  of  independent  judges,  elected  regardless  of 
their  nationality  from  among  persons  of  high  moral  character,  who  possess  the 
qualifications  required  in  their  respective  countries  for  appointment  to  the  highest 
judicial  offices,  or  are  jurisconsults  of  recognized  competence  in  international  law.  " Chapter  Three  94 
actually  possess  such  qualifications.  The  matter  will  be  left  to  the  good  sense  of 
every  member  state  that  desires  to  ensure  that  the  ACJ  is  composed  of  highly 
qualified  judges,  that  the  reputation  of  the  Court  as  a  whole  remains  high,  simply 
because  every  state  may  become  a  litigant  before  the  Court.  2 
On  the  other  hand,  it  becomes  clear  that  Art.  6  of  the  draft  Statute  stipulates 
two  different  types  of  qualifications  required  in  each  candidate,  qualification  for 
appointment  to  the  highest  judicial  office  in  their  own  countries,  recognised 
competence  in  Islamic  Shariah  and  international  law.  Actually,  there  is  no 
relationship  between  the  qualification  to  hold  the  highest  judicial  office  of  a  judge 
in  national  courts  and  to  be  qualified  in  international  law.  In  another  words,  it  is 
not  necessary  that  the  judge  who  may  hold  a  high  position  in  national  courts  is 
usually  deemed  qualified  to  be  the  right  person  to  hold  the  same  position  in  an 
international  court,  because  each  court  has  its  own  nature,  applicable  law,  and 
types  of  jurisdiction.  For  that  reason,  any  international  court  is  considered 
`international'  not  because  its  judges  will  be  from  different  nationalities,  but 
because  it  is  an  international  court  applying  international  law.  In  this  regard 
Rosenne  criticised  the  ICJ  Statute  when  he  argued  that  "the  order  in  which  those 
two  qualifications  are  stated  is  not  logical.  "3  The  need  for  a  solid  background  and 
2  See  for  more  details  Rosenne,  Shabtai,  The  World  Court:  What  it  is  and  How  it  Works,  London: 
Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers,  (1995)  p.  45.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Rosenne,  The  World  Court);  also 
see  his  The  Composition  of  the  Court,  in  Leo  Gross  (ed.  ),  The  Future  of  the  International  Court  of 
Justice,  vol.  1,  New  York:  Oceana  Publications,  INC.,  (1979)  p.  p.  387-388. 
3  Rosenne,  Shabtai,  The  Law  and  Practice  of  the  International  Court  1920-1996,  vol.  I,  The 
Hague:  Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers,  (1997)  p.  367.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Rosenne,  The  Law  and 
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high  standard  of  qualification  in  international  law  is  much  more  important  than 
holding  the  highest  judicial  office  in  his  own  country.  4 
This  criticism  cannot  to  be  levelled  against  the  qualification  of  a  judge  in  the 
Islamic  Shariah,  because  the  branch  of  law  which  regulates  principles  of 
international  relations  of  the  Islamic  state  is  based  on  the  same  sources  as  that 
branch  which  regulates  internal  relations.  In  another  words,  unlike  positive  law, 
there  is  no  difference  between  municipal  law  and  international  law  in  the  Islamic 
Shariah. 
In  spite  of  this  point,  the  qualifications  required  for  the  Arab  judges,  provided 
for  in  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  should  differ  from  person  to  person.  Compared 
with  the  judges  in  the  ICJ  it  becomes  clear  that  judges  of  this  Court  have  held  the 
highest  judicial  office  in  their  own  countries;  others  were  former  university 
professors  of  international  law,  legal  advisors  or  delegations  for  their  countries  at 
international  conferences;  others  were  diplomats  or  other  professionals  in 
international  legal  affairs;  and  some  pleaded  before  the  ICJ  as  advocates. 
Moreover,  numerous  judges  had  been  members  of  the  International  Law 
Commission  before  election  as  judges  in  the  Court.  This  means  the  majority  of 
judges  of  the  ICJ  are  qualified  in  international  law,  which  is  considered  as  an 
important  requirement  in  every  candidate.  ' 
°  See  Fitzmaurice,  Gerald,  Enlargement  of  the  Contentious  Jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  in  Leo  Gross 
(ed.  ),  The  Future  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  New  York:  Oceana  Publications,  INC., 
(1976)  p.  p.  467-468. 
S  Oda,  Shigeru,  The  International  Court  of  Justice  Viewed  from  the  Bench  (1976-1993),  244 
Recueil  Des  Cours  (1993)  p.  113.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Oda,  The  International  Court);  Prott, 
Lyndel  V.,  The  Latent  Power  of  Culture  and  the  International  Judges,  Abingdon:  Professional 
Books  Limited,  (1979)  p.  27;  For  more  details  about  the  legal  backgrounds  of  judges  of  the  ICJ 
see  49  YBICJ  (1994-95)  p.  p.  20-59. Chapter  Three  96 
It  is  not  expected  that  the  ACJ  will  face  any  difficulties  in  finding  candidates 
to  hold  the  position  of  judges.  A  considerable  number  of  persons,  citizens  of 
member  states  of  the  Arab  League,  fulfil  the  requirements  of  Art.  6  and  have 
substantial  knowledge  and  personal  experience  in  both  multilateral  diplomacy  and 
international  law. 
A  problem  arose  when  Arab  draftsmen  stipulated  qualifications  in  Islamic 
Shariah  as  a  second  requirement  in  candidates  while  requiring  at  the  same  time 
that  they  be  qualified  in  international  law.  So  one  may  ask  whether  the  Arab 
draftsmen  intended  to  exclude  from  appointment  those  who  are  not  qualified  in 
Islamic  Shariah  although  they  possess  a  high  standard  qualification  in 
international  law?  Not  only  that,  but  what  exactly  is  the  degree  of  qualification  in 
Islamic  Shariah  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  requite? 
Our  own  view  on  this  complicated  point,  on  a  close  reading  of  Art.  6,  whether 
in  the  original  version  or  in  translation,  is  that  it  appears  the  Arab  draftsmen  made 
a  direct  relationship  between  the  qualification  in  Islamic  Shariah  and  international 
law,  and  stipulated  that  every  candidate  has  to  be  qualified  in  both  in  order  to  be 
considered  as  a  legitimate  candidate,  because  the  word  `and'  is  used  instead  of  `or' 
in  the  phrase  "jurisconsults  of  recognised  competence  in  Islamic  Shariah  and 
international  law.  "  Evidence  supporting  this  interpretation  is  that  when  the  state 
of  Qatar  gave  its  view  on  this  point  in  its  letter  to  the  Secretary-General  of  the 
Arab  League,  it  stated:  6 
6  See  Unpublished  Document  Relating  to  the  Establishment  of  the  Arab  Court  of  Justice  and 
Discussion  of  the  1995  Draft  Statute,  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Unpublished  Letter),  Unpublished 
Letter  from  the  Permanent  Mission  of  State  of  Qatar  to  the  Arab  League  Cairo,  to  the  Secretary- Chapter  Three 
"It  is  understood  that  the  sentence  `in  Islamic  Shariah  and 
International  Law'  means  every  judge  should  have  recognised 
competence  in  Islamic  Shariah  and  International  Law,  and  because 
those  who  may  be  qualified  in  international  law  may  not  necessary 
qualified  in  Islamic  Shariah,  and.........,  therefore  it  is  recommended 
to  amend  the  wording  to  `in  Islamic  Shariah  or  international  law.  " 
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The  Secretary-General  of  the  Arab  League  did  not  a  give  clear  answer  to  this 
important  question  which  was  stated  by  Qatar.  His  response  was  as  follows:  7 
"The  combination  between  the  qualification  in  both  Islamic  Shariah 
and  international  law  in  the  Court's  judges  is  not  impossible  and  is 
considered  as  a  recommended  requirement.  " 
This  insistence  by  the  Secretary-General  to  keep  the  wording  of  Art.  6  as  it  is 
without  changes  and  the  absence  of  any  other  state  supporting  the  Qataris'  point  of 
view  give  us  a  clear  indication  that  Arab  draftsmen  want  the  ACJ  to  be  composed 
of  judges  who  are  professionals  in  Islamic  Shariah  and  international  law  at  the 
same  time.  This  is  a  practically  impossible  and  illogical  requirement,  and  would 
lead  to  unacceptable  legal  results. 
On  the  one  hand,  it  will  exclude  non-Muslims  who  are  citizens  of  member 
states  of  the  Arab  League  from  appointment  as  a  judge  in  the  Court,  even  if  they 
are  qualified  in  international  law,  despite  the  fact  that  most  cases  which  may  be 
brought  before  the  ACJ  will  be  settled  according  to  the  principles  and  rules  of 
international  law,  in  which  principles  of  Islamic  Shariah  are  not  required.  Most  if 
not  all  inter  Arab  disputes  are  boundary  disputes,  and  there  are  lot  of  examples 
General  of  the  League  of  Arab  States  (Secretary-General  Office),  No.  12/3-104,  dated,  10/09/1995, 
p.  3. 
'  Unpublished  Letter,  from  the  Secretary-General  (Secretary-General  Office)  to  the  Permanent 
Mission  of  the  State  of  Qatar  in  to  the  League  of  Arab  States,  no  number  given,  dated,  13/09/1995, 
p.  1. Chapter  Three  98 
that  could  be  cited  here.  8  The  most  recent  case  between  member  states  in  the 
Arab  League  brought  before  the  ICJ  is  the  Maritime  Delimitation  between  Bahrain 
and  Qatar.  9  We  believe  that  in  this  case,  if  the  parties  decide  to  bring  it  to  the 
ACJ,  its  decision  needs  judges  qualified  in  international  law  more  than  Islamic 
Shariah  simply  because  this  dispute  is  a  technical  dispute  that  needs  special  rules 
accepted  by  both  of  the  parties.  Principles  of  international  law  in  this  point  are 
more  clear  than  principles  of  Islamic  Shariah. 
On  the  other  hand,  Art.  18  (5)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  stipulates  that 
ad  hoc  judges  shall  fulfil  the  conditions  required  by  Art.  6,  which  means, 
according  to  the  wording  of  this  Article,  litigating  states  are  not  allowed  to  appoint 
an  ad  hoc  judge  to  sit  in  a  particular  case  if  he  is  not  qualified  in  Islamic  Shariah. 
We  believe  this  conclusion  will  decrease  the  number  of  cases  which  might  be 
brought  before  the  Court,  especially  if  Islamic  Shariah  is  not  the  law  to  be  applied 
in  that  particular  case.  The  same  argument  which  has  been  made  about  the  titular 
judges  also  applies  to  the  ad  hoc  judges.  If  state  A  desires  to  appoint  an  ad  hoc 
judge  in  its  dispute  with  state  B  which  is  a  technical  dispute,  for  example  over  a 
maritime  boundary,  and  both  have  agreed  that  principles  of  international  law 
comprise  the  law  to  be  applied  in  their  case,  and  state  A  appoints  a  Western  jurist 
who  is  considered  as  a  professional  in  this  kind  of  cases,  while  state  B  appoints  an 
ad  hoc  judge  who  is  only  qualified  in  the  Islamic  Shariah,  the  illogical  result  in 
8  See  Izz  al  Rijal,  Omar,  Jami`at  ad  Dowal  al  `Arabiyah  wa  Munaz'at  al  Hudud  al  `Arabiyah,  (The 
League  of  Arab  States  and  the  Arab  Boundaries  Disputes),  111  Mujallat  as  Siyasah  ad  Daw!  iyah 
(1993)  p.  p.  201-206. 
9  Case  Concerning  Maritime  Delimitations  and  Territorial  Questions  Between  Qatar  and  Bahrain 
(Qatar  v.  Bahrain),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1991)  p.  50. Chapter  Three  99 
this  example  is  that  the  appointment  of  state  A  is  illegal  and  the  appointment  of 
state  B  is  legal.  This  may  lead  state  A  not  to  accept  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ACJ 
and  a  preference  to  settle  the  dispute  before  the  ICJ. 
We  are  not  against  the  idea  that  judges  of  the  ACJ  should  be  qualified  in 
Islamic  Shariah  as  well  as  international  law.  Our  reservation  on  this  point  is  that  it 
is  not  required  that  every  judge  in  the  Court  must  be  qualified  in  Islamic  Shariah 
and  international  law  because  this  is  difficult  condition  to  be  achieved.  Rather  the 
Arab  draftsmen  should  have  adopted  logical  provisions  suited  to  Arab  political 
and  legal  circumstances  for  simple  reason  that  Islamic  Shariah  is  not  the  only 
primary  source  in  the  present  draft  Statute,  further  it  has  not  been  given  any 
priority  in  application,  so  why  the  draftsmen  adopt  this  requirement?  On  the  other 
hand,  if  the  Islamic  Shariah  is  the  only  primary  source  to  be  applied  by  the 
projected  ACJ  the  matter  then  will  be  different  because  in  this  case  it  becomes 
necessary  to  require  that  every  judge  of  the  Court  has  to  be  qualified  in  Islamic 
Shariah  as  the  International  Islamic  Court  of  Justice  (IICJ)  has  requested.  1°  To 
make  this  idea  clearer,  when  the  draftsmen  of  the  Statute  of  the  IICJ  required  that 
every  judge  should  be  qualified  in  Islamic  Shariah,  they  also  provided  that 
10  The  idea  of  the  creation  of  IICJ  appeared  in  1980  when  the  Third  Islamic  Summit  of  the 
Organisation  of  the  Islamic  Conference  adopted  Resolution  No.  11/3  which  provides  for  the 
establishment  of  this  Court.  A  special  expert  committee  was  appointed  to  prepare  its  Statute.  It  is 
however  to  be  noted  that  this  Statute's  still  not  in  force  because  ratification  by  two-thirds  majority 
(31  out  of  45)  member  states  as  provided  in  Art.  49  of  the  OIC  Charter  has  not  been  achieved. 
Amendment  must  be  made  to  Art.  3  of  the  Charter  of  the  OIC  before  activating  the  projected  IICJ 
by  adding  another  paragraph  designating  this  Court  as  the  principal  judicial  organ  of  the  OIC  in 
addition  with  the  other  three  organs:  Kings  and  Heads  of  States  and  Government;  Foreign 
Ministers;  and  General  Secretariat  and  subsidiary  organs.  For  more  details  about  this  Court  see 
Rifat,  Ahmed  M.,  Mahkamat  al  'Ad!  al  Islamiyah  ad  Dawl  yah,  (International  Islamic  Court  of 
Justice),  al  Qahirah:  Dar  an  Nahdah  al  `Arabiyah,  (1992);  al  Ashal,  Abdulla,  Usul  at  Tanzirn  a! 
Islami,  (The  Origin  of  Islamic  Organisations),  at  Qahirah:  Dar  an  Nahdah  at  Arabiyah,  (1988) 
p.  p.  185-205;  Shihab,  Mufeed,  The  Organisation  of  the  Islamic  Conference,  3  EPIL  (1997) Chapter  Three  100 
principles  of  Islamic  Shariah  were  the  primary  source  to  which  the  Court  had  to 
have  recourse  in  every  case  brought  before  it  where  this  was  necessary.  11 
Moreover,  when  they  discussed  the.  qualification  of  judges  in  the  draft  Statute  of 
the  IICJ,  they  laid  down  clear  provisions.  Art.  4  provides: 
"To  be  eligible  for  membership  of  the  Court,  a  candidate  must  be  a 
Muslim  of  high  moral  character,  and  national  of  one  of  the  member 
States  of  the  Organisation  provided  that  he  is  at  least  fort  years  of 
age,  a  Shariah  jurist  of  recognised  competence  and  experienced  in 
international  law  and  possesses  the  qualification  required  in  his  own 
country  for  appointment  to  the  highest  Ifta  or  judicial  office.  "12 
This  Article  settles  the  basic  principal  problems  which  may  arise  in  regard  to 
the  qualification  of  candidates.  Islam  was  the  first  condition  required,  then  the 
candidate  should  be  a  Shariah  jurist  appointed  in  the  highest  Ifta  or  judicial  office, 
but  in  international  law  it  is  only  recommended  that  he  has  experience  in  this  field. 
Compare  Art.  36  (1,3,5)  of  Rome  Statute  of  the  International  Criminal  Court, 
adopted  by  the  United  Nations  Diplomatic  Conference  of  Plenipotentiaries  on  the 
Establishment  of  an  International  Criminal  Court  on  17  July  1998,  in  which 
eighteen  judges  will  be  elected  from  two  lists:  at  least  nine  have  to  be  qualified  in 
criminal  law  experience,  and  five  qualified  in  international  law.  13 
p.  p.  827-828.  It  should  be  noted  that  all  Arab  states  which  are  members  of  the  Arab  League  are 
Muslim  states  and  also  members  of  the  Organisation  of  the  Islamic  Conference. 
Art.  27  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  IICJ. 
12  Ifta  (casuistry)  means  the  deliverance  of  formal  legal  opinion.  The  person  who  gives  this  formal 
legal  opinion  on  any  question  is  called  a  Mufti  or  expounder  of  the  law  of  the  Quran  and  Sunnah. 
This  Article  stated  clearly  what  kind  of  qualifications  is  required  in  each  candidate.  It  requires  that 
the  nominee  has  to  be  a  Shariah  jurist  which  means  he  must  have  finished  at  least  his 
undergraduate  Islamic  Studies  from  a  recognised  Islamic  school  or  University.  In  addition  he  has 
to  possesses  the  qualification  for  appointment  to  the  highest  judicial  office  or  ifta. 
"  For  more  details  about  this  Court  see  Ambos,  Kai,  Establishing  an  International  Criminal  Court 
and  an  International  Criminal  Code,  7  EJIL  (1996)  p.  p.  519-544. Chapter  Three  101 
This  does  not  mean  that  the  person  who  may  be  appointed  as  judge,  whether 
in  the  IICJ  or  ACJ,  has  to  posses  the  quality  of  reasoning  to  be  a  mujtahid.  This 
condition  is  disputed  as  a  necessity,  for  the  ability  of  ijtihad  is  also  not  necessary 
in  candidates  for  the  two  Courts.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  there  is  no  clear  provision 
clarifying  the  types  of  qualifications  in  Islamic  Shariah  which  every  candidate  for 
the  election  to  the  ACJ  should  possess.  For  that  reason  the  Sultanate  of  Oman 
recommended  that  every  candidate  should  be  a  Muslim  jurist  and  have  worked  at 
least  ten  years  in  a  national  Islamic  Court.  14 
In  addition,  as  the  IICJ  is  considered  to  be  an  International  Islamic  Court,  its 
aim  is  to  settle  disputes  between  Muslim  states  members  of  the  OIC,  according  to 
Islamic  Shariah  in  the  first  place  and  only  then  according  to  international  law  if 
this  is  relevant.  For  this  reason,  non-Muslims  citizens  of  member  states  of  the 
OIC  are  excluded  from  appointment  to  the  Court  because,  according  to  Islamic 
jurists'  views,  they  cannot  implement  the  rules  of  Islamic  Shariah.  15  This  matter 
in  the  case  of  the  ACJ  is  different,  because  this  Court  is  not  an  Islamic 
international  court  like  the  IICJ.  Furthermore,  it  is  not  required  that  judges, 
according  to  Art.  6  of  the  draft  Statute,  should  be  Muslim  to  be  allowed  to  take  up 
judgeship  in  the  ACJ.  But  why  did  the  draftsmen  not  mention  these  two  important 
points  explicitly  in  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ? 
"  Unpublished  Letter  from  the  Permanent  Mission  of  the  Sultanate  of  Oman  to  the  League  of 
Arab  States  to  the  Secretary-General  of  the  League  of  Arab  States  (Secretary-General  Office) 
No.  3906/21080/50024/140,  dated,  15/01/1995,  p.  1. 
15  According  to  Art.  VIII  of  the  Charter  of  the  OIC  only  Muslim  states  are  eligible  to  join  this 
Organisation.  See  al  Ahsan,  Abdullah,  The  Organisation  of  the  Islamic  Conference:  An 
Introduction  to  an  Islamic  Political  Institution,  Herndon,  Va.  USA:  The  International  Institute  of 
Islamic  Thought,  (1988)  p.  p.  45-46. Chapter  Three  102 
We  believe  the  reason  may  be  one  of  the  following:  (1)  member  states  want 
to  make  clear  (for  political  reasons)  that  they  do  not  desire  to  create  an  Islamic 
international  court  within  the  Arab  League  system  in  the  same  way  as  that  under 
the  OIC.  (2)  the  draftsmen  may  have  intended  not  to  deal  with  these  points  in 
depth,  and  just  mentioned  the  rule  in  general  and  left  the  details  to  the  general 
principles  of  Islamic  Shariah  regarding  the  appointment  of  judges. 
In  conclusion,  it  is  very  difficult  to  find  a  person  who  possesses  the  high 
standard  of  qualification  in  both  Islamic  Shariah  and  international  law  at  the  same 
time  as  provided  for  in  Art.  6  of  the  ACJ  draft  Statute.  16  So  we  strongly 
recommend  a  revision  of  Art.  6  to  substitute  `or'  instead  of  `and'.  This  would 
allow  the  Article  to  be  interpreted  as  meaning  that  the  whole  court  could  be 
composed  of  persons  some  of  whom  are  qualified  in  Islamic  Shariah  and  others 
qualified  in  international  law.  Nevertheless,  all  judges  qualified  in  Islamic 
Shariah  must  be  Muslims,  and  non-Muslim  citizens.  should  only  allowed  to  be 
members  of  the  Court  if  they  just  determine  cases  settled  by  principles  other  than 
those  of  Islamic  Shariah.  When  any  litigating  state  requests  the  Court  to  settle  the 
dispute  according  to  Islamic  Shariah,  they  have  to  be  disqualified  for  the  particular 
case  or  cases.  In  this  case  an  amendment  is  needed  to  the  draft  Statute  by  adding 
this  idea. 
International  judges,  like  national  judges,  must  be  independent.  So  Art.  6  of 
the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  refers  to  the  independence  of  judges  as  another 
16  In  numerous  Muslim  Universities,  such  as  al  Azhar  University  in  Egypt  and  al  Ain  University  in 
UAE,  students  should  study  at  the  same  time,  for  the  bachelor's  degree,  Islamic  Shariah  and  Law, 
but  we  cannot  say  that  this  is  enough  to  consider  such  graduates  as  professionally  qualified  in  both. Chapter  Three  103 
important  requirement.  It  is  considered  as  a  first  and  superior  requirement  in 
different  places  in  the  draft  Statute.  But  what  is  the  exact  meaning  of  the  word 
`independence'  which  expressly  appears  in  Art.  6  of  the  draft  Statute?  The  answer 
to  this  question  may  be  found  in  the  arguments  of  the  Committee  of  Jurists  made 
when  revising  Art.  2  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ.  At  San  Francisco  it  was  explained 
that  it  means  a  judge  is  to  enjoy  the  freedom  from  any  harassment  or  political 
control  while  he  exercises  his  duties  at  the  Court:  '7 
"...  After  discussion  as  to  whether  the  word  `independence'  should  be 
replaced  by  the  word  `impartial'  the  committee  unanimously  agreed 
to  adopt  Article  2  as  it  stood. 
It  was  felt  by  several  delegates  that  deletion  of  the  word 
`independence'  would  give  rise  to  misinterpretation,  since  it  is 
important  that  the  judge  of  the  Court  should  be  not  only  impartial  but 
also  independent  of  control  by  their  own  countries  or  United  Nations 
Organization". 
Lachs  had  his  own  view  on  judges'  independence.  He  argued  that:  18 
"independence  is  a  quality  of  man,  and  dependent  on  his  character;  it 
is  not  dependent  on  political  system.  One  may  test  it  by  the  writings 
in  which  he  presents  his  views  and  by  his  judicial  record.  By  his 
fruits  ye  shall  know  him.  Independence  is  a  `personal'  quality;  it  is 
the  man  who  is  to  be  evaluated,  and  not  a  system.  " 
Furthermore,  in  order  to  satisfy  this  requirement,  the  judges  of  the  ICJ  are 
clearly  under  an  obligation  not  to  hold  any  other  positions  while  their  term  of 
office  still  exists.  In  other  words,  candidates  who  are  elected  should  immediately 
17  Report  of  the  Committee  of  Jurists  in  UNCIO,  vol.  13,  (1945)  p.  174. 
18  Lachs,  Manfred,  A  Few  Thoughts  on  the  Independence  of  Judges  of  the  International  Court  of 
Justice,  25  CJTL  (1987)  p.  596;  also  see  his  separate  opinion  in  case  Concerning  Military  and 
Paramilitary  Activities  in  and  against  Nicaragua  (Nicaragua  v.  USA),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1986)  p.  158. 
When  he  argued  that:  "A  judge-as  needs  no  emphasis-is  bound  to  be  impartial,  objective,  detached, 
disinterested  and  unbiased.  "  For  comprehensive  explanation  of  these  qualities  see 
Schwarzenberger,  George,  The  Judicial  Corps  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  36  YBWA 
(1982)  p.  p.  241-267;  Prott,  Lyndel  V.,  The  Future  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  33  YBWA 
(1979)  p.  p.  291-294;  for  further  details  see  Shelton,  Dinah,  The  Independence  of  International 
Tribunals,  56  The  Review  (1996)  p.  p.  23-49;  also  see  Fitzmaurice's  separate  opinion  in  Barcelona 
Traction,  Light  and  Power  Company,  Limited,  case  (Belgium  v.  Spain),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1961)  p.  133. Chapter  Three  104 
resign  from  any  position  in  the  service  of  a  government  or  international 
organisation.  In  some  cases  they  may  be  forced  to  leave  their  private  functions  as 
well.  For  example,  in  one  case,  the  President  suggested  that  judge  Sir  Percy 
Spencer  had  to  resign  from  the  directorship  of  certain  companies,  19  and  also  when 
judge  Sir  Muhammad  Zafrullah  Khan  was  excluded  from  sitting  in  the  South  West 
Africa  case,  because  he  had  been  an  active  Pakistani  delegate  to  the  UN  General 
Assembly  when  it  was  discussing  the  situation  in  South  Africa.  20  This  however 
does  not  mean  that  a  judge  has  to  be  excluded  from  a  case  to  which  his  own 
country  is  a  party,  because  that  does  not  conflict  with  the  principles  of 
independence  and  impartiality  of  judges. 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  has  introduced  two  other 
important  provisions  in  order  to  secure  the  independence  and  impartiality  of 
judges.  No  similar  provisions  are  found  in  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ.  The  first  para.  3 
of  Art.  14  prohibits  members  of  the  Court  from  working  with  any  party  to  a 
dispute  whether  it  is  a  principal  party  or  intervening  in  a  case.  This  obligation 
exists  for  three  years  after  the  termination  of  his  office  in  the  Court.  It  reads  as 
follows: 
"A  Judge  whose  term  of  office  expires  may  not,  within  three  years, 
work  with  any  body  that  was  a  principal  or  intervening  party  in  a  case 
in  whose  decision  that  Judge  participated.  In  a  case  of  breach,  the 
issue  shall  be  submitted  to  the  Court  to  take  the  appropriate  action. 
However,  an  exception  may  be  made  on  the  basis  of  a  reasoned 
decision.  " 
19  See  correspondence  between  the  Prime  Minister  of  Australia  (R.  Menziens)  and  judge  Sir Percy 
Spender,  The  Times  (London),  Friday,  12th  September  1958  p.  9. 
20  See  South  West  Africa  case,  Second  Phase,  (Ethiopia  v.  South  West  Africa;  Liberia  v.  South 
West  Africa),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1965)  p.  3. Chapter  Three  105 
Second,  Art.  15  provides  that  "Judges  of  the  Court  may  not  be  dismissed". 
This  Article  states  explicitly  that  judges  of  the  ACJ  are  really  protected  from 
influence  and  control  of  their  governments,  which  means  that  as  soon  as  a  judge  is 
elected,  his  government  has  no  power  to  dismiss  him  from  his  position.  21 
3.2.  The  System  of  Elections 
There  is  a  strong  relation  between  the  nomination  and  election  of  members. 
Elections  start  when  states  nominate  their  candidates  following  the  Secretary- 
General's  invitation.  Arts.  7  (2,3)  and  8  of  the  draft  Statute  regulate  the 
nomination  of  candidates  and  the  election  of  members  of  the  ACJ.  These  two 
Articles  show  that,  unlike  the  international  drafters,  the  Arab  draftsmen  follow  the 
principle  of  direct  nomination  of  candidates.  On  the  one  hand,  Art.  7  provides: 
"2.  Each  member  state  shall  be  entitled,  upon  the  invitation  of  the 
League's  Secretary-General,  to  nominate  one  of  its  citizens,  at  least 
two  months  before  the  date  of  election. 
3.  Elections  shall  be  run  according  to  the  League's  Council  decision, 
by  secret  ballot  from  a  list  of  persons  which  shall  be  prepared  by  the 
League's  Secretary-General  containing  the  names  of  the  candidates  in 
alphabetical  order.  " 
Art.  8  on  the  other  hand  provides: 
"No  more  than  one  Judge  of  the  same  nationality  may  be  appointed  as 
a  member  of  the  Court.  " 
It  has  to  be  mentioned  that  the  draft  Statute  of  the  IICJ  also  employed  direct 
nomination  but  was  more  successful  in  laying  down  clear  and  simple  provisions 
with  regard  to  the  nomination  of  candidates  and  election  of  members  22 
21  This  will  be  discussed  later  in  this  chapter  when  dealing  with  vacancies  of  judges,  see  below 
p.  126. 
22  See  Art.  5  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  IICJ. Chapter  Three  106 
3.2.1.  Nomination  of  Candidates 
It  is  regrettable  to  say  that  the  wording  of  Art.  7  has  dissolved  the  flavour  and 
meaning  of  `independence'  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  had  already  adopted  in  Art.  6 
of  the  draft  Statute.  However,  before  we  can  state  our  own  view  on  this,  further 
information  must  be  given  about  the  system  of  nomination  of  candidates  in  the 
Statute  of  the  ICJ.  From  a  close  reading  of  those  Articles  regulating  the 
nomination  of  candidates  in  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  (Arts.  5-7),  it  becomes  clear  that 
the  international  drafters  have  followed  the  principle  of  indirect  nomination  of 
candidates.  This  idea  means  that  every  candidate  is  nominated  not  directly  by  his 
own  government,  but  indirectly  by  `national  groups'  created  in  each  country  for 
this  purpose;  their  main  function  is  to  check  that  candidates  possess  the 
qualifications  required  to  be  a  member  of  the  Court,  and  also  to  limit  the  control 
of  the  governments  on  their  nominees.  23 
The  idea  of  indirect  nomination  was  first  raised  when  the  Statute  of  the  PCIJ 
was  drafted  in  1920.  It  was  suggested  that  the  four  persons  who  had  already  been 
nominated  by  their  governments  as  Arbitrators  in  the  Permanent  Court  of 
Arbitration  (PCA)  should  nominate  candidates  for  the  PCIJ.  Countries  not  parties 
to  the  Hague  Conventions24  and  not  members  of  the  PCA,  were  entitled  to  create 
23  For  more  details  see  Fachiri,  Alexander,  P.,  The  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice:  Its 
Constitution,  Procedure  and  Work,  Germany:  Fotokop  Wilhelm  Weihert  KG,  (1980)  p.  35. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  Fachiri,  The  Permanent  Court);  Eagleton,  Clyde,  Choice  of  Judges  for  the 
International  Court  of  Justice,  47  AJIL  (1953)  p.  p.  462-463;  Rosenne,  The  World  Court,  supra 
note  2,  p.  62. 
24  It  is  however  to  be  understood  that  the  1899  and  1907  Hague  Conventions  for  the  Pacific 
Settlement  of  International  Disputes  presented  the  object  of  international  arbitration  as  a  method 
for  settling  disputes  between  states  by  judges  chosen  by  them.  The  1899  Hague  Convention 
pointed  to  the  beginning  of  a  new  period  of  arbitration  by  creating  the  PCA  which  started 
functioning  in  1902  and  remains  in  existence  and  has  its  seat  at  The  Hague.  Art.  44  of  1907  Hague 
Convention  granted  the  contracting  parties  the  right  to  nominate  not  more  than  four  persons  of Chapter  Three  107 
ad  hoc  national  groups  for  this  purpose.  25  The  PCIJ  Statute  recommended  that  the 
national  groups  have  to  consult,  before  nominating  candidates,  the  respective 
highest  court  of  justice,  legal  faculties  and  schools  of  law,  and  national  academies 
and  national  sections  of  international  academies  devoted  to  the  study  of  law.  This 
recommendation  was  provided  to  double  check  that  every  candidate  possesses  the 
qualifications  required  by  the  Statute.  26 
When  the  Statute  was  redrafted  in  1945  to  establish  the  ICJ,  there  were 
serious  attempts  to  modify  the  provisions.  It  was  disputed  that  the  system  of 
indirect  nomination  had  worked  as  intended,  but  it  was  also  argued  that  changing 
the  system  would  lead  to  the  same  result,  especially  as  governments  would 
known  competency  in  questions  of  international  law  and  of  highest  moral  reputation  for  the 
position  of  Arbitrator.  For  more  details  about  the  PCA  see  Official  Legal  Affairs  Codification 
Division,  Handbook  on  the  Peaceful  Settlement  of  Disputes  Between  States,  New  York:  United 
Nations  Publications,  (1992)  p.  p.  55-61;  Copithorne,  M.,  D.,  The  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration 
and  the  Election  of  Members  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  XVI  CYb1L  (1987) 
p.  p.  318-318;  Scott,  James  B.,  The  Election  of  Judges  for  the  Permanent  Court  of  International 
Justice,  15  AJIL  (1921)  p.  556;  McWhinney,  Edward,  Judicial  Settlement  of  Disputes  Jurisdiction 
and  Justiciability,  211  Recueil  Des  Cours  (1990)  p.  p.  129-131.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  McWhinney, 
Judicial  Settlement  of  Disputes);  and  his  Law,  Politics  and  "Regionalism"  in  the  Nomination  and 
Election  of  World  Court  Judges,  13  SJILC  (1986)  p.  p.  3-8.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  McWhinney, 
Election  of  World  Court  Judges). 
25  Art.  4  of  the  Statute  of  the  PCIJ  provides: 
"The  members  of  the  Court  shall  be  elected  by  the  Assembly  and  by  the  Council 
from  a  list  of  persons  nominated  by  the  national  groups  in  the  Court  of  Arbitration, 
in  accordance  with  the  following  provisions: 
In  the  case  of  Members  of  the  League  of  Nations  not  represented  in  the  Permanent 
Court  of  Arbitration,  the  lists  of  candidates  shall  drawn  up  by  national  groups 
appointed  for  this  purpose  by  their  governments  under  the  same  conditions  as  those 
prescribed  for  members  of  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  by  Article  44  of  the 
Convention  of  The  Hague  of  1907  for  the  pacific  settlement  of  international 
disputes.  " 
26  McWhinney,  Election  of  World  Court  Judges,  supra  note  24,  p.  8;  Fachiri,  The  Permanent 
Court,  supra  note  23,  p.  35;  also  see  Art.  6  of  the  ICJ  Statute  which  provides: 
"Before  making  those  nominations,  each  national  group  is  recommended  to  consult 
its  Highest  Court  of  Justice,  its  Legal  Faculties  and  Schools  of  Law,  and  its  National 
Academies  and  national  sections  of  International  Academies  devoted  to  the  study  of 
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undertake  a  serious  consultations  like  those  entrusted  to  the  national  groups. 
Ultimately,  it  was  decided  not  to  change  the  system.  27 
The  procedure  of  nominating  candidates  for  the  ICJ  is  found  in  the  provisions 
of  Arts.  4  and  5  of  its  Statute.  The  provisions  of  these  two  Articles  are 
summarised  in  the  following  points:  first,  if  a  state  is  a  member  of  the  United 
Nations  and  party  to  the  Hague  Convention,  in  this  case,  the  nomination  is  to  be 
made  by  the  national  groups  that  already  have  been  created  by  each  state.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  a  state  is  a  member  of  the  United  Nations  but  not  a  party  to  the 
Hague  Convention,  the  government  is  to  create  an  ad  hoc  national  group  similar  to 
those  prescribed  for  members  of  the  PCA.  Lastly,  if  a  particular  state  is  a  party  to 
the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  but  not  a  member  of  the  United  Nations,  then,  this  state  may 
participate  in  electing  members  of  the  Court  according  to  the  conditions  which 
shall  be  laid  down  by  the  General  Assembly  upon  the  recommendation  of  the 
Security  Council.  28 
At  least  three  months  before  the  date  of  election,  the  Secretary-General  of  the 
UN  has  to  communicate  with  the  national  groups,  through  the  foreign  ministry  of 
each  country,  and  invite  them  to  undertake  the  nomination.  Every  national  group 
may  nominate  not  more  than  four  persons,  of  whom  not  more  than  two  may  be  of 
its  nationality;  and  in  no  case  may  the  number  of  candidates  nominated  by  a  group 
be  more  than  double  the  number  of  seats  to  be  filled.  29  Furthermore,  names  of  the 
27  See  UNCIO,  vol.  13  (1945)  p.  p.  180,388-389;  also  see  vol.  14,  p.  p.  189-195,825. 
28  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  3,  p.  p.  375-376. 
29  Art.  5  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ. Chapter  Three  109 
candidates  are  to  be  listed  in  alphabetical  order  by  the  Secretary-General  before 
being  presented  to  the  General  Assembly  and  Security  Council.  Only  persons  who 
are  presented  in  this  list  are  eligible  for  election.  30  The  Secretary-General 
customarily  circulates  biographical  particulars  of  the  candidates  to  enable  the 
electors  and  advise  them  to  take  their  decision  with  a  full  knowledge  of  the 
candidates.  31 
Unlike  the  ICJ  Statute,  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  does  not  create  national 
groups  whose  job  is  to  nominate  candidates.  The  nomination  of  candidates  in  the 
ACJ  is  to  be  made  directly  by  the  governments  of  member  states  (through  the 
foreign  minister)  to  the  Secretary-General  following  his  previous  invitation  to  the 
governments  requesting  them  to  nominate  their  candidates.  Every  country  has  the 
right  to  nominate  just  one  of  its  citizens  at  least  two  months  before  the  date  of  the 
election.  Thus  of  twenty  two  candidates,  only  seven  will  become  judges  of  the 
ACJ.  The  Secretary-General  has  to  prepare  a  list  containing  the  names  of 
candidates  in  alphabetical  order  and  submit  it  to  the  League Council.  This  is  the 
only  political  organ  within  the  Arab  League  system  responsible  for  participating  in 
the  election.  32 
Despite  the  theoretical  justification,  the  use  of  national  groups  does  not 
always  mean  that  the  impartiality  of  nomination  candidates  is  secured,  to  the 
30  Art.  7  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ. 
31  Hudson,  Manley  0.,  The  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice  1920-1942  A  Treaties,  New 
York:  The  Macmillan  Company,  (1943)  p.  251.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Hudson  The  Permanent 
Court);  Rosenne,  The  World  Court,  supra  note  2,  p.  63;  also  see  his  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra 
note  3,  p.  377  (footnote  34). 
32  For  more  details  about  the  League  Council  in  the  Arab  League  see  chapter  1,  p.  p.  15-18. Chapter  Three  110 
exclusion  of  political  influences  when  a  particular  state  wishes  to  appoint  a 
particular  person.  Nevertheless,  adopting  indirect  nomination  by  creating  these 
groups  is  much  better  than  direct  nomination.  There  is  disagreement  between 
jurists  on  this  matter,  some  favour  their  retention  in  the  present  Statute  of  the  ICJ, 
while  others  argue  that  they  have  become  out  of  date.  For  example  Rosenne 
concludes:  33 
"although  at  times  there  may  be  an  elements  of  artificiality  in  the 
nominating  process,  especially  since,  in  the  present  circumstances,  a 
ready-made  national  group  does  not  exist  for  most  parties  to  the 
Statute,  the  decision  of  1945  to  retain  the  existing  system  was 
wise...  [T]he  present  nominating  system,  if  conscientiously  applied, 
does  offer  the  best  possibility  of  ensuring  that  the  candidates  will 
dully  qualified.  " 
On  the  other  hand,  McWhinney's  view  is  that:  34 
"This  raises  the  question  whether  the  legal  fiction  of  national  groups 
operating  and  nominating  independently  of  their  respective  national 
governments  should  not  yield  today,  in  any  future  revision  of  the 
Court  Statute,  to  the  contemporary  reality  that  the  choice  of  judges  for 
the  international  court  is  now  deemed  by  member  States  of  the  United 
Nations  as  politically  too  important  to  be  left  to  legal  "laymen", 
outside  the  professional  legal  divisions  of  the  national  foreign 
ministers.  " 
By  comparing  Art.  7  of  the  present  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  with  the  first  draft 
Statute  prepared  by  the  Three-Man  Commission  in  1950,35  it  becomes  clear  that 
the  drafters  of  the  1950  ACJ  Statute  also  adopted  the  provision  of  direct 
nomination  as  no  national  groups  were  mentioned.  At  the  same  time,  however, 
every  state  was  granted  the  right  to  nominate  three  persons,  not  more  than  two  of 
33  Rosenne,  The  World  Court,  supra  note  2,  p.  63. 
34  McWhinney,  Judicial  Settlement  of  Disputes,  supra  note  24,  p.  135;  for  further  details  about 
the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  national  groups  see  Hudson,  The  Permanent  Court,  supra 
note  31,  p.  p.  265-267. 
35  More  details  see  Foda,  Ezzeldin,  The  Projected  Arab  Court  of  Justice:  A  Study  in  Regional 
Jurisdiction  with  Specific  Reference  to  the  Muslim  Law  of  Nations,  The  Hague:  Martinus  Nijhoff, 
(1957)  p.  p.  188-189,226.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Foda,  The  Projected  Arab  Court). Chapter  Three  111 
whom  were  to  be  of  its  own  nationality.  In  addition,  it  required  every  state  before 
making  its  nomination,  to  consult  its  highest  judicial  institutions,  its  legal 
faculties,  its  lawyers'  unions  and  other  associations  devoted  to  the  study  of  law. 
These  provisions  are  absent  in  the  present  draft  Statute. 
We  believe  that  the  most  important  issue  that  arises  as  a  result  of  direct 
nomination  is  that  the  judge  who  displeases  his  own  government  during  his  term 
of  office  might  not  be  renominated.  It  would  be  better  if  the  Arab  draftsmen 
adopted  indirect  nomination  by  revising  Art.  7,  and  that  ad  hoc  national  groups  be 
created  for  the  purpose  of  nominating  candidates.  These  national  groups  should 
also  be  requested,  similar  to  the  matter  relations  to  the  ICJ,  before  making  their 
nomination,  to  consult  its  highest  judicial  institutions,  legal  faculties,  lawyer's 
unions  and  other  associations  devoted  to  the  study  of  law. 
Furthermore,  in  the  Statutes  of  both  the  ACJ  and  the  ICJ  no  provision  is  made 
regarding  the  withdrawal  of  candidates.  But  Art.  5  (1)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  is 
more  clear  in  this  regard  then  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ.  It  laid  down  the 
condition  relating  to  `the  nomination  of  person  in  a  position  to  accept  the  duties  of 
a  member  of  the  Court'.  So  the  interpretation  given  to  this  Article  was  that  once 
the  nominee  declared  his  unwillingness  to  be  one  of  the  candidates,  he  must  not  be 
forced  to  accept  the  duties  of  a  member  of  the  Court.  Therefore  his  name  should 
be  excluded  from  the  list  prepared  by  the  Secretary-General  and  submitted  to  the 
Security  Council  and  General  Assembly.  36 
36  Cf.  Art.  5  (1)  of  the  ICJ  with  Art.  7  (2,3)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ;  for  more  discussion 
see  Rosenne,  Shabtai,  Elections  of  Members  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice:  Late 
Nominations  and  Withdrawals  of  Candidates,  70  AJIL  (1976)  p.  p.  547-549. Chapter  Three  112 
3.2.2.  Election  of  the  Members 
Procedures  of  election  in  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  are,  compared  with 
those  in  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  very  simple.  The  difference  in  nature  and  structure 
between  the  UN  as  a  global  organisation,  and  the  Arab  League  as  a  regional 
organisation,  led  the  Arab  draftsmen  to  adopt  different  procedures.  There  are  two 
considerable  differences  between  the  two  systems.  Firstly,  members  of  the  ICJ  are 
elected  jointly  by  the  Security  Council  and  General  Assembly,  each  with  its  own 
complicated  procedure.  37  In  the  Arab  League  system,  the  League  Council  is  the 
only  political  organ.  Secondly,  when  an  election  is  held  for  the  ACJ,  the  Arab 
League  Council  needs  to  consider  just  one  requirement,  that  every  candidate 
fulfils  the  qualifications  required  by  Art.  6  of  the  draft  Statute.  Concerning  the 
ICJ,  both  the  General  Assembly  and  the  Security  Council  have  to  take  account  that 
the  Court  as  a  whole  has  to  comprise  not  just  highly  qualified  judges  but,  in 
addition,  to  ensures  that  the  representation  of  the  main  forms  of  civilisation  and 
principal  legal  system  of  the  World  is  achieved.  This  makes  the  system  of 
election  in  the  ICJ  more  complicated.  38 
When  the  Arab  League's  Secretary-General  finishes  preparing  the  list  which 
contains  the  names  of  twenty  two  candidates  organised  in  alphabetical  order,  he 
has  to  inform  the  League  Council.  Accordingly,  the  League  Council  has  to  decide 
37  Art.  8  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ;  for  further  details  about  the  procedures  for  election  in  the 
General  Assembly  and  Security  Council  see  Muller,  Sam,  and  Blokker  Niels,  The  1996  Elections 
to  the  International  Court  of  Justice:  New  Tendencies  in  the  Post-Cold  War  Era,  47  ICLQ  (1998) 
p.  p.  215-217;  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  3,  p.  p.  381-386. 
38  Shahabuddeen,  Mohamed,  The  World  Court  at  the  Turn  of  the  Century,  in  A.  S.  Muller,  D. 
Raid  and  J.  M.  Thurdnszky  (eds.  ),  The  International  Court  of  Justice:  Its  Future  Role  After  Fifty 
Years,  The  Hague:  Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers,  (1997)  p.  p.  9-16. Chapter  Three  113 
when  the  election  is  to  be  held.  There  is  no  further  rule  clarifying  on  which  level 
the  League  Council  should  meet  for  the  purpose  of  the  election.  Every  member 
state  through  its  delegation  in  the  League  Council  must  elect,  by  secret  ballot, 
seven  candidates,  from  those  presented  in  the  list. 
By  Art.  9  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  the  candidate  who  obtains  the 
greatest  number  of  votes  in  the  ballot  will  be  considered  elected;  in  the  event  of 
equal  votes,  the  eldest  is  deemed  elected.  It  is  however  to  be  noted  that  there  is  no 
further  proviso  to  deal  with  the  problem  that  would  arise  if  a  candidate  has  not 
obtained  the  greatest  number  of  votes  and  the  candidates  are  at  the  same  time  of 
the  same  age.  In  other  words,  it  is  necessary  to  allow  the  League  Council  to 
organise  a  second  or  third  meeting  if  one  or  more  seats  remain  to  be  filled.  This  is 
expressly  provided  for  in  Art.  11  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ.  39 
We  can  conclude  from  the  above  mentioned  procedures  concerning 
nomination  of  candidates  and  election  of  judges  of  the  ACJ  that  Arab  draftsmen 
were  more  influenced  by  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  than  by  principles  of  Islamic 
Shariah  regarding  the  appointment  of  judges.  This  however  does  not  mean  those 
procedures  which  have  been  adopted  conflict  with  principles  of  Islamic  Shariah. 
3.3.  Term  of  Office  of  Judges 
The  provisions  which  govern  the  term  of  office  of  judges  in  the  draft  Statute 
of  the  ACJ  are  laid  down  in  Arts.  7  (1),  10  (1)  and  17  (3).  Generally,  it  appears 
39  This  Article  reads  as  follows: 
"If,  after  the  first  meeting  held  for  the  purpose  of  the  election,  one  or  more  seats 
remain  to  be  filled,  a  second  and,  if  necessary,  a  third  meeting  shall  take  place.  " Chapter  Three  114 
that  the  Arab  draftsmen  adopted  the  same  provisions  in  this  matter  as  those 
already  adopted  by  the  ICJ  Statute  in  Arts.  13  (1)  and  15.  The  term  of  office  in  the 
ICJ,  according  to  Art.  13  (1)  is  nine  years.  "The  members  of  the  Court  shall  be 
elected  for  nine  years.  "  A  person  who  is  elected  to  replace  a  judge  whose  term  of 
office  had  not  expired  shall  only  hold  office  for  the  remainder  of  the  term.  40  All 
members  of  the  Court  are  eligible  for  re-election'  and  there  is  no  age  limit  or 
compulsory  retirement  for  the  judges.  42  Art.  2  of  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ  elucidates 
the  beginning  of  the  term  of  office  of  judges.  For  a  member  elected  at  a  triennial 
election,  the  term  begins  on  the  date  of  election,  which  is  normally  held  on  6 
February.  43 
These  provisions  on  the  term  of  office  have  been  criticised  by  the  Institute  of 
the  International  Law,  which  argued  that  the  relevant  Articles  should  be 
40  Art.  15  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ;  also  see  Rosenne,  Shabtai,  The  Election  of  Five  Members  of 
the  International  Court  of  Justice  in  1981,76  AJIL  (1982)  p.  364.  When  Judge  Sir  Humphry 
Waldock,  the  President  of  the  Court,  suddenly  died  at  The  Hague  on  15`h  August  1981,  his  death 
was  close  to  the  end  of  his  term  of  office,  which  mean  the  person  elected  would  fill  the  same  seat 
for  just  a  few  weeks.  Accordingly,  the  Security  Council,  according  the  recommendation  of  the 
Secretary-General,  decided: 
"on  the  basis  of  consultation  with  the  members  of  the  Security  Council....,  the 
Council  considers  that,  as  the  vacancy  which  has  arisen....,  will  be  filled  through  the 
regular  election  procedure  as  from  6  February  1982,  no  purpose  would  be  served  by 
invoking  the  procedures  of  the  Statute  of  the  Court  relating  to  the  filling  of  a  causal 
vacancy  for  the  reminder  of  Sir  Humphrey's  term  of  office.  Those  procedures  are 
applicable  in  cases  where  otherwise  a  considerable  delay  would  elapse  in  filling  a 
vacancy.  No  such  delay  is  involved  in  this  instance,  as  the  seat  will  be  filled  as  from 
6  February  1982.  "  UN  Doc.  A/36/451-5/14645,  (26th  August  1981). 
41  This  means  immediate  re-election.  Cf.  International  Organisations  Re-Eligibility  of  Members 
of  Executive  Board  Who  Cease  to  be  Members  of  the  Delegation  of  their  States-Constitution 
UNESCO,  A  D,  16  (1949),  case  No.  113,  p.  335. 
42  For  example,  Manfred  Lachs  held  office  as  a  judge  in  the  ICJ  for  around  twenty  six  years  1967- 
1993.  See  47  YBICJ  (1992-93)  p.  10;  Eyffinger,  Arthur,  The  International  Court  of  Justice  1946- 
1996,  London:  Kluwer  Law  International,  (1996)  p.  303.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Eyffinger,  The 
International  Court). 
43  For  further  details  on  this  point  see  Rosenne,  Shabtai,  The  1981  Occasional  Elections  to  Fill 
Two  Vacancies  on  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  75  AJIL  (1981)  p.  p.  349-361. Chapter  Three  Hs 
redrafted.  44  It  was  suggested  that  the  term  of  office  should  be  increased  to  fifteen 
years'  subject  to  compulsory  retirement  at  the  age  of  seventy  five.  The  same 
provisions  should  apply  to  those  members  elected  to  fill  occasional  vacancies. 
Their  term  of  office  should  also  be  for  a  fifteen  years'  term,  without  paying  any 
attention  to  the  term  for  which  their  predecessors  held  office.  45  Rosenne 
commented  on  these  proposals  by  saying:  46 
"it  is  desirable  to  distinguish  those  relating  to  the  members  elected  in 
regular  elections,  and  those  relating  to  the  occasional  vacancies.  It  is 
believed  that  the  relatively  short  term  of  office  inevitably  offered  to 
members  elected  to  fill  occasional  vacancies  may  deter  qualified 
persons  from  agreeing  to  be  candidates.  Such  disadvantages  would  be 
overcome  where  the  members  of  the  Court  elected  at  occasional 
elections  to  serve  a  full  term.  " 
Returning  to  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  it  is  clear  that  this  Court  comprises 
seven  judges  elected  for  six  years.  The  term  of  office  of  three  of  them  elected  in 
the  first  election  expires  at  the  end  of  three  years.  47  In  this  regard  Algeria 
suggested  that:  48 
"it  is  preferable  to  keep  the  term  of  office  of  judges  just  for  three 
years  eligible  for  renewal  just  for  another  time,  in  order  to  allow  other 
judges  in  member  States  to  hold  this  position  for  a  reasonable  period.  " 
44  Also  see,  Bowen,  D.  W.,  [et.  al],  The  International  Court  of  Justice,  Efficiency  of  procedures 
and  Working  Methods:  Report  of  the  Study  Group  Established  by  the  British  Institute  of 
International  and  Comparative  Law  as  a  Contribution  to  the  UN  Decade  of  International  Law,  45 
ICLQ  [supp.  ],  (1996)  p.  p.  20-21. 
43  See  45  Annuaire  IDI,  (1945-II)  p.  297  in  which  the  Institute  of  International  Law  argued: 
"With  a  view  to  reinforcing  the  independence  of  the  judges,  it  is  suggested  that 
members  of  the  Court  should  be  elected  for  fifteen  years  and  should  not  be  re- 
eligible.  In  this  event  an  age  limit  should  be  laid  down;  it  might  be  fixed  at  seventy 
five  years.  " 
46  Rosenne,  Shabtai,  The  Law  and  Practice  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  (2nd  revised 
edn.  ),  Lancaster:  Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers,  (1985)  p.  191.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Rosenne,  The 
Law  and  Practice). 
47  Arts.  7  (1),  10  (1,2)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ. 
48  Unpublished  Letter  from  the  Algerian  Embassy  in  Cairo  to  the  Secretariat  General  No.  106/95, 
dated  05/07/1995. Chapter  Three  116 
Accordingly,  the  Secretary-General  of  the  Arab  League  responded  that:  49 
"In  order  to  attribute  stability  on  the  position  of  judges  of  the  Arab 
Court,  the  term  of  office  is  fixed  as  six  years.  Notably,  that  term  of 
office  of  judges  in  the  Statute  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice  is 
nine  years.  The  present  draft  Statute  adopted  a  compromise  solution 
by  determining  the  period  of  six  years.  In  addition,  this  draft  Statute, 
also  deleted  those  provisions  relating  to  the  expiration  of  term  of 
office  of  some  judges  after  their  first  election  because  it  is  found 
keeping  these  provisions  in  the  present  draft  Statute  becomes 
unnecessary.  Furthermore,  it  grants  the  judges  more  stability  in 
holding  their  position.  " 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  office  of  a  judge  becomes  vacant  for  any  reason 
prior  to  the  expiration  of  his  term,  his  successor  will  hold  the  position  just  for  the 
remainder  of  the  an  expired  term.  50  Regarding  the  number  of  times  of  re-election, 
it  seems  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  followed  the  ICJ  as  a  model  in  that  all  the  judges 
are  eligible  for  re-election.  51 
We  believe  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  should  take  into  consideration  the 
difference  between  term  of  office  and  eligibility  for  re-election,  as  both  are 
strongly  related.  If  the  term  of  office  is  long  enough,  so  that  judges  during  their 
term  can  develop  the  jurisprudence  of  the  Court,  eligibility  for  re-election 
becomes  worthless.  It  is  also  necessary  to  change  the  blood  of  the  Court  by 
nominating  other  judges  and  giving  them  a  chance  to  develop  the  Court's 
jurisprudence. 
i9  Unpublished  Letter  from  the  General  Administration  of  Legal  Affairs,  Cairo,  No.  8963/3,  dated 
11/07/1995,  p.  2. 
so  Art.  17  (3)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ. 
51  Cf  the  draft  Statute  of  the  IICJ  in  which  Judges  are  eligible  only  for  one  re-election.  Art.  3  (A) 
in  this  matter  provides:  "The  Court  shall  be  composed  of  seven  judges  who  shall  be  elected  by  the 
Islamic  conference  of  foreign  Ministers  for  four  years  and  may  be  re  elected  for  another  term 
only.  " Chapter  Three  117 
Regarding  the  age  limit  of  judges,  neither  the  draft  Statute  nor  the  Rules  of 
the  ACJ  include  any  relevant  provision  by  specifying  a  specific  age  at  the  time  of 
nomination  or  at  the  time  for  a  compulsory  retirement  age.  52  Referring  to  the 
general  principles  of  the  Islamic  Shariah  in  the  given  context,  Muslim  jurists  do 
not  require  any  minimum  age  for  a  person  to  be  qualified  to  hold  the  office  of  a 
judge.  The  only  condition  he  must  fulfil  is  to  be  an  adult,  but  that  does  not 
prevent  Arab  draftsmen  from  imposing  a  particular  age  adapted  to  the  system  of 
the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ. 
There  is  no  clear  mention  of  the  commencement  of  the  term  of  office,  unlike 
Art.  2  (2)  of  the  1978  Rule  of  the  ICJ.  The  wording  of  Art.  1  (2)  of  the  ACJ  Rules 
provides: 
"Members  of  the  Court  shall  take  up  their  duties  with  effect  from  the 
first  day  of  the  Court's  annual  term  on  which  the  full  Court  meets. 
The  terms  provided  for  in  Article  10  of  the  Statute  shall  be  calculated 
with  effect  from  that  date.  " 
3.4.  Oath 
Before  taking  up  his  duties,  each  judge  of  the  ACJ  is  required,  by  Art.  11  of 
the  draft  Statute,  to  take  an  oath  in  open  Court,  that  he  will  perform  his  duties  and 
exercise  his  power  as  a  judge  faithfully,  honourably  and  impartially.  This  oath  has 
to  be  recorded  in  a  special  register,  in  open  session  before  the  Court. 
Ad  hoc  judges,  are  required  to  take  the  same  oath  which  is  taken  by  the  titular 
judges  of  the  Court,  in  the  first  sitting  following  their  selection.  53  If  the  case  is 
52  See  Art.  4  of  the  draft  Statute  of  IICJ  which  provides  that  to  be  eligible  for  membership  of  the 
Court  a  nominee  should  be  at  least  forty  years  of  age,  but  this  Article  does  not  mention  any  age  at 
which  judges  must  resign. 
53  Art.  4  (3)  of  the  draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ. Chapter  Three  118 
heard  in  a  closed  session,  the  Court  should  hold  a  special  public  sitting  to  enable 
those  ad  hoc  judges  take  their  oaths.  54  On  the  other  hand,  judges  who  are  re- 
elected  immediately  upon  the  expiration  of  their  prior  terms  of  office  need  not 
repeat  the  oath;  the  same  rule  is  applicable  to  ad  hoc  judges  in  successive  phases 
of  the  same  case.  55  If  they  sat  in  a  previous  case  between  the  same  parties, 
however,  they  have  to  take  a  new  oath  for  every  subsequent  case  in  which  they 
sit.  56  It  seems  that  the  oath  made  by  judges  of  ACJ  is  considered  to  be  a  religious 
oath.  57  Accordingly,  Art.  11,  of  the  draft  Statute  of  this  Court  reads  as: 
"I  swear  by  Allah  Almighty  that  I  will  perform  the  duties  of  my  office 
faithfully,  honourably  and  impartially.  " 
This  is  unlike  the  solemn  declaration  which  is  made  by  the  judges  of  the  ICJ 
as  an  international  declaration.  Art.  20  of  the  Statute  of  this  Court  provides: 
"Every  member  of  the  Court  shall,  before  taking  up  his  duties,  make  a 
solemn  declaration  in  open  Court  that  he  will  exercise  his  powers 
impartially  and  conscientiously.  " 
We  believe  that  the  respective  results  are  logical,  because  the  nature  of  the 
two  Courts  is  different.  The  ICJ  judges  come  from  various  countries  with 
different  languages,  religion,  culture,  education  and  legal  knowledge.  That  is  why 
Art.  9  requires  that  in  addition  to  the  personal  qualification  of  judges,  the  body  of 
sa  See  Asylum  case,  (Colombia  v.  Peru),  ICJ  Pleadings,  (1950),  vol.  II,  p.  15.  Similarly,  after  the 
ICJ  election  of  1957,  a  special  public  sitting  was  held  for  the  purpose  of  the  oath  see  12  YBICJ 
(1957-58)  p.  98. 
￿  Ambatielos  case,  (Greece  v.  United  Kingdom),  ICJ  Pleadings,  (1952)  p.  345. 
56  Haya  de  la  Torre  case,  (Colombia  v.  Peru),  ICJ  Pleadings,  (1950)  p.  131. 
S'  Similarly,  the  draft  Statute  of  the  IICJ  requires  that  every  judge  must  take  an  Islamic  oath  before 
exercising  his  duties  before  the  Court.  Art.  9  provides: 
"Every  member  of  the  Court  shall,  at  the  first  session  in  open  Court  after  his  election, 
take  the  following  oath:  In  the  name  of  the  God  Almighty,  I  swear  to  fear  only  God 
in  the  discharge  of  my  duties,  to  act  impartially  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
Islamic  Shariah  and  the  principles  of  Islam  and  to  abide  by  the  provisions  of  this 
Statute  and  those  of  the  Charter  of  the  Organisation  of  the  Islamic  Conference". Chapter  Three  119 
the  Court  as  a  whole  should  represent  the  main  forms  of  civilisation  and  principal 
legal  systems  of  the  world.  58  For  that  reason  Foda  has  argued:  59 
"The  affirmation  of  office  should  avoid  any  embarrassment  arising 
out  of  religious  or  other  scruples  relation  to  `swearing'  or  taking  an 
oath.  It  should  be  an  international  declaration,  not  a  national,  in  order 
to  avoid  any  tendency  to  place  the  judges  in  the  position  of  political 
representatives,  as  happened  in  the  practice  of  the  Central  American 
Court  of  Justice.  " 
We  do  not  agree  with  Foda  in  his  conclusion  because  in  the  case  of  the  ACJ 
all  its  judges  have  the  same  language,  education,  culture  and  mostly  the  same 
religion.  Muslims  believe  that  Allah  is  the  Lord  of  all  mankind  including  non- 
Muslims.  That  is  why  Muslims'  oath  should  be  in  the  name  of  Allah. 
Accordingly  we  do  not  think  that  any  embarrassment  will  be  caused  to  the  ACJ 
judges,  as  a  result  of  the  adoption  of  a  religious  oath,  rather  than  an  international 
oath,  by  the  Arab  draftsmen. 
3.5.  The  Presidency 
Talking  about  the  Presidency  means  talking  about  the  main  control,  the  heart 
and  the  spine  of  the  Court.  By  reading  the  Articles  which  regulate  the  Presidency 
of  the  ACJ,  it  appears  that  the  President  of  the  Court  has  onerous  duties.  By 
Arts.  10  (4)  of  the  draft  Statute  and  Art.  2  (1)  of  the  draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ,  the 
Court  elects  its  President  and  Vice-President  from  among  its  members,  to  hold 
office  for  a  renewable  two  year  term.  They  undertake  their  duties  immediately 
after  being  elected.  The  election  should  be  held  following  the  first  session  of  the 
38  For  more  details  in  this  point  see  Lachs,  Manfred,  Some  Reflections  on  the  Nationality  of 
Judges  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  4  PYBIL  (1992)  p.  p.  49-55. 
99  Foda,  The  Projected  Arab  Court,  supra  note  35,  p.  190;  also  see  Hudson,  who  argued  that  the 
national  oath  prevented  judges  in  the  Central  American  Court  of  Justice  from  enjoying  sufficient 
independence  of  their  governments  in  his  The  Permanent  Court,  supra  note  31,  p.  p.  69-70. Chapter  Three  120 
Court,  by  secret  ballot  and  absolute  majority.  60  If  the  President  is  unable  to 
perform  his  duties,  the  Vice-President  shall  take  his  place,  and  if  both  of  them 
cannot  fulfil  their  duties,  the  Presidency  of  the  Court  passes  to  the  oldest  member, 
who  has  been  longest  on  the  bench.  61  The  President  and  Vice-President  have  been 
assigned  numerous  duties  which  may  be  summarised  as  follows:  to  regulate  the 
work  and  administration  of  the  Court,  direct  its  affairs,  preside  over  its  meetings, 
supervise  its  Secretariat,  and  represent  it  with  regard  to  administrative  affairs.  62 
The  Presidency  also  includes  granting  the  President  and  the  Vice-President 
precedence  over  all  other  members  of  the  Court.  After  them  in  precedence  is  the 
oldest  in  age,  elected  with  them  at  the  same  time.  In  the  public  meetings  of  the 
ICJ,  the  Vice-President  is  normally  seen  sitting  directly  on  the  President's  right, 
and  other  judges  set  to  his  right  and  left  in  order  of  precedence,  but  it  is  to  be 
understood  that,  in  the  closed  deliberations  of  the  Court,  judges  vote  in  the  reverse 
order  of  precedence  as  is  the  general  rule  in  judicial  bodies.  63 
60  In  general,  the  same  provision  is  found  in  the  Statute  and  Rules  of  the  ICJ,  provided  that 
according  to  Art.  21  of  the  ICJ  Statute,  the  term  of  office  of  the  President  is  three  years  instead  of 
two  in  the  Arab  draft  Statute.  Full  details  see,  Spender,  Percy,  The  Office  of  President  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice,  IA  YBIL  (1965)  p.  p.  9-22;  Rosenne,  Shabtai,  The  President  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice,  in  Vaughan  Lowe,  and  Malgosia  Fitzmaurice  (eds.  ),  Fifty  Years  of 
the  International  Court  of  Justice:  Essays  in  honour  of  Sir  Robert  Jennings,  Cambridge: 
Cambridge  University  Press,  (1996)  p.  p.  406-423.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Rosenne,  The  President 
of  the  ICJ). 
6'  Arts.  3  (2)  and  8  (2)  of  the  draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ.  Cf.  Art.  3  (5,6)  of  the  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ. 
Rosenne  argued  that  "when  a  judge  other  than  the  President  is  called  upon  to  assume  the  duties  of 
the  President,  he  is  known  as  `Acting  President';  and  when  a  member  is  serving  as  acting  President, 
he  will  take  precedence  over  all  judges  pro  hac  vica.  "  See  his  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra 
note  46,  p.  193. 
62  Art.  3  (1)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ. 
63  Rosenne,  The  World  Court,  supra  note  2,  p.  27;  and  his,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  46, 
p.  194. Chapter  Three  121 
The  President  and  the  Registrar  of  the  Court  of  the  ACJ  are  obligated  by  Art. 
12  of  the  draft  Statute  to  reside  at  the  seat  of  the  Court  (Cairo).  No  similar 
obligation  is  imposed  upon  the  remaining  judges.  Like  the  ICJ  judges,  they  are 
not  obligated  to  reside  permanently  at  the  seat  of  the  Court.  Furthermore,  the 
President  together  with  the  Registrar,  according  to  Art.  63  (2)  of  the  draft  Rules, 
have  to  sign  all  formal  decisions  of  the  Court,  Judgments,  Advisory  Opinions,  and 
Orders.  64  By  Art.  40  of  the  draft  Statute,  the  hearing  of  the  case  shall  be  under  his 
control,  and  minutes  of  the  hearings  are  to  be  signed  by  him  and  the  Registrar. 
In  the  practice  of  the  ICJ,  consultation  normally  is  to  be  made  between  the 
Registrar  and  the  President,  who  has  the  final  decision,  regarding  the  name  of  a 
case,  whenever  no  suggestion  has  been  made  by  the  parties.  65  This  may  be  a  good 
example  for  the  expected  relationship  between  the  President  and  the  Registrar  of 
the  ACJ. 
It  is  expected  that  the  President  of  the  ACJ  will  represent  the  Court  at  the 
meetings  of  the  Council  of  the  Arab  League,  just  as  the  President  of  the  ICJ 
normally  represents  the  Court  at  meetings  of  the  General  Assembly,  66  but 
unfortunately  no  such  provision  has  been  laid  down  in  this  regard  by  the  draft 
Statute  or  in  the  Rules  of  the  ACJ.  The  President  is  considered  as  the  President  of 
64  Compare  in  this  regards  with  the  Statute  of  the  [CJ  in  Rosenne,  The  President  of  the  ICJ,  supra 
note  60,  p.  411. 
65  For  example,  compare  the  original  name  of  the  case  Concerning  the  Guardianship  of  An  Infant, 
(Netherlands  v.  Sweden),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1957)  p.  102,  with  the  name  given  to  the  case  by  the  Court 
after  the  pleading,  case  Concerning  the  Application  of  the  Convention  of  1902  Governing  the 
Guardianship  of  Infants,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1958)  p.  55. 
66  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  3,  p.  406. Chapter  Three  122 
the  ACJ,  the  principal  judicial  organ  of  the  Arab  League,  67  and  is  at  the  same  time, 
considered  to  be  as  the  President  of  the  Bench  whenever  he  sits  in  a  case,  except 
when  he  is  disqualified  to  act  as  President  or  to  sit  as  a  judge.  68 
The  President  of  the  ICJ  is  supposed  to  take  all  the  measures  necessary  to 
ensure  the  continuous  exercise  of  the  functions  of  the  Presidency  at  the  seat  of  the 
Court.  This  provision  is  stated  explicitly  in  the  wording  of  Art.  13  (3)  of  the  1978 
Rules.  No  similar  provision  is  found  in  the  draft  Statute  or  draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ. 
Normally,  when  the  President  is  absent,  the  Vice-President  or  the  oldest  judge  has 
to  exercise  his  functions.  69  Similarly,  Art.  20  (6)  of  the  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ 
gives  the  President  the  power,  in  the  event  of  urgency,  to  convene  the  Court  at  any 
time.  It  seems  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  have  not  paid  any  attention  either  in  the 
draft  Statute  or  draft  Rules  to  regulate  such  matters. 
According  to  Art.  32  (1)  of  the  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ,  the  President  is 
obligated  to  stand  down  as  President  in  a  case  in  which  he  is  a  national  of  one  of 
parties.  His  position  and  duties  are  then  be  transferred  to  the  Vice-President,  and 
if  the  latter  is  unable  to  act,  for  any  reason,  then  the  presidency  passes  the  next 
oldest  judge.  70  Again  this  important  provision  cannot  be  found  in  the  Arab  draft 
67  Art.  1  (1)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ. 
68  For  more  details  on  the  distinction  between  the  term  `Court'  and  the  term  `Bench',  see  letter  of 
18th  March  1982  from  the  Registrar  to  the  agent  of  Canada:  Gulf  of  Maine  case,  ICJ  Pleadings, 
(1984)  VII,  p.  p.  297-299,  (Doc.  23). 
69  For  examples,  see  the  order  of  Judge  Oda,  when  he  was  Vice-President  in  the  present  Court, 
fixing  new  time  limits  in  the  case  Concerning  Application  of  the  Convention  on  the  Prevention  and 
Punishment  of  the  Crime  of  Genocide  (Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  v.  Yugoslavia  (Serbia  and 
Montenegro)),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1993)  p.  470. 
70  See  case  Concerning  Questions  of  Interpretation  and  Application  of  the  1971  Montreal 
Convention  arising  from  the  Aerial  Incident  at  Lockerbie  (Libya  v.  United  Kingdom)  and 
Questions  of  Interpretation  and  Application  of  the  1971  Montreal  Convention  arising  from  the 
Aerial  Incident  at  Lockerbie  (Libya  v.  United  States).  In  this  case,  President  Sir  Robert  Jennings Chapter  Three  123 
Statute  or  draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ.  Only  a  general  rule  appears,  in  this  regard,  as 
Art.  19  (3)  of  the  draft  Statute  provides: 
"if  there  is  a  reason  to  prevent  the  President  or  Vice  President  from 
participating  in  particular  case,  the  Court  shall  decide  this  matter,  by 
the  unanimous  agreement  of  its  remaining  members.  " 
This  Article  could  be  interpreted  by  considering  the  nationality  of  the 
President  as  a  sufficient  reason  to  prevent  him  to  participate  as  President  in  any 
particular  case  that  involves  his  national  state  as  a  party. 
Art.  44  (4)  of  the  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ  grants  the  President  the  power  to  take 
interlocutory  decisions,  even  when  the  Court  is  sitting.  7'  These  decisions  are  final 
and  not  eligible  for  appeal.  No  similar  provision  is  found  in  the  draft  Statute  or 
draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ. 
The  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  has  adopted  the  same  ICJ  provision  regarding 
the  casting  vote  of  the  President,  as  Art.  26  provides  that  all  decisions  are  to  be 
taken  by  majority  of  the  judges  present,  and  in  case  of  equality  of  votes,  the 
President  shall  have  a  casting  vote.  72  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  during  the 
(because  of  his  UK  nationality)  decided  that  he  had  to  vacate  his  position  as  President  when  the 
Court  decided  to  join  the  two  cases  in  one  (Libya  against  UK  and  USA)  according  to  Art.  47  of  the 
1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ,  in  47  YBICJ  (1992-93)  p.  178. 
71  For  example  see  Competence  of  the  ILO  in  Regard  to  International  Regulation  of  the 
Conditions  of  Labour  of  Persons  Employed  in  Agriculture,  Advisory  Opinion,  PCIJ  (1922)  Ser.  B, 
No.  2,  p.  p.  28,66.  In  this  case  the  President  took  decisions  while  the  Court  was  not  sitting;  On  the 
other  hand,  the  President  made  orders  regarding  the  time  limits  in  the  case  Concerning  East  Timor 
(Portugal  v.  Australia),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1993)  p.  32,  and  in  the  case  Concerning  Oil  Platforms,  (Islamic 
Republic  of  Iran  v.  United  States  of  America),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1993)  p.  35  during  the  Court's 
deliberation  on  another  case.  It  appears  that  decisions  of  the  President  which  are  taken  while  the 
Court  is  not  sitting  are  not  eligible  for  appeal,  PCIJ(1927)  Ser.  E,  No.  3,  p.  210. 
72  Cf.  this  Article  with  Art.  55  of  the  ICJ  Statute.  For  more  details  see  Rosenne,  The  President  of 
the  ICJ,  supra  note  60,  p.  p.  410-411. Chapter  Three  124 
history  of  the  two  World  Courts  (the  PCIJ  and  the  ICJ),  only  four  decisions  have 
been  made  by  the  casting  vote  of  the  President.  73 
3.6.  Judicial  Vacancies 
Vacancies  caused  by  the  death,  removal  from  duty  or  resignation  of  judges 
are  filled  by  the  same  methods  as  those  laid  down  for  the  original  election.  Art.  16 
of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  enumerates  conditions  in  which  the  office  of  judge 
becomes  vacant.  It  provides: 
"The  office  of  a  judge 
following  cases: 
1.  death; 
2.  resignation; 
3.  removal  from  duty.  " 
shall  be  deemed  vacant  in  each  'of  the 
Art.  17  of  the  draft  Statute  lays  down  some  further  procedures  to  be  followed 
in  such  a  case.  74  According  to  para.  1,  if  a  judge  desires  to  resign  from  the  Court, 
he  has  to  submit  his  resignation  to  the  President  in  writing.  The  President  then  has 
to  inform  the  Secretary-General  of  the  Arab  League  in  order  to  enable  him  to  set 
in  motion  the  occasional  election  to  fill  the  vacancy.  It  provides:  75 
"l.  If  a  Judge  wishes  to  resign,  he  shall  submit  his  resignation  in 
writing  to  the  President,  who  should  inform  the  League  Secretary- 
General  and  accordingly  this  position  falls  vacant.  " 
73  Lotus  case,  Judgment,  PCIJ  (1927)  Ser.  A,  No.  10;  South  West  Africa  cases  (Ethiopia  v.  South 
Africa  and  Liberia  v.  South  Africa)  ICJ  Rep.,  (1966)  p.  6;  see  also  Legality  of  the  Use  by  a  State 
of  Nuclear  Weapons  in  Armed  Conflict,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1996)  p.  66  and  Legality  of  the  Threat  or  Use  of 
Nuclear  Weapons,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1996)  p.  595. 
74  Cf.  Arts.  14  (4),  18  (1)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ. 
75  Cf.  the  provisions  of  resignation  in  the  ICJ  in  Bernärdez,  Santiago  Torres,  Resignations  at  the 
World  Court,  in  Yoram  Dinstein  &  Mala  Tabory  (eds.  ),  International  Law  at  a  Time  of  Perplexity: 
Essays  in  Honour  ofShabtai  Rosenne,  London:  Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers,  (1989)  p.  p.  953-975; 
Rosenne,  Shabtai,  Procedure  in  the  International  Court:  A  Commentary  on  the  Rules  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice,  The  Hague:  Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers,  (1983)  p.  24.  (hereinafter 
cited  as:  Rosenne,  Procedure  in  the  International  Court). Chapter  Three  125 
By  para.  2  of  the  same  Article,  if  the  Court  finds  that  a  judge  has  ceased  to  be 
able  to  carry  out  his  duties,  it  can  take  the  decision  to  relive  him  from  his  position. 
The  decision  is  to  be  taken  by  the  unanimous  agreement  of  the  other  judges  and  it 
must  state  explicitly  the  reasons  why  the  judge  has  been  relieved  from  his  duty. 
The  Secretary-General  of  the  Arab  League  must  be  informed: 
"2.  If  a  Judge  ceases  to  be  able  to  carry  out  his  duties,  he  may  not  be 
relieved  from  his  duty  except  by  the  unanimous  agreement  of  the 
remaining  Judges.  Upon  the  issuance  of  a  reasoned  decision 
concerning  his  removal  from  duty  and  its  communication  to  the 
League  Secretary-General,  his  office  shall  be  deemed  vacant.  " 
By  Art.  5  of  the  draft  Rules,  the  President  has  to  convene  the  Court,  the 
member  affected  shall  be  allowed  to  defend  himself  and  when  he  has  done  so, 
voting  shall  be  conducted  in  his  absence.  Unanimity  is  necessary  to  make  that 
decision  valid.  76 
It  appears  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  followed  the  same  provisions  of  judicial 
vacancies  as  adopted  by  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  nevertheless  they  have 
distinguished  between  two  types  of  judicial  removal,  removal  by  an  external 
authority  and  removal  by  an  internal  authority,  and  in  each  condition  different 
terms  have  been  used.  For  removal  which  could  be  effected  by  external  authority, 
the  word  `Az1  is  used  in  the  Arabic  text  and  translated  by  the  present  author  into 
English  as  dismissal.  On  the  other  hand,  for  removal  which  could  be  made  by 
internal  authority,  the  word  I  fa'  is  used  in  the  Arabic  text  and  translated  into 
English  as  removal  from  office;  but  how  may  these  two  terms  work  to  produce 
different  results  within  the  present  Arab  draft  Statute?  No  clear  answer  can  be 
76  Cf  this  provision  in  the  Statute  and  the  Rules  of  the  ICJ.  See  also  for  example,  Rosenne,  The 
Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  46,  p.  195. Chapter  Three  126 
found  by  referring  to  the  unpublished  documents  relating  to  the  establishment  of 
the  ACJ  and  discussions  of  1995  draft  Statute.  When  Iraq  asked  the  Secretariat 
General  to  give  a  clear  meaning  to  the  word  I  fa  (removal  from  duty)  which  was 
used  in  the  1995  draft  Statute,  the  General  Administration  of  Legal  Affairs 
(Secretariat  General)  failed  to  give  a  clear  answer  to  the  Iraqi  question,  and 
advised  Iraq  to  refer  to  Art.  17  (2)  in  which  a  clear  meaning  of  the  term  I  fa  would 
be  found.  77 
Although  Art.  15  of  the  draft  Statute  provides  that  judges  of  the  Court  may 
not  be  dismissed,  "qudat  al  mahkamah  ghair  qabileen  lil  `Azl",  no  further 
information  is  given  to  show  how  this  Article  is  to  be  applied.  However,  in  order 
to  deduce  the  real  aim  of  the  Arab  draftsmen  and  to  know  why  they  adopted  this 
provision,  it  becomes  necessary  to  return  back  to  Art.  16  (3)  of  the  draft  Statute. 
This  Article,  as  mentioned,  enumerates  the  conditions  that  make  the  office  of  a 
judge  vacant,  and  a  close  reading  of  it  makes  it  appear  that  the  word  1  fa'  (removal 
from  duty)  was  used.  Then  in  Art.  17  (2)  again  the  same  word  is  used  to  mean  the 
judges  can  only  be  removed  (relived  from  office)  by  an  internal  authority  (the 
Court)  if  they  become  unable  to  carry  out  their  duties.  Accordingly,  the  correct 
conclusion  appears  to  be,  the  Arab  draftsmen  have  adopted  the  general  rule  that 
judges  may  not  dismissed,  but  in  an  exceptional  condition  may  be  removed 
(relieved)  from  their  offices  if  they  cease  to  be  able  to  carry  out  their  duties. 
77  See  Unpublished  Letter  from  the  Permanent  Mission  of  Iraq  to  the  League  of  Arab  States 
No.  01/03/263,  dated  10/07/1995  and  Unpublished  Letter  from  the  General  Administration  of 
Legal  Affairs  (Secretariat  General)  No.  3981/03,  dated,  02/08/1995. Chapter  Three  127 
In  conclusion  "dismissal"  in  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  may  be  defined  as 
removal  of  a  judge  by  an  external  authority  that  may  be  done  by  the  state  party  to  a 
dispute  for  any  political  reasons,  which  is  absolutely  prohibited  whether  in  the 
draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  or  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ.  The  term  "removal  from  duty", 
on  the  other  hand,  may  be  defined  as  removal  of  a  judge  not  by  an  external 
authority  but  by  the  Court  itself,  if  he  becomes  unable  or  unqualified  to  fulfil  his 
duties  for  legal  reason.  Very  strict  procedures  should  be  followed  by  the  Court  in 
such  cases,  78 
But  why  these  two  terms  have  been  used  by  the  Arab  draftsmen?  Why  did 
the  Arab  draftsmen  not  use  only  the  term  dismissal  as  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  does? 
It  is  assumed  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  want  to  make  clear  that  no  political 
influence  could  be  exercised  upon  the  judges  of  the  ACJ  once  the  direct 
nomination  of  candidate  has  been  adopted.  On  the  other  hand,  in  Arabic  the  term 
dismissal  (`Az!  )  is  mostly  used  in  the  case  when  a  particular  judge  commits  any 
action  that  contradicts  his  position  as  a  judge,  for  example,  if  he  accepts  bribes, 
but  removal  from  duty  (1  fa)  may  be  made  for  any  reason  and  does  not  mean  that 
the  judge  has  committed  any  action  that  contradicts  his  position.  Therefore,  the 
distinction  between  these  two  terms  has  been  adopted  by  the  Arab  draftsmen  in 
the  present  draft  Statute. 
78  It  is  worth  mentioning  here  that,  since  the  establishment  of  the  ICJ  in  1945,  no  judge  has  been 
removed  according  to  Art.  18  of  the  [CJ  Statute.  But  in  some  other  cases,  judges  have  been 
requested  or  obliged  to  step  down  according  to  Arts.  16,17,  and  18  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  in 
relation  to  particular  case. Chapter  Three  128 
3.7.  Incompatibility  of  Functions  and  Disqualification  of  Members 
The  provisions  that  regulate  these  two  matters  appear  in  Arts.  14  and  19  of 
the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ.  Art.  14  contains  three  paragraphs.  The  provisions 
adopted  in  the  first  two  paragraphs  are  mostly  the  same  as  those  in  Arts.  16  and  17 
of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  whereas  the  third  adopts  a  new  rule  not  found  in  the 
Statute  of  the  ICJ. 
By  Art.  14  (1/A),  judges  are  required  not  to  exercise  any  political  or 
administrative  function  or  to  take  up  any  duties  in  the  capacity  of  agents,  counsel, 
or  advocates,  or  engage  in  any  occupation  of  professional  nature.  79  However,  we 
wonder  how  a  member  of  the  Court  can  carry  on  regular  professional  duties  while 
he  is  at  the  same  time  holding  the  office  of  judgeship  in  the  Court  as  a  regular 
judge.  80  It  seems  this  paragraph  prohibits  two  kinds  of  functions  to  be  exercised, 
those  which  have  the  general  nature  of  "any  administrative  and  political  function", 
and  those  which  are  considered  as  professional  functions,  the  exercise  of  which 
may  affect  and  conflict  with  judicial  independence  and  impartiality,  namely  "to  act 
as  agent,  counsel,  or  advocate.  "81 
79  It  is  worth  mentioning  here  that  on  10  December  1950,  the  General  Assembly  of  the  United 
Nations  adopted  Resolution  No.  427  (V),  and  requested  the  Secretary-General  to  appoint  an  ad  hoc 
committee  of  three  impartial  persons  with  a  view  to  settle  the  question  of  prisoners  of  war,  and  find 
out  a  suitable  solution  for  their  problems  to  be  accepted  by  states  concerned.  The  matter  was 
discussed  with  the  members  of  the  World  Court,  accordingly,  Vice-President  Guerrero  became  a 
member  of  this  committee.  The  question  raised  whether  this  appointment  conflicted  with  his 
position  in  the  Court  or  not.  5  YBICJ  (1950-51)  p.  103;  also  see  Rosenne,  Law  and  Practice, 
supra  note  46,  p.  p.  195-196  who  argues: 
"  it  seems  that  this  principles  may  also  require  a  judge  to  divest  himself  of  financial 
and  other  material  holdings  which  could  lead  to  a  conflict  of  interests.  " 
go  For  more  details  in  this  point  see  Fachiri,  The  Permanent  Court,  supra  note  23,  p.  44. 
81  The  question  has  arisen  before  the  World  Court  whether  a  judge  can  accept  any  arbitral  function 
or  not.  The  decision  taken  by  the  Court  in  this  regard  concluded  that  judge  must  not  accept  the 
function  of  arbitrator,  chairman  of  commission  of  conciliation  or  enquiry,  or  any  similar  function, 
if  there  is  any  provision  to  the  effect  that  decision  taken  by  him,  or  one  in  which  he  has  taken  part, Chapter  Three  129 
Para.  (1/B)  of  the  same  Article  contains  an  additional  provision  which 
requires  judges  during  their  term  of  office  not  to  participate  in  the  decision  of  any 
case  in  which  they  have  already  taken  part  as  agents,  counsels,  advocates  or 
experts,  or  in  any  case  which  has  been  previously  laid  before  them  in  their 
capacities  as  a  member  of  a  national  or  international  court  or  commission  of 
inquiry  or  any  other  capacity.  82  It  is  clear  that  the  difference  between  the  two 
paragraphs  is  that  the  first  regulates  external  functions  which  may  exercised  by 
judges  while  the  second  regulates  their  internal  functions. 
By  the  wording  of  para.  2,  if  any  doubt  is  raised  regarding  the  compliance  of 
any  judge  with  the  provision  of  para.  1,  the  matter  is  to  be  settled  by  the  decision 
of  the  Court.  No  special  procedure  is  provided  for  the  manner  in  which  a  such 
decision  is  to  be  reached  by  the  Court.  The  matter  may  be  governed  by  returning 
to  the  general  procedure  used  for  reaching  decisions.  83 
The  most  important  principle  adopted  by  the  Arab  draftsmen  is  in  the  third 
paragraph  of  Art.  14.  It  actually  prevents  any  doubt  being  cast  upon  the 
impartiality  of  the  judges  of  the  Court.  Its  requires  them,  for  three  years  after  the 
expiration  of  their  term  of  office,  not  to  work  with  or  become  an  employee  of  any 
government  which  has  previously  brought  any  case  before  the  Court,  where  the 
judge  concerned  participated  in  the  decision  of  the  dispute  and  delivery  of  the 
may  be  the  subject  of  an  application  to  the  Court,  or  if  there  is  a  possibility  that  such  a  decision 
may  be  the  subject  of  such  an  application.  See  8  YBICJ(1953-54)  p.  96. 
82  In  some  cases  which  have  appeared  before  the  World  Court,  judges  of  this  Court  have  not  been 
disqualified  even  though,  they  were  involved  in  functions  which  conflict  with  the  provisions  of 
Art.  17  of  the  ICJ  Statute,  parallel  to  Art.  14  (1/B)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ.  See  Rosenne, 
The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  46,  p.  197. 
83  See  Art.  26  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  which  deals  with  casting  vote. Chapter  "Three  130 
judgment.  This  kind  of  provision  cannot  be  found  in  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ.  It 
seems  that  Arab  draftsmen  have  been  influenced,  when  drafting  this  Article,  by 
Art.  4  of  the  Protocol  of  the  Statute  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Coal 
and  Steel  Community  which  also  contains  a  similar  provision.  It  provides:  84 
"The  judges  may  not..  .  acquire  or  retain,  directly  or  indirectly,  any 
interest  in  any  business  related  to  coal  and  steel  during  their  term  of 
office  and  for  three  years  after  ceasing  hold  office.  " 
On  the  other  hand,  under  Art.  19  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  three  kinds  of 
abstention  may  prevent  a  judge  from  taking  part  in  a  particular  case.  First,  if  the 
judge  himself  considers  that  he  cannot  take  part  in  the  case  (recusation).  Second, 
if  the  President  or  any  other  judge  considers  that  one  of  the  judges  in  the  Court  is 
not  eligible  to  take  part  in  the  decision  of  a  particular  case  (disqualification). 
Third,  regarding  only  the  President  and  Vice-President,  when  there  is  a  reason  to 
prevent  one  or  both  of  them  from  participating  in  a  particular  case.  This  Article 
reads  as  follows: 
"1.  If,  for  some  special  reason,  a  Judge  considers  that  he  should  not 
take  part  in  the  decision  of  a  particular  case,  he  shall  so  inform  the 
President.  The  President  shall  accordingly  notify  the  Court. 
2.  If  the  President  or  any  of  the  Judges  considers  that  'for  some 
special  reason  one  of  the  Judges  should  not  take  part  in  the  decision 
of  a  particular  case,  the  President  shall  notify  the  relevant  Judge, 
stating  the  reasons  on  which  this  challenge  is  based.  If  the  President 
and  the  impugned  Judge  disagree,  the  Court  shall  decide  in 
accordance  with  the  majority  of  the  remaining  members. 
3.  If  there  is  a  reason  to  prevent  the  President  or  Vice-President  from 
participating  in  a  particular  case,  the  Court  shall  decide  this  matter  by 
the  unanimous  agreement  of  its  remaining  members.  " 
In  the  first  situation,  the  judge  concerned  has  to  inform  the  President  that  he 
cannot  take  part  in  a  case,  and  the  President  has  to  inform  the  Court  accordingly. 
In  the  second,  the  President  has  to  inform  the  judge  concerned  that  he  is  not 
84  For  further  details  see  Lasok,  K.  P.  E.,  The  European  Court  ofJustice:  Practice  and  Procedure, Chapter  Three  131 
qualified  to  take  part  in  the  case,  stating  the  reasons  on  which  this  challenge  is 
based.  If  the  judge  in  question  does  not  agree,  the  remaining  judges  of  the  Court 
then  have  to  decide  the  matter.  A  majority  vote  is  required.  However,  when  the 
President  or  the  Vice-President  is  thought  to  be  not  qualified  to  sit  in  particular 
case,  a  unanimous  vote  of  the  remaining  judges  is  required  disqualify  them. 
It  appears  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  did  not  give  the  President  alone  the  right  to 
disqualify  a  particular  judge  from  taking  part  in  a  case.  This  competence,  unlike 
the  regulation  of  this  matter  in  the  ICJ  Statute,  can  be  exercised  by  the  President 
and  any  other  member  of  the  Court.  Gross  criticised  Art.  24  (2)  of  the  Statute  of 
the  ICJ  which  grants  the  President  alone  such  a  right  by  saying:  85 
"As  there  is  no  particular  reason  why  the  President  alone  should  have 
the  right  to  raise  the  matter,  it  could  also  be  provided  that  any  member 
of  the  Court  could  initiate  the  appropriate  proceedings.  " 
In  conclusion,  these  kinds  of  disqualification  are  mostly  based  on  personal 
interests  which  may  bias  a  person  in  the  exercise  of  the  judicial  function.  This 
could  happen  when  particular  judge,  for  example,  disqualifies  himself  because  one 
of  his  relatives  is  appointed  as  agent,  counsel,  or  advocate  in  the  given  case, 
whereas  disqualification  of  judges  under  Art.  14  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  is 
mostly  based  on  political  or  professional  matters. 
3.8.  The  Composition  of  the  Court 
As  a  general  rule,  the  Court  has  to  sit  with  a  full  complement  of  its  judges. 
Nevertheless,  in  exceptional  cases,  it  is  possible  for  it  to  hear  cases  while  some  of 
London:  Butterworths,  (1994)  p.  16. 
as  Gross,  Leo,  The  International  Court  of  Justice:  Consideration  of  Requirements  for  Enhancing  its 
Role  in  the  International  Legal  Order,  in  his  as  (ed.  ),  The  Future  of  the  International  Court  of Chapter  Three  132 
its  members  are  absent.  In  principle,  a  judge  has  to  attend  all  the  Courts' 
meetings,  but  he  may  be  allowed  to  be  absent  if  he  is  ill  or  has  other  serious 
reasons  for  absence.  There  is however  no  provision  either  in  the  draft  Statute  or  in 
the  draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ  which  requires  judges  to  hold  themselves  permanently 
at  the  disposal  of  the  Court  as  in  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ.  86 
Arts.  7  (1)  and  25  (1)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  deal  with  the  matters  of 
regulating  the  composition  of  the  Court.  Art.  7  (1)  provides  that  "the  Court  shall 
consist  of  seven  judges  elected  from  candidates.  "  Art.  25  (1)  provides  "the  full 
Court  shall  decide  cases  brought  before  it.  A  quorum  of  five  judges  shall  suffice 
to  constitute  the  Court,  provided  that  the  President  or  whoever  represents  him 
shall  participate.  "87  If  the  quorum,  is  for  any  reason  not  completed,  then  the 
President  can  delay  the  meeting  of  the  Court  until  a  quorum  is  obtained.  88 
Judges  of  the  ACJ  who  are  temporarily  absent  from  part  of  the  hearings  are 
allowed  to  take  part  in  the  deliberation  of  the  Court  and  adhere  to  the  judgment. 
No  explicit  provision  is  to  be  found  whether  in  the  draft  Statute  or  draft  Rules  of 
the  ACJ  dealing  with  this  principles.  However  Art.  42  (2)  of  the  draft  Statute 
provides  "The  judgment  shall  include  [....,  ]  the  names  of  the  Judges  who  took  part 
Justice,  vol.  1,  New  York:  Oceana  Publications,  INC.,  (1976)  p.  60.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Gross, 
The  International  Court  of  Justice). 
96  See  Art.  23  (3)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  which  provides: 
"Members  of  the  Court  shall  be  bound,  unless  they  are  on  leave  or  prevented  from 
attending  by  illness  or  other  serious  reasons  duly  explained  to  the  President,  to  hold 
themselves  permanently  at  the  disposal  of  the  Court". 
87  This  exact  provision  was  also  adopted  by  the  IICJ  in  which  Arts.  3  and  13  of  its  draft  Statute 
which  provide  that  seven  judges  are  required  to  constitute  the  full  Court  and  five  for  the  quorum. 
However,  Arts.  3  (1)  and  25  (3)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  require  fifteen  judges  for  the  Bench  and 
nine  for  the  quorum.  For  a  further  discussion  about  the  reason  for  choosing  of  number,  see 
UNCIO,  vol.  13,  (1945)  p.  p.  143,387  and  vol.  14,  p.  p.  262,276,824. 
88  Art.  11  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ. Chapter  Three  133 
and  their  signatures  and  the  reasons  on  which  the  judgment  is  based.  "  According 
to  the  practice  of  the  ICJ,  every  judgment,  advisory  opinion,  and  order  starts  with 
a  list  of  judges.  The  list  only  includes  those  judges  who  were  present  when  the 
decision  was  rendered.  89  Judges  not  present  during  the  hearings  are  not  allowed  to 
participate  in  the  drafting  of  the  judgment.  90  In  this  matter,  Art.  41  of  the  draft 
Statute  of  the  ACJ  provides:  91 
"I.  The  President  shall  declare,  upon  the  closure  of  pleadings,  that 
the  case  is  pending  judgment. 
2.  The  deliberations  of  the  Court  remain  secret.  Only  Judges  who 
have  heard  the  oral  pleadings  shall  take  part  therein.  " 
Normally,  the  composition  of  the  Court  is  liable  to  change  from  case  to  case 
given  the  ad  hoc  disqualification  of  some  of  its  judges,  or  by  adding,  in  some 
other  cases,  national  judges  or  ad  hoc  judges.  In  other  words,  judges  in  some 
conditions  may  cease  to  take  part  in  a  particular  case.  Accordingly,  one  may  ask, 
whether  a  judge  may  be  relieved  form  his  office  before  finishing  a  case  he  has 
started  to  hear. 
The  solution  adopted  by  the  ICJ  is  not  the  same  as  that  provided  for  the  ACJ. 
In  the  former  "the  members  of  the  Court  shall  continue  to  discharge  their  duties 
until  their  places  have  been  filled.  Though  replaced,  they  shall  finish  any  case 
which  they  may  have  begun.  "92  This  means  that  if  a  judge  in  the  ICJ  has 
participated  in  just  one  session  of  oral  pleadings  in  a  particular  case,  and  then  his 
89  For  example  see  Corfu  Channel  case,  ICJ  Pleadings,  (1947),  vol.  III,  p.  p.  195-196;  Asylum 
case,  ICJ  Pleadings,  (1949),  vol.  II,  p.  85. 
90  See  for  example,  Corfu  Channel  case,  ICJ  Pleadings,  (1947),  vol.  IV,  p.  702;  ILO 
Administrative  Tribunals  (UNESCO)  case,  ICJ  Pleadings,  (1956)  p.  227. 
91  Cf.  these  provisions  with  Arts.  45,46,54  (3)  of  the  ICJ  Statute. 
92  Art.  13  (3)  of  the  Statute  and  Art.  33  of  the  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ. Chapter  Three  134 
term  of  office  expires,  he  has  to  finish  this  case  until  a  decision  in  that  phase  of  the 
case  is  delivered.  In  the  latter,  it  appears  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  adopted  limiting 
provisions  regarding  finishing  cases.  A  judge  of  the  ACJ  whose  term  of  office  has 
expired  is  bound  to  continue  to  discharge  his  duties  until  his  place  is  filled.  He  is 
permitted  however  to  finish  cases  in  which  he  has  participated,  on  condition  that 
the  pleadings  have  been  closed  in  those  cases  and  are  awaiting  judgment.  Art.  13 
of  the  draft  Statute  provides: 
"Judges  whose  term  of  office  expires  shall  continue  deciding  cases  in 
which  pleadings  have  been  closed  and  is  pending  judgment.  " 
3.9.  Seat  of  the  Court 
The  draft  Statute  does  not  mention  any  particular  place  that  can  be  considered 
as  a  permanent  seat  for  the  ACJ.  The  only  provision  with  regard  to  the  seat  of  the 
Court  could  be  found  in  Art.  1  (2)  which  makes  the  permanent  seat  of  the  Court 
the  same  place  as  the  permanent  seat  of  the  Arab  League.  It  provides: 
"The  permanent  seat  of  the  League  of  Arab  States  shall  be  the 
permanent  seat  of  the  Court.  " 
By  Art.  10  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League,  the  city  of  Cairo  is  the  permanent 
seat  of  the  Arab  League.  It  provides: 
"The  permanent  seat  of  the  League  of  Arab  States  shall  be  Cairo.  The 
Council  of  the  League  may  meet  at  any  other  place  it  designates.  " 
This  provision  differs  from  those  adopted  by  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  and  by 
many  other  regional  Courts.  When  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  was  revised  at  San 
Francisco,  it  was  recommended  that  the  seat  of  this  Court  should  be  established  in 
a  territory  other  than  that  where  the  political  bodies  of  the  organisation  usually 
meet.  It  was  therefore  agreed  to  retain  the  seat  of  the  Court  at  the  Hague,  the 
Netherlands  (Peace  Palace),  while  the  headquarters  of  the  UN  was  created  in  New Chapter  Three  135 
York.  93  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  Egyptian  delegation  to  the  Committee  of 
Jurists  was  the  first  person  who  called  for  the  separation  between  the  legal  organ 
(ICJ)  from  the  political  organ  (UN  headquarters).  The  delegation's  view  was 
supported  by  other  delegations.  94  The  same  approach  was  adopted  when  the 
Statute  of  the  purposed  IICJ  was  being  drafted.  The  draftsmen  followed  the  ICJ 
Statute  by  creating  the  permanent  seat  of  this  Court  in  a  place  other  than  where  the 
organisation  of  the  Islamic  Conference  regularly  meets.  Art.  2  (1)  of  the  draft 
Statute  of  the  IICJ  provides:  "The  seat  of  the  Court  shall  be  established  in  the  City 
of  Kuwait",  whereas  the  permanent  seat  of  the  OIC  was  established  in  Jeddah 
City,  Saudi  Arabia,  according  to  Art.  V  (5)  of  the  Charter  of  this  organisation. 
It  is  worth  mentioning  that  not  all  delegations  were  satisfied  with  the  idea  of 
creating  the  seat  of  the  ACJ  at  the  seat  of  the  Arab  League.  The  Iraqi  delegation 
made  the  following  observation:  95 
"Paragraph  2,  of  the  first  Article  should  be  reworded,  so  the  Court's 
seat  should  not  be  the  Arab  League  headquarters.  The  interest  of  the 
Arab  States  which  are  members  in  Arab  organisations  may  be 
promoted  if  such  organisations  are  not  concentrated  in  one  State  but 
distributed  among  them  all.  In  addition,  the  International  Community 
provides  us  with  examples  proving  that  the  Court's  seat  should  not  be 
its  political  headquarters.  " 
93  For  further  details  see  UNCIO,  vol.  14,  (1945)  p.  405;  and  Art.  22  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ; 
also  see  Eyffinger,  The  International  Court,  supra  note  42,  p.  p.  114-124;  Rosenne,  The  World 
Court,  supra  note  2,  p.  50;  see  also  Jennings,  Robert  Y.,  The  Role  of  the  International  Court  of 
Justice,  LXVIII  BYbIL  (1997)  p.  2.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Jennings,  The  Role  of  the  ICJ). 
94  See  UNCIO,  vol.  14,  (1945)  p.  p.  62-63. 
93  See  Iraqi's  objection  in  Unpublished  Letter  No.  01/03/263,  dated  10/07/1995  p.  1  and  the 
Secretary-General's  response  in  Letter  No.  3981/3,  dated  03/08/1995  p.  1.  It  has  to  be  mentioned 
that  some  Arab  jurists  were  delighted  with  the  creation  of  the  seat  of  the  Court  at  Cairo  City,  for 
example  Shihab  in  his  draft  Statute  which  was  proposed  in  1977  according  to  the  request  of  the 
Secretary-General  of  the  Arab  League,  Shihab,  Mufeed  M.,  Jami'at  ad  Dowal  al  'Arabiyah: 
Mithaquha  wa  Injazatuha,  (The  League  of  Arab  States:  its  Charter  and  Implementations),  at 
Qahirah:  Ma'had  at  Buhuth  wad  Dirasat  al  'Arabiyah,  (1978)  p.  388,  particularly  Art.  13  (1);  and 
also  Musalhi,  Muhammad  al  Husaine,  Mashru'  Mahkamat  a!  'Adl  a!  'Arabiyah,  (The  Projected 
Arab  Court  of  Justice),  Riyadh:  Dar  an  Nashir  bi  at  Markaz  at  'Arabi  lid  Dirasat  at  Amniyah  wat 
Tadreeb,  (1991)  p.  40. Chapter  Three  136 
We  believe  that  the  draftsmen  have  made  a  considerable  mistake,  not  just 
because  they  made  the  permanent  seat  of  the  Court  at  the  same  place  where  the 
Arab  League  functions,  but  also  when  they  related  the  establishment  of  the  seat  of 
the  Court  to  the  seat  of  the  Arab  League,  because  any  changes  to  the  seat  of  the 
headquarters  due  to  political  circumstances  means  that  the  seat  of  the  Court  has  to 
be  changed.  This  will  put  the  Court  under  the  direct  influence  of  political 
circumstances  and  may  affect  its  work.  It  was  expected  from  the  Arab  draftsmen 
that  they  would  keep  the  Court  far  from  any  political  influence  in  the  sphere  of  the 
relations  between  member  states,  for  example,  when  in  1979  Egypt's  membership 
was  suspended  prior  to  the  signature  of  the  Peace  Treaty  with  Israel  and  as  a  result 
of  that  the  permanent  seat  of  the  Arab  League  was  removed  from  Cairo  to 
Tunisia.  6 
The  third  paragraph  of  Art.  1,  makes  clear  that  the  establishment  of  the  Court 
at  Cairo  does  not  prevent  the  Court  from  sitting  and  exercising  its  functions 
elsewhere  whenever  it  thinks  this  to  be  desirable.  It  provides: 
"The  Court  may,  when  necessary,  decide  to  sit  and  exercise  its 
functions  elsewhere  whenever  the  Court  considers  it  desirable.  " 
This  means  that  the  Court  itself  decides,  but  not  the  parties  to  a  dispute,  when 
it  becomes  necessary,  to  exercise  its  functions  elsewhere  than  at  its  permanent 
seat.  It  has  to  be  noted  that  since  the  establishment  of  the  ICJ,  its  seat  has  never 
moved  from  the  Hague,  even  if  a  litigating  state  has  lodged  a  relevant  request.  For 
96  For  more  details  see  chapter  1,  p.  p.  30-3  1.  Egypt  also  faced  similar  legal  problems  when  the 
removal  of  the  regional  headquarters  of  the  WHO  was  claimed  by  its  General  Manager.  This  may 
referred  to  the  ICJ  for  advisory  opinion  asking  about  the  legality  of  this  action.  For  further  details 
see  chapter  V,  p.  p.  302-304. Chapter  Three  137 
example,  when  South  Africa  invited  the  Court  to  visit  South  Africa,  the  ICJ 
refused  this  invitation.  The  Court  explained:  97 
"the  Court  would  naturally  exercise  this  option  for  a  particular  case 
when  considerations  of  the  convenience  of  the  parties  and  of  the 
effective  administration  of  the  judicial  functions  made  such  a 
departure  from  its  headquarters  desirable.  " 
But  that  does  not  mean  the  Court  never  visits  the  scene  of  the  dispute  when  it 
finds  that  action  becomes  necessary.  The  PCIJ  and  its  successor  the  ICJ  have 
done  that,  but  this  was  not  a  change  in  the  seat  of  the  Court  but  rather  an  attempt 
to  gain  evidence.  98 
3.10.  Ad  Hoc  Judges 
What  happens  if  a  state  party  to  a  dispute  finds  that  one  of  the  titular  judges 
on  the  bench  has  the  nationality  of  the  other  party  to  the  dispute?  Or  if  either  of 
the  parties  to  the  case  does  not  have  a  judge  of  their  nationality  among  the  titular 
judges?  Or  if  both  parties  each  have  a  member  of  their  nationality  on  the  bench? 
These  three  possibilities  have  been  considered  by  Art.  18  (2,3,4)  of  the  draft 
Statute  of  the  ACJ  which  is  parallel  to  Art.  31  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ.  This 
means,  as  a  general  rule  in  the  two  Courts,  that  a  judge  of  the  nationality  of  each 
litigating  state  is  not  prevented  from  examining  a  case  before  the  Court.  99  Art.  18 
provides: 
97  See  South  West  Africa  cases,  (Ethiopia  v.  South  Africa;  Liberia  v.  South  Africa),  Order  of  29 
November  1965,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1965)  p.  9;  also  see  South  West  Africa  case,  Second  Phase,  Judgment, 
ICJ  Rep.,  (1966)  p.  9;  for  further  discussion  see  Gross,  The  International  Court  of  Justice,  supra 
note  85,  p.  p.  65-66;  and  his  The  Time  Element  in  the  Contentious  Proceedings  in  the  International 
Court  of  Justice,  63  AJIL  (1969)  p.  84. 
98  See  Diversion  of  Water  from  Meuse,  Judgment,  PCIJ  (1937)  Ser.  AB,  No.  70,  p.  9;  and  Case 
Concerning  the  Gabcikovo-Nagymaros  Project,  (Hungary/Slovakia),  Order  of  5  Feb.  1997,  ICJ 
Rep.,  (1997)  p.  4. 
99  Fachiri,  The  Permanent  Court,  supra  note  23,  p.  p.  56-57;  Eyffinger,  The  International  Court, 
supra  note  42,  p.  p.  163-164. Chapter  Three  138 
"1.  A  Judge  of  the  nationality  of  each  of  the  parties  may  not  be 
prevented  from  examining  a  case  submitted  to  the  Court. 
2.  If  a  Judge  is  a  national  of  a  state  which  is  a  party  to  the  dispute,  all 
the  other  parties  may  select  a  Judge  ad  hoc  to  participate  in  the 
decision  of  the  case  in  question. 
3.  If  no  Judge  in  the  Court  is  national  of  one  of  the  parties,  each  party 
may  select  a  Judge  ad  hoc. 
4.  Should  there  be  several  parties  in  the  same  interest,  they  shall  be 
considered  one  party  with  regard  to  the  provisions  of  paragraphs  2 
and  3  of  this  Article.  Any  doubt  upon  this  point  shall  be  settled  by  the 
decision  of  the  Court.  " 
By  comparing  this  with  Art.  31  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  it  appears  that  the 
two  Articles  have  the  same  general  provisions  but  the  drafting  of  the  ICJ  Article  is 
clearer.  Para.  2  of  the  ICJ  Statute  lays  down  clear  provisions  regarding  the 
appointment  of  an  ad  hoc  judge  by  recommending  to  state  parties  to  a  dispute  to 
chose  their  ad  hoc  judge  among  persons  who  have  been  nominated  but  not  elected 
as  ICJ  judges.  "Such  a  person  shall  be  chosen  preferably  from  among  those 
persons  who  have  been  nominated  as  candidates  as  provided  in  Article  4  and  5.  " 
This  provision  cannot  be  found  in  either  the  draft  Statute  or  the  draft  Rules  of  the 
ACJ.  Further,  para.  4  of  Art.  31  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  allows  ad  hoc  judges  to 
sit  in  chambers.  This  is  an  important  provision,  because  this  encourages  states  to 
use  a  chamber  of  the  Court.  The  Arab  draftsmen  have  not  paid  any  attention  to 
this  provision.  The  relevant  paragraph  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  reads  as  follows: 
"The  provisions  of  this  Article  shall  apply  to  the  case  of  Articles  26 
and  29.  In  such  cases,  the  President  shall  request  one  or,  if  necessary, 
two  of  the  members  of  the  Court  forming  the  chamber  to  give  place  to 
the  members  of  the  Court  of  the  nationality  of  the  parties  concerned, 
and,  failing  such,  or  if  they  are  unable  to  be  present,  to  the  judges 
specially  chosen  by  the  parties.  " 
Before  going  into  more  details  in  discussing  the  system  of  ad  hoc  judges  in 
the  present  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  it  seems  necessary  to  distinguish  between  the Chapter  Three  139 
two  types  of  judges:  the  regular  judges,  and  the  ad  hoc  judges.  100  Regular  judges, 
whether  national  or  non  national,  are  those  nominated  by  a  `national  group'  within 
the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration,  or  specially  appointed  by  their  government 
party  to  the  Statute  and  are  elected  by  the  General  Assembly  and  Security  Council 
in  the  ICJ  or  by  the  Arab  League  Council  in  the  ACJ.  101  Ad  hoc  judges  are 
persons  always  appointed  directly  by  their  government  to  sit  on  the  bench  in  any 
particular  case.  102 
One  may  ask  whether  it  is  necessary  that  an  ad  hoc  judge  should  be  a  national 
of  the  state  which  appointed  him  to  sit  on  the  bench.  In  the  practice  of  the  ICJ, 
possessing  the  nationality  of  one  of  litigating  states  is  not  necessary.  It  is 
permitted  to  appoint  an  ad  hoc  judge  to  sit  in  particular  case  even  if  he  is  not  a 
national  of  the  government  that  appointed  him.  103 
The  idea  of  appointing  ad  hoc  judges  from  litigating  states  was  rooted  in  the 
Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  and  then  transferred  to  the  Statute  of  the  PCIJ  and 
its  successor  the  10.104  Yet  the  system  of  ad  hoc  judges  has  been  the  subject  of 
disagreement  between  jurists  on  several  occasions.  Many  criticisms  against  this 
system  have  been  made  such  as,  for  example,  that  it  diminishes  the  principle  that 
100  Eyffinger,  The  International  Court,  supra  note  42,  p.  165. 
t01  Arts.  4-8  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  and  Arts.  7-9  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ. 
102  Art.  18  (2,3)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  and  Art.  31  (2,3)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ. 
103  Rosenne,  The  World  Court,  supra  note  2,  p.  75;  Eyffmger,  The  International  Court,  supra 
note  42,  p.  165;  also  see  as  an  example,  the  list  of  judges  ad  hoc  who  were  chosen  in  several  cases 
although  they  were  not  nationals  of  any  parties  to  the  dispute  in  46  YBICJ  (1991-92)  p.  p.  12-15; 
also  in  47  YBICJ(1992-93)  p.  p.  13-16. 
104  Hill,  Norman  L.,  National  Judges  in  the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice,  25  AJIL 
(1931)  p.  p.  670-674;  II  Ro  Suh,  Voting  Behaviour  of  National  Judges  in  International  Court,  63 
AJIL  (1969)  p.  p.  224-225.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  II  Ro  Suh,  Voting  Behaviour). Chapter  Three  140 
no  one  should  be  a  judge  in  his  own  case.  105  In  1945,  the  Institute  of  International 
Law  discussed  the  ad  hoc  judges  system  and  after  a  considerable  debate  adopted 
the  following  Resolution: 
"If  the  system  of  ad  hoc  judges  cannot  be  abandoned,  it  is  as  a 
minimum  highly  desirable  that  the  appointment  of  such  judges  should 
be  subject  to  guarantees  as  nearly  possible  equivalent  to  those 
governing  the  election  of  titular  judges.  The  appointment  of  such 
judges  might,  for  instance,  be  entrusted  to  the  national  group  of  the 
Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  of  the  State  concerned,  or  to  the 
national  group  appointed  by  the  government  in  pursuance  to  Article  4, 
paragraph  2,  of  the  Statute.  "  06 
Chagla,  who  was  appointed  as  an  ad  hoc  judge  in  the  Right  of  Passage  case, 
also  declared  that  "[he  thought  ]  the  system  of  ad  hoc  judges  is bad.  "  107 
We  believe  that  the  system  of  ad  hoc  judges,  despite  its  disadvantages  which 
will  be  mentioned  below,  also  has  some  advantages,  at  least  in  the  view  of  the 
litigating  states.  Firstly,  if  the  idea  of  ad  hoc  judges  were  dropped  from  the 
system  of  the  ICJ  or  ACJ,  the  number  of  cases  which  may  brought  before  these 
two  Courts  may  decrease,  because  litigating  states  like,  for  political  reasons,  their 
view  to  be  supported  not  just  during  the  public  hearings,  but  also  during  the  later 
phase  of  private  deliberations.  108  This,  however,  does  not  mean  that  ad  hoc  judges 
105  Lauterpacht,  H.  (ed.  ),  Oppenheim's  International  Law:  A  Treatise,  vol.  II,  London:  Longmans, 
Green  and  Co.,  (1955)  p.  p.  78-79;  Gross,  The  International  Court  of  Justice,  supra  note  85, 
p.  p.  61-62. 
106  45  Annuaire  IDI,  (1954/11)  p.  298;  for  more  discussion  see  II  Ro  Suh,  Voting  Behaviour, 
supra  note  104,  p.  231.  'It  has  to  be  mentioned  that  according  to  Art.  7  (1)  of  the  draft  Statute  of 
the  ACJ,  regular  Judges  are  appointed  directly  by  their  government.  So  there  is  no  possibility  to 
adopt  the  provision  which  requires  that  the  ad  hoc  judges  have  to  be  appointed  by  national  groups. 
107  Chagla,  Mahomedali  C.,  Rule  of  Law  and  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  Proc.  ASIL  (1960) 
p.  242;  for  more  details  about  this  case  see,  Right  of  Passage  Over  Indian  Territory  (Portugal  v. 
India)  ICJ  Rep.,  (1957)  p.  p.  3,125. 
108  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  3,  p.  204;  Plender,  Richard,  Procedure  in  the 
European  Court:  Comparisons  and  Proposals,  267  Recueil  Des  Cours,  (1997)  p.  46. Chapter  Three  141 
have  always  voted  in  favour  of  their  government,  109  but  rather  because  their 
participation  in  the  formulation  of  judgment  is  more  important  than  their  influence 
on  the  actual  decision.  Secondly,  it  has  been  argued  that  an  ad  hoc  judge  is 
considered  to  be  better  informed  about  the  national  problems  that  gave  rise  to  the 
case.  110 
By  Art.  4  (1)  of  the  draft  ACJ  Rules,  a  state  party  to  a  dispute  which  wishes 
to  exercise  its  right  to  choose  an  ad  hoc  judge  has  to  notify  the  Registrar  prior  to 
the  commencement  of  hearings,  stating  the  name  of  the  person  chosen  as  its  ad 
hoc  judge.  The  Registrar  then  has  to  notify  the  other  parties  to  comment  on  this 
choice  within  a  time  limit  fixed  by  the  President.  This  Article  has  confirmed  that 
the  appointment  of  ad  hoc  judges  is  a  right  of  the  state  concerned  and  not  of  the 
Court. 
Art.  18  (5)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  provides  that  ad  hoc  judges  should 
fulfil  the  same  conditions  required  by  Art.  6,11  and  14.  This  means,  in  other 
words,  that  an  ad  hoc  judge  has  to  be  a  citizen  of  a  member  state  and  qualified  in 
Islamic  Shariah  and  international  law;  he  has  to  take  the  same  oath  taken  by  titular 
judges;  and  also  he  is  not  allowed  to  engage  in  any  political  functions  or  to  act  as 
109  There  is  at  least  one  case  that  could  be  mentioned  here,  the  Application  for  Revision  an 
Interpretation  of  the  Judgment  of  24  February  1982  in  the  case  Concerning  the  Continental  Shelf 
(Tunisia/  Libyan  Arab  Jamahiriya),  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1985)  p.  247;  for  further  discussion  see 
Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  vol.  111,  supra  note  3,  p.  p.  1128-1129.  The  same  idea  could  be 
said  regarding  the  national  titular  judges  who  also  should  not  represent  their  governments  but  enjoy 
full  independence  in  expressing  their  views  even  if  that  against  their  governments.  See  the 
following  cases  which  show  that  sometimes  judges  may  vote  contrary  to  the  views  held  by  their 
governments,  for  example,  Judges  McNair,  Basdevant  and  Hachworth  in  The  Monetary  Gold 
Removed  from  Rome  in  1943  case,  (Italy  v.  French,  UK.,  USA.  ),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1954)  p.  35;  Judge 
Basdevant  in  The  Minquiers  and  Ecrehos  case,  (France  v.  U.  K.  ),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1953)  p.  74;  Judge 
McNair  in  The  Anglo-Iranian  Oil  Co.  case,  (United  Kingdom  v.  Iran  ),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1952)  p.  116. 
11°  Eyffinger,  The  International  Court,  supra  note  42,  p.  p.  164-165;  Gross,  The  International 
Court  of  Justice,  supra  note  85,  p.  p.  62-63;  UNCIO,  vol.  14,  (1945)  p.  113. Chapter  Three  142 
an  agent,  counsel  or  advocate  in  any  case  of  an  international  nature.  Art.  18  (5) 
provides: 
"A  Judge  ad  hoc  shall  fulfil  the  conditions  required  by  Articles  6,11 
and  14  of  this  Statute,  and  may  participate  in  meetings,  proceedings 
and  in  deciding  judgments  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  original 
Judges.  " 
On  the  other  hand,  ad  hoc  judges  are  not  obliged  to  give  up  their  normal  jobs. 
The  only  condition  they  have  to  keep  in  mind  is  to  give  preference  to  the 
requirements  of  the  Court.  tit  When  discussing  the  qualifications  of  judges  in  the 
ACJ,  we  concluded  that  Art.  6  must  be  revised  to  make  it  more  flexible  by 
requiring  that  not  all  members  of  the  Court  have  to  be  qualified  in  both  Islamic 
Shariah  and  international  law,  but  that  the  Court  as  whole  should  comprise  judges 
who  are  qualified  in  either  Islamic  Shariah  or  international  law.  If  this  revision  is 
made,  then  there  will  be  no  problem  to  refer  to  Art.  6  and  require  that  an  ad  hoc 
judge  should  fulfil  the  same  qualifications  as  required  for  the  titular  judge.  Art.  6 
also  requires  that  titular  judges  should  be  citizens  of  the  member  states.  Does  this 
means  that  the  draft  Statute  requires  litigating  states  to  appoint  ad  hoc  judges  who 
are  their  own  nationals?  We  found  in  the  practice  of  the  ICJ,  that  an  ad  hoc  judge 
need  not  be  a  national  of  one  of  the  litigating  states.  So  the  Arab  draftsmen  have 
to  reconsider  this  Article  by  distinguishing  between  ad  hoc  judges  and  titular 
judges  as  to  nationality  and  qualifications  in  order  to  avoid  any  legal  or  procedural 
problems. 
Unlike  the  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ,  the  draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ  do  not  lay  down 
any  details  about  ad  hoc  judges.  So  by  analogy  with  the  provisions  of  the  ICJ 
111  Rosenne,  The  World  Court,  supra  note  2,  p.  75. Chapter  Three  143 
Rules,  it  should  be  the  case  that  they  participate  on  a  footing  of  equality  with 
regular  judges  on  the  bench,  both  in  hearing  the  case  and  in  the  formation  of  the 
decision.  However,  the  titular  judges  have  precedence  over  ad  hoc  judges  in  order 
of  seniority  of  age.  "2  They  are  entitled,  like  the  titular  judges,  to  write  dissenting 
and  separate  opinions,  113  but  ad  hoc  judges  are  not  taken  into  account  in  the 
calculation  of  the  quorum.  '  14 
One  the  other  hand,  neither  the  ICJ  Statute  nor  the  1978  Rules  contain  any 
express  provision  to  permit  ad  hoc  judges  to  participate  in  advisory  opinion 
proceedings.  Despite  this  fact,  an  ad  hoc  judge  was  first  appointed  since  the 
creation  of  the  present  World  Court  (the  ICJ)  in  advisory  proceedings  in  the 
Namibia  case.  t15  The  practice  of  the  first  period  of  the  PCIJ's  life  did  allow  ad 
hoc  judges  to  participate  in  some  types  of  advisory  opinion.  Fachiri  argued  in  this 
regard: 
"it  will  be  noted  that  the  right  to  have  a  national  judge  does  not  exist 
in  every  advisory  case  it  only  arises  where  the  question  submitted  to 
the  Court  relates  an  existing  international  dispute,  and,  therefore, 
substantially  the  same  considerations  are  applicable  as  in  contentious 
cases.  "t  16 
112  Art.  7  (2,3)  of  the  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ. 
117  For  more  details  in  this  point  see  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  3,  p.  p.  204-205; 
Oda  defined  dissenting  and  separate  opinions  as  follows:  "A  dissenting  opinion  is  given  by  any 
judge  who  differs  from  the  court  as  to  the  actual  conclusion  and  a  separate  opinion  is  given  by  any 
judge  who  agrees  with  the  conclusion  of  the  court  but  for  different  reasons.  "  Oda,  The 
International  Court,  supra  note  5,  p.  125. 
114  Art.  20  (3)  of  the  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ. 
115  Advisory  Opinion  in  the  Legal  Consequences  for  States  of  the  Continued  Presence  of  South 
Africa  in  Namibia  (South  West  Africa)  Notwithstanding  Security  Council  Resolution  276  (1970), 
ICJ  Rep.,  (1971)  p.  p.  12,16;  for  further  details  about  this  case  see  Pomerance,  Michla,  The 
Admission  of  Judge  Ad  Hoc  in  Advisory  Proceedings:  Some  Reflections  in  the  Light  of  the 
Namibia  Case,  67  AJ!  L  (1973)  p.  p.  446-447,449-454. 
116  Fachiri,  The  Permanent  Court,  supra  note  23,  p.  60;  in  the  following  cases  ad  hoc  judges  were 
appointed:  Jurisdiction  of  the  Courts  of  Danzig,  Advisory  Opinion,  PCIJ  (1928)  Ser.  B,  No.  15, 
p.  274;  Greco-Bulgarian  "Communities",  Advisory  Opinion,  PCIJ(1930)  Ser.  B,  No.  17,  p.  306; 
Railway  Traffic  between  Lithuania  and  Poland,  Advisory  Opinion,  PCIJ(1931)  Ser.  A/B,  No.  42, Chapter  Three  144 
Art.  68  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  is  the  justification  for  this  appointment.  This 
Article  provides: 
"In  the  exercise  of  its  advisory  functions  the  Court  shall  further  be 
guided  by  the  provisions  of  the  present  Statute  which  apply  in 
contentious  cases  to  the  extent  to  which  it  recognizes  them  to  be 
applicable.  " 
This  may  be  taken  into  account  in  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  by  allowing  ad 
hoc  judges  to  participate  in  advisory  opinion  proceedings  even  although  the  draft 
Statute  does  not  give  any  clear  permission  to  allow  them  such  competence.  It  has 
to  be  mentioned  that  the  same  provision  of  Art.  68  can  be  found  in  Art.  50  (4)  of 
the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  which  may  help  the  Arab  Court  to  take  the  same 
decision  as  has  been  taken  by  the  ICJ. 
3.11.  Chambers 
Cases  before  the  ICJ  are  to  be  decided  by  a  full  Court  of  fifteen,  or  at  least  by 
nine  judges  who  constitute  a  quorum.  However,  it  is  also  possible,  as  an 
alternative,  to  have  cases  decided  by  a  smaller  number  of  judges  meeting  as  a 
`Chamber'.  The  Statute  of  the  ICJ  provides  for  three  kinds  of  chambers:  the 
Chamber  of  Summary  Procedure;  Chambers  dealing  with  particular  categories  of 
cases  (Special  Chambers);  and  a  Chamber  for  dealing  with  a  particular  case  (ad 
hoc  Chamber).  "'  Neither  Special  Chambers  nor  the  Chamber  of  Summary 
Procedure  have  ever  been  used  by  the  ICJ,  while  since  1981  four  cases  have  been 
p.  324;  Access  to,  or  Anchorage  in,  the  Port  of  Danzig,  of  Polish  War  Vessels,  Advisory  Opinion, 
PCIJ  (1931)  Ser.  A/B,  No.  43,  p.  326. 
117  For  more  details  see  Valencia-Ospina,  Eduardo,  The  Use  of  Chambers  of  the  International 
Court  of  Justice,  in  Vaughan  Lowe  &  Malgosia  Fitzmaurice  (eds.  ),  Fifty  Years  of  the  International 
Court  of  Justice:  Essays  in  honour  of  Sir  Robert  Jennings,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University 
Press,  (1996)  p.  p.  504-506.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Valencia-Ospina,  The  Use  of  Chambers  of  the 
ICJ);  Jennings,  Robert  Y.,  The  United  Nations  at  Fifty:  The  International  Court  of  Justice  After 
Fifty  Years,  89  AJIL  (1995)  p.  p.  496-497. Chapter  Three  145 
decided  by  ad  hoc  Chambers  in  accordance  with  the  request  of  the  parties.  For 
that  reason,  a  discussion  of  the  historical  background  of  Chambers  in  the  ICJ 
becomes  necessary  in  order  to  find  out  whether  the  Arab  draftsmen  are  adopting 
the  same  kind  of  Chambers  in  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ. 
It  has  to  be  mentioned,  at  the  outset,  that  not  all  jurists  are  satisfied  with  the 
general  idea  of  creating  chambers  as  an  additional  choice  in  the  ICJ.  Some  argue 
that  recourse  to  these  kind  of  chambers  does  not  make  any  sense,  as  long  as  the 
procedures  to  be  followed  before  them  are  the  same  as  before  the  full  Court. 
Judge  Oda  for  example,  has  argued  that:  118 
"I  do  not  see  any  incentive  for  states  in  dispute  to  prefer  a  chamber 
consisting  of  small  number  of  judges  to  the  full  court,  as  the 
procedures  employed  in  both  stances  remain  the  same.  " 
Jennings  on  the  other  hand,  said  that  the  general  purpose  of  creating 
chambers  seems  to  be  speed  and  informality.  In  this  regard  he  argued:  119 
"The  intention  of  Articles  26-29  of  the  Court's  Statute  seems  to  have 
been  twofold:  to  provide  for  speedy  justice  where  the  parties  want  it, 
and  also  to  provide  for  `particular  categories  of  cases;  for  example, 
labour  cases  and  cases  relating  to  transit  and  communications.  " 
A.  The  Chamber  of  Summary  Procedure 
The  Chamber  of  Summary  Procedure  is  to  be  formed  annually  by  the  Court 
without  the  necessity  of  a  request  from  the  parties  of  a  dispute.  It  is  composed  of 
five  judges,  three  elected  by  secret  ballot;  the  remaining  two  are  the  President  and 
Vice-President  acting  ex  officio.  At  the  same  time  two  other  judges  are  to  be 
elected  by  the  same  procedures  to  act  as  substitutes.  The  purpose  of  forming  this 
116  Oda,  The  International  Court,  supra  note  5,  p.  55;  also  see  Toope,  Stephen  J.,  Pragmatic 
Compromise  or  More  Transaction?  The  Use  of  Chamber  Procedures  in  International  Adjudication, 
31  VJIL  (1990)  p.  54. 
119  Jennings,  The  Role  of  the  ICJ,  supra  note  93,  p.  36. Chapter  Three  146 
kind  of  chamber  is  to  accelerate  the  work  of  the  Court  or  in  other  words,  to  hear 
and  determine  cases  according  to  the  request  of  the  parties  by  using  summary 
procedures.  120  The  wording  of  Art.  29  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  in  this  regard 
explicitly  provides:  121 
"with  a  view  to  the  speedy  despatch  of  business,  the  Court  shall  form 
annually  a  chamber  composed  of  five  judges  which,  at  the  request  of 
the  parties,  may  hear  and  determine  cases  by  summary  procedure.  In 
addition,  two  judges  shall  be  selected  for  the  purpose  of  replacing 
judges  who  find  it  impossible  to  sit.  " 
It  is  to  be  noted  the  previous  World  Court  (PCIJ)  also  knew  this  kind  of 
chamber  under  Art.  29  of  its  Statute.  However,  this  chamber  was  used  only  once 
during  the  entire  history  of  this  Court  in  the  Treaty  of  Neuilly  case.  122  This  kind 
of  chamber  has  never  functioned  or  been  called  upon  to  meet  since  the 
establishment  of  the  ICJ.  123 
B.  Special  Chambers 
The  Statute  allows  the  ICJ  to  form,  in  advance,  one  or  more  special 
chambers,  to  deal  with  particular  categories  of  cases  such  as  labour  cases  and 
cases  relating  to  transit  and  communications.  When  this  kind  of  chamber  is  to  be 
formed,  the  Court  has  to  determine  the  number  of  its  members,  their  term  of 
office,  the  date  at  which  they  will  take  up  their  duties,  and  the  category  of  cases 
for  which  each  chamber  is  established.  The  members  of  these  chambers,  whether 
three  or  more,  are  elected  by  secret  ballot,  and  should  be  experts  in  the  particular 
120  It  has  to  be  mentioned  that  only  parties  to  a  dispute  can  decide  whether  their  case  is  to  be 
decided  by  chamber  of  summary  procedure  or  not,  but  their  right  to  intervene  in  the  establishment 
of  this  chamber  is  limited  to  the  appointment  of  an  ad  hoc  judge. 
121  See  also  Arts.  15  (1),  18  (1)  of  the  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ. 
122  Or  more  precisely,  two  linked  cases:  the  Treaty  ofNeuiily  case,  (Greece  v.  Bulgaria)  Art.  179, 
Annex,  Para.  4,  Interpretation  of  Judgment  No.  3,  PCIJ  (1924)  Ser.  A,  No.  3;  Interpretation  of 
Judgment  No.  3,  PCIJ  (1925)  Ser.  A,  No.  4. 
123  49  YBICJ  (1994-95)  p.  17. Chapter  Three  147 
field  or  have  special  knowledge,  as  such  chambers  are  created  to  deal  with  cases 
which  have  a  technical  nature.  124  Art.  26  (1)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  provides:  125 
"The  Court  may  from  time  to  time  form  one  or  more  chambers, 
composed  of  three  or  more  judges,  as  the  Court  may  determine,  for 
dealing  with  particular  categories  of  cases;  for  example,  labour  cases 
and  cases  relating  to  transit  and  communications.  " 
It  is  not  necessary  under  Art.  17  (3)  of  the  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ,  unlike  in  the 
case  of  the  previous  World  Court  (PCIJ),  that  the  judges  who  compose  special 
chambers  represent  the  main  forms  of  civilisation  and  principal  legal  systems  of 
the  world.  The  draftsmen  of  the  present  Court  (ICJ)  dropped  this  provision  from 
the  1945  Statute.  '26 
Since  1945,  no  special  chamber  has  been  formed  under  the  provision  of  Art. 
26  (1).  Nevertheless,  in  August  1993,  the  Court  decided  to  form  a  Special 
Chamber  dealing  with  cases  involving  issues  of  international  environmental 
law.  127  This  chamber  is  composed  of  seven  judges  and  was  initially  constituted 
for  a  period  of  six  months,  which  was  then  the  remaining  period  of  the  then 
124  Eyffinger,  The  International  Court,  supra  note  42,  p.  161. 
125  See  also  Art.  26  (3)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ;  Arts.  16,18  (1)  of  the  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ. 
126  Cf.  Arts.  26,27  of  the  Statute  of  the  PCIJ  in  International  Court  of  Justice  (ed.  ),  International 
Court  of  Justice:  Selected  Documents  Relating  to  the  Drafting  of  the  Statute,  Washington:  United 
States  Government  Printing  Office,  (1945)  p.  p.  63-64;  also  see  Oda,  Shigeru,  Further  Thoughts  on 
the  Chambers  Procedure  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  82  AJIL  (1988)  p.  557.  (hereinafter 
cited  as:  Oda,  Further  Thought  of  the  Chambers  Procedures);  Schwebel,  Stephen  M.,  Ad  hoc 
Chambers  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  81  AJIL  (1987)  p.  p.  831-832.  (hereinafter  cited  as: 
Schwebel,  Ad  hoc  Chambers);  McWhinney,  Edward,  Special  Chambers  Within  the  International 
Court  of  Justice:  The  Preliminary,  Procedural  Aspect  of  the  Gulf  Maine  Case,  SJILC  (1985) 
p.  p.  5-6;  see  also  in  this  regard  the  comments  of  Shabtai  Rosenne  in  his  Procedure  in  the 
International  Court,  supra  note  75,  p.  p.  188-191. 
127  For  more  details  about  the  Chamber  dealing  with  environmental  cases  see  Valencia-Ospina, 
The  Use  of  Chambers  of  the  ICJ,  supra  note  117,  p.  p.  521-527.  It  has  to  be  mentioned  that  only 
two  environmental  cases  have  been  brought  before  the  full  Court  since  its  establishment  up  to  the 
present  time:  Request  for  an  Examination  of  the  Situation  in  Accordance  with  Paragraph  63  of  the 
Court's  Judgment  of  20  December  1974  in  the  Nuclear  Tests  case,  (New  Zealand  v.  France),  ICJ 
Rep.,  (1995)  p.  228;  Gabcikovo-Nagymaros  Project  (Hungary  v.  Slovakia),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1994) 
p.  151;  also  see  Evans,  Malcolm  D.  (ed.  ),  International  Court  of  Justice:  Recent  Cases,  47  ICLQ 
(1998)  p.  p.  668-669. Chapter  Three  148 
composition  of  the  Court  until  February  1994.  It  still  remains  functioning 
according  to  the  decision  of  the  Court  in  February  1997.12ß  It  was  the  first  special 
chamber  to  be  formed  in  the  whole  history  of  the  ICJ  and  its  predecessor  the  PCIJ 
deal  with  particular  categories  of  cases,  but  it  has  yet  to  decide  a  case.  '  29  This 
action  was  taken  by  the  ICJ  as  a  result  of  the  recent  development  and  importance 
of  environmental  matters.  130  However  some  jurists,  such  as  judge  Oda,  have 
another  view  of  this  kind  of  chamber.  He  has  argued:  '  31 
I  am  unable  to  state  why  this  action  was  taken  at  that  time,  so  the 
intention  behind  the  creation  of  this  particular  chamber  must,  I  am 
afraid,  be  left  to  speculation.  " 
C.  Ad  Hoc  Chambers 
The  ICJ  is  also  allowed,  at  the  request  of  the  parties,  to  form  a  chamber  to 
deal  with  a  particular  case.  This  kind  of  chamber  was  first  intended  by  Art.  26  (2) 
of  the  present  Statute  which  provides:  132 
"The  Court  may  at  any  time  form  a  chamber  for  dealing  with  a 
particular  case.  The  number  of  judges  to  constitute  [this]  chamber 
shall  be  determined  by  the  Court  with  the  approval  of  the  parties.  " 
During  the  first  39  years  of  the  life  of  the  ICJ,  no  ad  hoc  Chamber  was 
formed  according  to  this  Article.  133  Yet,  four  ad  hoc  Chambers  have  been  formed 
123 
49  YBICJ  (1994-95)  p.  17. 
129  As  mentioned  before,  the  PCIJ  had  also  known  two  Special  Chambers,  for  labour  cases 
(Art.  26)  and  for  transit  and  communications  cases  (Art.  27). 
110  See  48  YBICJ  (1993-94)  p.  18;  also  Fitzmaurice,  Malgosia,  Environmental  Protection  and  the 
International  Court  of  Justice,  in  Vaughan  Lowe,  and  Malgosia  Fitzmaurice  (eds.  ),  Fifty  Years  of 
the  International  Court  of  Justice:  Essays  in  honour  of  Sir  Robert  Jennings,  Cambridge: 
Cambridge  University  Press,  (1996)  p.  p.  302-308. 
131  Oda,  The  International  Court,  supra  note  5,  p.  55. 
132  See  UNCIO,  vol.  14,  (1945)  p.  p.  834-835. 
133  It  has  to  be  mentioned  that  there  were  several  declarations  from  jurists  recommending  recourse 
to  this  kind  of  chamber.  For  example,  see  Rogers  William  P.,  The  Rule  of  the  Law  and  the 
Settlement  of  International  Disputes,  64  AJIL  (1970)  p.  288;  Jessup,  Philip  C.,  To  Form  a  More 
Perfect  United  Nations,  129  Recueil  Des  Cours  (1970-1)  p.  21. Chapter  Three  149 
since  1981  as  follows:  Gulf  Maine  case;  134  Frontier  Dispute  case;  135  Land,  Island 
and  Maritime  Frontier  Dispute  case;  136  ELSI  case.  137 
It  was  realised  that  the  reason  for  parties'  abstention  from  recourse  to  this 
type  of  chamber  was  because  of  the  Court's  Rules  which  provided  for  the  election 
of  its  members  by  secret  ballot.  138  This  may  contradict  the  wish  of  the  parties  who 
may  like  to  constitute  a  chamber  composed  of  judges  chosen  by  them.,  39  so 
changes  to  the  Court's  Rules  became  an  important  requirement  in  order  to 
motivate  states  to  have  recourse  to  ad  hoc  Chambers.  The  Beagle  Channel  case  in 
1971  helped  to  take  the  idea  of  reconsidering  the  Rules  of  the  Court  more 
seriously.  In  this  case,  one  party  wanted  to  go  to  the  Court,  while  the  other 
required  arbitration.  Finally,  the  parties  (Argentina/Chile)  agreed  that  instead  of 
submitting  their  case  to  the  Court,  to  conclude  a  compromise  using  an  ad  hoc 
arbitral  tribunal.  They  selected  five  members  of  the  Court  to  sit  as  an  ad  hoc 
13'  This  was  the  first  case  submitted  to  a  Chamber  and  brought  to  the  1CJ.  'See  the  joint  letter  of 
the  parties  to  the  Registry  dated  25  November  1981,  case  Concerning  Delimitation  of  the  Maritime 
Boundary  in  the  Gulf  Maine  Area,  (Canada  v.  United  State  of  America);  constituted  on  20  January 
1982,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1982)  p.  3. 
135  Joint  letter  of  the  parties  to  the  Registry  dated  14  October  1983,  case  Concerning  the  Frontier 
Dispute,  (Burkina  Faso  v.  Mali);  constituted  on  3  April  1985,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1985)  p.  6. 
136  Joint  letter  of  the  parties  to  the  Registry  dated  II  December  1986,  case  Concerning  the  Land. 
Island  and  Maritime  Frontier  Dispute,  (El  Salvador  v.  Honduras:  Nicaragua  [as  from  13 
September  19901  intervening);  constituted  on  8  May  1987,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1987)  p.  10,  and  ICJ  Rep., 
(1990)  p.  p.  3-4. 
137  Letter  of  the  United  States  to  the  Registry  dated  6  February  1987;  telegram  of  the  Italian 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  dated  13  February  1987,  case  Concerning  Elettronica  Sicula  S.  p.  A. 
(ELSI),  (United  State  v.  Italy);  constituted  on  2  March  1987,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1987)  p.  3. 
138  Art.  18  (1)  of  the  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ  provides  that  `Elections  to  all  Chambers  shall  take 
place  by  secret  ballot.  " 
139  Schwebel,  Ad  hoc  Chambers,  supra  note  126,  p.  837;  and  his  Chambers  of  the  International 
Court  of  Justice  Formed  for  Particular  Cases,  in  Yoram  Dinstein  &  Mala  Tabory  (eds.  ), 
International  Law  at  a  Time  of  Perplexity:  Essays  in  Honour  of  Shabtai  Rosenne,  London: 
Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers,  (1989)  p.  747. Chapter  Three  ISO 
Arbitral  panel.  140  It  then  became  necessary  to  make  changes  to  the  Rules  of  the 
Court  by  which  the  parties  were  given  a  voice  in  the  composition  of  the  ad  hoc 
Chamber.  They  can  now  choose  the  members  of  such  a  chamber  who  satisfy  them 
and  thus  exclude  others.  '4' 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  original  Rules  of  the  ICJ,  the  1946  Rules,  provide 
with  regard  to  the  composition  of  the  chamber  that  "the  President  shall  ascertain 
the  views  of  the  parties  as  to  the  number  of  judges  to  constitute  its  chamber.  "  142 
This  provision  was  first  revised  in  1972.  The  1972  Rules  provide  that  "the 
President  shall  consult  the  agents  of  the  parties  regarding  the  composition  of  the 
chamber.  i143  Finally  in  Art.  17  (1)  of  the  1978  Rules  the  President  shall  ascertain 
the  parties'  views  regarding  the  composition  of  the  Court.  It  provides: 
"A  request  for  the  formation  of  a  Chamber  to  deal  with  a  particular 
case,  as  provided  for  in  Article  26,  paragraph  2,  of  the  Statute,  may  be 
filed  at  any  time  until  the  closure  of  the  written  proceedings.  Upon 
receipt  of  a  request  made  by  one  party,  the  President  shall  ascertain 
whether  the  other  party  assents.  " 
It  has  to  be  understood  that  in  the  four  ad  hoc  Chambers  mentioned  above, 
the  President  ascertained  the  views  of  the  parties  regarding  the  composition  of  the 
chamber.  This  raises  a  question,  what  it  is  meant  by  `ascertain'?  We  believe  that 
the  main  requirements  needed  to  form  an  ad  hoc  Chamber  is  the  consent  of  the 
parties  and  the  explicit  wishes  of  those  judges  who  will  be  nominated  as  members 
of  the  chamber.  The  parties  may  take  into  account  some  personal  abilities  in  the 
130  Beagle  Channel  Arbitration  (Argentina  v.  Chile),  25  YBICJ  (1970-71)  p.  114;  52  ILR  (1979) 
p.  93. 
"'  Schwebel,  Stephen  M.,  Justice  in  International  Law:  Selected  Writings  of  Judge  Stephen  M. 
Schwebe!,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  (1994)  p.  103;  see  also  in  this  regard  the 
comments  of  Shabtai  Rosenne,  Procedure  in  the  International  Court,  supra  note  75,  p.  p.  38-47. 
142 
Art.  71  (3). 
143 
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judges  to  be  chosen,  without  disregard  to  his  political  beliefs  or  any  other  reasons; 
but  how  is  this  wish  expressed?  Do  the  parties  give  the  President  particular  names 
of  judges?  Oda  has  noted  in  this  matter  that:  144 
"he  was  not  in  a  position  to  tell  how  the  judges  of  Chambers  were 
chosen  by  the  full  Court  in  each  case.  " 
During  the  process  of  revising  the  1978  Rules,  consulting  the  parties  in  the 
composition  of  the  ad  hoc  Chamber  was  criticised  and  has  been  criticised  since 
then.  '45  On  the  other  hand,  the  recourse  to  this  type  of  chamber  was  strongly 
recommended  by  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  in  its  Resolution  2323 
(XXIX)  1974  on  a  `Review  of  the  Role  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice', 
which  declared:  '46 
"...  Considering  that  the  International  Court  of  Justice  has  recently 
amended  the  Rules  of  Court  with  a  view  to  facilitating  recourse  to  it 
for  the  judicial  settlement  of  dispute,  inter  alia  by  simplifying,  the 
procedure,  reducing  the  likelihood  of  undue  delays  and  costs  and 
allowing  for  greater  influence  of  parties  on  the  composition  of  ad  hoc 
chambers,...  Draws  the  attention  of  States  to  the  possibility  of  making 
use  of  Chambers  as  provided  in  Articles  26  and  29  of  the  State  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  and  in  the  Rules  of  the  Court,  including 
those  which  would  deal  with  particular  categories  of  cases.  " 
It  appears  by  a  close  reading  of  the  relevant  Articles  which  regulate  the 
procedure  to  be  followed  to  constitute  an  ad  hoc  Chamber,  that  the  function  of  this 
kind  of  chamber  seems  to  be  similar  to  arbitration,  especially  in  its  constitution 
144  Oda,  The  International  Court,  supra  note  5,  p.  58. 
145  Hambro,  Edvard,  Will  the  Revised  Rules  of  Court  Lead  to  greater  Willingness  on  the  Part  of 
Prospective  Clients?,  in  Leo  Gross  (ed.  ),  The  Future  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  vol.  1, 
New  York:  Oceana  Publications,  INC,  (1976)  p.  p.  368-369;  Eduardo  Jimenez  de  Arechaga,  The 
Amendments  to  the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  67  AJIL  (1973) 
p.  p.  2-3;  also  see  Delimitation  of  Maritime  Boundary  in  the  Gulf  of  Maine  Area,  (Canada  v. 
USA),  constitution  of  Chamber,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1982)  p.  p.  11-13;  Shahabuddeen  (dissenting  opinion) 
in  Land,  Island  and  Maritime  Frontier  Dispute  (El  Salvador  v.  Handuras)  ICJ  Rep.,  (1990)  p.  18; 
Lauterpacht,  Elihu,  Aspects  of  the  Administration  of  International  Justice,  Cambridge:  Grotius 
Publications  Limited,  (1991)  p.  90. 
146  GAOR  supp.  (No.  31)  UN  Doc.  A/9631,  vol.  1,  (1974)  p.  p.  141-142. Chapter  Three  152 
and  the  necessity  for  the  parties  approval.  This  may  raise  a  question:  why  use  an 
ad  hoc  Chamber  and  not  arbitration?  147 
Judges  who  are  selected  to  constitute  the  ad  hoc  Chamber  have  to  obtain  the 
consent  of  the  parties.  In  other  words,  when  such  parties  decide  to  settle  their 
dispute  before  an  ad  hoc  Chamber,  instead  of  the  full  Court,  this  means  that  the 
composition  of  the  full  Court  does  not  suit  them,  so  the  only  other  choice  is  to 
resort  to  an  ad  hoc  Chamber  or  arbitration.  148  Judge  Oda  declared  in  the  Frontier 
Dispute  case  that:  149 
"The  Court,  being  sovereign  in  judicial  proceedings,  is  free  to  choose 
any  composition  it  likes;  yet  the  possibility  must  also  be  borne  in 
mind  that  sovereign  States  have  the  legal  right  to  withdraw  a  case  if 
they  prefer  a  composition  different  from  that  determined  by  the  Court. 
In  practical  terms,  therefore,  it  is  inevitable,  if  a  chamber  is  to  be 
viable,  that  its  composition  must  result  from  a  consensus  between  the 
parties  and  the  Court.  To  ensure  that  viability,  it  accordingly  behoves 
the  Court  to  take  account  of  the  views  of  the  Parties  when  proceeding 
to  the  election.  " 
But  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  procedure  to  be 
followed  before  the  ICJ  is  not  the  same  as  in  Arbitral  Tribunals.  Judge  Oda 
argued  on  this  point:  '  so 
"I  submit  that  an  ad  hoc  chamber  of  the  ICJ  may  in  some  measure  to 
be  equated  to  an  arbitral  tribunals  that  may  be  set  up  by  an  agreement 
of  the  States  in  dispute,  although,  unlike  an  arbitration,  the 
proceedings  of  an  ad  hoc  chamber  of  the  ICJ  are  governed  by  the 
firmly  established  procedure  of  the  Court  and,  in  addition,  the 
expenses  borne  by  the  parties  may  be  less  onerous  because  of  the  use 
of  the  ample  facilities  of  the  Court,  which  charges  no  Court  fees.  The 
most  important  difference  in  that  a  case  submitted  to  an  ad  hoc 
Chamber  is  adjudged  in  the  same  way  as  proceedings  before  the  full 
147  Hyde,  James  N.,  A  Special  Chamber  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice-An  Alternative  to  Ad 
hoc  Arbitration,  62  AJIL  (1968)  p.  439. 
148  More  details  see  Oda,  The  International  Court,  supra  note  5,  p.  p.  58-59;  and  also  his  Further 
Thought  on  the  Chambers  Procedure,  supra  note  126,  p.  558. 
149  Land,  Island  and  Maritime  Frontier  Dispute  case,  (El  Salvador  v.  Honduras),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1987) 
p.  13. 
150  Oda,  The  International  Court,  supra  note  5,  p.  59. Chapter  Three  153 
Court  and  is  concluded  with  a  judgment  that  has  the  same  effect  as 
one  rendered  by  the  full  Court.  " 
It  is  clear  that  chambers  in  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  are  of  three  types  and  each 
has  its  own  nature,  functions,  and  jurisdiction.  Unfortunately,  these  explicit 
differences  cannot  be  found  in  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ.  In  spite  of  the  fact 
that  the  Arab  draftsmen  recognised  chambers  as  another  essential  choice  to  which 
the  parties  can  have  recourse  in  order  to  settle  their  disputes,  they  nevertheless  did 
not  succeed  to  produce  accurate  provisions  clarifying  the  differences  of  these 
chambers. 
Closely  reading  Art.  25  (2,3)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  which  is 
considered  as  the  only  Article  which  regulates  chambers  in  this  Statute,  one  can 
note  the  misunderstanding  of  the  true  concept  of  chambers  by  the  Arab  draftsmen 
who  have  not  distinguished  the  three  kinds  of  chambers  in  the  ICJ  Statute.  This 
Article  permits  the  Court,  upon  the  consent  of  the  parties,  to  form  just  one 
chamber,  known  under  the  name  `Special  Chamber',  composed  of  at  least  three 
judges,  to  deal  with  a  particular  case.  The  formation  of  such  a  chamber  is  possible 
only  when  the  following  two  conditions  are  present:  a  particular  case  has  a 
technical  nature  or  the  parties  want  their  case  to  be  considered  in  a  summary 
procedure.  No  attention  to  an  ad  hoc  Chamber  appears  in  this  Article  or  in  any 
other.  It  provides: 
"2.  The  Court  may,  with  the  consent  of  parties  to  the  dispute,  form  a 
special  Chamber  dealing  with  particular  case  because  of  its  technical 
nature  or  the  need  to  follow  summary  procedures. 
3.  The  Chamber  shall  be  formed  of  at  least  three  Judges  and  its 
meetings  shall  not  be  valid  unless  all  its  members  are  present. 
In  all  cases  a  judgment  shall  be  considered  as  rendered  by  the  Court.  " Chapter  Three  154 
On  the  other  hand,  Arts.  6-9  of  the  draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ  involve  regulating 
chambers  in  this  Court  and,  surprisingly,  the  Arab  draftsmen  adopted  the  same 
provisions  of  the  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ  relating  to  Special  Chambers  and  the 
Chamber  for  Summary  Procedures  including  the  ad  hoc  Chamber.  This  means 
there  is  no  coordination  between  the  draft  Statute  and  draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ.  A 
revision  of  both  is  necessary. 
When  the  Arab  draftsmen  provided  for  forming  a  Chamber  of  Summary 
Procedure,  they  adopted  with  minor  differences  the  exact  provisions  of  the  Statute 
(Art.  29),  and  the  1978  Rules  (Art.  15)  of  the  ICJ.  This  chamber  is  formed  everyyear, 
as  with  the  ICJ  Statute,  and  composed  of  three  members,  elected  by  secret 
ballot,  instead  of  five  as  in  the  case  of  the  ICJ.  In  addition,  two  substitute 
members  replace  members  of  the  chamber  who  for  any  reason  are  unable  to  sit  in 
a  given  case,  but  no  provision  is  made  to  include  the  President  and  Vice-President 
acting  ex  officio. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  chamber  which  can  be  formed  to  deal  with  cases  which 
have  a  technical  nature  is  to  be  considered  as  parallel  to  the  Special  Chamber 
provided  by  Art.  26  (1)  of  the  ICJ  Statute  with  the  following  differences:  in  the 
draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  only  one  chamber  can  be  formed  to  deal  with  a  particular 
case  due  to  its  "technical  nature",  while  in  the  ICJ  Statute  one  or  more  chambers 
can  be  formed  to  deal  with  particular  categories  of  cases.  The  Arab  draftsmen,  on 
the  other  hand,  have  avoided  giving  examples  for  the  Special  Chamber  which  may 
be  formed  according  to  Art.  25  (2),  in  contrast  to  the  case  of  the  ICJ  which 
provides  that  Special  Chambers  are  to  be  formed  for  dealing  with  labour,  transit Chapter  Three  155 
and  communication.  We  believe  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  give  examples  for  those 
special  chambers  which  may  be  formed  to  deal  with  particular  matters,  because 
the  practice  of  the  ICJ  shows  the  possibility  of  forming  special  chambers  to  deal 
with  matters  not  mentioned  in  the  given  examples.  This  happened  exactly  when 
the  ICJ  formed  a  special  chamber  to  deal  with  cases  involving  issues  of 
international  environment  law.  Furthermore,  it  has  to  be  mentioned  at  this  point, 
that  the  Arab  draftsmen  failed  to  differentiate  between  Special  Chambers  and  ad 
hoc  Chambers.  The  latter  are  normally  formed  to  deal  with  a  particular  case, 
while  Special  Chambers  are  formed  to  deal  with  particular  categories  of  cases. 
This  confusion  can  be  found  in  the  wording  of  Art.  25,  which  uses  in  relation  to 
the  forming  of  a  Special  Chamber  the  terms  "for  a  particular  case"  instead  of 
"particular  categories  of  cases.  " 
As  mentioned  before,  no  provisions  can  be  found  in  the  draft  Statute  of  the 
ACJ  regarding  ad  hoc  Chambers  while  Art.  8  of  the  draft  Rules  provides  if  the 
Court  decides  to  form  a  Chamber  to  deal  with  a  particular  case,  consultation 
should  be  made  by  the  President  regarding  its  formation  with  the  parties 
concerned.  Accordingly,  a  report  has  to  be  prepared  by  him  and  submitted  to  the 
Court.  It  is,  on  the  other  hand,  stipulated  that  the  President  has  to  preside  over  this 
chamber  and  if  he  is  not  available,  the  Vice-President,  and  if  both  are  absent,  the 
senior  member  of  this  chamber  presides.  151  When  comparing  this  Article  with 
151  Art.  8  of  the  draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ  provides: 
"I.  If  the  Court  decides  to  form  a  Chamber  for  deciding  a  particular  case,  the 
President  shall  consult  the  concerned  parties  regarding  the  composition  of  such  a 
Chamber.  A  report  in  this  regard  shall  be  prepared  for  the  Court. 
2.  This  Chamber  shall  be  presided  over  by  the  President  and,  in  his  absence,  by  the 
Vice-President.  If  neither  are  present,  the  senior  member  shall  preside.  " Chapter  Three  156 
Art.  17  of  the  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ,  it  appears  that  some  provisions  are  missing 
and  others  are  different.  On  the  one  hand,  Art.  17  of  the  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ 
contains  a  time  limit  in  which  parties  can  request  the  Court  to  form  an  ad  hoc 
Chamber.  It  provides: 
"A  request  for  the  formation  of  a  Chamber  dealing  with  particular 
case...,  may  be  filed  at  any  time  until  the  closure  of  the  written 
proceeding.  " 
No  similar  provision  can  be  found  in  the  draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ.  So  the 
question  may  be  raised  whether  an  ad  hoc  Chamber  can  be  formed  at  any  time 
even  after  the  closure  of  the  written  proceedings  or  will  the  1978  Rules  be  applied 
by  analogy  in  this  regard?  Furthermore,  the  consultation  which  has  to  be  made  by 
the  President  with  the  parties  to  the  dispute  is  based  on  the  1972  Rules  of  the  ICJ 
which  were  revised  by  the  1978  Rules.  Major  changes  were  made,  especially 
when  the  draftsmen  changed  the  word  `consult'  to  `ascertain'.  However,  the  most 
important  point  is  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  have  disregarded  any  provision  which 
would  clarify  how  the  parties  are  to  be  consulted  and  when  the  election  is  to  be 
held,  unlike  Art.  17  (3)  of  the  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ  which  provides: 
"when  the  Court  has  determined,  with  the  approval  of  the  parties,  the 
number  of  its  Members  who  are  to  constitute  the  chamber,  it  shall 
proceed  to  their  election  [by  secret  ballot].  " 
It  has  to  be  noted  that,  as  in  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  it  is  provided  in  the  draft 
Statute  of  the  ACJ  that  a  judgment  given  by  a  chamber  is  considered  as  rendered 
by  the  Court.  152  In  this  conclusion,  it  is  interesting  to  refer  to  the  dissenting 
152  See  Art.  25  (3)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  Art.  27  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ. Chapter  Three  157 
opinion  of  Judge  Tarassov  when  he  interpreted  Art.  27  in  the  Frontier  Dispute 
case: 
153 
"According  to  Article  27  of  the  Statute,  a  judgment  given  by  an  ad 
hoc  chamber  is  to  be  considered  as  rendered  by  the  full  Court.  As  a 
result  of  the  present  order  adopted  by  a  majority  of  judges,  the 
Application  [for  permission  to  intervene]  will  have  no  more  then  two 
possible  courses  of  action-  it  can  either  abandon  its  intention  of 
preserving  and  defending  its  interests  against  possible  violation  as  a 
result  of  judicial  processes  in  the  International  Court  of  Justice  or  it 
can  submit  its  Application  to  the  chamber.  If  it  opts  for  the  latter 
course,  the  applicant  will  have  to  abide  by  the  decision  of  five  judges, 
only  two  of  whom  are  Members  of  the  Court,  but  whose  decision  will 
have  the  status  of  a  judgment  of  the  Court.  In  the  event  that 
permission  to  intervene  is  summarily  rejected,  or  if  the  judgment  on 
its  merits  fails  to  provide  a  proper  safeguard  of  its  lawful  interests  as 
an  intervening  party,  the  Applicant  will  not  be  able  to  appeal,  as  the 
court's  judgment  will  have  been  rendered.  " 
For  the  above  mentioned  reasons,  it  seems  necessary  to  reorganise  and  redraft 
those  Articles  regulating  the  chambers  in  the  draft  Statute  and  the  draft  Rules  of 
the  ACJ.  The  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ  is  an  excellent  model  to  follow  in  order  to 
redraft  the  draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ,  while  it  is  preferable  to  follow  the  provision  of 
Art.  15  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  IICJ  which  regulates  chambers  in  this  Court  and 
take  it  as  a  model  to  reconsider  Art.  25  (2,3)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ.  This 
recommended  Article  reads  as  follows: 
"a.  The  Court  may  form  one  or  more  Chambers  composed  of  three  or 
more  judges  for  dealing  with  particular  categories  of  cases. 
b.  The  Court  may  form  a  Chamber  for  dealing  with  particular  case. 
The  number  of  judges  to  constitute  such  a  Chamber  shall  be 
determined  by  the  Court  with  the  approval  of  the  parties. 
c.  The  Court  may  form  annually  a  Chamber  composed  of  three  judges 
which,  at  the.  request  of  the  parties,  may  hear  and  determine  cases  by 
summary  procedures.  " 
's;  Land,  Island  and  Maritime  Frontier  Dispute  (El  Salvador  v.  Honduras/  Nicaragua  intervening 
in  1990)  ICJ  Rep.,  (1990)  p.  16;  for  further  details  see  Rosenne,  Shabtai,  Article  27  of  the  Statute 
of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  32  VJIL  (1992)  p.  p.  213-231. Chapter  Three  158 
4.12.  Registrar  and  Registry 
By  Art.  5  of  the  draft  Statute,  the  ACJ  has  the  power  to  elect  its  Registrar, 
Deputy-Registrar  and  other  officers  as  may  be  necessary.  The  Registrar  and  his 
Deputy  are  elected  by  secret  ballot  and  by  an  absolute  majority  of  votes  from  a  list 
of  candidates  proposed  by  the  members  of  the  Court,  serve  for  period  of  two  years 
and  are  eligible  for  re-election.  Both  of  them,  before  taking  up  their  duties,  must 
take  an  oath  before  the  Court.  Their  duties,  which  are  usually  performed  under  the 
supervision  of  the  President,  may  be  divided  into  four  main  types:  diplomatic, 
administrative,  judicial  and  linguistic.  They  are  considered  as  a  channel  of 
communication  to  and  from  the  Court.  The  Court  can  select  other  officers  to 
assist  the  Registrar  and  his  Deputy,  upon  the  recommendation  of  the  Registrar.  154 
3.13.  Diplomatic  Privileges  and  Immunities 
Generally,  privileges  and  immunities  have  been  granted  to  states  and  their 
diplomatic  agents  by  other  states  as  a  result  of  the  development  of  customary 
international  law,  in  order  to  fulfil  their  functions  and  duties  independently.  155 
The  necessity  of  granting  international  organisations  privileges  and  immunities  is 
to  "enable  [them]  to  function  properly  without  undue  interference  in  their  affairs 
by  states  and  thus  ensure  the  independent  discharge  of  the  tasks  entrusted  to 
them.  "  56 
154  Arts.  14,15,  and  16  of  the  draft  Rule  of  the  ACJ. 
155  Amerasinghe,  Chittharanjan  F.,  Principles  of  the  Institutional  Law  and  International 
Organisations,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  (1996)  p.  369;  Robert  Jennings  &  Arthur 
Watt  (eds.  ),  Oppenheim's  International  Law,  vol.  1,  London:  Longman,  (1996)  p.  p.  1090-1092. 
156  Scobbie,  lain,  International  Organizations  and  International  Relations,  in  Rene-Jean  Dupuy 
(ed.  ),  A  Handbook  on  International  Organizations,  2"d  edn.,  London:  Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers, 
(1998)  p.  833. Chapter  Three  159 
When  talking  about  privileges  and  immunities  generally,  the  1961  Vienna 
Convention  on  Diplomatic  Relations  is  the  main  source  of  law  on  this  matter.  The 
preamble  of  this  Convention  states  that  the  purpose  of  granting  such  privileges 
and  immunities  is  "to  ensure  the  efficient  performance  of  the  functions  of 
diplomatic  missions  as  representing  states",  but  earlier,  the  Charter  of  the  UN 
granted  the  organisation,  and  the  Court  as  an  integral  part,  the  right  to  enjoy 
functional  privileges  and  immunities.  157 
Art.  19  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  provides  that  members  of  the  Court,  when 
engaged  on  the  business  of  the  Court,  shall  enjoy  diplomatic  privileges  and- 
immunities.  Moreover,  functional  privileges  and  immunities  are  extended 
according  to  Art.  42  (3)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  to  the  agent,  counsel  and 
advocates  of  parties  before  the  Court  in  order  that  they  can  exercise  their  duties 
before  the  Court  independently.  '58 
When  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  was  drafted,  the  question  of  the  privileges 
and  immunities  granted  to  the  members  of  the  Council  of  the  League  and  other 
officials  in  this  organisation  was  discussed.  Art.  14  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab 
League  provides:  159 
"The  members  of  the  Council  of  the  League,  the  members  of  its 
Committees  and  such  of  its  officials  as  shall  be  designated  in  the 
internal  organisation,  shall  enjoy,  in  the  exercise  of  their  duties, 
diplomatic  privileges  and  immunities. 
137  Art.  105  (1,2);  also  see  the  general  Convention  on  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  of  the  United 
Nations  of  1946  in,  I  UNTS  (1946/47)  No.  4,  p.  p.  16-32. 
158  It  is  to  be  noted  that  this  provision  was  not  found  in  the  Statute  of  the  previous  Court,  the  PCIJ. 
It  was  suggested  that  the  above  provision  should  be  added  to  the  new  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  because  it 
appeared  that  members  of  the  Court  "might  have  travel  through  several  countries  to  reach  the 
Court,  and  also  because  of  the  possibility  that  special  Chambers  of  the  Court  might  sit  at  places 
other  than  The  Hague.  "  See  UNCIO,  vol.  13,  (1945)  p.  208. 
139  For  full  text  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  see  Appendix  1. Chapter  Three  160 
The  premises  occupied  by  the  institutions  of  the  League  shall  be 
inviolable.  " 
The  Convention  on  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  of  the  Arab  League  was 
drafted  and  approved  by  the  League  Council  and  entered  into  force  on  10th  May 
1953.  This  Convention  contains  38  Articles  covering  subjects  such  as  property 
and  assets,  facilities  in  respect  of  communications,  the  representatives  of  member 
states,  officials,  experts  and  travel  documents.  160 
Arts.  51  and  52  of  the  draft  Statute  regulate  the  privileges  and  immunities  of 
the  projected  ACJ  and  its  judges.  It  appears  by  a  close  reading  of  these  two 
Articles  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  have  distinguished  between  the  Court  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  judges  on  the  other. 
By  Art.  51,  in  performing  its  functions  and  for  achieving  its  purposes,  the 
ACJ  enjoys  immunities  and  privileges  in  all  member  states  of  the  Arab  League. 
These  privileges  and  immunities  extend  to  the  Registrar  of  the  Court,  Officers, 
Experts,  Witnesses  and  Representatives  of  parties  before  the  Court,  in  order  to 
protect  their  independence  and  freedom  while  they  exercise  their  functions  and 
duties.  The  Convention  of  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  the  Arab  League  is  to 
be  applied  to  them.  161 
160  For  unofficial  English  translation  to  this  Convention  see  Khalil,  Muhammad,  The  Arab  State 
and  the  Arab  League:  A  Documentary  Record,  vol.  2,  Beirut:  Khayats,  (1962)  p.  p.  116-122. 
161  It  provides: 
"I.  The  Court  shall  enjoy,  in  the  member  states,  such  immunities  and  privileges  as 
may  be  required  for  achieving  its  purposes  and  performing  its  functions. 
2.  The  Court's  Registrar,  officers,  experts,  witnesses,  and  representatives  of  parties 
appearing  before  the  Court  shall  enjoy  such  immunities  and  privileges  as  may  be 
necessary  to  safeguard  their  independence  and  freedom  while  performing  their 
functions  and  duties. 
3.  The  Convention  on  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  of  the  League  of  Arab  States 
shall  apply  concerning  the  implementation  of  paragraphs  I  and  2  of  this  Article.  " Chapter  Three  161 
However,  according  to  Art.  52,  judges  of  the  Court  are  granted  a  different 
treatment  while  exercising  their  duties,  that  is,  that  accorded  to  diplomatic  envoys, 
particularly  under  the  Vienna  Convention  of  1961.162 
162  Art.  52  provides: 
"I.  Judges  in  the  member  states  shall  enjoy  the  same  Privileges  and  Diplomatic 
Immunities  accorded  to  diplomatic  envoys  in  accordance  with  international 
agreements,  particularly  the  Vienna  Convention  of  1961.  " Chapter  Three 
Concluding  Remarks 
162 
The  Statute  of  the  ICJ  can  be  taken  as  a  good  model  to  be  followed  when 
assessing  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ.  Statutes  of  other  international  courts  and 
tribunals  also  can  be  taken  into  account.  The  most  important  thing  that  should  be 
realised  is  that  when  any  provision  is  taken  from  any  other  court,  it  should  be 
studied  closely  to  determine  whether  it  will  suit  Arab  legal  and  political 
circumstances.  On  the  other  hand,  any  single  provision  taken  from  court  Statutes 
should  not  be  treated  in  isolation  but  in  relation  with  other  related  Articles,  and 
any  changes  in  a  provision  should  cover  all  Articles  related  to  it. 
It  seems  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  were  influenced  more  by  the  Statute  of  the 
ICJ  than  by  the  principles  of  Islamic  Shariah  when  drafting  the  Articles  relating  to 
the  composition  of  the  proposed  ACJ.  In  a  number  of  places,  they  did  not  succeed 
to  draw  provisions  from  the  World  Court  Statute,  especially  in  matters  in  which 
different  provisions  are  needed.  After  more  than  forty  five  years  of  discussion 
about  the  establishment  of  the  ACJ  within  the  Arab  League  system,  no  agreement 
upon  the  major  points  has  been  achieved.  It  is  furthermore  realised  that  the  Arab 
draftsmen  have  not  finalised  their  point  of  view  regarding  matters  which  are 
strongly  related  to  principles  of  Islamic  Shariah,  for  example  no  clear  provision 
can  be  found  in  the  draft  Statute  regulate  the  appointment  of  non-Muslims,  and 
women.  Furthermore,  the  position  of  Arab  draftsmen  regarding  the  qualification 
of  judges  is  not  so  clear.  This  has  resulted  in  unclear  provisions  adopted  in  the 
present  draft  Statute. Chapter  Three  163 
The  next  chapter  will  discuss  the  Islamic  Shariah  as  a  legal  source  to  be 
applied  by  the  projected  ACJ,  which  is  considered  as  another  important  point 
which  needed  special  treatment  by  the  Arab  draftsmen.  The  most  important 
question  to  arise  in  this  point  is  how  the  Arab  draftsmen  managed  to  use  Islamic 
Shariah  as  well  as  international  law  as  these  are  different  legal  systems.  Did  they 
give  either  system  priority  in  application,  and  will  the  application  of  international 
law  conflict  with  principles  of  the  Islamic  Shariah?  The  next  chapter  will 
concentrate  on  Islamic  Shariah  by  studying  its  definition  and  sources,  including  a 
general  historical  background  about  the  Siyar  (Islamic  international  law). Chapter  IV 
Application  of  the  Islamic  Shariah  by  the 
Arab  Court  of  Justice 
The  importance  of  discussing  Islamic  Shariah  in  the  present  chapter  arises 
because  Shariah  is  one  of  the  primary  sources  to  be  applied  by  the  projected  ACJ. 
When  the  Arab  draftsmen  dealt  with  the  composition  of  the  Court,  they  stipulated 
that  the  judges  must  be  qualified  in  Islamic  Shariah  and  international  law.  '  In  the 
present  chapter  the  concept  of  Islamic  Shariah  and  its  sources  of  legislation  will  be 
discussed  in  terms  of  four  main  subjects:  (1)  international  law  sources  in  general; 
(2)  the  definition  of  Islamic  Shariah  (3)  the  Islamic  Shariah  sources;  and  (4)  the 
application  of  the  Islamic  Shariah  by  the  ACJ. 
4.1.  Sources  of  International  Law  in  General 
At  the  national  level,  it  is  easy  to  recognise  how  law  is  made,  and  who  is 
responsible  to  enact  municipal  laws.  Most  modem  states  refer  in  this  respect  to 
their  respective  constitutions,  legislative  power,  or  to  the  judicial  process  (case 
law)  if  a  particular  state  follows  such  a  system.  The  matter  is  more  difficult  and 
complicated  at  the  international  level;  there  is  no  constitution  for  the  international 
community  that  could  be  taken  as  a  fundamental  legislative  instrument;  2  if  one 
points  to  the  decisions  of  the  World  Courts,  whether  the  ICJ  or  its  predecessor  the 
1  This  appears  in  Art.  6  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ.  For  further  details  see  below  chapter  II, 
p.  65  and  chapter  III,  p.  92. 
2  Lauterpacht,  Hersch,  The  Absence  of  an  International  Legislature  and  the  Compulsory 
Jurisdiction  of  International  Tribunals,  XI  BYb1L  (1930)  p.  134. Chapter  Four  165 
PCIJ,  these  decisions  legally  bind  only  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  3  which  means 
that  stare  decisis  (or  case  law)  is  not  considered  as  a  primary  source  of 
international  law.  4 
When  discussing  the  sources  of  international  law,  it  is  important  to  find  out 
what  actually  the  law  is;  and  not  only  that,  it  appears  that  every  case  brought 
before  the  World  Court  needs,  first  of  all,  an  intensive  investigation  in  order  to 
reach  an  explicit  answer  about  the  law  to  be  applied  in  the  given  case.  In  another 
words,  the  first  problem  that  may  face  the  ICJ  is  to  which  source  it  will  have 
recourse,  taking  into  consideration  any  particular  rule  agreed  by  the  parties.  5- 
Normally  when  international  lawyers  want  to  discuss  the  sources  of  international 
law,  they  refer  to  Art.  38  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  which  enumerates  the  main 
sources  of  international  law,  despite  the  fact  that  the  term  `source'  is  not  used.  6 
This  Article  provides: 
According  to  Art.  59  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  which  provides:  "The  decision  of  the  Court  has  no 
binding  force  except  between  the  parties  and  respect  of  that  particular  case".  This  Article  follows 
the  same  provision  and  without  any  changes  from  its  predecessor  in  the  PCIJ  Statute. 
°  Shaw,  M.  N.,  International  Law,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  (1994)  p.  p.  58-59. 
This  opinion  is  not  absolutely  correct  because  the  World  Court,  in  its  practice,  has  put  into 
consideration  its  previous  decisions  when  deciding  a  new  case,  or  in  other  words,  the  past  decisions 
of  the  Court  have  often  affected  its  future  course  of  action.  Shahabuddeen  has  argued  that:  "....  the 
Court  seeks  guidance  from  its  previous  decisions,  that  it  regards  them  as  reliable  expositions  of  the 
law  and  that,  though  having  the  power  to  depart  from  them,  it  will  not  lightly  exercise  that  power. 
In  these  respects,  the  submission  is  that  the  Court  uses  its  previous  decisions  in  much  the  same  way 
as  that  in  which  a  common  law  court  of  last  resort  will  today  treat  its  own  previous  decisions.  " 
Shahabuddeen,  Mohamed,  Precedent  in  the  World  Court,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press, 
(1996)  p.  p.  2-3;  also  see  Fitzmaurice,  Gerald,  The  Law  and  Procedure  of  the  International  Court 
of  Justice,  Cambridge:  Crotius  Publications  Limited,  vol.  1,  (1986)  p.  xxxii;  Lauterpacht,  Hersch, 
The  Development  of  International  Law  by  the  International  Court,  London:  Steven's  &  Sons, 
(1958)  p.  p.  9-11. 
s  Mendelson,  Maurice,  The  International  Court  of  Justice  and  the  Sources  of  International  Law,  in 
Vaughan  Lowe  &  Malgosia  Fitzmaurice  (eds.  ),  Fifty  Years  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice: 
Essay  in  Honours  of  Sir  Robert  Jennings,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  (1996)  p.  63. 
6  There  have  appeared  different  terms  in  addition  to  the  term  `source'  such  as  'cause',  'basis', 
'origin'  and  'evidence'  of  international  law,  and  jurists  differs  in  their  conception  and  definitions. 
For  more  details  see  Corbett,  P.  E.,  The  Consent  of  States  and  the  Sources  of  the  Law  of  Nations, Chapter  Four  166 
"l.  The  Court,  whose  function  is  to  decide  in  accordance  with 
international  law  such  disputes  as  are  submitted  to  it,  shall  apply: 
a.  international  conventions,  whether  general  of  particular, 
establishing  rules  expressly  recognised  by  the  contesting  states; 
b.  international  custom,  as  evidence  of  a  general  practice  accepted  as 
law; 
c.  the  general  principles  of  law  recognised  by  civilised  nations; 
d.  subject  to  the  provisions  of  Art.  59,  judicial  decisions  and  the 
teachings  of  the  most  highly  qualified  publicists  of  the  various  nations 
as  subsidiary  means  for  the  determination  of  rules  of  law 
2.  This  provision  shall  not  prejudice  the  power  of  the  Court  to  decide 
a  case  ex  aequo  et  Bono,  if  the  parties  agree  thereto.  "7 
The  agreed  interpretation  of  this  Article  is  that  international  law  consists  of, 
or  has  as  its  basis  as  primary  sources,  international  conventions,  international 
custom,  and  general  principles  of  law  recognised  by  civilised  nations.  Judicial 
decisions  and  teachings  of  highly  qualified  publicists  are  not  considered  as  sources 
of  law;  they  are  just  subsidiary  means  for  finding  what  the  law  is.  So  no  rule  can 
be  treated  as  international  law  unless  it  is  derived  from  one  of  the  primary  sources 
mentioned  in  sub  paragraphs  a-c,  of  Art.  38  (1)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  because 
the  secondary  sources  cannot  create  law  by  themselves.  8 
VI  BYbIL  (1925)  p.  p.  20,29-30.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Corbett,  Sources  of  the  Law  of  Nations); 
Robert  Jennings  &  Arthur  Watt  (eds.  ),  Oppenheim's  International  Law,  London:  Longman,  vol.  I 
part  1,  (1992)  p.  23.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Oppenheim's  International  Law);  Parry,  Clive,  The 
Sources  and  Evidences  of  International  Law,  Manchester:  Manchester  University  Press,  (1965) 
p.  p.  1-5.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Parry,  The  Sources  and  Evidences);  Degan,  V.  D.,  Sources  of 
International  Law,  London:  Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers,  (1997)  p.  p.  1-2. 
7  It  is  however  to  be  noted  that  this  Article  follows  the  same  conception  of  its  predecessor  the 
PCIJ,  the  only  change  made  to  this  Article  is  that  the  words  "whose  function  is  to  decide  in 
accordance  with  international  law  such  disputes  as  are  submitted  to  it"  are  inserted  in  paragraph  1. 
For  more  details  see  Advisory  Committee  of  Jurists,  Proccs-verbaury  of  Proceedings  of  the 
Committee,  (16  June-24  July,  1920,  League  of  Nations  Publication,  1920);  International  Court  of 
Justice  (ed.  ),  International  Court  of  Justice:  Selected  Documents  Relating  to  the  Drafting  of  the 
Statute,  Washington:  United  States  Government  Printing  Office,  (1946)  p.  p.  9,45-46;  Hudson, 
Manley  0.,  The  Twenty  Fourth  Year  of  the  World  Court,  40  AJIL  (1946)  p.  p.  35-36. 
8  Verzijl,  J.  H.  W.,  International  Law  in  Historical  Perspective,  Leyden:  A.  W.  Sijthoff,  vol.  1, 
(1968)  p.  8;  Gross,  Leo,  The  International  Court  of  Justice:  Consideration  of  Requirements  for 
Enhancing  its  Role  in  the  International  Legal  Order,  65  AJIL  (1971)  p.  320.  (hereinafter  cited  as: 
Gross,  The  International  Court  of  Justice);  Buergenthal,  Thomas,  &  Maier,  Harold  G.,  Public 
International  Law,  USA:  West  Publishing  co.,  (1990)  p.  21;  Gihl,  Torsten,  The  Legal  Character 
and  Sources  of  International  Law,  1  SSL  (1957)  p.  p.  71-72;  Sorensen,  Max,  Manual  of  Public Chapter  Four  167 
Furthermore,  Art.  38  (1)  does  not  mention  or  explain  which  of  those  three 
sources  takes  priority  in  application;  whether  treaties  have  preference  over  custom, 
and  custom  over  general  principles  of  law.  However,  in  World  Court  practice 
treaties  and  conventions  that  bind  the  parties  are  first  taken  into  account.  If  the 
dispute  cannot  be  settled  on  that  basis  alone,  then  international  customary  law  has 
to  be  taken  into  account,  either  as  the  only  source  or  as  an  additional  one.  If  the 
dispute  cannot  be  solved  using  either  source,  the  Court  then  must  have  recourse  to 
the  third  choice,  general  principles  of  law  recognised  by  civilised  nations.  If  there 
are  no  rules  that  could  be  taken  from  these  three  categories,  the  Court  will  then 
resort  to  the  previous  judicial  decisions'  and  jurists'  opinions.  9  This  however  does 
not  prevent  the  World  Court  to  have  recourse  to  all  the  recognised  sources  in  its 
quest  for  the  rules  applicable  in  such  disputes  that  are  brought  before  it.  10 
It  is  an  indisputable  fact  that  the  World  Court  is  to  apply  the  spirit  of  the  law 
and  not  only  the  letter  of  the  law  in  its  judgments.  For  this  reason,  a  distinction 
must  be  made  between  two  complicated  and  difficult  terms:  the  Court's  ex  aequo 
et  bono  power  and  equity  as  a  general  principle  of  law.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the 
word  `equity'  does  not  appear  in  Art.  38  or  in  any  other  Articles  of  the  Statute  of 
the  PCIJ  or  the  ICJ,  but  the  World  Court  itself  on  several  occasions  has  indicated 
that  it  considers  the  principles  of  equity  to  constitute  an  integral  part  of 
International  Law,  London:  Macmillan,  (1968)  p.  122.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Sorensen,  Manual  of 
Public  International  Law). 
9  Simma,  Bruno,  The  Charter  of  The  United  Nations  (a  commentary),  Oxford:  Oxford  University 
Press,  (1995)  p.  992;  Shearer,  1.  A.,  Starke's  International  Law,  London:  Butterworths,  (1994) 
P"  48. 
10  Thirlway,  Hugh,  The  Law  and  Procedure  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice  1960-1989,  LX 
BYbML  (1989)  p.  144. Chapter  Four  168 
international  law.  In  the  Diversion  of  Water  from  the  Meuse  case  judge  Hudson 
declared:  11 
"what  are  widely  known  as  principles  of  equity  have  long  been 
considered  to  constitute  a  part  of  international  law,  and  as  such  they 
have  often  been  applied  by  international  tribunals.  " 
Regarding  the  power  to  decide  a  case  ex  aequo  et  bono,  authorisation  must  be 
given  to  the  World  Court  from  the  parties  according  to  para.  2  of  Art.  38  before  it 
can  so  decide  a  case,  whereas  deciding  a  case  according  to  equity  does  not  need 
any  kind  of  authorisation  or  special  agreement  from  the  parties.  12  When  the 
World  Court  decides  a  case  ex  aequo  et  bono,  it  does  not  mean  it  has  to  refer  to 
equity,  because  each  term  has  its  own  specific  reference.  13  Jennings  has  argued  in 
this  matter  that: 
"the  power  of  the  Court  to  decide  a  case  ex  aequo  et  bono,  if  the 
parties  agree  thereto,  this  does  not  plainly  refer  to  equity  in  the 
ordinary  and  proper  sense  of  the  word;  for  equity  is  a  part  of  the  law, 
and  is  moreover  a  general  principle  of  law.  Consequently  the 
application  of  equity  properly  so  called  cannot  depend  upon  the 
existence  of  any  special  agreement  thereto  by  the  parties. 
Presumably,  therefore,  decision  ex  aequo  et  bono  in  this  context  refers 
to  the  possibility  of  some  kind  of  political,  or  compromise, 
determination,  beyond  the  quite  considerable  equitable  discretion  that 
the  Court  in  fact  had  in  its  application  of  the  law  to  almost  any 
conceivable  case.  "  14 
11  Diversion  of  Water  from  the  Meuse  case,  Judgment,  PCIJ(1937)  Ser.  A/B,  No.  70,  p.  73. 
12  Free  Zones  of  Upper  Savoy  and  the  District  of  Gex,  Order,  PCIJ  (1930)  Ser.  A,  No.  24,  p.  10; 
also  see  Frontier  Dispute  case,  (Burkina  Faso  v.  Republic  of  Mali),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1986)  p.  p.  567-568, 
[para.  28]. 
13  For  more  details  see  Brownlie,  Ian,  Principles  of  Public  International  Law,  Oxford:  Clarendon 
Press,  (1996)  p.  p.  26-27;  Jenks,  C.  W.,  Equity  As  A  Part  of  the  Law  Applied  by  the  Permanent 
Court  of  International  Justice,  LIII  LQR  (1937)  p.  p.  519-524;  Cheng,  Bin,  Justice  and  Equity  in 
International  Law,  8  CLP  (1955)  p.  p.  202-208;  Lapidoth,  Ruth,  Equity  In  International  Law,  Proc. 
ASIL  (1987)  p.  p.  143-145;  Lauterpacht,  Elihu,  Aspects  of  the  Administration  of  International 
Justice,  Cambridge:  Grotius  Publications  Limited,  (1991)  p.  p.  117-118.  (hereinafter  cited  as: 
Lauterpacht,  Administration  of  International  Justice);  also  see  Continental  Shelf,  (Tunisia  v. 
Libya  Arab  Jamahiriya),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1982)  p.  60,  [para.  71]. 
14  Jennings,  Robert.  Y.,  General  Course  on  Principles  of  International  Law,  121  Recueil  Des 
Cours  (1967)  p.  343. Chapter  Four  169 
It  is  not  the  aim  of  the  present  chapter  to  discuss  the  power  of  the  Court  to 
decide  a  case  ex  aequo  et  bono  or  to  discuss  equity.  The  purpose  of  introducing 
this  subject  here  is  to  find  an  answer  to  an  important  question  that  may  arise 
before  the  projected  ACJ  as  a  regional  Court  applying  international  law  and 
Islamic  Shariah  at  the  same  time.  If  the  projected  ACJ  decided  a  case  ex  aequo  et 
bono  or  did  so  by  applying  equity,  then  could  this  conflict  with  the  principles  of 
Islamic  Shariah?  If  this  were  the  case,  then  how  could  it  decide  a  case  by  using 
either  method?  is 
Lastly,  questions  have  arisen  whether  Art.  38  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ- 
enumerates  all  the  sources  of  international  law  or  not.  Actually,  a  number  of 
jurists  are  in  agreement  that  there  are  other  sources  which  have  been  excluded  and 
they  have  suggested  amendments  to  this  Article  in  order  to  include  United  Nations 
law  as  a  source  of  International  Law,  whether  primary  or  subsidiary,  and  also 
resolutions  and  declarations  of  the  General  Assembly  as  subsidiary  means.  16 
4.2.  The  Concept  of  the  Islamic  Shariah  in  the  Statute  of  the  ACJ 
In  order  to  understand  the  concept  of  Islamic  Shariah  as  a  legal  system 
capable  to  regulate  internal  as  well  as  external  relations  of  Islamic  states,  a  clear 
distinction  must  be  made  between  its  scope  as  a  national  legal  system  on  the  one 
"  This  subject  will  be  discussed  later  when  discussing  Art.  23  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ 
which  concerns  the  applicable  law  by  this  Court.  see  below  p.  217. 
16  For  discussions  of  amendment  of  the  Statute  in  1945,  see  UNCIO,  vol.  13,  (1945) 
p.  p.  164,284-285,392,  and  vol.  14,  p.  p.  170,205,670-671;  Gross,  The  International  Court  of 
Justice,  supra  note  8,  p.  319;  Higgins,  Rosalyn,  The  United  Nations  and  Law  Making:  The 
Political  Organs,  Proc.  ASIL  (1970)  p.  p.  37-48;  Schwelb,  Egon,  The  process  of  Amending  the 
Statute  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  64  AJIL  (1970)  p.  p.  880-89  1;  Rosenne,  Shabtai,  The 
Law  and  Practice  of  the  International  Court  1920-1996,  vol.  1,  The  Hague:  Martinus  Nijhoff 
Publishers,  (1997)  p.  95;  Parry,  The  Sources  and  Evidences,  supra  note  6,  p.  p.  109-115. Chapter  Four  170 
hand,  and  an  international  legal  system  on  the  other.  This  approach  requires  a 
general  discussion  of  its  definition,  and  then  an  outline  of  the  Muslim  conception 
of  Islamic  international  law.  Therefore,  this  section  will  discuss  these  two  main 
points:  (1)  the  definition  of  Islamic  Shariah;  (2)  Islamic  international  law. 
4.2.1.  Definition  of  Islamic  Shariah 
The  linguistic  meaning  of  Shariah  in  Arabic  is  "the  road  to  the  watering  place 
where  humans  and  animals  daily  gather  to  drink,  or  the  clear  path  to  be 
followed.  "  7  In  this  sense  Allah  said  in  the  Quran:  "To  each  among  you,  We  have 
prescribed  a  law  and  a  clear  way.  48  "Then  we  have  put  you  (0  Mohammed)  on  a- 
plain  way  of  (Our)  commandment  [which  we  commanded  Our  Messengers  before 
you  i.  e.  the  legal  ways  and  laws  of  Islamic  Monotheism].  So  follow  you  that 
(Islamic  Monotheism  and  its  laws),  and  follow  not  the  desires  of  those  who  know 
not.  "19  However,  the  legal  meaning  of  Shariah  is  the  "sum  total  of  injunctions 
(rules  and  principles)  which  were  revealed  from  Allah  to  His  slaves  through  one 
of  His  Prophets.  "20 
17  Mustafa,  Ebrahim  [et.  al],  Al  Mu  jam  Al  Wasit,  (Arabic  Arabic  Dictionary),  al  Qahirah:  Majma' 
al  Lughah  al  Arabiyah,  (1972)  p.  479.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  at  Mu  jam  at  Wasit);  Gibb,  H.  A.  R., 
&  Kramers,  J.  H.,  Shorter  Encyclopaedia  of  Islam,  Leiden,  E.  J.  Brill,  (1991)  p.  524.  (hereinafter 
cited  as:  Gibb,  Encyclopaedia  of  Islam). 
18  Quran,  5:  48. 
19  Quran,  45:  18. 
20  The  relationship  between  the  linguistic  and  legal  meanings  of  Shariah  is  that  both  of  them  share 
the  same  conception  of  straightness,  because  it  is  revealed  from  Allah.  For  more  details  see 
Shalabi,  Mohammed  Mustafa,  at  Madkhal  ft  at  Tarif  bit  Fiqh  at  Islami,  (An  Introduction  to  the 
Definition  of  Islamic  Jurisprudence),  Beirut:  Dar  an  Nahdah  at  Arabiyah,  (1969)  p.  27. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  Shalabi,  Introduction  to  Islamic  Jurisprudence);  Husni,  Abbas,  Khasai's  at 
Tashri'  al  Islami  Dirash  Muqaranah  bil  Qanun  at  Wadh'i,  (The  Characteristics  of  the  Islamic 
Shariah  (Law)  Compared  with  Positive  (man-made)  Laws,  24  JSIS  (1994)  p.  17.  (Hereinafter  cited 
as:  Husni,  The  Characteristics  of  the  Islamic  Shariah). Chapter  Four  171 
A  distinction  must  be  made  between  two  terms,  `Shariah'  and  'Fiqh'.  First  of 
all  it  is  to  be  noted  that  both  Shariah  and  Fiqh  have  been  translated  into  English  as 
Islamic  Law.  21  However,  Muslim  jurists  usually  mean  by  the  first  term  the  divine 
law  which  Allah  has  revealed  to  His  Prophet,  and  He  and  His  Prophet  only  have 
the  best  understanding  of  its  definite  meaning  and  commandments.  Fiqh,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  the  process  of  discovering  and  understanding  the  injunctions,  rules 
and  principles  of  Shariah.  22  So  Fiqh  differs  from  Shariah  in  some  of  the  following 
points:  Shariah  is  considered  as  the  sum  of  revealed  injunctions  found  in  Quran 
and  Sunnah,  but  Fiqh  is  deemed  as  a  body  of  laws  deduced  from  Shariah  by  jurists 
to  cover  particular  situations;  Shariah  is  unchangeable,  because  it  is  revealed  by 
Allah,  whereas  Fiqh  changes  according  to  the  circumstances  under  which  it  is 
applied;  lastly,  Shariah  deals  with  general  rules  and  principles  whereas  Fiqh  deals 
with  the  practical  details  in  order  to  establish  how  these  general  rules  can  be 
applied  in  given  circumstances.  23  Fiqh  literally  means,  `understanding, 
intelligence  and  also  means  jurisprudence.  '  The  person  who  is  working  with  or 
learning  it  is  called  a  (Faqih)  jurist.  24  Legally,  Fiqh  refers  to  "the  science  of 
deducing  Shariah  from  evidence  found  in  its  sources  .,, 
25  Fiqh  is  mentioned  in  the 
21  Schacht,  Joseph,  Islamic  Law  in  Contemporary  States,  8  AJCL  (1959)  p.  136.  In  this  thesis  the 
term  `Islamic  Shariah'  has  been  used  instead. 
22  Omar,  Mohamed  Abdel  Khalek,  Reasoning  in  Islamic  Law,  12  ALQ  (1997)  p.  149.  (hereinafter 
cited  as:  Omar,  Reasoning  in  Islamic  Law). 
21  Differences  in  the  interpretation  and  understanding  the  Quran  and  Sunnah  led  to  the 
establishment  of  Islamic  schools  which  are  called  after  their  founders.  For  more  details  see  Philips, 
Abu  Aminah  Bilal,  The  Evolution  of  Fiqh:  Islamic  law  and  the  Madhabs,  Riyadh:  Tawhid 
publications,  (1990)  p.  2.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Philips,  The  Evolution  of  Fiqh). 
24  al  Mu  jam  al  Wasit,  supra  note  17,  p.  698;  Gibb,  Encyclopaedia  of  Islam,  supra  note  17, 
p.  102;  Muhairi,  Butti,  S.  B.,  Islamisation  and  Modernisation  Within  The  UAE  Penal  Law: 
Shariah  In  The  Pre  Modem  Period,  10  ALQ  (1995)  p.  291. 
25  For  same  definition  see  Husni,  The  Characteristics  of  the  Islamic  Shariah,  supra  note  20, 
p.  p.  42-43;  Philips,  The  Evolution  of  Fiqh,  supra  note  23,  p.  1. Chapter  Four  172 
Quran  which  gives  it  a  special  meaning  as  a  true  or  accurate  understanding.  Allah 
said:  "Say:  All  things  are  from  Allah,  so  what  is  wrong  with  these  people  that 
they  fail  to  understand  any  word?  "26  In  another  verse  He  said:  "And  surely,  We 
have  created  many  of  the  jinn  and  mankind  for  Hell.  They  have  hearts  wherewith 
they  understand  not,  they  have  eyes  wherewith  they  see  not,  and  they  have  ears 
wherewith  they  hear  not  (the  truth).  They  are  like  cattle,  nay  even  more  astray; 
those!  They  are  the  heedless  ones.  ,  27  The  same  meaning  was  mentioned  in  the 
Sunnah  when  the  Prophet  said:  "To  whomsoever  Allah  wishes  good,  He  gives  the 
Fiqh  (true  understanding)  of  the  religion.  "28 
Islamic  Shariah  is  deemed  to  be  a  comprehensive  system  which  regulates  all 
Muslims'  activities,  their  relationship  to  Allah,  their  relations  with  each  other,  and 
at  the  same  time  it  regulates  how  an  Islamic  nation  conducts  its  affairs  with  other 
communities  (  non-Muslim  nations)  whether  in  war  or  peace.  29  The  question  thus 
raised  relevant  to  this  study  is  whether  there  is  an  Islamic  international  law  within 
the  Islamic  Shariah  system  that  can  regulate  the  external  relations  of  the  Islamic 
states  with  other  states. 
26  Quran,  4:  78. 
27  Quran,  7:  179.  Also  in  another  verse  Allah  said:  "They  said;  0  Shuaib!  We  do  not  understand 
much  of  what  you  say.  "  Quran,  11:  91. 
28  al  Bukhari,  Mohammed  bin  Esmail,  Sahih  al  Bukhari,  (194-256),  by  Mohammed  Muhsin  Khan 
(trans.  ),  Medina:  Dar  at  Fikr,  vol.  1,  p.  61.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Sahih  a!  Bukhari). 
29  Gragg,  Kenneth,  The  House  of  Islam,  California:  Dickenson  Publishing  Company  INC.  (1969) 
p.  p.  45-46;  also  see  al  Zarqa,  Mustafa,  al  Madkhal  a!  Fiqhi  a!  'Amm,  Dimashq:  Jami'at  Dimashq, 
(1959)  p.  p.  25-26,31,62.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  al  Zarqa,  al  Madkhal  al  Fiqhi);  Husni,  The 
Characteristics  of  the  Islamic  Shariah,  supra  note  20,  p.  p.  84-87. Chapter  Four  173 
4.2.2.  Islamic  International  Law 
The  branch  of  Islamic  Shariah  which  involves  regulating  the  intercourse  of 
Islamic  states  with  non-Islamic  states  is  called  Siyar  or  Islamic  international  law.  30 
It  is  based  on  the  same  sources  and  has  the  same  character  as  the  Islamic 
Shariah.  31  The  early  Muslim  jurists  discussed  Siyar  either  under  the  general 
heading  of  jihad  (holy  war)  or  under  specific  subjects  such  as  maghazi  (invasion), 
ghanima  (spoil),  ridda  (apostasy),  and  aman  (safe  conduct);  but  almost  all  limited 
their  discussions  to  the  law  of  war.  32  A  very  early  study  of  the  Siyar  was  made  by 
al  Shaybani  who  wrote  a  number  of  books  on  this  subject.  33  Nevertheless,  a  clear 
definition  of  it  has  been  made  by  his  successors  in  their  comments  on  his  writings. 
Sarkhasi  defines  the  term  "Siyar"  as  follows: 
"The  Siyar  is  plural  of  sirah  and  this  book  is  named  after  this  term.  It 
presents  the  conduct  of  Muslims  in  their  intercourse  with  the 
unbelievers  of  enemy  territory  as  well  as  with  the  people  with  whom 
Muslims  made  treaties,  who  may  have  been  temporarily  (musta'mins) 
or  permanently  (dhimmis)  in  Islamic  territory;  with  apostates,  who 
were  the  worst  of  the  unbelievers,  since  they  adjured  after  they 
accepted  Islam,  and  with  baghis  (rebels)  who  were  not  counted  as 
30  Siyar  means  conduct  and  behaviour.  Its  first  usage  was  by  historians  when  they  dealt  with  the 
life  or  biography  of  the  Prophet  especially  in  relation  to  His  wars.  Subsequently  this  term  used  to 
mean  the  conduct  of  the  state  in  its  intercourse  with  other  communities.  See  Gibb,  Encyclopaedia 
of  Islam,  supra  note  17,  p.  547;  Julian  Johansen,  al  Sarkhasi's  Contribution  to  International 
Relations  and  International  Law  in  Islam,  2  Islamica,  part  4,  (1998)  p.  55;  Hamidullah, 
Muhammad,  Muslim  Conduct  of  State,  Lahore:  Sh.  Muhammad  Ashraf,  (1953)  p.  p.  10-12. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  Hamidullah,  Muslim  Conduct  of  State). 
31  Hamidullah,  Mohammed,  The  International  Law  in  Islam,  39  Isl.  Rev.  (1951)  p.  8.  (hereinafter 
cited  as:  Hamidullah,  The  International  Law  in  Islam);  Gottingen,  Hans  Kruse,  The  Foundation  of 
Islamic  International  Jurisprudence,  3  JPHS  (1955)  p.  p.  234-235. 
32  Akhtar,  Shameem,  An  Inquiry  into  the  Nature,  Origin,  and  Sources  of  Islamic  Law  of 
Nations,  10  Is1.  Stud  (1971)  p.  31. 
33  al  Shaybani,  Abu  Abdullah  bin  Mohammad  ibn  al  Hassan  ibn  Farqad,  (132  A.  H.  /750  A.  D.  -189 
A.  N.  /804  A.  D.  )  is  considered  the  founder  of  Muslim  international  law.  His  famous  book  is,  Kitab 
al  Siyar  (book  of  Siyar).  For  further  details  about  al  Shaybani's  life  and  writings  see  Khadduri, 
Majid,  The  Islamic  Law  of  Nations,  Shaybani's  Siyar,  (trans.  ),  Baltimore:  The  Johns  Hopkins 
Press,  (1966)  p.  p.  22-38.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Khadduri;  The  Islamic  Law  of  Nations). Chapter  Four  174 
unbelievers,  nevertheless  they  were  ignorant  and  their  understanding 
of  Islam  was  erroneous.  "34 
Islamic  international  law  is  rich  in  definitions,  the  same  as  public 
international  law.  Every  Muslim  jurist  defines  it  from  the  aspect  he  feels  it  is 
most  important.  For  Hamidullah,  Muslim  international  law  is defined  as  "The  part 
of  the  law  and  custom  of  the  land  and  treaty  obligations  which  a  Muslim  de  facto 
.  or  de  jure  state  observes  in  its  dealing  with  other  de  facto  or  de  jure  states.  "35 
Khadduri  maintains  that  the  term  `law  of  nations'  means  "The  sum  total  of  the 
rules  and  practices  of  Islam's  intercourse  with  other  peoples.  "36  Al  Ghunaimi 
defines  Muslim  international  law  as  "The  sum  total  of  rules  and  practices  which. 
Islam  ordains  or  tolerates  in  international  relations.  "37  Mahmassani  defines  it  as 
"The  rules  of  conduct  laid  down  by  tradition  of  the  Prophet  or  His  companions 
concerning  military  campaigns  (maghazi).  "38  Public  international  law,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  defined  as  "the  law  which  regulates  the  intercourse  between  all  the 
members  of  the  international  community  of  states  in  accordance  with  principles  of 
equality  and  justice.  "39  Islamic  international  law,  according  to  these  definitions, 
74  al  Sarkhasi,  Shams  ad  Din,  a!  Mabsut,  Beirut:  Dar  al  Ma`rifah,  vol.  10,  (1989)  p.  2;  Cf.  the 
translation  with  Hamidullah,  Muslim  Conduct  of  State,  supra  note  30,  p.  p.  11-12;  Khadduri,  The 
Islamic  Law  of  Nations,  supra  note  33,  p.  40. 
35  Hamidullah,  Muslim  Conduct  of  States,  supra  note  30,  p.  3. 
36  Khadduri,  War  and  Peace  in  the  Law  of  Islam,  London:  The  Johns  Hopkins  Press,  (1955)  p.  47. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  Khadduri,  War  and  Peace  in  Islam). 
37  al  Ghunaimi,  Muhammad  Tal'at.,  The  Muslim  Conception  of  International  Law  and  the  Western 
Approach,  The  Hague:  Martinus  Nijhoff,  (1968)  p.  96.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  al  Ghunaimi,  The 
Muslim  Conception  of  International  Law). 
38  Mahmassani,  Sobhi,  The  Principles  of  International  Law  in  the  Light  of  Islamic  Doctrine,  116 
Recuei!  Des  Cours  (1966)  p.  235.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Mahmassani,  The  Principles  of 
International  Law). 
39  An-Na'im,  Abdullahi  Ahmed,  Toward  an  Islamic  Reformation:  Civil  Liberties,  Human  Rights, 
and  International  Law,  New  York:  Syracuse  University  Press,  (1996)  p.  137.  (hereinafter  cited  as: 
An-Na'im,  Toward  an  Islamic  Reformation);  for  similar  definitions  see  for  example,  Oppenheim's 
International  Law,  supra  note  6,  p.  4;  Starke,  J.  G.,  introduction  to  International  Law,  10th  edn., Chapter  Four  175 
contains  the  same  conceptions  as  public  international  law  in  its  general  concept 
but  at  the  same  time  it  has  its  own  view  on  some  matters  of  international  relations. 
However,  the  most  important  point  to  be  mentioned  here  is  that  if  international 
law  as  positive  law  is  based  on  three  primary  sources,  treaties,  customs  and 
general  principles  of  law,  then  Islamic  international  law  is  considered  as  divine 
law  based  on  other  types  of  sources  such  as  the  Quran  and  the  Sunnah.  Despite 
this  fact,  some  western  writers  reject  the  idea  that  there  is  a  distinct  school  of 
Islamic  international  law.  4° 
It  is  not  the  aim  of  this  study  to  compare  Islamic  international  law  and  public 
international  law  in  order  to  find  the  differences  and  similarities  between  them. 
Only  one  point  needs  emphasis  here,  namely,  that  Islamic  international  law  is  not 
necessarily  the  same  as  public  international  law.  This  branch  of  law  generally 
regulates  the  international  relations  of  Muslim  states,  which  is  seen  to  encompass 
all  Muslim  peoples  in  the  World  as  one  nation  (Ummah),  with  other  non-Muslim 
states  in  both  war  and  peace.  It  is  assumed  that  when  the  Arab  draftsmen  included 
principles  of  Islamic  Shariah  as  a  source  to  be  applied  by  the  ACJ  their  intention 
was  to  mean  the  application  of  the  Islamic  Shariah  as  a  comprehensive  legal 
system  including  that  branch  which  is  called  Muslim  International  law,  that  may 
be  defined  as  "the  sum  roles  and  practice  of  Islam's  relations  either  with  each 
other  or  with  other  people". 
London:  Butterworths,  (1989)  p.  3;  Sorensen,  Manual  of  Public  International  Law,  supra  note  8, 
P"  I 
40  Westbrook,  David  A.,  Islamic  International  Law  and  Public  International  Law:  Separate 
Expression  of  World  Order,  33  VJIL  (1993)  p.  p.  822,859-884;  see  also  Kruse,  Hans,  The  Notion 
of  Siyar,  2  JPHS  (1954)  p.  p.  24-25. Chapter  Four  176 
At  the  present  time,  the  modem  international  community  consists  of 
numerous  states  that  are  deemed  to  be  equal  and  independent.  Their  relationship 
is  not  regulated  by  the  internal  legal  system  of  any  one  of  them  but  by  an 
international  system  known  as  international  law.  Any  conflicts  should  be  settled 
by  peaceful  means  according  to  the  Charter  of  the  UN;  it  may  be  the  best 
instrument  to  clarify  the  purpose  and  principles  of  modem  international  law 
because  it  is  the  only  general  treaty  that  legally  binds  virtually  all  states,  including 
Arab  and  Muslim  states.  41 
The  matter  in  classical  Islamic  thought  relating  to  international  relations  was- 
absolutely  different.  The  world  was  divided  into  two  parts:.  Dar  El  Islam  (the 
territory  of  Islam)  and  Dar  El  Harb  (the  territory  of  war  or  enemy  territory).  42 
Nonetheless,  not  all  Muslim  jurists  accepted  that  the  world  was  divided  in  this 
way  as  Dar  El  Islam  and  Dar  El  Harb.  Al  Shafi'i,  for  example,  added  another 
temporary  division,  called  Dar  El  Sulh  or  Dar  El  `Ahd  (the  territory  of  Peaceful 
agreement).  This  is  a  place  not  under  the  control  of  a  Muslim  ruler,  but  in  which 
non-Muslim  states  have  agreed  to  pay  jizyah  (poll  tax)  or  give  up  some  of  their 
territorial  rights  to  the  Muslim  state.  43 
01  Art.  I  and  2  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  only  the  1949  Geneva  Conventions 
have  more  parties  than  the  UN  Charter. 
42  There  was  a  similar  idea  in  medieval  Christian  thought.  Before  1860  international  law 
essentially  only  regulated  the  relationship  between  Christian  nations.  Non  Christians  had  no  rights 
before  European  or  Christian  international  law.  For  more  details  see  Cassese,  Antonio, 
International  Law  in  a  Divided  World,  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  (1994)  p.  p.  34-54. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  Cassese,  International  Law  in  a  Divided  World);  Scott,  James  Brown,  The 
Codification  of  International  Law,  18  AJIL  (1924)  p.  261;  Wilk,  Kurt,  International  Law  and 
Global  Ideological  Conflict:  Reflections  on  the  Universality  of  International  Law,  45  AJIL  (1951) 
p.  648;  Wright,  Quincy,  International  Law  and  Ideologies,  48  AJIL  (1945)  p.  617. 
43  at  Shafi`i,  al  Imam  Muhammad  ibn  Idris  (150-204),  a!  Umm,  vol.  4,  Beirut:  Dar  al  Fikr,  (1990) 
p.  192;  Gibb,  Encyclopaedia  of  Islam,  supra  note  17,  p.  68. Chapter  Four  177 
Dar  El  Islam  comprises  Muslims  and  non-Muslim  territories  held  under 
Islamic  sovereignty.  Its  inhabitants  were  Muslims  and  the  people  of  the  tolerated 
religions  or  the  people  of  the  book,  ahl  al  kitab  (Christians  and  Jews),  who  refuse 
to  accept  Islam  as  their  religion  and  in-return  they  accept  to  pay  jizyah  (poll  tax)  to 
the  Muslim  authorities  whose  duty  is  to  secure  their  lives,  property  and  all  human 
rights.  44  In  Dar  El  Islam,  war  is  forbidden,  45  Islamic  Shariah  is  the  authority, 
Allah's  divine  ordinances  are  obeyed  and  a  Muslim  sovereign  is  the  ruler.  All 
Muslims  residing  in  Dar  El  Islam  are  obligated  to  protect  and  defend  this  territory 
through  jihad  if  it  is  invaded.  6  The  opposite  of  Dar  El  Islam  is  Dar  El  Harb, 
which  consists  of  all  the  communities  outside  the  territory  or  the  control  of  Islam. 
Its  inhabitants  are  people  who  fail  to  accept  Islam  as  their  religion. 
The  Imam  or  caliph  has  the  responsibility  to  place  Dar  El  Harb  under  Dar  El 
Islam,  in  order  to  achieve  the  enforcement  of  Islamic  Shariah  throughout  the  world 
and  to  unite  the  world  into  one  nation  (Ummah)  under  the  sovereignty  of  an 
Islamic  state.  Jihad  is  the  one  of  the  instruments  by  which  Muslims  can  achieve 
this  objective.  47  This  means  that  Dar  El  Islam  is  at  war  with  Dar  El  Harb  until  this 
°'  For  further  discussion  of  the  status  of  non-Muslims  under  Muslim  rule,  see  Doi,  Abdur  Rahman 
I.,  Non-Muslims  under  Shariah  (Islamic  Law),  London:  Ta  Ha  Publishers  Ltd.,  (1983). 
49  For  modem  study  about  the  forbidden  war  in  Dar  El  Islam  see  Bedjaoui,  Muhammad,  The  Gulf 
War  of  1980-1988  and  the  Islamic  Conception  of  International  Law,  in  Dekker,  Ige  F.,  &  Post, 
Harry  H.  G.  (eds.  ),  The  Gulf  War  of  1980-1988:  The  Iran-Iraq  War  in  International  Legal 
Perspective,  London:  Martins  Nijhoff  Publishers,  (1992)  p.  p.  283-288;  also  see  Western  Sahara 
case,  ICJ  Rep.  (1975)  p.  p.  12,40-49. 
46  al  Zuhaili,  Wahbah,  at  'Elaqat  ad  Dawlyah  fr  al  Islam:  Muqaran  bil  Qanun  ad  Dawli  a! 
Hadith,  (International  Relations  In  Islam:  Comparison  with  the  Modern  International  Law), 
Beirut:  Muassasat  ar  Risalah,  (1981)  p.  p.  104-105. 
47  Jihad  is  derived  from  jahada  or  juhd  which  means  ability,  exertion  or  power.  Normally  this  is 
translated  to  English  as  Holy  War.  In  Islamic  Shariahjihad  is  defined  as  "the  struggle  for  the  cause 
of  Allah  by  all  means,  including  speech,  life  and  property.  "  See  al  Kasani,  'Ala'  al  Din  Abi  Baker 
bin  Masud,  Bdai'  as  Sanai'fi  Tartib  ash  Sharai',  Beirut:  Dar  al  Kutub,  al  'Ilmiyah,  (1986)  p.  97; 
Mahmassani,  The  Principles  of  International  Law,  supra  note  38,  p.  p.  279-280. Chapter  Four  178 
requirement  is  fulfilled.  It  is  the  Imam's  duty  to  decide  when  jihad  is  necessary 
and  also  he  is  the  only  one  who  can  decide  which  other  instrument  to  use  to  bring 
Dar  El  Harb  under  Islamic  control.  He  may  opt  for  jihad  or  diplomatic  methods 
such  as  creating  temporary  peaceful  relations  by  concluding  agreements  between 
them.  48  This  does  not  mean  that  Islam  is  a  religion  against  peace,  but  in  the 
Islamic  view  peace  can  only  achieved  if  there  is  a  universal  community  bound  by 
Islamic  Shariah.  49  There  are  a  number  of  verses  in  the  Quran  which  prove  that 
jihad  in  Islam  is  intended  as  an  instrument  of  exception.  Allah  says:  "But  if  they 
incline  to  peace,  you  also  incline  to  it,  and  (put  your)  trust  in  Allah.  Verily,  He  is 
the  All-Hearer,  the  All-Knower.  "50  Ibn  Umar  is  reported  to  have  said  that  Allah's 
Messenger  said: 
_ 
"I  have  been  ordered  (by  Allah)  to  fight  against  the  people  till  they 
testify  that  none  has  the  right  to  be  worshipped  but  Allah  and  that 
Muhammad  is  Allah's  Messenger,  and  offer  prayers  perfectly  and 
give  the  obligatory  charity,  so  if  they  perform  all  that,  then  they  save 
their  bloods  (lives),  and  properties  from  me  except  for  Islamic  Law, 
and  their  reckoning  (accounts)  will  be  with  (done  by)  Allah.  51 
Some  modem  Muslim  scholars  object  to  the  dual  division  of  the  world  as  a 
principle  of  Islamic  legal  theory,  because  one  of  its  principles  concerning  the 
terms  of  Dar  El  Islam  and  Dar  El  Harb  are  an  innovation  of  the  Abbassids 
d8  Khadduri,  Majid,  The  Islamic  System:  Its  Competition  and  Co  Existence  with  Western  System, 
Proc.  ASIL,  (1959)  p.  p.  49-50;  and  his  Article,  Islam  and  Modem  Law  of  Nations,  50  AJIL  (1956) 
p.  p.  359-360;  see  also  Ahmed,  Mahmood  Hassan,  a!  'Elaqat  a!  Dawliyah  ft  al  Islam, 
(International  Relations  in  Islam),  Ash  Shariqah:  Dar  al  Thaqafah  al  Arabiyah,  (1996)  p.  p.  76-77; 
For  more  details  about  peace  treaties  which  were  concluded  between  Muslims  and  non-Muslims 
see  Piscatori,  James  P.,  Islam  in  a  World  of  Nation-States,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University 
Press,  (1994)  p.  p.  49-62. 
49  Allah  Says:  "And  fight  them  until  there  is  no  more  disbelief  and  worshipping  of  others  along 
with  Allah  and  (all  and  every  kind  of)  worship  is  for  Allah  alone.  But  if  they  cease,  let  there  be  no 
transgression  except  against  polytheists.  "  Quran,  2:  193;  also  see  Khadduri,  Mäjid,  The  Islamic 
Conception  of  Justice,  London:  The  John  Hopkins  University  Press,  (1984)  p.  p.  167-168. 
S0  Quran,  8:  61. 
51  Sahih  a!  Bukhari,  supra  note  28,  vol.  1,  Hadith  No.  24. Chapter  Four  179 
jurists.  52  Their  view  is  based  on  the  presumption  that  this  notion  of  division  is 
dependent  on  the  idea  of  constant  or  aggressive  jihad,  and  if  this  concept  cannot 
be  maintained,  the  division  should  also  be  dropped;  they  support  their  opinion  by 
saying  that  the  two  terms,  Dar  El  Islam  and  Dar  El.  Harb  never  occur  in  the  Quran 
or  Sunnah.  They  also  reject  the  tripartite  division  (by  the  addition  of  Dar  El  Sulh) 
because  it  does  not  cover  all  the  non-Muslim  states  which  are  not  at  war  with  the 
Islamic  state.  On  this  point  al  Ghunaimi  says:  53 
"We  object  to  including  this  division  in  the  Muslim  legal  theory  as 
one  of  its  principles.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  this  division,  under  the 
Abbassids,  corresponded  to  factual  relations  between  the  Islamic 
State  and  non  Muslim  States.  " 
In  my  opinion  this  idea  cannot  be  accepted.  Since  Muslims  insist  on  creating 
the  Islamic  state,  a  division  between  Islamic  and  non-Islamic  worlds  will  appear 
automatically,  because  the  idea  of  an  integrated  Islamic  state  will  not  be  accepted 
by  the  other  communities  immediately.  54  In  addition,  in  the  Quran,  the  division 
between  the  above  mentioned  two  worlds  can  be  deduced  from  the  following  text 
when  Allah  said: 
"Verily,  those  who  believed,  and  emigrated  and  strove  hard  and 
fought  with  their  property  and  their  lives  in  the  cause  of  Allah  as  well 
as  those  who  gave  (them)  asylum  and  help,  those  are  (all)  allies  to  one 
another.  And  as  to  those  who  believed  but  did  not  emigrate  (to  you  0 
Muhammad)  you  owe  no  duty  of  protection  to  them  until  they 
emigrate,  but  if  they  seek  your  help  in  religion,  it  is  your  duty  to  help 
52  We  believed  that  these  divisions  have  existed  as  a  fact,  since  the  lifetime  of  the  Prophet,  when 
He  first  created  the  first  Islamic  state.  But  only  in  the  Abbassids  era  jurists  started  studying  them 
in  order  to  find  out  the  origin  of  jihad  (holy  war)  as  it  is  defensive  or  offensive  instrument.  More 
details  see  Abu  Zahrah,  Muhammad,  a!  'Elaqat  ad  Dawliyah  fi  a!  Islam,  (International  Relations 
in  Islam),  at  Qahirah:  Dar  al  Fikr  al  Arab,  [  1964]  p.  51. 
53  at  Ghunaimi,  The  Muslim  Conception  of  International  Law,  supra  note  37,  p.  p.  183-184;  also 
see  Schacht,  Joseph,  The  Origins  of  Muhammadan  Jurisprudence,  Oxford:  At  The  Clarendon 
Press,  (1950)  p.  p.  204-205. 
S°  For  further  details  see  El  Bakry,  Muhammad  M.  M.,  The  Legality  of  War  in  al  Shariah  a! 
Islamiyah  (Islamic  Law)  and  Contemporary  International  Law:  Comparative  Study,  Thesis 
submitted  to  the  degree  of  (Ph.  D.  ),  University  of  Glasgow,  vol.  1,  (1987)  p.  p.  87-88. Chapter  Four  180 
them  except  against  a  people  with  whom  you  have  a  treaty  of  mutual 
alliance,  and  Allah  is  the  All-Seer  of  what  you  do.  And  those  who 
disbelieve  are  allies  to  one  another,  (and)  if  you  (Muslims  of  the 
whole  world  collectively)  do  not  do  so,  there  will  be  fitnah  (wars, 
battles  etc.  )  and  oppression  on  earth,  and  a  great  mischief  and 
corruption.  And  those  who  believed,  and  emigrated  and  strove  hard 
in  the  Cause  of  Allah  (jihad)  asylum  and  aid;  these  are  the  believers  in 
truth,  for  them  is  forgiveness  and  generous  provision.  And  those  who 
believed  afterwards,  and  emigrated  and  strove  hard  along  with  you  (in 
the  Cause  of  Allah)  they  are  of  you.  But  kindred  by  blood  are  nearer 
to  one  another  regarding  inheritance  in  the  decree  ordained  by  Allah. 
Verily,  Allah  is  the  All-Knower  of  everything.  "55 
In  Sunnah  it  is  well  known  that  when  the  Prophet  himself  created  the  first 
Islamic  state,  He  concluded  peace  treaties  with  non-Muslims  and  led  Muslims  in 
their  jihad.  During  his  life  Dar  El  Islam  was  in  Medina  where  Muslims  resided, 
whereas  Dar  El  Harb  was  in  Mecca,  where  polytheists  resided. 
It  is  believed  that  this  difference  of  opinion  between  modern  scholars  arises 
because  of  the  split  of  the  unitary  Islamic  state  into  various  nations  states,  and  all 
these  states  have  become  members  of  the  UN  whose  rules  differ  from  the  original 
concept  of  Muslim  international  relations.  Since  then  the  conception  of  the  Siyar 
in  its  old  interpretation  has  become  vague.  Khadduri  has  argued  in  this  matter 
that: 
"Muslim  States  have  shown  in  recent  years  eagerness  to  participate  in 
international  organisation  and  cooperate  with  other  Powers  to 
promote  international  peace  and  security.  This  is  a  significant 
phenomenon  in  the  behavior  of  states  whose  traditional  law  of  nations 
is  so  radically  different  from  the  modern  law  of  nations  and  the 
principles  implied  in  the  United  Nations  Charter.  "  56 
In  conclusion,  it  is  the  duty  of  modern  Muslim  scholars  to  fill  the  gap 
between  the  two  systems  of  Islamic  and  non-Islamic  public  international  law  in 
55  Quran,  8:  72-75. 
56  Khadduri,  Majid,  Islam  and  Modern  Law  of  Nations,  50  AJIL  (1956)  p.  358;  also  see  An- 
Na'im,  Toward  an  Islamic  Reformation,  supra  note  39,  p.  138. Chapter  Four  181 
the  light  of  divine  sources,  Quran  and  Sunnah,  and  find  answers  by  applying 
ijtihad  (reasoning)  to  new  views  on  international  relations.  Then  comparative 
studies  should  come  in  as  a  second  step  to  promote  the  security  of  humanity  in  the 
world.  57  Nothing  should  prevent  them  from  developing  their  own  view  regarding 
new  situations  as  long  as  they  are  not  adopting  any  thing  that  contradicts 
principles  and  rules  of  the  Islamic  Shariah.  Similarly  Ramadan  argues:  58 
"The  door  is  wide-open  to  the  adoption  of  any  thing  of  vitality  of 
whatever  origin,  so  long  as  it  does  not  go  against  the  text  of  the  Quran 
and  the  Sunnah.  " 
4.3.  Sources  and  Methods  of  Interpretation  of  Islamic  Shariah 
As  already  mentioned,  Art.  38  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  categorises  the 
sources  of  international  law  into  two  groups;  international  conventions, 
international  custom  and  general  principles  of  law  as  primary  sources,  with 
judicial  decisions  and  teachings  of  publicists  as  secondary  sources.  It  is 
interesting  to  note  that  in  the  Islamic  Shariah,  sources  are  also  divided  into 
primary  sources  based  on  texts  such  as  the  Quran  and  the  Sunnah,  and  secondary 
sources  based  on  opinion  or  human  reasoning  such  as  ijtihad. 
It  has  to  be  mentioned  at  this  point,  that  all  Muslim  schools  are  in  agreement 
about  the  Quran  and  Sunnah  by  considering  them  as  primary  sources.  They 
disagree  however,  on  the  validity  of  other  sources.  Sunni  schools  consider  ijma 
s'  Comparative  studies  will  not  lead  to  any  positive  results  unless  recourse  is  made  to  and  fully 
understands  the  history  of  both  Islamic  and  public  international  law.  For  more  details  see  El 
Kosheri,  Ahmed  S.,  History  of  the  Law  of  Nations  Regional  Developments:  Islam,  2  EPIL  (1995) 
p.  p.  809-818;  Boisard,  Marcel  A.,  On  the  Probable  Influence  of  Islam  on  Western  Public 
International  Law,  11  IJMES  (1980)  p.  p.  429-450. 
58  Ramadan,  Said,  Islamic  Law:  Its  Scope  and  Equity,  London:  P.  R.  Macmillan  Limited,  (1961) 
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(consensus)  and  qiyas  (analogy)  also  as  primary  sources  in  addition  to  the  former 
sources,  whereas  Shi'is  have  their  own  view  on  ijma  and  they  refuse  to  accept 
qiyas  as  a  source.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  disagreement  between  Sunni  schools 
themselves  on  some  other  approaches,  some  recognise  them  as  secondary  while 
others  do  not.  These  are  such  sources  as  istihsan  (equity),  istislah  (considerations 
of  public  interest),  and  istishab  (presumption  of  continuity).  In  another  words,  the 
Sunni  schools  agree  among  themselves  to  consider  Quran,  Sunnah,  ijma,  and  qiyas 
as  primary  sources,  but  they  disagree  on  the  secondary  sources.  The  Shi`i  schools 
agree  to  recognise  only  the  Quran  and  Sunnah  as  primary  sources  and  disagree 
59  about  the  status  of  the  remainder. 
By  comparing  the  primary  and  secondary  sources  in  Islam  and  the  Statute  of 
the  ICJ  (Art.  38)  we  see  that  the  primary  sources  in  Islam  are  not  the  same  as  in 
the  Statute.  60  In  Islamic  legal  theory  there  is  no  doubt  in  considering  the  Quran 
and  Sunnah  as  primary  sources,  which  have  a  completely  divine  nature,  while 
international  conventions  and  custom  are  considered  as  secondary  sources.  As  to 
the  secondary  sources,  in  the  ICJ  Statute  or  in  Islamic  Shariah,  it  appears  that  in 
both  secondary  sources  depend  on  human  reason,  as  ijtihad  (reasoning)  in  Islamic 
Shariah  may  be  compared  with  judicial  decisions  and  the  teaching  of  publicists.  If 
59  Mahmassani,  Sobhi,  Falsafai  at  Tashri'  ft  at  Islam,  (The  Philosophy  of  Jurisprudence  in  Islam), 
Farhat  J.  Ziadeh  (trans.  ),  Netherlands:  Leiden  E.  J.  Brill,  (1961)  p.  63.  (Hereinafter  cited  as: 
Mahmassani,  The  Philosophy);  Tritton,  A.  S.,  Islam:  Belief  and  Practices,  London:  Hutchinson 
University  Library,  (1966)  p.  p.  59-61,63-64;  Owsia,  Parviz,  Sources  of  Law  under  English, 
French,  Islamic,  and  Iranian  Law:  A  Comparative  Review  of  Legal  Techniques,  6  ALQ  (1991) 
p.  p.  36-37;  Vesey-Fitzgerald,  Seymour,  Muhammadan  Law:  An  Abridgement  According  to  its 
Various  Schools,  London:  Oxford  University  Press,  (1931)  p.  p.  3-9. 
60  Talking  about  primary  sources  in  Islamic  Shariah  does  not  mean  where  the  rules  are  first  to  be 
found  or  taken,  as  in  the  World  Court  Statute,  but  the  rules  themselves  which  are  included  in  those 
forms. Chapter  Four  183 
we  explore  the  sources,  whether  primary  or  secondary  as  to  their  divine  nature, 
only  the  Quran  and  Sunnah  would  be  regarded  as  primary  sources  and  all  other 
methods  would  be  secondary  sources.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  examine  them 
according  to  the  jurists'  views  or  divisions  (Islamic  schools)  and  distinguish 
between  Sunni  and  Shi'i  Schools,  we  will  find  agreement  on  the  primary  sources 
among  the  two  schools  and  disagreement  on  the  secondary.  61 
In  the  present  thesis  the  division  of  the  sources  of  Islamic  Shariah  as  primary 
or  secondary  will  be,  according  to  their  divine  nature,  as  follows:  primary 
sources,  such  as  the  Quran  and  Sunnah;  secondary  sources,  such  as  ijtihad  and- 
ijma;  and  sources  specific  to  Islamic  international  law,  such  as  treaties; 
declarations  and  instructions;  and  the  book  of  Siyar.  62 
4.3.1.  The  Primary  Sources 
4.3.1.1.  The  Quran 
All  Islamic  jurists  unanimously  agree  that  the  Quran  is  the  most  important 
source  in  Islamic  Shariah,  and  all  the  other  sources  must  supplement  and  not 
conflict  with  its  legal  rules,  except  the  Prophet's  Sunnah  which  is  an  integral  part 
of  it.  The  Quran  is  the  word  of  Allah,  revealed  to  His  Prophet  by  inspiration, 
through  the  angel  Gabriel,  in  Arabic.  63  This  was  clearly  explained  when  Allah 
61  Sultan,  Hamed,  Ahkam  al  Qanun  ad  Dawli  fi  al  Shariah  al  Islam  yah,  (Principles  of 
International  Law  in  the  Islamic  Shariah),  al  Qahirah:  Dar  an  Nahdah  at  `Arabiyah,  (1986) 
p.  p.  59,63-64.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Sultan,  International  Law  in  the  Islamic  Shariah). 
62  Cf  this  division  with  Hamidullah,  Muslim  Conduct  of  State,  supra  note  30,  p.  17;  Moinuddin, 
Hassan,  The  Charter  of  the  Islamic  Conference,  and  Legal  Framework  of  Economic  Cooperation 
among  its  Member  States,  Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  (1987)  p.  p.  7-8,15-17.  (hereinafter  cited  as: 
Moinuddin,  The  Charter  of  the  Islamic  Conference). 
63  at  Khudari,  Muhammad,  Tarikh  at  Tashri'  a!  Islami,  (History  of  Islamic  Legislation),  Maser:  at 
Maktabah  at  Tijariyah  at  Kubra,  (1960)  p.  6.  (hereinafter  cited  as  :  at  Khudari,  Tarikh); Chapter  Four  184 
said:  "And  truly,  this  (the  Quran)  is  a  revelation  from  the  Lord  of  the  Alamin 
(mankind,  jinns  and  all  that  exists),  which  the  trustworthy  Ruh  (Gabriel)  has 
brought  down;  upon  your  heart  (0  Mohammed)  that  you  may  be  (one)  of  the 
warners,  in  the  plain  Arabic  Language.  "ý 
Muslims  believe  that  Quran  is  the  last  holy  book,  for  the  last  religion, 
revealed  to  the  last  Messenger  as  a  foundation  of  the  Islamic  nation  until  the  last 
day  (the  day  of  judgement).  65  It  sets  down  general  rules  and  provisions,  leaving 
the  Prophet's  tradition  to  elucidate  and  provide  details  to  its  judgements.  66 
Furthermore,  it  was  laid  down  intermittently,  at  different  times,  to  meet  the- 
requirements  of  events  and  needs  in  Islamic  society,  and  to  allow  Allah's 
Messenger  and  other  Muslims  to  memorise  it  correctly  and  understand  its 
meanings.  67  The  Quran  comprises  eighty  five  Meccan  and  twenty  nine  Medinan 
Surah  (chapters),  68  that  were  revealed  to  the  Prophet  over  22  years.  Twelve  years 
Mahmassani,  The  Philosophy,  supra  note  59,  p.  19;  Watt,  W.  Montgomery,  Introduction  to 
Quran,  Edinburgh:  Edinburgh  University  Press,  (1997)  p.  p.  82-85.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Watt, 
Introduction  to  Quran).  The  translation  of  the  Quran  into  another  language  is  not  considered  as  a 
part  of  the  original  Quran.  It  is  just  to  give  non  Arabic  speakers  a  clear  meaning  of  it. 
64  Quran,  26:  192-195.  The  Quran  also  calls  itself  by  alternative  names,  such  as:  Al  Kitab,  2:  2;  Al 
Burhan,  4:  174;  Al  Muhaimin,  5:  48;  An  Nur,  7:  157;  Al  Maw'idhah,  10:  57;  Ash  Shifa',  10:  57; 
Al  Hukm,  13:  37;  Umm  at  Kitab,  13:  39;  Al  Haqq,  17:  81;  Adh  Dhikr,  15:  9;  Al  Hikmah,  17:  39; 
Ar  Rahmah,  17:  82;  Al  Qayyim,  18:  2;  Al  Furqan,  25:  1;  At  Tanzil,  26:  192;  Ahsan  at  Hadith, 
39:  23;  Ar  Ruh,  42:  52;  Al  Bayan,  55:  7;  Al  Huda,  72:  13.  For  more  details  see  Watt,  Introduction 
to  Quran,  supra  note  63,  p.  p.  135-147. 
65  It  could  be  said  Quran  presents  the  best  rules  which  covers  most  parts  of  social  life.  See 
Mahmood,  Tahir,.  Law  In  Quran:  Draft  Code,  7  Is!.  CLQ  (1987)  p.  p.  1-23.  In  this  Article  the 
author  presents  the  verses  of  Quran  as  a  Code  which  directly  relates  or  deals  with  legal  aspects  of 
Muslim  life. 
66  In  this  matter  Allah  said:  "And  we  have  also  sent  down  unto  you  (0  Mohammed)  the  reminder 
and  the  advice  (the  Quran)  that  you  may  explain  clearly  to  men  what  is  sent  down  to  them,  and  that 
they  may  give  thought.  ",  Quran,  16:  44. 
67  Allah  said:  "And  (it  is)  a  Quran  which  we  have  divided  (into  parts),  in  order  that  you  might 
recite  it  to  men  at  intervals.  And  we  have  revealed  it  by  stages.  ",  Quran,  17:  106. 
68  Karnali,  Muhammad  Hashim,  Principles  of  Islamic  Jurisprudence,  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
Islamic  Society,  (1991)  p.  18.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Karnali,  Principles  of  Islamic  Jurisprudence). Chapter  Four  185 
and  five  months  and  thirteen  days  is  the  time  when  He  was  in  Mecca  before  His 
Hijrah  (emigration),  and  the  rest  of  the  revelation  was  continued  in  Medina.  69  The 
Meccan  Suras  are  small  and  mostly  deal  with  matters  relating  to  religion  (belief) 
at  a  time  when  Islam  as  a  religion  was  still  new  and  a  strong  relationship  had  to  be 
developed  between  believers  and  the  new  religion.  The  Medina  Suras  mostly  deal 
with  Islamic  legislation,  and  regulate  the  political,  social,  economic  and  legal  life 
of  the  new  community  (Islamic  nation). 
Compilation  of  the  Quran:  During  the  life  of  Allah's  Messenger,  the  Quran 
was  not  collected  in  one  book,  it  was  memorised  by  His  companions'70  but 
according  to  the  Prophet's  order,  the  revelation  writers  (kuttab  al  wahy)  wrote  it 
on  pieces  of  cloth,  leather,  bones  and  stones.  71  There  were  two  main  reasons  for 
not  gathering  and  binding  the  Quran  in  one  book.  The  first  was  to  keep  the 
companions  memorising  it,  and  the  second  was  because  the  Prophet,  until  the  last 
day  of  His  life,  was  waiting  for  further  revelations,  and  compilation  might  have 
caused  an  error  in  the  correct  arrangement  of  the  verses  in  the  Quran.  Later  on, 
after  the  death  of  the  Prophet  and  during  the  first  caliphate  of  Abu  Bakir  al 
Siddeeq,  Umar  bin  al  Khattab  advised  the  caliph  to  bind  the  Quran  in  one  volume. 
Zaid  ibn  Thabit  was  ordered  to  do  so  after  consultation  with  other  leading 
companions.  After  Zaid  had  finished  collecting  the  contents  of  the  Quran,  Abu 
Bakir  kept  them  until  his  death.  Umar  as  a  second  caliph,  took  those  texts  which 
69  Mahmassani,  The  Philosophy,  supra  note  59,  p.  66. 
70  Companions  are  those  peoples  who  lived  during  the  era  of  the  Prophet,  they  also  called 
Sahabah. 
71  Shalabi,  Introduction  to  Islamic  Jurisprudence,  supra  note  20,  p.  p.  229-230. Chapter  Four  186 
were  collected  by  Zaid  and  gave  them  to  his  daughter  Lady  Hafsa  (one  of  the 
Prophet's  wives)  until  Uthman  Ibn  Affan  became  caliph,  and  ordered  the  writers 
Zaid  bin  Thabit,  Abdulla  ibn  al  Zubair,  said  ibn  al  Ass,  and  Abdul  Rahman  ibn 
Alharith  bin  Hisham  to  write  four  copies  of  the  Quran  from  the  main  copy 
deposited  with  Lady  Hafsa.  When  the  four  copies  were  prepared,  Uthman  kept  a 
copy  at  Medina  and  sent  the  remaining  three  to  different  Islamic  countries  (  al 
Kufa,  al  Basra,  and  Damascus),  as  an  official  Quran,  and  all  other  texts  which 
differed  from  these  official  ones  were  collected  and  burnt.  72 
The  Quran  comprises  114  chapters  (Surah);  every  Surah  is  an  independent 
part  of  the  book  which  comprises  6235  verses  (Ayah)  in  total.  73  Allah  said:  "And 
if  you  (Arab  pagans,  Jews  and  Christians)  are  in  doubt  concerning  that  which  we 
have  sent  down  (i.  e.  the  Quran)  to  Our  slave  (Mohammed)  then  produce  a  Surah 
(chapter)  of  the  like  thereof  and  call  your  witnesses  (supporters  and  helpers) 
besides  Allah,  if  you  are  truthful.  But  if  you  do  it  not,  and  you  can  never  do  it, 
then  fear  the  Fire  (Hell)  whose  fuel  is  men  and  stones,  prepared  for  the 
disbelievers.  "74  Out  of  the  6235  verses,  there  are  just  350  verses  dealing  with 
legal  matters:  140  verses  deal  with  religious  matters  such  as  Salah,  Zakat,  Sawm, 
Hajj,  and  so  on.  Another  140  verses  regulate  husbands'  and  wives'  relationships 
72  Kamali,  Principles  of  Islamic  Jurisprudence,  supra  note  68,  p.  17;  Burton,  John,  The 
Collection  of  the  Quran,  23  GUOS  (1969)  p.  p.  42-44;  Watt,  Introduction  to  Quran,  supra  note  63, 
p.  p.  40-47. 
73  Every  Surah  has  its  own  title  which  has  taken  from  a  separate  subject  dealt  with  in  that  Surah. 
The  Prophet  named  every  Surah  in  the  Quran.  The  shortest  Surah  consists  of  three  Ayah  and  the 
longest  of  286  Ayah. 
71  Quran,  2:  23-24;  And  He  also  said:  "Say:  if  the  mankind  and  the  jinns  were  together  to  produce 
the  like  of  this  Quran,  they  could  not  produce  the  like  thereof,  even  if  they  helped  one  another.  ", 
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such  as  marriage,  divorce,  revocation,  the  waiting  of  a  woman's  monthly  period, 
custody  of  children.  It  also  regulates  other  parts  of  Muslim  life  by  laying  down 
rules  concerning  commercial  transactions  such  as  sales,  loans,  mortgage  and  so 
on.  The  remaining  70  verses  deal  with  crimes  and  penalties,  murder,  highway 
robbery,  equality,  evidence,  consultation,  and  the  obligations  of  citizens.  75 
The  legal  rules  of  the  Quran  are  of  two  categories,  the  definitive  (Qat'i)  and 
the  speculative  (Dhanni).  A  Qat'i  is  clear  in  its  meaning  and  language  and  does 
not  allow  for  interpretation  or  ijtihad.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Dhanni  are 
ambiguous  and  liable  to  have  more  than  one  meaning  and  so  are  open  to  debate; 
interpretation  and  ijtihad.  It  is  unanimously  agreed  that  both  kinds  of  Quranic  text 
bind  all  Muslims  to  follow  its  injunctions;  76  but  if  any  definitive  text  affirms 
something  and  a  speculative  text  negates  it  at  the  same  time,  priority  is  to  be  given 
to  the  definitive  text.  When  interpreting  the  speculative  Quranic  text,  Islamic 
jurists  prefer  first  of  all  to  resort  to  the  Quran  itself,  that  is,  by  looking  at  the 
Quran  as  a  whole  in  order  to  find  the  necessary  interpretation.  The  Prophet's 
Sunnah  is  the  second  step77  and  if  jurists  do  not  find  any  guidance  in  the  Sunnah, 
they  resort  to  the  companions  of  the  Prophet  as  the  most  qualified  to  interpret  the 
speculative  Quranic  text.  Only  Allah  and  His  Prophet  know  the  accurate 
interpretation  of  Quran.  This  is  stated  in  the  Quran  itself  when  Allah  said:  "but 
73  Karnali,  Principles  of  Islamic  Jurisprudence,  supra  note  68,  p.  p.  19-20. 
76  Allah  said:  "It  is  He  Who  sent  down  to  You  (Muhammad)  the  Book  (this  Quran).  In  it  are 
verses  that  are  entirely  clear,  they  are  the  foundations  of  the  Book,  and  others  not  entirely  clear.  " 
Quran,  3:  7. 
77  It  has  to  be  mentioned  that  Sunnah  should  always  first  to  be  consulted  in  the  matter  of 
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none  knows  its  hidden  meanings  save  Allah".  78  However,  this  does  not  mean  it  is 
prohibited  for  Muslim  jurists  to  seek  an  understanding  of  the  true  interpretation  of 
the  Quran  if  a  jurist  is  well  qualified  and  possesses  the  capacity  of  ijtihad. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Quran  also  recognises  the  idea  of  abrogation  (Naskh), 
which  is  defined  as  "the  suspension  or  replacement  of  one  Shariah  ruling  by 
another,  provided  that  the  latter  is  of  a  subsequent  origin,  and  that  the  two  rulings 
are  enacted  separately  from  one  another.  "79  This  can  be  supported  by  the  Quran 
itself,  when  Allah  said:  "Whatever  a  verse  do  we  abrogate  or  cause  to  be 
forgotten,  we  bring  a  better  one  or  similar  to  it.  "80  It  is  to  be  noted  that  there  has- 
been  no  abrogation  after  the  death  of  the  Prophet,  and  as  a  general  rule,  there  is  no 
abrogation  in  matters  of  belief. 
4.3.1.2.  The  Sunnah 
Linguistically,  Sunnah  means  clear  path,  behaviour,  or  manner  of  acting.  8'  In 
its  legal  meaning  it  stands  for  all  that  is  narrated  as  related  to  the  Prophet;  His  acts 
(Afal),  His  sayings  (Aqwal),  and  whatever  He  approved  (Taqrir),  plus  all  reports 
which  describe  His  physical  attributes  and  character.  His  silence  in  some  matters 
79  Quran,  3:  7;  and  when  He  also  said:  "And  when  we  have  recited  it  to  you  (0  Muhammad),  then 
follow  you  its  (the  Quran)  recital.  Then  it  is  for  Us  (Allah)  to  make  it  clear  to  you", 
Quran,  75:  18-19. 
79  Karnali,  Principles  of  Islamic  Jurisprudence,  supra  note  68,  p.  149;  al  Khudari,  Mohammad, 
Usul  al  Fiqh,  Beirut:  Dar  Ihia'  al  Turath  al  Arabi,  (1969)  p.  250.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  at  Khudari, 
Usul  al  Fiqh);  al  Shawkani,  at  Hafidh  Mohammad  bin  Ali,  Irshad  a!  Fuhul  ila  Tahqeeq  a!  Haq 
min  'Ilm  a!  Usul,  Maser:  Dar  al  Kutbi,  vol.  2,  p.  p.  71-75.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  at  Shawkani, 
Irshad  a!  Fuhul);  for  a  comprehensive  study  see  Burton,  John,  The  Sources  of  Islamic  Law: 
Theories  ofAbrogation,  Edinburgh:  Edinburgh  University  Press,  (1990). 
B0  Quran,  2:  106;  in  another  verse  Allah  said:  "And  when  We  change  a  verse  [of  the  Quran,  i.  e. 
cancel  (abrogate)  its  order]  in  place  of  another,  and  Allah  knows  the  best  of  what  He  sends  down". 
Quran,  16:  101. 
81  al  Mu  jam  al  Wasit,  supra  note  17,  p.  456. Chapter  Four  189 
is  deemed  to  be  approval.  The  opposite  of  the  Sunnah  is  known  as  Bid'ah 
(innovation).  82  It  is  important  to  clarify  the  difference  and  relation  between  the 
terms  Sunnah  and  Hadith.  The  second  is  limited  only  to  the  sayings  of  the 
Prophet,  whereas  the  first  refers  to  acts,  sayings  and  approval  by  the  Prophet.  This 
means  that  the  Sunnah  can  be  divided  into  three  parts:  first,  al  Sunnah  al  Qawliyh 
or  the  traditions  of  al  Hadith,  that  is  the  statements  and  sayings  of  the  Prophet; 
second,  al  Sunnah  al  Fi'liyah  (the  tradition  of  deeds);  and  the  third,  al  Sunnah  al 
Taqririyah  (the  tradition  of  tacit  approval).  83 
The  Sunnah  as  a  second  source  in  the  Islamic  Shariah  comes  directly  after  the 
Quran  and  is  regarded  as  complementary  to  it,  because  it  helps  to  explain,  clarify, 
and  elaborate  its  injunctions,  which  means  that  the  Sunnah  builds  upon  the  Quran 
while  the  Quran  is  not  dependant  on  the  Sunnah.  In  fact,  without  the  Sunnah,  the 
Shariah  itself  would  be  deficient.  It  consists  of  rulings  on  numerous  situations  on 
which  the  Quran  is  silent.  For  example,  when  Abu  Hurairah  reported  that  the 
Prophet  said;  "No  woman  shall  be  married  simultaneously  with  her  paternal  or 
maternal  aunt";  84  according  to  the  verse  in  Quran,  Allah  said;  "Forbidden  to  you 
82  Al  Khudari,  Usul  at  Fiqh,  supra  note  79,  p.  214.  It  is  important  to  mention  here  that,  not  all  the 
Prophets  statements,  actions,  sanctions,  should  be  taken  as  Sunnah  such  as  His  personal  human  acts 
i.  e.  eating,  drinking,  sleeping,  walking,  etc.,  and  also  those  things  which  distinguished  Him  by  them 
from  others,  like  He  could  marry  more  than  four  wives  while  others  could  not.  For  more  details 
see  Shalabi,  Introduction  to  Islamic  Jurisprudence,  supra  note  20,  p.  240;  Karnali,  Principles  of 
Islamic  Jurisprudence,  supra  note  68,  p.  44;  al  Shawkani,  Irshad  at  Fuhul,  supra  note  79,  vol.  1, 
p.  155. 
93  al  Khatib,  Muhammad  A.,  Usul  at  Hadith:  Ulumuh  wa  Mustalahuh,  Beirut:  Dar  al  Fikr  lit 
Tiba'ah  wat  Tawzi',  (1982)  p.  p.  19-21.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  al  Khatib,  Usul  at  Hadith). 
as  Sahih  at  Bukhari,  supra  note  28,  vol.  7,  p.  34;  Muslim  bin  al  Hjjaj,  Sahih  Muslim,  (204-261 
A.  H.  ),  Abdul  Hamid  Siddiqi  (trans.  ),  vol.  2,  Lahore:  Sh.  Muhammad  Ashraf,  (1990)  p.  347. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  Sahih  Muslim). Chapter  Four  190 
(for  Marriage)  are:  Your  mothers,  your  daughters,  your  sisters,  your  father's 
sisters,  your  mother's  sisters.  ..,, 
85  The  Quran  states  in  numerous  verses  that  the 
Sunnah  is  an  important  source  of  Islamic  Shariah  when  Allah  said;  "He  who 
obeys  the  Messenger  (Mohammed),  has  indeed  obeyed  Allah,  but  he  who  turns 
"86  away,  then  we  have  not  sent  you  (0  Mohammed)  as  watcher  over  them. 
It  is  to  be  understood  that  the  decisions  of  the  Prophet  should  be  followed  as 
the  commandments  of  Allah.  So  Allah's  Messenger  is  reported  to  have  said;  "I 
left  two  things  among  you.  You  shall  not  go  astray  so  long  as  you  hold  on  to 
them:  The  Book  of  Allah,  (Quran)  and  my  Sunnah  (Sunnati).  Narrated  Abu- 
Hurairah,  Allah's  Messenger  said;  "whoever  obeys  me,  he  obeys  Allah,  and 
whoever  disobeys  me,  he  disobeys  Allah,  and  whoever  obeys  the  ruler  I  appoint, 
"87  he  obeys  me,  and  whoever  disobeys  him,  he  disobeys  me. 
Collection  of  Hadith:  The  Quran  is  the  word  of  Allah,  and  the  Sunnah  is  the 
word  of  His  Messenger.  The  second  is  deemed  to  be  integral  to  the  first, 
wherewith  an  important  question  arises  regarding  the  time  of  writing  of  the 
Sunnah  and  why  the  Prophet  did  not  allow  His  companions  to  write  His  Hadith 
during  His  life  and  ordered  those  who  already  has  written  some  to  rub  them  out. 
85  Quran,  4:  23.  Another  example  when  Allah  gave  general  provisions  on  inheritance,  Quran,  4:  11, 
and  the  Prophet  explained  what  was  not  mentioned  in  that  verse  when  He  said;  the  killer  shall  not 
inherit.  See  `Armush,  Ahmed  R.  (ed.  ),  Muwatta'  Imam  Malik,  narration  by  al  Laythi,  Yahya  bin 
Yahya,  Beirut:  Dar  at  Nafa's,  (1981)  p.  p.  352-353.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Muwatta'  Imam  Malik). 
86  Quran,  4:  80;  also  in  another  verse  He  said;  "It  is  not  for  a  believer,  man  or  woman,  when  Allah 
and  His  Messenger  have  decreed  a  matter  that  they  should  have  any  option  in  their  decision.  And 
whoever  disobeys  Allah  and  His  Messenger,  He  has  indeed  strayed  in  a  plain  error.  ",  Quran,  33:  36. 
97  Sahih  al  Bukhari,  supra  note  28,  vol.  9,  p.  251. Chapter  Four  191 
"Do  not  write  down  my  sayings.  He  who  has  quoted  me  in  writing  in  other  than 
the  Quran  should  delete  what  he  has  written.  You  are  free  to  quote  me  orally.  ,  88 
The  reason  is  that  writing  the  Prophet's  Hadith  at  the  time  when  the 
companions  were  writing  the  Quran  could  have  caused  some  confusion  between 
the  two  sources.  The  prohibition  was  to  focus  the  companions'  attention  on  just 
the  Quran.  89  So  during  the  Messenger's  life  there  was  not  any  formal  writing  of 
the  Hadith,  90  but  after  His  death  there  were  some  attempts  to  collect  the  Hadith 
during  the  rule  of  the  first  four  caliphs.  These  attempts  were  not  successful  for 
different  reasons,  and  the  true  compilation  of  the  Prophet's  Hadith  started  during- 
the  third  century  (A.  H.  )  with  the  six  great  collections  of  Hadith  and  the  collection 
of  Hadith  became  a  science  with  its  own  rules  and  principles.  91  They  produced 
very  strict  rules  for  examining,  protecting,  and  securing  the  tradition.  The  relevant 
rules  became  a  science  known  as  `mustalah  al  Hadith'.  The  jurists  in  this  field 
88  Sahih  Muslim,  supra  note  84,  vol.  8,  p.  261. 
89  This  later  caused  a  lot  of  fabrication  of  the  tradition  (false  Hadith)  in  some  periods  of  Islamic 
history  to  support  some  political  leaders  and  political  functions.  The  Prophet  said:  "He  who 
quotes  me  in  things  I  have  not  uttered,  let  him  occupy  his  seat  in  hell.  "  So  every  Hadith  is 
considered  false  until  the  contrary  is  proved.  Mahmassani,  The  Philosophy,  supra  note  59,  p.  76. 
90  Some  of  them  had  his  own  text  of  the  Prophet's  Hadith  like  the  text  which  belonged  to  Abdulla 
bin  Amr  bin  al  Ass.  It  was  nominated  as  the  truth  (al  Sadiqah),  he  wrote  some  tradition  in  it.  For 
more  details  about  collection  of  Hadith  see  al  Khatib,  Usul  a!  Hadith,  supra  note  83,  p.  p.  139-207; 
Siddiqi,  Muhammad  Zubayr,  Hadith  Literature:  Its  Origin,  Development  &  Special  Features, 
Cambridge:  The  Islamic  Texts  Society,  (1993)  p.  p.  24-27.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Siddiqi,  Hadith 
Literature). 
91  Those  great  collections  are:  al  Bukhari,  Mohammed  bin  Esmail,  (194-256  A.  H.  )  his  famous 
book  called  Sahih  al  Bukhari.  Muslim,  Muslim  bin  al  Hjjaj,  (204-261  A.  H.  )  his  famous  book 
called  Sahih  Muslim.  al  Termidhi,  Mohammed  bin  Eissa,  (209-279  A.  H.  )  his  famous  book  called 
Sunan  al  Termidhi.  al  Nisai,  Ahmed  bin  Shuaib  bin  Ali,  (215-303  A.  H.  ),  his  famous  book  called  al 
Sunan  al  Sughra  and  al  Sunan  al  Kubra.  Abu  Dawood,  Sulayman  al  Ashath,  (202-275  A.  H.  ),  his 
famous  book  called  Sunan  Abu  Dawood.  ibn  Majah,  Mohammed  bin  Yazid,  (209-273  A.  H.  ),  his 
famous  book  called  Sunan  Ibn  Majah.  Hanbal,  Ahmed  bin  Mohammed,  (164-241  A.  H.  ),  his 
famous  book  called  al  Musnad.  and  finally  Malik,  Malik  bin  Anas,  (39-179  A.  H.  ),  his  famous  book 
called,  Al  Muwatta.  For  more  details  see  al  Khatib,  Usul  al  Hadith,  supra  note  83,  p.  p.  308-330; 
Siddiqi,  Hadith  Literature,  supra  note  90,  p.  p.  43-75;  and  in  his  two  Articles,  `Ulum  al  Hadith,  5 
Stud.  Isl.  (1968)  p.  p.  197-211  and  Atrafal  Hadith,  8  Stud  Is!.  (1971)  p.  p.  17-28. Chapter  Four  192 
were  known  as  rijal  al  jarh  wat  ta'dil,  that  is  the  men  who  declare  traditions  valid 
or  void.  One  of  these  rules  is  called  the  chain  of  authorities  (Sanad).  The  Sanad 
went  back  to  the  original  reporter  who  had  informed  about  the  Hadith,  and  the 
process  was  called  backing  (Isnad).  -  Also  biographical  data  were  collected, 
dealing  with  all  those  who  reported  the  Prophet's  Hadith.  According  to  these  data 
all  the  reporters  had  been  investigated  and  classified.  If  any  new  information  is 
discovered  about  one  of  the  reporters,  the  chain  of  the  Hadith  may  be  changed.  92 
Hadith  may  be  classified  into  two  main  categories:  according  to  its  reporters 
such  as  Mutawatir,  Mashhur,  and  Ahad;  and  according  to  its  acceptance  and- 
rejection  such  as  Sahih,  Hasan  and  Dha'if.  The  Mutawatir  is  Hadith  ensured  by 
many  lines  of  transmission  namely,  "which  is  reported  by  an  indefinite  number  of 
people  related  in  such  a  way  as  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  their  agreement  to 
perpetuate  a  lie.  "93  The  Mashhur  is  a  well  known  Hadith  "which  is  originally 
reported  by  one,  two  or  more  companions  whether  directly  from  the  Prophet  or 
from  another  companions,  but  has  later  become  well  known  and  transmitted  by  an 
indefinite  number  of  people.  "94  The  Ahad  (solitary  Hadith)  is  a  Hadith  reported 
by  one  person  or  by  odd  individuals  directly  from  the  Prophet.  95 
Sahih  (authentic  Hadith)  is defined  as  "a  Hadith  with  a  continuous  Isnad  all 
the  way  back  to  the  Prophet  consisting  of  honest  and  reliable  persons  who  possess 
92  The  Hadith  is  composed  of  two  parts:  al  Matn  (the  text)  and  al  Isnad  (those  who  reported  the 
Hadith  and  collected  it).  For  more  details  see  al  Khatib,  Usul  a!  Hadith,  supra  note  83,  p.  p.  7-12. 
93  Karnali,  Principles  of  Islamic  Jurisprudence,  supra  note  68,  p.  68;  al  Shawkani,  Irshad  a! 
Fuhul,  supra  note  79,  vol.  1,  p.  200;  Mahmassani,  The  Philosophy,  supra  note  59,  p.  p.  73-74. 
94  Karnali,  Principles  of  Islamic  Jurisprudence,  supra  note  68,  p.  70;  al  Khatib,  Usul  a!  Kadith, 
supra  note  83,  p.  302. 
95  Mahmassani,  The  Philosophy,  supra  note  59,  p.  74. Chapter  Four  193 
retentive  memories  and  whose  narration  is  free  both  of  obvious  and  of  subtle 
defects.  ,  96  Hasan  (fair  or  good  Hadith)  falls  between  authentic  and  weak  Hadith, 
and  may  include  among  its  reporters  a  person  or  persons  who  do  not  possess  the 
full  qualifications  to  report  Hadith  such  as  persons  who  reported  the  authentic 
one.  97  Da'if  (weak  Hadith)  are  those  whose  reporters  did  not  possess  the 
qualifications  required  for  the  above  mentioned  Hadiths.  98 
Disagreements  arose  between  Islamic  schools  over  the  Sunnah,  between 
Sunnis  themselves  and  between  Sunnis  and  Shi`is.  The  Shi'is  schools  accepted 
only  those  Hadiths  which  were  reported  by  members  of  the  Prophet's  family,  Ali- 
bin  Abi  Talib  and  his  adherents,  and  have  their  own  Hadith  which  they  believe  to 
support  their  opinion  in  this  matter.  The  text  of  this  Hadith  is  "Whatsoever  has 
not  emanated  from  Prophet's  family  is  fictitious".  Sunni  schools  also  disagree 
among  Hadith  and  are  divided  into  two  groups:  the  school  of  opinion  in  Iraq,  and 
the  school  of  Hadith  in  Hijaz.  The  former  rejected  numerous  Hadiths  accepted  by 
the  latter.  Priority  in  application  is  also  recognised  in  Islamic  legal  theory 
regarding  particular  Hadiths,  so  that  when  Hadiths  are  in  conflict,  the  authentic 
must  be  given  priority;  when  there  is  no  authentic  Hadith  involved,  then  the  fair 
has  priority,  and  after  it,  the  weak.  One  may  not  act  on  a  false  Hadith  because  it  is 
not  accepted  and  is  considered  not  binding. 
96  Karnali,  Principles  of  Islamic  Jurisprudence,  supra  note  68,  p.  81. 
97  Ibid. 
9'  Ibid. 
99  Mahmassani,  The  Philosophy,  supra  note  59,  p.  73;  Fazlur  Rahman,  Concepts  of  Sunnah, 
ljtihad,  and  ljma  in  the  Early  Period,  1  Isl.  Stud.,  (1962)  p.  14. Chapter  Four  194 
4.3.2.  The  Secondary  Sources 
4.3.2.1.  Ijtihad  (Reasoning)  'oo 
During  the  lifetime  of  the  Prophet  every  legal  issue  in  the  new  Muslim 
community  was  settled  by  Him,  because  He  was  the  only  person  apart  from  Allah 
to  know  the  real  meaning  of  provisions  and  injunctions  of  the  divine  revelation. 
After  His  death,  Muslims  faced  difficulties  in  finding  answers  to  new  legal 
problems;  they  would  have  recourse  first  to  the  divine  text.  If  they  failed  to  find  a 
solution  they  would  have  then  recourse  to  their  personal  opinion  (ra'y)  in  order  to 
deliver  a  decision  in  accordance  with  their  own  independent  reasoning  (ijtihad). 
Ijtihad  has  played  very  important  role  in  developing  Islamic  jurisprudence  (fiqh) 
since  the  life  of  the  Prophet.  1°' 
Ijtihad  literally  means  expanding  effort  and  exhausting  energy.  102  Its  legal 
usage  refers  to  the  ability  to  extract  judgment  as  elements  from  the  sources  of 
legislation.  Ijtihad  could  be  defined  as  "the  total  expenditure  of  effort  made  by  a 
jurist  in  order  to  infer,  with  a  degree  of  probability,  the  rules  of  Shariah  from  their 
detailed  evidence  in  the  sources.  i103  A  qualified  jurist  (mujtahid)  with  the  ability 
100  Generally  see  at  Shafi'i,  al  Imam  Muhammad  ibn  Idris,  ar  Risala  fi  Usul  a!  Fiqh,  (Treatise  on 
the  Foundations  of  Islamic  Jurisprudence),  Translated  with  an  Introduction,  Notes  and  Appendices 
by  Majid  Khadduri,  Cambridge:  The  Islamic  Texts  Society,  (1987)  p.  p.  295-303. 
101  Some  jurists  admit  that  the  gate  of  ijtihad  was  closed  after  the  third  century  of  Islamic  era, 
others  maintain  that  the  gate  of  ijtihad  is  never  closed,  or  if  it  was  closed  it  should  be  reopened  to 
face  present  legal  problems  and  to  regulate  the  modem  Muslim  societies.  See  Omar,  Reasoning  in 
Islamic  Law,  supra  note  22,  p.  p.  354-455;  Hallaq,  Wael  B.,  Was  the  Gate  of  Ijtihad  Closed?,  16 
IMES  (1984)  p.  p.  208-229,  and  his  other  Article,  On  the  Origins  of  Controversy  About  the 
Existence  of  Mujtahids  and  the  Gate  of  Ijtihad,  63  Stv.  Isl  (1986)  p.  p.  129-141;  Schacht,  Joseph, 
An  Introduction  to  Islamic  Law,  Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  (1998)  p.  p.  69-75. 
102  Gibb,  Encyclopaedia  oflslam,  supra  note  17,  p.  158. 
103  Kamali,  Principles  of  Islamic  Jurisprudence,  supra  note  68,  p.  367;  similarly  see  Weiss, 
Bernard,  Interpretation  in  Islamic  Law:  The  Theory  of  Ijtihad,  26  AJCL  (1978)  p.  p.  199-200. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  Weiss,  Interpretation  in  Islamic  Law);  at  Shawkani,  Irshad  al  Fuhul,  supra 
note  79,  vol.  2,  p.  295. Chapter  Four  195 
to  deduce  rules  from  the  sources  is  different  from  persons  called  imitates 
(muqalidun).  The  latter  accept  rules  not  with  reference  to  sources  but  by 
following  other  jurists.  Opinions  of  others  are  followed  without  searching  for  the 
evidence.  Such  scholars  can  understand  the  main  injunctions  of  Islam  well,  but  do 
not  have  the  ability  to  extract  conclusions  and  are  therefore  not  qualified  for 
ijtihad.  104  Ijtihad,  as  a  human  activity,  is  in  Muslim  theory  always  considered  as  a 
fallible  opinion  (dhann)  but  if  the  result  of  an  individual  ijtihad  obtains  the 
agreement  of  all  Muslims  it  will  be  treated  as  infallible,  as  the  Prophet  declares 
that  "My  followers  will  not  [altogether]  agree  upon  error.  s105  Some  jurists  equate 
ijtihad  with  reasoning  by  analogy,  others  admit  that  ijtihad  has  a  wider  content 
which  covers  other  methods  such  as  istihsan  (equity),  istishab  (presumption  of 
continuity)  and  istislah  (considerations  of  public  interest).  106 
Ijtihad  bases  its  legality  on  both  the  Quran  and  the  Sunnah.  In  the  Quran 
several  verses  deal  with  ijtihad.  Allah  says:  "When.  there  comes  to  them  some 
matters  touching  (public)  safety  or  fear,  they  make  it  known  (among  the  people),  if 
only  they  had  referred  it  to  the  Messenger  or  to  those  charged  with  authority 
among  them,  the  proper  investigators  would  have  understood  it  from  them 
(directly).  "  107  In  the  Sunnah,  it  is  reported  that  the  Prophet  asked  Muadh  bin  Jabal 
before  sending  him  to  Yemen  as  a  judge,  what  would  he  do  if  he  failed  to  find 
guidance  in  the  Quran  or  Sunnah  in  'any  case  brought  before  him?  Muadh 
104  al  Shawkani,  Irshad  al  Fuhul,  supra  note  79,  vol.  2,  p.  345;  Shalabi,  Introduction  to  Islamic 
Jurisprudence,  supra  note  20,  p.  136. 
105  Weiss,  Interpretation  of  Islamic  Law,  supra  note  103,  p.  p.  208-209. 
106  Omar,  Reasoning  in  Islamic  Law,  supra  note  22,  p.  355. 
107  Quran,  4:  83. Chapter  Four  196 
answered  that  he  would  resort  to  his  own  reasoning  (ijtihad).  The  Prophet  was 
pleased  when  He  heard  this  response.  108 
Ijtihad  may  be  divided  into  three  categories:  (1)  the  absolute  ijtihad  (al  ijtihad 
al  mutlaq);  this  kind  of  ijtihad  dates  from  the  lifetime  of  the  Prophet  until  the  end 
of  the  third  century  A.  H.  It  refers  especially  to  the  companions  of  the  Prophet, 
their  successors,  the  leading  jurists  of  the  four  Sunni  Schools,  and  the  leading 
Imams  of  the  Shi'is;  (2)  limited  ijtihad  within  one  school  (al  ijtihad  fi  al  madhab); 
it  refers  to  those  jurists  who  enlarge  the  law  within  the  bounds  of  a  particular 
school  (madhab)  while  abiding  within  the  principles  established  by  their  Imams.  - 
They  are  called  the  followers  or  the  students;  and  (3)  ijtihad  on  a  special  issue  (al 
ijtihad  fi  al  mas'ala);  in  this  kind  of  ijtihad,  jurists  are  not  in  disagreement  with  the 
leading  Imams  but  their  ijtihad  is  limited  to  a  particular  case  not  settled  in  the  first 
and  second  kinds  of  ijtihad.  '09 
As  mentioned,  the  function  of  ijtihad  in  Islamic  Shariah  is  to  deduce  a  rule 
from  the  divine  text.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  detailed  evidence  found  in  the 
two  sources  (the  Quran  and  the  Sunnah)  is  divided  into  four  categories:  (1) 
definite  as  proof  and  meaning;  (2)  definite  as  proof  but  speculative  in  meaning; 
(3)  definite  in  meaning  but  with  authenticity  open  to  doubt;  and  (4)  speculative  in 
both  authenticity  and  meaning.  Ijtihad  cannot  be  exercised  in  the  first  category  but 
can  be  resorted  to  any  of  the  remaining  three  categories.  '  10 
log  Hassan,  Ahmed  (trans.  ),  Sunan  Abu  Dawud,  vol.  111,  Lahore:  Sh.  Muhammad  Ashraf 
Publishers,  (1993)  Hadith  No.  1348,  p.  1019. 
109  For  more  details  see  Karnali,  Principles  of  Islamic  Jurisprudence,  supra  note  68,  p.  p.  386-391. 
110  Omar,  Reasoning  in  Islamic  Law,  supra  note  22,  p.  p.  356-358. Chapter  Four  197 
It  could  be  said  that  the  exercise  of  ijtihad  by  the  projected  ACJ,  through  its 
qualified  Muslim  judges,  can  play  a  vital  role  in  developing  the  principles  of 
Muslim  international  law  to  meet  the  necessities  of  the  members  states  of  the  Arab 
League  in  their  inter-relations,  on  the-one  hand,  and  their  external  relations  with 
non-Muslim  states  on  the  other.  The  use  of  ijtihad  (reasoning)  to  develop  the 
Islamic  Shariah  is  similar  to  what  Brierly  intended  to  introduce  in  international 
law.  He  argued: 
"Those  who  administer  law  must  meet  new  situations  not  precisely 
covered  by  a  formulated  rule  by  resorting  to  the  principles  which 
medieval  writers  would  have  called  natural  law,  and  which  we 
generally  call  reason.  Reason  in  this  context  does  not  mean  the 
unassisted  reasoning  power  of  any  intelligent  man,  but  `judicial' 
reason,  which  means  that  a  principle  to  cover  the  new  situation  is 
discovered  by  applying  methods  of  reasoning  which  lawyers  every 
where  accept  as  valid,  for  example,  the  consideration  of  precedents, 
the  finding  of  analogies,  the  disengagement  for  accidental 
circumstances  of  the  principles  underlying  rules  of  law  already 
III  1t 
4.3.2.2.  Ijma  (Consensus) 
The  concept  of  ijma  came  into  existence  as  a  result  of  the  exercise  of  ijtihad. 
The  first  four  `god-guided'  and  exemplary  caliphs  and  the  jurists  in  their  era  had 
resorted  to  their  own  opinion  (ra'y)  when  there  were  no  clear  rules  to  be  found  in 
the  Quran  and  the  Sunnah.  Although  Ijma  is  not  considered  as  a  divine  source, 
most  jurists  have  agreed  that  once  it  has  been  reached  on  a  particular  case,  the  case 
itself  becomes  an  authoritative  precedent  upon  which  a  further  qiyas  (analogy)  can 
be  based.  '  12 
111  Brierly,  J.  L.,  The  Law  of  Nations:  An  Introduction  to  the  International  Law  of  Peace,  Oxford: 
The  Clarendon  Press,  (1963)  p.  p.  66-67. 
112  Hallaq,  Wael  B.,  On  the  Authoritativeness  of  Sunni  Consensus,  18  I  MES  (1986)  p.  427. Chapter  Four  198 
Although  Muslim  jurists  have  differed  upon  its  definition,  ijma  could  be 
defined  as  "the  agreement  of  the  majority  of  Muslim  jurists  of  the  Islamic 
community  living  in  a  certain  period,  after  the  death  of  the  Prophet  Mohammed  on 
a  specific  issue.  "113  When  some  texts  in  the  Quran  or  Hadith  need  interpretation, 
or  if  a  particular  legal  matter  not  covered  by  any  text  in  the  Quran  or  the  Sunnah 
arises,  jurists  could  apply  their  own  reasoning  to  reach  the  right  solution  in  the 
given  case.  If  all  scholars  accept  the  result  unanimously,  it  can  then  be  said  that 
ijma  has  been  achieved.  Such  a  kind  of  ijma  was  possible  during  the  period  of  the 
first  two  caliphs,  Abu  Bakir  and  Umar,  because  most  of  the  Islamic  jurists  were 
still  living  in  Medina,  and  it  was  possible  to  identify  them  and  know  what  their 
opinion  was  on  particular  issue,  but  after  that,  when  the  territory  of  the  Islamic 
state  became  extended,  and  most  of  the  jurists  left  Medina  as  a  result  of  Islamic 
conquests,  the  chance  of  the  availability  of  consensus  became  more  difficult.  1  4 
Ijma  bases  its  legality  on  the  Quran  and  Sunnah.  There  are  numerous  verses 
and  Hadiths  dealing  with  Ijma,  some  of  them  are  cited  infra.  In  the  Quran  Allah 
said;  "When  there  comes  to  them  some  matter  touching  (public)  safety  or  fear, 
they  make  it  known  (among  the  people),  if  only  they  had  referred  it  to  the 
Messenger  or  to  those  charged  with  authority  among  them,  the  proper 
investigators  would  have  understood  it  from  them  (directly).  Had  it  not  been  for 
113  Mahmssani,  The  Philosophy,  supra  note  69,  p.  77;  Karnali,  Principles  of  Islamic 
Jurisprudence,  supra  note  68,  p.  169;  at  Zarqa,  al  Madkhal  a!  Fiqhi,  supra  note  29,  vol.  1,  p.  36; 
al  Shawkani,  Irshad  al  Fuhul,  supra  note  79,  vol.  1,  p.  287;  Cf  this  definition  with  the  following 
one  which  considers  ijma  as  "the  unanimous  agreement,  after  the  death  of  the  Prophet,  of  all 
Muslim  jurists  or  all  the  leading  personalities  having  the  power  of  decision-making  on  any  matter 
of  religion  or  worldly  affair".  Omar,  Reasoning  in  Islamic  Law,  supra  note  22,  p.  185. 
114  Ibid. Chapter  Four  199 
the  Grace  and  Mercy  of  Allah  upon  you,  you  would  have  followed  Satan,  save  a 
few  of  you.  "  Also  "And  whoever  contradicts  and  opposes  the  Messenger 
(Mohammed)  after  the  Right  Path  has  been  shown  clearly  to  him,  and  follows 
other  than  the  believers  way.  We  shall  keep  him  in  the  path  he  has  chosen,  and 
burn  him  in  Hell-what  an  evil  destination.  "'  15 
In  the  Sunnah  there  are  numerous  Hadiths  which  support  the  ijma.  It  is 
reported  that  the  Prophet  said;  "My  community  shall  never  agree  on  an  error.  " 
Also  He  said;  "A  group  of  my  community  (Ummah)  shall  continue  to  remain  on 
the  right  path.  They  will  be  the  dominant  force  and  will  not  be  harmed  by  the- 
opposition  of  opponents.  "  In  another  Hadith  He  said;  "whatever  the  Muslims 
deem  to  be  good  is  good  in  the  eyes  of  God.  ",  and  "The  Hand  of  Allah  is  with  the 
group.  " 
Two  kinds  of  ijma  should  be  distinguished:  (1)  explicit  consensus  (al  ijma  al 
Sarih)  that  is,  the  explicit  agreement  of  the  majority  of  Muslim  scholars  on  a 
particular  case,  whether  by  words  or  action;  (2)  tacit  consensus,  (al  ijma  al 
Sukuti),  namely,  when  some  Muslim  scholars  agree  on  an  specific  issue  while 
others  remain  silent  without  expressing  their  own  opinion  on  the  case.  It  is 
important  to  know  that  both  of  these  categories  are  treated  as  the  consensus  of  the 
community.  '  16 
115  Quran,  4:  83,115;  also  see  other  verses  gives  the  same  meaning,  Quran,  4:  59;  Quran  3:  103; 
Quran,  3:  110;  Quran,  2:  143;  Quran,  9:  119. 
116  Shalabi,  Introduction  to  Islamic  Jurisprudence,  supra  note  20,  p.  248;  al  Khudari,  Usul  a! 
Fiqh,  supra  note  79,  p.  p.  273-275. Chapter  Four  200 
Not  all  Islamic  schools  accept  this  source;  there  is  some  disagreement 
between  the  Islamic  schools  regarding  the  acceptability  of  consensus  as  a  source 
of  Islamic  Shariah.  Every  school  has  its  own  view  on  it.  Kharijis  reject  the  idea 
of  consensus  as  one  of  the  Islamic  sources.  Shi'is  would  accept  consensus  only  if 
it  emanates  from  their  infallible  Imams.  Some  Sunni  schools  have  their  own  ideas 
as  to  which  given  unanimous  agreement  should  be  treated  as  ijma  and  then 
bindingly  followed.  Some  Hanbalis  limit  consensus  only  to  the  agreement  of 
companions  of  the  Prophet,  whereas  Malikis  would  accept  ijma  of  the  companions 
of  the  Prophet  and  the  ijma  of  the  two  generations  who  are  known  as  the  followers 
(al  Tabi'un),  and  of  those  who  are  known  as  the  followers'  followers  (Tabi'  at 
Tabi`un).  117 
4.3.3.  Methods  of  Interpretation 
It  became  clear  during  the  lifetime  of  the  Prophet  that  only  the  Quran, 
Sunnah,  and  ijtihad  were  the  sources  of  Islamic  Shariah.  Other  sources  introduced 
by  Muslim  jurists  have  become,  in  fact,  methods  of  interpretation  in  order  to 
deduce  rules  from  sources  while  exercising  ijtihad.  There  is  no  need  to  go  into 
detail  about  them.  The  ijtihad  comprises  several  methods  of  deduction  and 
interpretation  which  are,  to  varying  degrees,  accepted  by  the  different  Islamic 
1  17  al  Khudari,  Tarikh,  supra  note  63,  p.  p.  207-210;  Nasir,  Jamal  J.,  The  Islamic  Law  of  Personal 
Status,  London:  Graham  &  Trotman,  (1986)  p.  20;  Shalabi,  Introduction  to  Islamic  Jurisprudence, 
supra  note  20,  p.  p.  248-250;  al  Shawkani,  Irshad  al  Fuhul,  supra  note  79,  vol.  1,  p.  p.  292-293; 
Karnali,  Principles  of  Islamic  Jurisprudence,  supra  note  68,  p.  p.  182-185. Chapter  Four  201 
Schools.  These  methods  are  the  qiyas  (analogy),  the  istihsan  (equity)  istislah 
(consideration  of  public  interest)  and  istishab  (presumption  of  continuity).  '  18 
4.3.3.1.  Qiyas  (Analogy) 
Islamic  jurists  recognise  analogy  (qiyas)  as  another  source  in  Shariah.  It 
means  comparison  between  two  or  more  issues.  Jurists  define  it  as  a  basis  for 
"Constituting  the  appropriate  ruling  in  one  issue  to  another,  because  of  the 
similarity  in  the  same  peculiarity  (reason)  upon  which  the  ruling  was  based.  "'  19 
The  reason  for  using  analogy  is  to  find  out  a  rule  applicable  to  a  particular  case 
which  not  covered  by  any  divine  source,  either  the  Quran  or  Sunnah,  and  also 
when  there  is  not  any  ijma  on  it.  In  other  words  it  means  the  extension  of  a 
Shariah  value  from  an  original  case  (al  Asl),  which  has  its  own  proof  whether  in 
the  Quran  or  Sunnah,  to  the  new  case  (Far')  because  the  latter  has  the  same 
effective  cause  ('Illah)  as  the  former.  Accordingly,  qiyas  is  based  on  four  basic 
elements,  namely:  (1)  The  original  case  (Asl)  on  which  a  ruling  is  given;  (2) 
The  new  case  (Far')  on  which  a  ruling  is  required  or  missing;  (3)  The  rule 
(Hukm)  already  used  in  the  original  case  and  which  the  jurists  have  to  extend  to 
118  it  is  to  be  understood  that  these  methods  may  by  grouped  under  the  general  heading  of  reason 
and  equity.  Qiyas  admitted  by  the  four  Sunni  schools,  istihsan  by  the  Hanafi  school,  istislah  in  the 
Maliki  school,  and  istishab  in  the  Shafi'i,  Hanbali,  and  Ja'fari  schools.  For  more  details  see  Amin, 
Sayed  Hassan,  Islamic  Law:  Introduction,  Glossary,  and  Bibliography,  Glasgow:  Royston 
Limited,  (1985)  p.  p.  2-8;  Makdisi,  John,  Legal  Logic  and  Equity  in  Islamic  Law,  33  AJCL  (1985) 
p.  66.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Makdisi,  Legal  Logic  and  Equity);  Weiss,  Interpretation  in  Islamic 
Law,  supra  note  103,  p.  p.  202-203. 
119  Karnali,  Principles  of  Islamic  Jurisprudence,  supra  note  68,  p.  197;  Mahmassani,  The 
Principles  of  International  Law,  supra  note  38,  p.  31;  Shalabi,  Introduction  to  Islamic 
Jurisprudence,  supra  note  20,  p.  251. Chapter  Four  202 
the  new  case;  and  (4)  The  effective  cause  (`Illah),  as  an  attribute  (Wasf)  of  the 
original  (Asl)  found  to  be  common  between  the  Asl  and  Far'.  120 
A  simple  example  for  qiyas  concerns  drinking  wine  or  alcohol  in  Islamic 
Shariah,  explicitly  prohibited  in  the  Quran.  If  this  is  the  original  case  (Asl),  taking 
drugs  is  the  new  case  (Far').  The  link  between  the  two  cases  (Illah)  or  the 
effective  cause  is  the  intoxicating  effect;  the  ruling  (Hukm)  or  the  rule  of  the  new 
case  therefore  is  a  prohibition  because  taking  drugs  is  like  drinking  wine.  As 
another  example,  the  Quran  forbids  selling  or  buying  after  the  last  call  for  Friday 
prayer  (Salah)  until  the  end  of  the  prayer.  121  By  qiyas  this  prohibition  is  expanded- 
to  cover  all  kinds  of  transactions.  It  is  also  reported  that  the  Prophet  said;  "The 
killer  shall  not  inherit  from  his  victim.  "  By  qiyas  this  ruling  is  expanded  also  to 
bequests. 
There  is  no  direct  proof  in  the  Quran  to  support  qiyas,  but  some  Muslim 
jurists  (especially  of  the  Sunni  schools)  have  accepted  it  as  an  important  source  in 
Islamic  Shariah,  despite  some  disagreement  between  Islamic  schools  about  its 
legitimacy.  However,  in  the  Prophet's  tradition  there  are  two  Hadiths  which 
Sunni  jurists  constantly  refer  to  as  proof  of  qiyas  to  demonstrate  that  the  Prophet 
practised  it  in  several  cases  submitted  to  Him.  First,  when  He  asked  Muadh  bin 
Jabal  before  sending  him  to  Yemen  as  a  judge,  what  would  he  do  if  he  failed  to 
find  guidance  in  the  Quran  or  Sunnah  upon  any  case  brought  to  him,  Muadh 
120  For  more  details  see  al  Shawkani,  Irshad  a!  Fuhul,  supra  note  79,  vol.  2,  p.  p.  149-166. 
121  Quran,  62:  9. Chapter  Four  203 
answered  that  he  would  resort  to  his  own  reasoning  (ijtihad).  122  The  Prophet  was 
pleased  when  He  heard  this  response.  Second,  a  woman  known  as  al 
Khathamiyyah  came  to  Him  and  asked  about  her  father,  who  had  died  without 
performing  the  pilgrimage  (Hajj),  whether  it  was  possible  for  her  to  perform  Hajj 
on  his  behalf?  The  Prophet  replied  "suppose  that  your  father  had  a  debt  to  pay 
and  you  paid  it  on  his  behalf,  would  this  benefit  him?  "  She  replied  yes,  the 
Prophet  then  replied  that  the  debt  owed  to  God  merits  even  greater  consideration. 
4.3.3.2.  Istihsan  (Equity  in  Islamic  Shariah) 
Not  all  Muslim  Sunni  jurists  were  in  agreement  over  the  legal  meaning  of 
istihsan.  Their  disagreement  led  to  major  conflicts  over  its  usage  either  as  a 
secondary  source  or  method  of  legal  reasoning.  Therefore,  they  disagreed  about 
its  definition.  Al  istihsan  literally  means  considering  a  thing  to  be  good  or 
preferable;  technically,  it  refers  to  private  judgment,  not  on  the  basis  of  al  qiyas, 
but  on  the  basis  of  public  good  or  the  interest  of  justice.  It  could  be  in  other 
words,  defined  as  "a  method  of  exercising  personal  opinion  in  order  to  avoid  any 
rigidity  and  unfairness  that  might  result  from  the  literal  enforcement  of  the 
existing  law.  "  123 
Jurists  who  follow  this  method  try  to  support  it  by  quoting  the  following  two 
verses  from  Quran.  Allah  says:  "Those  who  listen  to  the  word  and  follow  the  best 
thereof  those  are  (the  ones)  whom  Allah  has  guided  and  those  are  men  of 
122  ljtihad  means  here  that  he  will  apply  his  own  opinion  using  any  methods  accepted  by  Muslim 
jurists  including  qiyas. 
123  Karnali,  Principles  of  Islamic  Jurisprudence,  supra  note  68,  p.  246. Chapter  Four  204 
understanding.  "  And  also  when  He  said:  "And  follow  the  best  of  that  which  is 
sent  down  to  you  from  your  Lord,  before  the  torment  comes  on  you  suddenly 
while  you  perceive  not!  "124 
4.3.3.3.  Istislah  (Consideration  of  Public  Interest) 
Al  istihsan  and  al  istislah  have  a  close  relationship,  and  in  most  cases  are 
confused.  In  Arabic  maslaha  means  benefit  or  interest,  and  if  this  interest  is  not 
covered  by  any  text  in  Shariah  it  is  considered  as  mursala  or  unrestricted.  So 
maslaha  mursalah  may  be  defined  as  "unrestricted  public  interest  in  the  sense  of 
its  not  having  been  regulated  by  the  law  giver  insofar  as  no  textual  authority  can- 
be  found  on  its  validity  or  otherwise.  "  125  To  clarify  the  idea  of  this  method  two 
examples  will  be  given.  First,  in  the  event  of  war,  if  the  unbelievers  shield 
themselves  using  Muslim  prisoners  of  war,  then  maslaha  allows  the  killing  of 
these  prisoners  in  order  to  fight  the  unbelievers.  The  other  example  is  that 
although  it  is  not  specifically  required  in  Islamic  Shariah,  governments  require  for 
the  purpose  of  certainty  that  all  marriage  contracts  should  be  authenticated  and 
registered  by  a  qualified  public  officer  to  protect  husbands'  and  wives'  rights  and 
duties. 
4.3.3.4.  Istishab  (Presumption  of  Continuity) 
Al  istishab  is  more  a  rule  of  evidence  than  a  rule  of  substantive  Shariah. 
Literally  it  means  seeking  for  a  link  to  something  which  is  known  and  certain; 
124  Quran,  39:  18,55. 
123  Kamali,  Principles  of  Islamic  Jurisprudence,  supra  note  68,  p.  267;  Mahmassani,  The 
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technically,  it  refers  to  a  process  of  settling  juristic  rules  by  argument,  which 
means  the  attempt  to  link  up  a  later  set  of  circumstances  with  an  earlier  or 
conversely.  For  example,  on  account  of  the  long  absence  of  someone,  it  may  be 
doubtful  whether  he  is  alive  or  dead.  By  applying  the  method  of  istishab,  all  rules 
must  remain  in  force  which  would  hold  if  one  knew  for  certain  that  he  was  still 
alive.  Al  istishab  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  juristic  rules  applicable  to 
certain  conditions  remain  valid  so  long  as  it  is  not  certain  that  the  conditions  have 
altered.  '26 
4.3.4.  Specific  Sources  in  Islamic  International  Law 
In  addition  to  the  aforementioned  sources  of  Islamic  Shariah,  it  is  possible  to 
consider  the  following  methods  as  additional  secondary  means  of  Islamic 
international  law:  the  treaties  concluded  between  Muslims  and  non-Muslims;  the 
messages  of  the  Prophet  as  a  political  leader  of  the  Islamic  state  and  of  Muslim 
caliphs  to  the  leaders  of  other  countries  calling  them  to  Islam,  and  His  and  their 
instructions  to  the  Muslim  military  commanders;  and  history  and  the  book  of 
Siyar.  It  is  very  important  to  mention  here  that  all  treaties,  statements, 
declarations  and  instructions  could  be  treated  as  a  primary  source  if  they  were 
concluded  or  made  by  the  Prophet  himself  or  by  any  other  governor  during  His  life 
and  received  His  approval,  because  according  to  the  definition  of  the  Sunnah,  they 
would  be  defined  as  "the  Prophet's  acts,  sayings,  and  whatever  He  has  approved, 
plus  all  reports  which  described  His  physical  attributes  and  character.  "  However 
if  they  were  made  by  His  successors  they  must  treated  as  secondary  sources. 
126  Kamali,  Principles  of  Islamic  Jurisprudence,  supra  note  68,  p.  p.  297-298. Chapter  Four  206 
4.3.4.1.  International  Treaties 
Art.  2  of  the  Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties  of  1969  provides  that 
`treaty'  means  an  international  agreement  concluded  between  states  in  written 
form  and  governed  by  international  law"  which  thus  creates  legal  rights  and 
obligations  between  the  parties.  Long  before  this,  Muslims  recognised  treaties  as 
a  method  regulating  relations  between  parties  and  considered  them  binding.  127 
There  are  many  verses  in  the  Quran  concerning  treaties  with  non-Muslims.  Allah 
says  "How  can  there  be  a  covenant  with  Allah  and  with  His  Messenger  for  the 
Mushrikun  (polytheists)  except  those  with  whom  you  made  a  covenant  near  al 
Masjid  al  Haram  (the  Holy  Mosque  in  Mecca)?  So  long,  as  they  are  true  to  you, 
stand  you  true  to  them.  Verily,  Allah  loves  al  Muttaqun  (pious  and  righteous 
person).  "  128  Normally  the  caliph  or  his  representative  had  the  power  to  negotiate 
and  sign  treaties;  however,  in  the  event  of  war  or  under  any  special  authorisation, 
the  army  commander  could  conclude  treaties.  129 
During  the  lifetime  of  the  Prophet  many  treaties  were  concluded  between 
Muslims  and  non-Muslims  in  order  to  settle  some  political  conflicts  and  to 
establish  peaceful  relations  between  the  two  sides.  The  very  well  known  treaties 
that  were  concluded  between  the  Aws  and  Khazraj  (two  Jewish  tribes  of  Medina), 
127  El  Berri,  Zakaria,  Immunity  of  Members  of  Diplomatic  Missions  in  Islamic  Law,  41  Revue 
Egyptienne  (1985)  p.  p.  182-184. 
128  Quran,  9:  7;  also  when  Allah  said  in  another  verse  "and  fulfil  (every)  engagement,  for  every 
(covenant),  will  be  enquired  into  (on  the  Day  of  Reckoning).  "  Quran,  17:  34;  see  also 
Quran,  48:  10. 
129  al  Ghunaimi,  Muhammad  Tal'at,  Ahkam  a!  Mu'ahadat  fi  a!  Shariah  a!  Islamiyah,  (The 
Principles  of  Treaties  in  Islamic  Shariah),  Alexandria:  Munsha'at  al  Ma'arif,  [1977]  p.  56. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  al  Ghunaimi,  Treaties  in  Islamic  Shariah);  Khadduri,  War  and  Peace  in 
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and  the  treaty  of  al  Hudabiyyah  created  a  temporary  settlement  between  the 
Muslims  of  Medina  and  the  polytheists  of  Mecca  and  was  regarded  by  Muslim 
jurists  as  a  model  for  Muslims'  subsequent  treaties.  In  addition,  there  were  other 
treaties  concluded  with  Jews  and  Christians  in  residence  in  the  Muslim  state 
(Medina).  130 
Most  Muslim  jurists  admit  that  treaties  must  be  in  written  form.  Their  idea 
was  supported  by  the  practice  of  the  Prophet  who  wrote  down  all  the  treaties  He 
concluded,  and  according  to  the  commandment  of  Allah  when  He  said:  "0  you 
who  believe,  when  you  contract  a  debt  for  a  fixed  period,  write  it  down.  "  131. 
Others  said,  however,  that  the  writing,  signing  and  dating  of  a  treaty  are  not 
necessary,  and  treaties  create  rights  and  obligations  even  without  them,  because 
they  are  just  formalities  to  indicate  that  an  agreement  has  been  reached  between 
the  parties.  132  Ratification  as  a  procedure  to  bring  the  treaty  into  force  is  also 
recognised  by  Muslim  jurists,  whether  the  treaty  was  concluded  by  the  head  of  the 
state  or  his  representatives  or  by  any  of  the  army  commanders;  otherwise  the  treaty 
is  null  and  void.  History  has  recorded  that  the  Prophet  Himself  concluded  a  treaty 
under  the  condition  that  it  would  be  ratified  after  consulting  His  companions. 
Another  example  was  when  Khalid  ibn  al  Walid,  as  a  commander  of  the  Muslim 
army,  sent  a  letter  to  the  Prophet  asking  for  instructions  before  concluding  any 
130  Pirzada,  Syed  Sharifuddin,  Islam  and  International  Law,  in  A.  Gauhar  (ed.  )  The  Challenge  of 
Islam,  London:  Islamic  Council  of  Europe,  (1978)  p.  p.  210-211;  Khadduri,  War  and  Peace  in 
Islam,  supra  note  36,  p.  205. 
131  Quran,  2:  282. 
132  al  Ghunaimi,  Treaties  in  Islamic  Shariah,  supra  note  129,  p.  p.  68-70;  Khadduri,  War  and 
Peace  in  Islam,  supra  note  36,  p.  204. Chapter  Four  208 
treaty.  133  Once  the  treaty  enters  into  force,  it  becomes  binding  on  Muslim  leaders 
and  they  have  to  adhere  to  its  terms.  In  this  matter  Allah  Says:  "Except  those  of 
the  Mushrikun  with  whom  you  have  a  treaty,  and  who  have  not  subsequently 
failed  you  in  aught,  nor  have  supported  anyone  against  you.  So  fulfil  their  treaty 
to  them  to  the  end  of  their  term.  Surely  Allah  loves  the  pious.  "134 
The  1969  Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties  provides  that  good  faith 
and  pacta  sunt  servanda  are  universally  recognised.  135  This  provision  also  can  be 
found  in  the  Quran  and  Sunnah.  In  the  Quran  Allah  said:  "0,  you  who  believe 
fulfil  your  obligations.  "  136  In  Islamic  theory,  however,  Allah  deems  Himself  a- 
third  party  to  any  treaty  concluded  by  Muslims,  and  if  there  is  any  breach  of  treaty, 
it  will  be  a  great  and  unforgivable  sin.  Allah  says:  "And  fulfil  the  covenant  of 
Allah  when  you  have  covenanted,  and  break  not  the  oaths  after  you  have 
confirmed  them,  and  indeed  you  have  appointed  Allah  your  Surety,  Verily  Allah 
Knows  what  you  do".  137  In  the  Sunnah  the  Prophet  expressly  stated  that  "Be 
faithful  in  Keeping  your  contract  for  God  will  require  an  account  of  such  at  your 
hand.  " 
General  principles  of  Muslim  treaties:  These  were  brief  and  provided.  only 
general  rules.  The  preamble  opened  with  the  name  of  Allah,  and  was  followed  by 
the  names  of  the  parties  or  their  representatives.  Treaties  ended  with  the  names  of 
133  al  Ghunaimi,  Treaties  in  Islamic  Shariah,  supra  note  129,  p.  p.  59,64-65. 
134  Quran,  9:  4. 
135  The  preamble  provides  that:  "Noting  that  the  principles  of  free  consent  and  of  good  faith  and 
the  pacta  sunt  servanda  rule  are  universally  recognised";  also  Art.  26  provides  that:  "Every  treaty 
in  force  is  binding  upon  the  parties  to  it  and  must  be  performed  by  them  in  good  faith.  " 
136  Quran,  5:  1. 
137  Quran,  16:  91. Chapter  Four  209 
witnesses  and  the  signature  of  the  parties  and  witnesses.  The  contents  or  the  body 
of  the  treaty  which  outlined  the  purpose  of  the  treaty  should  be  set  forth  in  detail. 
The  duration  should  be  specified  and  if  a  period  was  not  mentioned,  the  duration 
of  treaty  according  to  some  jurists  should  not  exceed  a  period  of  ten  years  by 
analogy  with  the  duration  of  al  Hudabiyyah  treaty.  138 
4.3.4.2.  The  Prophet's  Instructions 
The  messages  of  the  Prophet  as  a  political  leader  and  the  Muslim  caliphs  to 
the  leaders  of  the  other  countries  calling  them  to  Islam,  and  His  and  their 
instructions  to  Muslim  military  commanders  are  another  important  source  in. 
Islamic  international  law.  139  Briefly,  the  instructions  given  to  Muslim 
commanders  relating  to  the  conduct  of  war  were  that  whenever  the  Prophet  sent 
any  sariyah  (detachment)  or  jaysh  (armed  force)  to  jihad  He  usually  commanded 
its  commander  personally  to  fear  Allah,  the  most  high,  and  to  enjoin  the  Muslims 
who  were  with  him  to  do  good.  Further,  the  fighting  was  to  be  in  the  name  of 
Allah  and  limited  to  those  who  do  not  believe  in  Allah  and  are  able  to  fight.  It  is 
prohibited  to  kill  children,  women,  and  aged  men  who  are  unable  to  fight.  The 
Muslim  commander  must  first  of  all  invite  the  enemies  to  convert  to  Islam, 
because  Allah  said:  "And  We  never  punish  until  We  have  sent  a  Messenger  (to 
give  warning)".  140  If  they  accept  his  invitation  he  must  leave  them  in  peace. 
138  Khadduri,  War  and  Peace  in  Islam,  supra  note  36,  p.  p.  218-220;  Sultan,  International  Law  in 
the  Islamic  Shariah,  supra  note  61,  p.  p.  206-211. 
139  Hamidullah,  Muslim  Conduct  of  State,  supra  note  30,  p.  33. 
140  Quran,  17:  15. Chapter  Four  210 
Otherwise  he  must  call  upon  them  to  pay  jizyah  (poll  tax)  and  if  they  refuse  he 
may  fight  them.  141 
4.3.4.3.  The  Siyar  book 
History  and  Siyar  books  are  also  considered  to  be  other  important  subsidiary 
sources  in  Islamic  international  law,  because  these  books  concern  the  interaction 
between  principles  and  facts  or  between  the  conception  and  application  of  Islamic 
international  law.  Islamic  Shariah  is  rich  in  such  books,  almost  all  jurists  in 
different  schools  have  discussed  the  Siyar  in  detail,  they  may  be  excellent 
references  to  be  used  in  modern  comparative  studies.  142 
4.4.  The  ACJ  and  the  Application  of  the  Islamic  Shariah 
In  Islam,  executing  the  Islamic  Shariah  within  the  territory  of  Dar  El  Islam  is 
considered  as  one  of  the  most  important  duties  that  the  caliph  has  to  fulfill. 
Muslims  must  obey  and  support  him  in  order  to  achieve  this  aim.  However,  if  the 
caliph,  for  any  reason  fails  to  do  so,  some  Muslim  jurists  such  as  al  Mawardi, 
argue  that  Muslims  are  entitled  to  dismiss  him  from  his  position.  143  This  means 
that  the  execution  of  the  Islamic  Shariah  is  a  divine  obligation  on  the  caliph  and  he 
has  no  choice,  religiously,  to  act  against  this  obligation. 
141  For  more  details  see  Khadduri,  The  Islamic  Law  of  Nation,  supra  note  33,  p.  p.  75-105;  and  his 
War  and  Peace  in  Islam,  supra  note  36,  p.  p.  94-101;  at  Mawardi,  Abut  Hassan,  al  Ahkam  as 
Sultaniyah,  (The  Laws  of  Islamic  Governance),  Asadullah  Yate  (trans.  ),  London:  Ta-Ha  Publishers 
Ltd.,  (1996)  p.  p.  60-61,75-79.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  at  Mawardi,  The  Laws  of  Islamic 
Governance);  Hamidullah,  The  International  Law  in  [slam,  supra  note  31,  p.  p.  10-11;  Muwatta' 
Imam  Malik,  supra  note  85,  p.  p.  296-298. 
142  Moinuddin,  The  Charter  of  the  Islamic  Conference,  supra  note  62,  p.  16. 
143  at  Mawardi,  The  Laws  of  Islamic  Governance,  supra  note  141,  p.  p.  27-29;  see  also  Khadduri, 
War  and  Peace  in  Islam,  supra  note  36,  p.  p.  10-13. Chapter  Four  211 
Since  the  creation  of  the  first  Islamic  State  in  Medina,  in  the  seventh  century, 
the  Islamic  Shariah  was  the  only  system  of  law  to  which  all  Muslims  had  recourse. 
However,  the  matter  changed  when  the  Ottoman  Empire  started  to  adopt  some 
French  codes  in  order  to  apply  them  within  its  territory,  such  as  for  example,  the 
Penal  code  1858,  the  code  of  Commercial  Procedure  1861,  and  the  code  of 
Maritime  Commerce  1863.144  The  breaking-up  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  after  the 
World  War  I,  had  the  result  that  the  Arab  and  the  Muslim  territories  which  were 
ruled  directly  or  indirectly  by  this  Empire,  became  subject  to  either  British  or 
French  protection  through  many  different  treaties.  Accordingly,  Muslims  and 
Arabs  were  subject  to  increasing  Western  influence  as  Britain  or  France  started  to 
introduce  their  own  legal  systems.  Therefore  the  legal  systems  of  the  Arab  states 
which  were  based  on  the  Islamic  Shariah  became  largely  secularised  by  the 
introduction  of  codes  based  either  on  French  or  British  law.  Only  in  matters 
related  to  personal  status  such  as  marriage,  divorce,  inheritance,  and  religious 
endowment  continued  to  be  regulated  by  the  principles  of  the  Islamic  Shariah.  145 
During  the  1950s  -1970s,  Arab  states  started  to  reiterate  that  principles  and 
rules  of  the  Islamic  Shariah  must  be  re-enforced  within  their  territories.  This  aim 
resulted  in  the  adoption  of  constitutional  provisions  that  provided  that  the  official 
religion  of  the  state  was  Islam  and  Islamic  Shariah  the  main  source  of  legislation, 
144  Abu-Talib,  Sufi  Husain,  Tatbeeq  al  Shariah  a!  Islamryah  fi  al  Bilad  a!  Arabyah,  (The 
Application  of  the  Islamic  Shariah  in  the  Arab  States),  4t'  edn.,  at  Qahirah:  Dar  at  Nahdah  al 
Arabiyah,  (1995)  p.  p.  3-5;  Anderson,  Norman  D.,  Islamic  Law  Today:  The  Background  to  Islamic 
Fundamentalism,  2  ALQ  (1987)  p.  p.  345;  also  see  Coulson,  N.  J.,  A  History  of  Islamic  Law, 
Edinburgh:  Edinburgh  University  Press,  (1999)  p.  p.  149-162;  Imber,  Colin,  Ebu's-su'ud  The 
Islamic  Legal  Tradition,  Edinburgh:  Edinburgh  University  Press,  (1997)  p.  p.  40-45. 
145  For  further  discussion  see  Brown,  Nathan  J.,  The  rule  of  law  in  the  Arab  World.  -  Courts  in 
Egypt  and  the  Gulf,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  (1997)  p.  p.  1-22. Chapter  Four  212 
and  that  any  encroachment  upon  was  to  be  penalised.  146  However,  this  did  not 
change  the  true  situation,  as  the  Islamic  Shariah  is  still  not  the  only  legal  system 
applying  within  the  Arab  states,  as  its  application  is  parallel  with  a  western 
influenced  secular  legal  system. 
To  return  to  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  regarding  the  application  of  the 
Islamic  Shariah,  it  appears  as  mentioned  above,  that  this  draft  Statute  is  based  on 
the  Statute  of  the  ICJ.  Particularly  regarding  the  applicable  law,  the  Arab 
draftsmen  have  followed  the  exact  formulation  of  Art.  38  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ, 
without  taking  into  consideration  any  suggestions  for  amending  or  rewording  this- 
Article.  From  a  close  reading  of  Art.  23  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  it  appears 
that  nothing  new  has  been  enumerated  except  the  addition  of  the  principles  of 
Islamic  Shariah  as  a  new  primary  source  to  be  applied  by  this  projected  Court.  It 
is  however  to  be  noted  that  nothing  in  the  present  draft  Statute  makes  clear  that  the 
Islamic  Shariah  is  considered  as  a  primary  source,  but  it  is  submitted  that  this 
Article  can  only  be  interpreted  as  designating  the  Islamic  Shariah  as  a  primary 
source  and  nothing  else,  because  its  inclusion  appears  in  the  first  paragraph  of  Art. 
23.  The  Article  provides: 
"1.  The  Court  shall  decide  cases  submitted  to  it  in  accordance  with 
the  Arab  League  Pact,  principles  of  international  law,  and  pursuant  to 
the  following  legal  sources: 
146  For  example  see  Art.  2  of  the  Kuwaiti  constitution  which  provides  that:  "The  religion  of  the 
State  is  Islam,  and  the  Islamic  Shariah  shall  be  a  main  source  of  legislation.  "  For  further 
discussion  see  al  Moqatei,  Mohammad,  Introducing  Islamic  Law  in  the  Arab  Gulf  States:  A  Case 
Study  of  Kuwait,  4  ALQ  (1989)  p.  p.  138-148;  also  see  AI-Sanhuri  and  Islamic  Law:  The  Place  and 
Significance  of  Islamic  Law  in  the  Life  of  `Abd  al  Razzaq  Ahmad  al-Sanhuri  Egyptian  Jurist  and 
Scholar  1895-2971,3  ALQ  (1988)  p.  p.  210-214. Chapter  Four 
A.  The  rules  approved  expressly  by  parties  to  a  dispute  and 
contained  in  bilateral  or  multilateral  treaties  signed  by  them;  '47 
B.  The  principles  and  provisions  of  Islamic  Shariah; 
C.  The  rules  of  international  custom; 
D.  The  established  general  principles  of  law. 
2.  The  Court  may  be  guided  by  the  judgments  of  other  Courts  and  the 
opinions  of  senior  Shariah  and  law  scholars  from  various  states. 
3.  The  Court  may  decide  a  case  ex  aequo  et  bono,  if  the  parties 
expressly  agree  thereto.  " 
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It  appears  that  the  draftsmen  did  not  specify  whether  Arab  custom  is  to  be 
followed  first  or  is  to  be  equal  in  application  to  the  rules  of  international  custom. 
Before  going  into  more  details  and  discussing  the  Islamic  Shariah  as  a  source 
to  be  applied  by  the  projected  ACJ,  it  is  important  to  distinguish  between  it  and 
another  proposed  regional  Court  which  is  to  decide  cases  in  the  light  of  provisions 
of  Islamic  Shariah.  This  other  court  is  the  projected  International  Islamic  Court  of 
Justice  (IICJ).  Regarding  Art.  27  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  IICJ  which  deals  with 
the  applicable  law,  it  appears  that  this  Article  contains  two  main  and  different 
categories  of  sources.  First,  Islamic  Shariah  is  the  only  primary  source  to  be 
applied  by  the  Court.  The  second  category  identifies  sources  other  than  Islamic 
Shariah  as  secondary  means.  These  are:  international  conventions;  international 
custom;  general  principles  of  law;  judgments  of  the  World  Court;  and  teachings  of 
publicists.  '48 
"'  I  use  the  term  `treaty'  instead  of  the  term  `convention'  in  my  translation  because  according  to 
Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties  which  was  concluded  on  22nd  May  1969  and  which 
entered  into  force  on  27th  January  1980,  `treaty'  means:  an  international  agreement  concluded 
between  states  in  written  form,  creating  legal  rights  and  obligations  between  the  parties. 
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It  reads  as  follows: 
"a.  A  Islamic  Shariah  shall  be  the  main  source  on  which  the  International  Islamic 
Court  of  Justice  shall  base  its  cases 
b.  The  Court  shall  be  guided  by  international  law,  bilateral  or  multilateral 
conventions,  international  practice  accepted  as  law,  general  principles  of  law, 
judgments  rendered  by  International  Court  and  the  teachings  of  the  most  highly 
qualified  publicists  of  the  various  states.  " Chapter  Four  214 
It  appears  that  the  two  proposed  Courts  refer  to  Islamic  Shariah  as  a  primary 
source.  However,  in  the  projected  IICJ  the  Islamic  Shariah  has  been  given 
superiority  in  application  as  the  only  primary  source.  The  other  sources  are 
considered  only  as  secondary  to  guide  the  Court  in  deciding  cases.  This  means  the 
IICJ  first  of  all  has  to  have  recourse  to  Islamic  Shariah  to  deduce  the  rule  to  be 
applied  in  the  case  and,  if  it  fails  to  find  any  rule,  it  has  then  the  power  to  refer  to 
the  other  secondary  sources,  provided  the  selected  rules  do  not  conflict  with  the 
fundamental  principles  of  Islamic  Shariah.  On  the  other  hand,  the  parties  to 
disputes  cannot  agree  between  themselves  to  exclude  the  application  of  Islamic 
Shariah  because  such  an  agreement  would  conflict  with  ordre  public'49  and  would 
breach  the  Statute  of  the  Court  according  to  the  explicit  wording  of  para.  (a)  of 
Art.  27.  Therefore,  if  such  any  agreement  were  made,  it  would  be  null  and  void. 
In  other  words,  if  the  parties  were  to  advise  the  Court  to  have  recourse  to  sources 
other  than  Islamic  Shariah,  while  there  may  be  a  rule  available  in  the  latter,  the 
Court  will  have  the  full  power  to  reject  the  request;  but  when  there  is  no  rule  that 
can  be  taken  from  Islamic  Shariah,  it  becomes  the  Court's  duty,  by  applying  its 
1°9  The  concept  of  ordre  public  was extensively  clarified  in  the  case  Concerning  the  Application  of 
the  Convention  of  1902  Governing  the  Guardianship  of  Infants,  (Netherlands  v.  Sweden), 
Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1958)  p.  55.  Judge  Badawi  made  clear  in  his  separate  opinion  in  this  case 
that  the  concept  of  laws  of  ordre  public  "is  a  common  one  in  private  international  law.  It  is 
universally  recognized  in  national  systems  of  conflicts  of  laws...  "  Ibid,  p.  74.  However,  Judge 
Moreno  Quintana  in  his  separate  opinion  gave  clear  definition  to  ordre  public  when  he  stated: 
"The  concept  of  ordre  public  which  is  so  clear  and  well  defined  in  the  legal  systems 
derived  from  the  so-called  continental  law  in  the  latin  countries,  does  not  seem 
always  to  be  understood  in  the  same  way  in  other  legal  system.  [then  he  added]  I 
understand  ordre  public  to  be  the  whole  body  of  laws  and  legal  instruments  whose 
principles  cannot  be  set  at  naught  either  by  special  conventions  or  by  a  conflicting 
foreign  law.  Its  provisions  have  retrospective  effect  and  definitively  acquired  rights 
cannot  be  invoked  against  it.  "  Ibid.,  105. Chapter  Four  215 
own  legal  reasoning  and  without  the  need  of  a  request  by  the  parties  to  the  dispute, 
to  deduce  which  source  is  to  be  used  in  such  a  situation.  Thus,  in  principle, 
superiority  was  given  to  Islamic  Shariah  in  the  draft  Statute  of  the  IICJ. 
These  considerations  cannot  be  found  in  Art.  23  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the 
ACJ,  because  this  Article  makes  the  application  of  Islamic  Shariah  equivalent  to 
the  other  sources,  without  giving  it,  at  least,  explicit  priority  in  application.  This 
means,  as  a  result  of  disappearance  of  the  superiority  of  the  Islamic  Shariah,  any 
agreement  between  parties  to  a  dispute  to  exclude  the  application  of  the  Islamic 
Shariah  in  their  case  must  be  taken  into  consideration  by  the  projected  ACJ,  and- 
will  not  be  in  conflict  with  order  public  or  breach  the  draft  Statute  of  the  Court 
(Art.  23).  On  the  other  hand,  Art.  23  does  not  seem  to  be  sufficiently  clear 
regarding  the  application  of  Islamic  Shariah,  because  it  does  not  mention  or  solve 
the  foreseeable  problem  that  may  arise  when  the  parties  agree  between  themselves 
to  apply  a  particular  source,  which  may  conflict  with  the  general  principles  of 
Islamic  Shariah.  Specifically,  some  delegations  proposed  to  add  another 
paragraph  to  this  Article  in  order  to  give  the  parties  to  disputes  the  power  to  agree 
among  themselves  on  the  legal  source  which  should  be  followed.  The  Lebanese 
delegation  proposed  the  following  paragraph  to  be  added  to  Art.  23.  This  proposal 
reads  as  follows:  '50 
"states  which  are  parties  to  the  disputes  may  within  the  provisions  of 
paragraph  one  of  this  article  agree  among  themselves  concerning  the 
legal  source  which  should  followed.  " 
150  See  Unpublished  Letter  of  the  Permanent  Mission  of  Lebanon  to  the  Arab  League,  Cairo, 
Doc.  10001/95/J,  date,  7/9/1995,  p.  4. Chapter  Four  216 
Giving  the  parties  to  a  dispute  the  power  to  agree  among  themselves  to  which 
legal  source  the  Court  must  have  recourse  is  a  positivistic  characteristic,  because 
every  rule  of  international  law  is  dependent  on  the  consent  of  states.  However  the 
problem  with  Islamic  Shariah  as  a  source  before  the  projected  ACJ  is  different, 
and  needs  a  special  solution,  because  it  must  be  clear  to  the  Court  and  parties 
when  and  how  principles  of  Islamic  Shariah  can  be  applied  in  a  case.  We  are  not 
submitting  that  superiority  should  be  conceded  to  Islamic  Shariah  in  the  draft 
Statute  of  the  ACJ  by  making  the  Islamic  Shariah  the  only  primary  source  as  the 
IICJ  draft  Statute.  Our  intention  is  simply  to  give  it  priority  in  application,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  to  avoid  applying  any  international  law  source  that  may  conflict 
with  its  principles,  on  the  other  hand,  because  if  the  question  of  priority  is  not 
solved,  a  legal  problem  will  arise  before  the  Court.  This  legal  problem  may  be 
termed  a  `conflict  of  evidences'.  In  Islamic  Shariah  a  conflict  of  evidences  occurs 
when  "each  of  two  evidences  of  equal  strength  requires  the  opposite  of  the  other, 
which  means  that  if  one  of  them  affirms  something,  the  other  would  negate  it  at 
the  same  time  and  place.  s151  An  example  would  be  conflicts  between  two  texts  of 
the  Quran  or  between  two  rulings  of  Hadiths.  There  is  no  problem  if  the  conflict 
arises  between  two  sources  of  unequal  strength,  because  simply  the  stronger  of  the 
two  evidences  would  then  have  priority  in  application,  for  example,  if  there  would 
be  a  conflict  between  the  text  of  the  Quran  and  a  ruling  of  Hadith  or  between  ijma 
(consensus)  and  qiyas  (analogy). 
151  Kamali,  Principles  of  Islamic  Jurisprudence,  supra  note  68,  p.  356;  at  Shawkani,  Irshad  a! 
Fuhul,  supra  note  79,  vol.  2,  p.  p.  371-372. Chapter  Four  217 
The  Arab  draftsmen  seem  to  have  made  a  considerable  mistake  when  drafting 
Art.  23.  No  distinction  has  been  made  between  principles  of  the  Islamic  Shariah 
and  its  sources,  unlike  Art.  38  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  which  states  that  "the 
Court,  whose  function  is  to  decide  in  accordance  with  international  law"  and  then 
enumerates  several  methods  to  be  applied  by  the  Court.  These  methods  are 
unanimously  accepted  by  international  lawyers  who  consider  them  as  sources  of 
international  law.  In  contrast,  the  Arab  draftsmen  have  stated  that  the  "Arab  Court 
of  Justice  shall  decide  cases  submitted  to  it  in  accordance  with  the  Arab  League 
Pact,  principles  of  international  law,  and  pursuant  to  the  following  sources:  ",  and 
then  principles  of  Islamic  Shariah  are  enumerated  on  the  same  level  with  the 
sources  of  international  law.  This  means  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  have  mixed  two 
different  points:  principles  of  Islamic  Shariah  and  its  sources  of  legislation  on  the 
one  hand,  and  Islamic  Shariah  as  a  divine  revelation  and  independent  legal  system 
capable  to  serve  as  international  law  on  the  other  hand.  152 
Lastly,  Art.  23  (3)  would  empower  the  projected  ACJ  to  decide  a  case  ex 
aequo  et  bono  in  any  dispute  if  the  parties  agree  thereto.  The  power  to  decide  a 
case  ex  aequo  et  bono  may  raise  another  question,  namely,  whether  it  would 
conflict  with  principles  of  the  Islamic  Shariah  or  not?  It  is  understood  that  when 
deciding  a  case  ex  aequo  et  bono  the  Court  is  requested  to  create  for  the  parties 
152  There  is  a  difference  between  the  term  "principle"  and  the  term  "source"  in  international  law. 
Cassese  argued  that  "principles  are  in  the  pinnacle  of  the  legal  system  and  are  intended  to  serve  as 
basic  guidelines  for  the  life  of  the  whole  community;  besides  imposing  general  duties  and 
obligations.  "  Cassese,  International  Law  in  a  Divided  World,  supra,  note  42,  p.  126.  On  another 
hand,  Corbett  argued  that:  "the  sources  of  international  law  would  thus  be  the  origins  of  the  rules 
which  go  to  make  up  the  system".  see  Corbett,  Sources  of  the  Law  of  Nations,  supra  note  6,  p.  23. Chapter  Four  218 
new  law  outside  the  existing  law.  153  This  would  potentially  place  the  concept  of 
ex  aequo  et  bono  in  a  situation  of  conflict  with  principles  of  the  Islamic  Shariah. 
In  Islam,  all  injunctions  are  derived  from  Allah  and  His  Prophet  through  the  Quran 
and  Sunnah,  and  every  rule  should  be  deduced  from  these  twofold  divine  sources 
through  ijtihad  (reasoning)  and  therefore,  no  rule  could  be  created  outside  these 
sources,  or  in  other  words,  not  related  to  these  two  sources.  That  is  why  the  idea 
of  ex  aequo  et  bono  is  excluded  from  the  draft  Statute  of  the  IICJ,  because  Islamic 
Shariah  is  considered  to  be  the  only  primary  source  to  be  applied  by  the  Court. 
Since  the  establishment  of  the  ICJ,  no  case  has  been  decided  ex  aequo  et- 
bono,  which  means  that  after  more  than  fifty  years  since  its  creation,  the  parties  to 
cases  are  still  not  satisfied  to  authorise  the  World  Court  to  apply  its  own  legal 
reasoning  outside  the  existing  law,  despite  the  fact  that  there  is  increasing 
reference  to  equity  in  the  judgments  of  the  World  Court,  which  means  that  the 
Court  has  accepted  equity  as  an  important  part  of  law,  especially  with  reference  to 
maritime  boundary  delimitation  cases.  154  The  importance  of.  equity  in 
international  law  raises  an  important  question  as  to  whether  it  could  be  in  conflict 
with  the  principles  of  Islamic  Shariah,  and  how  the  projected  ACJ  would  apply  it? 
157  Lauterpacht,  Administration  of  International  Justice,  supra  note  13,  p.  120. 
154  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  most  prominent  text  mentioning  equity  is  the  1982  Convention  on  the 
Law  of  the  Sea.  The  use  of  equity  appears  in  different  places  such  as  Arts.  69  (1);  70  (1);  74  (1); 
82  (4);  83  (1);  160  (2)  g;  161  (1)  e.  This  demonstrates  that  equity  has  become  an  important  part 
of  international  law.  For  more  details  see  Kwiatkowska,  Barbara,  The  ICJ  Doctrine  of  Equitable 
Principles  Applicable  to  Maritime  Boundary  Delimitation  and  its  Impact  on  the  International  Law 
of  the  Sea  in  Bloed,  A.,  &  Van  Dijk,  P.,  (eds)  Forty  Years  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice: 
jurisdiction,  equity  and  equality,  Utrecht:  Europa  Institute,  (1988)  p.  p.  121-158. Chapter  Four  219 
Some  Muslim  scholars  argue  that  equity  in  western  law  is  parallel  to  istihsan 
in  Islamic  Shariah.  The  two  terms  have  a  very  close  similarity  to  one  another  but 
are  not  the  same.  Without  going  into  too  much  detail  over  the  exact  meaning  of 
equity  in  Islam  and  the  West,  the  most  important  point  to  be  clarified  is  that  every 
system  has  its  own  notion  of  equity.  The  concept  of  equity  in  the  West  derives  its 
legitimacy  from  the  belief  in  natural  right  or  justice  beyond  positive  law,  or  as  a 
law  of  nature  superior  to  any  written  or  traditional  legal  rule.  155  This  notion  of 
equity  is  not  accepted  in  Islamic  theory,  because  Islamic  Shariah  excludes  all 
recourse  to  natural  law  which  is  not  based  in  divine  revelation,  and  istihsan 
(equity  in  Islamic  Shariah)  expresses  values  and  principles  from  Shariah.  156 
Kamali  has  made  clear  the  distinction  between  the  concept  of  equity  and  istihsan 
when  he  said: 
"Notwithstanding  their  different  approaches  to  the  question  of  right 
and  wrong,  for  example,  the  values  upheld  by  natural  law  and  the 
divine  law  of  Islam  are  substantially  concurrent.  Briefly,  both  assume 
that  right  and  wrong  are  not  a  matter  of  relative  convenience  for  the 
individuals,  but  derive  form  an  eternally  valid  standard  which  is 
ultimately  independent  of  human  cognizance  and  adherence.  But 
natural  law  differs  with  the  divine  law  in  its  assumption  that  right  and 
wrong  are  inherent  in  nature.  "157 
155  Natural  law  (jus  naturae,  jus  naturale)  "is  a  theory,  applied  alike  to  international  and  municipal 
law,  which  holds  that  the  rules  of  international  law  are  drown  from  the  moral  law  of  nature  which 
had  its  roots  in  human  reason,  and  which  could  therefore  be  discerned  without  any  knowledge  of 
positive  law.  "  John  P.  Grant,  Anthony  Parry,  and  Arthur  D.  Watts  (eds.  ),  Parry  and  Grant 
Encyclopaedic  Dictionary  of  international  Law,  London:  Oceana  Publications,  Inc.,  (1986)  p.  253; 
for  further  discussion  of  natural  law  see  Weinreb,  Lloyd  L.,  Natural  Law  and  Justice,  London: 
Harvard  University  Press,  (1987)  p.  p.  15-96. 
156  See  for  example,  Kunz,  Josef  L.,  Natural  Law  Thinking  in  the  Modern  Science  of  International 
Law,  55  AJIL  (1961)  p.  p.  951-958;  Makdisi,  Legal  Logic  and  Equity,  supra  note  118,  p.  p.  63-92; 
Cf.  North  Sea  Continental  Shelf  case,  (Federal  Republic  of  Germany/Denmark;  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany/Netherlands),  separate  opinion  of  judge  Ammoun,  !  CJ  Rep.,  (1969)  p.  p.  139-140. 
157  Karnali,  Principles  of  Islamic  Jurisprudence,  supra  note  68,  p.  245. Chapter  Four  220 
Accordingly,  if  the  projected  ACJ  is  from  the  beginning  requested  to  apply 
principles  of  Islamic  Shariah,  the  Court  has  to  have  recourse  only  to  the  principles 
and  sources  of  Islamic  Shariah,  and  to  disqualify  all  rules  including  equity  which 
conflict  with  Islamic  principles.  In  other  words,  it  is  unreasonable  to  apply 
principles  of  Islamic  Shariah  in  such  case,  and  at  the  same  time  apply  equity  in  its 
western  conception.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  Court  is  requested  to  apply 
principles  of  international  law,  there  will  be  no  need  to  decide  whether  equity  is  or 
is  not  in  conflict  with  principles  of  Islamic  Shariah. 
In  conclusion,  the  application  of  the  Islamic  Shariah  regarding  the  agreement. 
of  the  parties  can  be  summarised  in  the  following  points:  (1)  the  parties  to  the 
dispute  may  agree  to  apply  or  not  to  apply  the  Islamic  Shariah  which  is  possible 
according  to  our  interpretation  to  Art.  23;  (2)  the  parties  may  disagree  regarding 
the  application  of  the  Islamic  Shariah,  this  would  happen  when  state  A,  accepts 
the  application  of  the  Islamic  Shariah  while  state  B  rejects  that  application  and 
wishes  to  refer  to  an  international  law  source;  and  (3)  the  parties  to  the  dispute  do 
not  express  their  wish  clearly  regarding  the  application  of  the  Islamic  Shariah.  On 
these  three  possibilities,  it  is  submitted  that  the  ACJ  will  not  face  any  problem  if 
there  is  an  explicit  agreement  regarding  the  application  of  the  Islamic  Shariah  or 
excluding  its  application,  because  the  Court  in  this  case  has  to  follow  what  the 
parties  desire.  The  same  could  be  said  if  the  parties  do  not  expressly  agree  on  the 
applicable  law  leaving  the  matter  to  be  solved  by  the  ACJ.  The  only  legal 
problem  which  the  ACJ  may  be  expected  to  face  is  limited  to  the  case  if  the 
parties  are  in  disagreement  on  the  applicable  law  as  mentioned  in  point  (2)  above Chapter  Four  221 
or  if  the  parties  are  in  agreement  to  exclude  the  application  of  the  Islamic  Shariah 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  other  source  requested  by  the  parties  is  in  conflict  with 
the  Islamic  Shariah.  To  avoid  this  possibility,  it  would  be  necessary  to  redraft  Art. 
23  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  by  making  two  major  changes:  First,  sub 
paragraph  (B)  of  the  existing  Article  would  have  to  be  relocated  in  paragraph  1,  as 
follows: 
"1.  The  Court  shall  decide  cases  submitted  to  it  in  accordance  with 
the  Arab  League  Pact,  principles  of  international  law,  principles  of 
Islamic  Shariah,  and  pursuant  to  the  following  legal  sources: 
a.  The  rules  approved  expressly  by  parties  to  a  dispute  and  contained 
in  bilateral  or  multilateral  treaties  signed  by  them; 
b.  rules  of  international  custom; 
c.  established  general  principles  of  law.  " 
According  to  this  proposed  change  the  Court  would  have  to  take  into 
consideration  principles  of  Islamic  Shariah  in  all  cases  submitted  to  it.  Secondly, 
however,  a  new  Article  would  have  be  added  stipulating  that  any  rules  taken  from 
sources  other  than  Islamic  Shariah  must  at  least  not  conflict  with  its  principles. Chapter  Four 
Concluding  Remarks 
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1.  No  doubt  that  the  idea  of  the  establishment  of  the  ACJ  may  be  deemed  to 
be  a  very  positive  step  in  the  life  of  the  Arab  League.  Its  creation  will  assist  the 
adjudication  of  disputes  between  its  member  states  and  will  aid  to  strengthen  the 
ties  and  international  relations  in  the  Arab  world. 
2.  It  appears  that  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  particularly  regarding  the 
applicable  law,  is  based  on  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ.  The  inclusion  of  the  Islamic 
Shariah  as  a  primary  source  is  considered  as  the  only  addition  in  the  Statute  of  the- 
ACJ.  The  intention  of  the  draftsmen  regarding  the  Islamic  Shariah  refers  to  the 
branch  which  regulates  the  relations  of  a  Muslim  state  with  a  non-Muslim  state. 
As  such  it  is  Muslim  international  law. 
3.  Islamic  Shariah  as  a  divine  revelation  has  its  own  sources  of  legislation. 
They  differ  in  nature  and  a  concepts  from  those  of  international  law.  The 
draftsmen  have  not  paid  any  attention  to  the  superiority  of  Islamic  Shariah  as  an 
independent  and  divine  law,  and  also  have  not  given  any  priority  to  its  application 
before  the  Arab  Court.  This  means  that  the  member  states  of  the  Arab  League  are 
in  agreement  to  create  an  Arab  Court  applying  Islamic  Shariah  equally  with 
international  law. 
4.  Islamic  Shariah  is  flexible  enough  to  face  new  circumstances  arising  in  the 
international  relations  of  Muslim  states.  Ijtihad  (reasoning)  is  the  most 
appropriate  source  to  be  used  to  develop  principles  of  Islamic  Shariah  and  fill  the 
gaps  between  the  principles  of  Muslim  international  law  and  public  international Chapter  Four  223 
law.  The  ACJ,  depending  on  its  technical  quality,  is  expected  to  play  a  significant 
role  in  the  presentation,  application,  and  interpretation  of  the  general  rules  of 
Islamic  Shariah. 
The  next  chapter  discusses  the  most  important  part  in  the  draft  Statute  of  the 
ACJ,  namely  the  jurisdiction  of  this  Court.  The  Arab  states'  positions  since 
drafting  the  first  proposal  of  the  Court  until  the  present  draft  Statute  will  be 
outlined. Chapter  V 
Jurisdiction  of  the  Court 
Differences  between  Arab  states  on  the  meaning  and  scope  of  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  ACJ  have  caused  more  than  50  years  of  delay  in  creating  the  Court  within 
the  Arab  League  system.  After  all  that  delay  and  as  a  result  of  their  sensitivities  to 
their  sovereignty  and  independence,  they  have  preferred  to  create  at  the  end, 
comparable  with  the  PCIJ  and  its  successor  the  ICJ,  a  Court  with  only  optional 
jurisdiction.  This  was  affirmed  when  Sudan  asked  the  Secretary-General  of  the 
Arab  League  about  the  scope  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ACJ:  whether  it  was 
compulsory  or  optional.  The  response  of  the  Secretary-General  admitted  that  the 
ACJ  has  only  optional  jurisdiction.  ' 
The  importance  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ACJ  leads  us  to  discuss  it  in  four 
sections.  The  first  will  be  in  the  form  of  introductory  remarks  dealing  with 
specific  and  selected  points.  The  second  will  clarify  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ACJ 
ratione  personae  in  order  to  know  under  which  rules  of  international  law  will  it  be 
possible  to  appear  before  the  Court.  The  third  will  discuss  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
ACJ  ratione  materiae.  Lastly,  we  will  study  the  meaning  of  the  advisory 
jurisdiction  of  the  ACJ,  and  how  the  Court  will  practise  it  and  which  type  of  cases 
would  be  affected  by  it. 
1  Unpublished  Letter  of  the  Permanent  Mission  of  the  Republic  of  the  Sudan  to  the  Arab  League, 
Cairo,  Doc.  B/D/J/5/2B,  dated  17/6/1995,  p.  1;  Unpublished  Letter  of  the  Secretary-General, 
General  Department  of  Legal  Affairs,  Doc.  3/3697,  dated  11/7/1995. Chapter  Five  225 
5.1.  Introductory  Remarks 
In  this  section  four  main  points  will  be  discussed:  (1)  the  meaning  of  the 
term  jurisdiction,  (2)  the  difference  between  legal  and  political  disputes,  (3)  the 
concept  of  domestic  jurisdiction:  whether  the  ACJ  has  competence  to  deal  with 
disputes  relating  to  domestic  jurisdiction,  and  (4)  the  necessity  to  secure  consent 
by  states  to  accept  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  and  the  way  in  which  consent  is  to 
be  expressed. 
5.1.1.  The  Term  Jurisdiction 
As  Rosenne  has  pointed  out,  two  main  meanings  may  apply  to  the  term 
jurisdiction:  `mainline  jurisdiction'  and  `incidental  jurisdiction'.  `Mainline 
jurisdiction'  concerns  the  power  of  the  Court  to  deliver  a  binding  decision  in  any 
case  submitted  to  it.  `Incidental  jurisdiction',  refers  to  the  authority  of  the  Court 
to  discuss  any  matter  that  may  arise  before  it  when  dealing  with  a  case  such  as,  for 
example,  its  competence  to  decide  whether  a  particular  dispute  falls  under  its 
jurisdiction,  its  competence  to  consider  third  state  intervention  in  a  particular  case, 
its  competence  to  control  the  proceedings  and  in  general,  its  competence  to  decree 
provisional  measures  of  protection.  Moreover,  this  kind  of  jurisdiction  may  be 
invoked  even  after  the  delivery  of  a  judgment,  if  the  Court  is  requested  by  the 
parties  to  the  dispute  to  interpret  or  revise  its  judgment  under  certain 
circumstances.  2  Furthermore,  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  includes  competence  to 
enlarge  the  number  of  parties  to  a  given  case.  In  other  words,  the  Court  is  the  only 
2  Rosenne,  Shabtai,  The  World  Court:  What  it  is  and  how  it  works,  London:  Martinus  Nijhoff 
Publishers,  (1995)  p.  81.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Rosenne,  The  World  Court);  see  also  his  The  Law 
and  Practice  of  the  International  Court  1920-1996,  vol.  II,  The  Hague:  Martinus  Nijhoff 
Publishers,  (1997)  p.  p.  536-537,839-840.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice). Chapter  Five  226 
organ  which  can  decide  whether  a  particular  party  to  a  dispute  has  the  right  to 
appear  before  it.  3  This  idea  was  expounded  by  Daxner,  an  ad  hoc  judge  in  the 
Corfu  Channel  case,  when  he  said: 
"First,  I  must  point  out  that  it  is  necessary  to  make  a  clear  difference 
[sc.  distinction]  between  two  notions: 
1.  Ability  to  appear  before  the  Court; 
2.  Competence  of  the  Court. 
`Ability  to  appear  before  the  Court  depends  on  the  fulfilment  of  two 
conditions:  (a)  only  States  (Article  34  (1)  of  the  Statute)  and  not 
other  juridical  nor  physical  persons  may  appear  before  the  Court;  (b) 
such  States  must  be  parties  to  the  Statute,  i.  e.  must  accept  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Court.  ' 
`In  my  opinion,  the  word  "jurisdiction"  has  two  fundamental 
meanings  in  international  law.  This  word  is  used: 
(1)  to  recognize  the  Court  as  an  organ  instituted  for  the  purposejus 
dicere  and  in  order  to  acquire  the  ability  to  appear  before  it; 
(2)  to  determine  the  competence  of  the  Court,  i.  e.,  to  invest  the  Court 
with  the  right  to  solve  a  concrete  case.  " 
It  is  here  submitted  that  the  ACJ  will  face  a  great  challenge  as  soon  as  it  is 
created  when  the  scope  of  its  jurisdiction  is  disputed  by  the  parties.  The  Court 
should  then  strike  a  balance  between  two  main  points:  on  the  one  hand, 
interpreting  and  applying  the  law  correctly  in  order  to  reach  a  decision  acceptable 
to  the  parties,  and  on  the  other  hand,  defining  its  judicial  philosophy  for  itself  as 
an  Arab  Court  in  distinction  from  other  international  courts  or  tribunals.  If  the 
ACJ  fails  in  this  respect,  the  number  of  the  cases  submitted  to  it  will  be  decreased 
because  Arab  states  will  definitely  seek  recourse  to  the  ICJ  to  settle  their 
justiciable  disputes,  as  a  more  trusty  tribunal  than  the  ACJ. 
Fitzmaurice,  Gerald,  The  Law  and  Procedure  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  vol.  1, 
Cambridge:  Grotius  Publications  Limited,  (1986)  p.  110.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Fitzmaurice,  The 
Law  and  Procedure);  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  538.  Cf.  South  West 
Africa  case,  (Ethiopia  v.  South  Africa;  Liberia  v.  South  Africa),  Second  Phase,  Judgment,  ICJ 
Rep.,  (1966)  p.  29,  [para.  34];  Case  Concerning  Oil  Platforms,  (Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  v.  United 
States  of  America),  Preliminary  Objection,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1996)  p.  810,  [para.  16]. 
Corfu  Channel  case,  (United  Kingdom  v.  Albania),  dissenting  opinion,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1947-48) 
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5.1.2.  Difference  between  Legal  and  Political  Disputes 
The  practice  of  the  ICJ  shows  that  many  contentious  as  well  as  advisory 
proceedings  before  it  have  involved  also  political  issues,  for  example,  the 
Fisheries  Jurisdiction  case;  5  Nuclear  Tests  case;  6  Hostages  case;  Nicaraguan 
case;  8  the  Lockerbie  case;  9  the  Bosnia-Herzegovina  case;  10  as  contentious  cases; 
and  the  Legality  of  Nuclear  Weapons;  "  and  Threat  of  Nuclear  Weapons12  as 
advisory  opinions.  For  this  reason  a  discussion  and  clarification  of  contents  of  the 
two  terms  is  here  relevant. 
As  in  Art.  36  (2)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  Art.  22  (3)  of  the  draft  Statute  of 
the  ACJ  refers  to  the  term  `legal  disputes'  as  comprising  four  categories:  (1) 
interpretation  of  international  treaties;  (2)  the  existence  of  any  fact  which,  if 
established,  would  constitute  a  breach  of  an  international  obligation;  (3)  the 
determination  of  the  nature  or  extent  of  the  reparation  to  be  made  for  the  breach  of 
an  international  obligation;  (4)  any  question  of  international  law.  13  This  means 
S  Fisheries  Jurisdiction  case,  (Federal  Republic  of  Germany  v.  Iceland),  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep., 
(1973)  p.  49. 
6  Nuclear  Tests  case,  (Australia  v  France),  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1974)  p.  253;  also  see  Nuclear 
Tests  case,  (New  Zealand  v.  France),  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1974)  p.  457. 
7  United  States  Diplomatic  and  Consular  Staff  in  Tehran,  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1980)  p.  3. 
a  Military  and  Paramilitary  Activities  in  and  Against  Nicaragua,  (Nicaragua  v.  United  States  of 
America),  Merits,  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1986)  p.  14. 
9  Questions  of  Interpretation  and  Application  of  the  1971  Montreal  Convention  Arising  from  the 
Aerial  Incident  at  Lockerbie,  (Libyan  Arab  Jamahiriya  v.  United  Kingdom),  Provisional  Measures, 
Order,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1992)  p.  3;  and  Question  of  Interpretation  and  Application  of  the  1971 
Montreal  Convention  Arising  from  the  Aerial  Incident  at  Lockerbie,  (Libyan  Arab  Jamahiriya  v. 
United  States  of  America),  Provisional  Measures,  Order,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1992)  p.  114. 
10  Application  of  the  Convention  on  the  Prevention  of  the  Crime  of  Genocide  case,  (Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  v.  Yugoslavia  (Serbia  and  Montenegro)),  Request  for  the  Indication  of  Provisional 
Measures,  Order,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1993)  p.  3. 
11  Legality  of  the  Use  by  a  State  of  Nuclear  Weapons  in  Armed  Conflict,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1996)  p.  66. 
12  Legality  of  the  Threat  or  Use  of  Nuclear  Weapons,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1996)  p.  226. 
13  The  same  list  appears  in  Art.  25  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  IICJ. Chapter  Five  228 
that  the  four  classes  mentioned  in  both  Statutes  should  be  treated  as  representative 
of  classes  of  legal  disputes.  14  However,  they  do  not  clarify  the  distinction  between 
political  and  legal  disputes.  15  The  two  Articles  only  make  it  clear  that,  any  dispute 
that  falls  within  one  or  any  of  these  four  categories  should  be  considered  as  having 
a  legal  character  and  ipso  facto  fall  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Courts  (the  ICJ 
or  the  ACJ).  16 
It  is  difficult  to  define  clearly  the  terms  legal  and  political  dispute  because 
such  definitions  depend  on  how  the  nature  of  international  law  is  understood.  '7 
One  may  ask  what  the  difference  between  a  legal  and  political  dispute  is,  and  how- 
the  ACJ  shall  deal  with  it  when  a  problem  arises.  It  could  be  said  that  a  legal 
dispute  would  be  a  dispute  based  on  law,  whereas  a  political  dispute  would  not  be 
necessarily  based  on  law.  In  other  words,  the  classical  distinction  between  legal 
and  political  disputes  is  normally  based  on  the  law  applied  by  the  Court  whether  in 
the  case  of  the  ICJ  or  the  projected  ACJ.  Legal  disputes  would  be  disputes  where 
the  Court  would  find  a  legal  basis  for  its  judgment,  i.  e.  applying  principles  and 
rules  of  international  law.  The  political  dispute,  on  the  other  hand,  would  suggest 
14  Williams,  John  Fischer,  The  Optional  Clause,  XI  BYbIL  (1930)  p.  68;  Hudson,  Manley  0., 
International  Tribunals:  Past  and  Future,  Washington:  Brookings  Institution,  (1944)  p.  242;  and 
his  The  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice  1920-1942:  A  Treatise,  New  York:  Macmillan 
Company,  (1943)  p.  p.  454-460.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Hudson,  The  Permanent  Court). 
15  Higgins,  Rosalyn,  Policy  Considerations  and  the  International  Judicial  Process,  17  ICLQ  (1968) 
p.  65.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Higgins,  The  International  Judicial  Process). 
16  See  dissenting  opinion  of  judge  Oda  in  Case  Concerning  Military  and  Paramilitary  Activities  in 
and  Against  Nicaragua,  (Nicaragua  v.  United  States  of  America),  Merits,  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep., 
(1986)  p.  p.  220-236;  Hudson,  The  Permanent  Court,  supra  note  14,  p.  545;  Rosenne,  The  Law 
and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  742;  Foda,  Ezzeldin,  The  Projected  Arab  Court  of  Justice:  a  study 
in  regional  jurisdiction  with  specific  reference  to  the  Muslim  law  of  nations,  The  Hague:  Martinus 
Nijhoff,  (1957)  p.  197.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Foda,  The  Projected  Arab  Court). 
1'  Higgins,  The  International  Judicial  Process,  supra  note  15,  p.  p.  74,83;  see  also  Gordon, 
Edward,  Legal  Disputes  Under  Article  36  (2)  of  the  Statute,  in  Lori  F.  Damrosch  (ed.  ),  The 
International  Court  of  Justice  At  a  Crossroads,  New  York:  Transnational  Publishers,  Inc.,  (1987) 
p.  183.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Gordon,  Legal  Disputes). Chapter  Five  229 
a  solution  where  no  law  would  apply.  18  For  this  reason,  it  would  be  possible  for 
the  Court  to  decide  a  political  dispute  ex  aequo  et  bono,  with  the  agreement  of  the 
parties  agree  thereto.  Hambro  has  argued  on  this  point: 
"It  seems  clear  that  the  Court  would  not  be  competent  to  treat  political 
problems  except  in  order  to  give  a  judgment  ex  aequo  et  Bono  when 
the  parties  request  it  to  do  so.  "19 
When  a  dispute  is  submitted  to  the  ACJ  it  will  be  then  its  duty  to  decide 
whether  the  dispute  is  political  or  legal.  The  practice  of  the  ICJ  admits  this;  in  the 
Customs  Regime  case,  seven  judges  submitted  a  joint  opinion  stating:  20 
"the  Court  is  not  concerned  with  political  considerations  nor  with 
political  consequences.  These  lie  outside  its  competence.  The 
Council  has  asked  for  the  opinion  of  the  Court  on  a  legal  question. 
This  is  in  effect  whether  the  proposals  embodied  in  the  Vienna 
Protocol  are  or  are  not  compatible  with  the  obligations  assumed  by 
Austria  in  the  two  other  international  instruments  referred  to  in  the 
question.  That  question  is  purely  legal  in  the  sense  that  it  is 
concerned  with  the  interpretation  of  treaties.  " 
One  may  ask,  what  about  disputes  which  may  be  based  on  facts?  Are  such 
disputes  considered  to  be  legal?  It  could  be  said  that  if  facts  are  used  as  a  basis  for 
the  settlement  of  a  dispute,  these  will  necessarily  have  legal  consequences  for  a 
18  See  Free  Zones  of  Upper  Savoy  and  the  District  of  Ger,  Order  of  6  December  1930,  PCIJ 
(1930)  Ser.  A,  No.  24,  p.  p.  37-43;  Hudson,  The  Permanent  Court,  supra  note  14,  p.  455;  for 
further  details  see  Jennings,  Robert  Y.,  The  Proper  Work  and  Purposes  of  the  International  Court 
of  Justice,  in  A.  S.  Muller,  D.  Raid  and  J.  M.  Thuranszky  (eds.  ),  The  International  Court  of 
Justice:  Its  Future  Role  After  Fifty  Years,  The  Hague:  Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers,  (1997) 
p.  p.  38-39;  and  Adede,  Andronico  0.,  Judicial  Settlement  in  Perspective,  in  A.  S.  Muller,  D.  Raid 
and  J.  M.  Thuranszky  (eds.  ),  The  International  Court  of  Justice:  Its  Future  Role  After  Fifty  Years, 
The  Hague:  Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers,  (1997)  p.  50. 
19  Hambro,  Edvard,  The  Jurisdiction  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  76  Recueil  Des  Cours, 
(1950)  p.  171.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Hambro,  The  Jurisdiction  of  the  ICJ).  similarly,  Rosenne 
argued  in  his  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  588,  that: 
"if  the  parties  agree  to  the  dispute  being  decided  according  to  some  other  criterion 
than  `international  law'  which  is  the  normal  discipline  for  deciding  disputes,  but  by  a 
process  which  retains  the  essential  features  of  the  international  judicial  technique  as 
applied  in  contentious  cases,  the  Court  has  the  power  to  act.  " 
20  Customs  Regime  between  Germany  and  Austria,  Advisory  Opinion,  PCIJ  (1931)  Ser.  A/B, 
No.  41,  p.  75. Chapter  Five  230 
state  party  to  the  dispute.  Usually,  a  fact-based  dispute  would  have  such  an  a 
priori  characteristic,  and  the  Court  would  have  to  evaluate  the  facts  as  well  as  their 
legal  consequences.  The  PCIJ,  in  the  Mavrommatis  case,  was  aware  of  such  a 
distinction,  and  declared  that: 
"A  dispute  is  a  disagreement  on  a  point  of  law  or  fact,  a  conflict  of 
legal  views  or  of  interests  between  two  persons.  "  21 
Art.  22  (1)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  provides  that  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
ACJ  can  include  those  disputes  that  states  parties  agree  to  submit  to  the  Court. 
Therefore,  what  could  restrain  parties  from  submitting  a  case  not  based  on  the  law 
to  the  Court?  An  inherent  inconsistency  in  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  appears, 
on  the  one  hand,  to  be  the  statement  that  states  can  create  through  their  will  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  but  that,  on  the  other  hand,  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court 
is  limited  by  treaties  or  convention  just  to  legal  disputes.  22  It  is  submitted  here 
that  it  would  have  to  apply  a  wide  interpretation  to  this  Article,  and  include 
political  disputes  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  arguing  that  it  should  be  the 
agreement  of  the  states  which  should  determine  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court. 
Such  an  interpretation  would  be  refuted,  however,  by  the  practice  of  the  ICJ. 
The  Asylum  case  is  a  good  example  which  supports  thus  point.  On  October 
3`d  a  military  rebellion  broke  out  in  Peru.  It  was  suppressed  on  the  same  day  and 
investigations  were  at  once  opened.  Paul  Haya  de  la  Torre,  escaped  and  political 
21  Mavrommatis  Palestine  Concessions  case,  Judgment,  PCIJ,  (1924)  Ser.  A,  No.  2,  p.  11; 
similarly  Hambro  affirmed  this  idea  by  stating  that:  "cases  of  law  also  imply  questions  of  fact  and 
it  is  obviously  true  that  the  Court  will  have  to  settle  matters  of  fact.  "  See  his  The  Jurisdiction  of 
the  ICJ,  supra  note  19,  p.  165. 
22  Ben  Miled  Hela,  La  Competence  de  la  Cour  Arabe  de  Justice:  Se/on  L'Avant-Projet  de  Statut, 
(The  Competence  of  the  Arab  Court  of  Justice:  According  to  the  Draft  Statute),  Tunisia:  Memoire 
Pour  la  D.  E.  A.  de  Droit  International  Public,  (1982)  p.  47.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Ben  Miled,  The 
Competence  of  the  ACJ). Chapter  Five  231 
asylum  was  granted  to  him  by  the  Colombian  embassy  in  Lima,  but  the 
Colombian  government  quickly  disagreed  with  Peru.  Columbia  actually  wanted  a 
safe-conduct  for  the  man  they  qualified  as  a  political  refugee,  and  faced 
disagreement  with  Peru.  The  first  decision  was  taken  by  the  ICJ  in  this  case 
according  to  an  agreement  called  the  "Act  of  Lima",  which  had  been  signed  at 
Lima  in  the  name  of  the  Colombian  Government  and  of  the  Peruvian  Government 
to  deal  with  irregularities  in  political  asylum.  23  This  decision  did  not  satisfy  the 
Colombian  government  which  decided  to  submit  the  case  again,  arguing  that  the 
decision  of  the  Court  should  have  taken  due  regard  to  the  friendship  protocol 
signed  by  the  two  states  in  1934.24  In  the  decision  delivered  on  June,  131h  1951, 
the  ICJ  noted  that  the  parties  asked  the  Court  to  choose  between  the  different  ways 
in  which  an  asylum  could  end.  Such  choice  should  not  be  based  on  legal 
considerations,  but  on  political  matters  or  political  opportunities:  25 
"A  choice  amongst  them  could  not  be  based  on  legal  considerations, 
but  only  on  considerations  of  practicability  or  of  political  expediency; 
it  is  not  part  of  the  Court's  judicial  function  to  take  such  a  choice.  " 
The  Court  did  not  want  to  give  any  advice  because  this  lay  outside  its  legal 
function.  Therefore,  it  limited  itself,  despite  the  will  of  the  parties,  to  just  defining 
the  legal  relations  between  the  parties.  26 
When  considering  a  similar  situation  in  the  ACJ,  we  might  ask  ourselves 
whether  an  Arab  judge  would  be  justified  in  reserving  to  himself  the  right  to 
include  political  disputes  in  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court.  We  cannot  predict  the 
23  Asylum  case,  (Colombia/Peru),  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1950)  p.  p.  226-227,272-273. 
24  Haya  de  la  Torre  case,  (Colombia  v.  Peru),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1951)  p.  p.  71-72. 
25  Ibid.,  p.  79. 
26  Ibid.,  p.  p.  82-83. Chapter  Five  232 
future,  the  only  thing  we  can  do  is  to  wait  till  the  creation  of  the  ACJ  and  see  how 
Arab  judges  will  deal  with  matters  concerning  legal  and  political  disputes.  The 
only  thing  we  can  say  is  that  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  grants  Arab  judges  the 
same  competence  as  judges  of  the  ICJ  to  decide  a  case  ex  aequo  et  bono  if  the 
parties  so  agree.  This  means  the  judges  have  the  right  to  decide  a  political  dispute 
in  the  absence  of  applicable  law. 
5.1.3.  The  Concept  of  Domestic  Jurisdiction 
Normally  when  a  state  desires  to  challenge  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ICJ,  it  can 
plead  that  the  dispute  submitted  to  the  Court  falls  under  that  state's  domestic- 
jurisdiction  and  can  thus  claim  that  the  Court  is  incompetent  to  act.  Mostly,  when 
disputes  are  related  to  matters  falling  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  a  state, 
they  are  excluded  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ICJ  as  they  were  from  its 
predecessor  the  PCIJ.  27  This  point  is  an  important  topic  which  deserves 
discussion  in  order  to  uncover  the  genuine  meaning  of  the  term  domestic 
jurisdiction  and  how  it  relates  to  the  jurisprudence  of  the  present  World  Court,  the 
ICJ. 
27  It  is  to  be  noted  that  there  were  many  cases  brought  before  the  PCIJ  or  ICJ  where  domestic 
jurisdiction  was claimed  by  states  concerned  in  order  to  prevent  the  Court  to  decide  that  case.  For 
example,  Nationality  Decrees  Issued  in  Tunis  and  Morocco,  Advisory  Opinion,  PCIJ  (1923)  Ser. 
B,  No.  4;  Exchange  of  Greek  and  Turkish  Populations,  Advisory  Opinion,  PCIJ  (1925)  Ser.  B, 
No.  10;  Treatment  of  Polish  Nationals  and  Other  Persons  of  Polish  Origin  or  Speech  in  the 
Danzig  Territory,  Advisory  Opinion,  PCIJ  (1932)  Ser.  A/B,  No.  44;  Losinger  case,  Order  of  27 
June  1936,  PCIJ  (1936)  Ser.  A/B,  No.  67;  Electricity  Company  of  Sofia  and  Bulgaria  case, 
Judgment,  PCIJ  (1939)  Ser.  A/B,  No.  77;  Interpretation  of  Peace  Treaties  with  Bulgaria, 
Hungary  and  Romania  case,  First  Phase,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1950)  p.  p.  65,70-71;  Anglo-Iranian  Oil 
Company,  (United  States  of  America  v.  Iran),  Preliminary  Objection,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1952)  p.  93; 
Certain  Norwegian  Loans  case,  (France  v.  Norway),  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1957)  p.  9;  Right  of 
Passage  over  Indian  Territory,  (Portugal  v.  India),  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1957)  p.  125; 
Interhandel  case,  (Switzerland  v.  United  States  of  America),  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1959)  p.  6; 
Aerial  Incident  of  27  July  1955,  (Israel  v.  Bulgaria),  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1959)  p.  127. Chapter  Five  233 
The  term  domestic  jurisdiction  appeared  first  in  Art.  15  (8),  of  the  Covenant 
of  the  League  of  Nations  and  then  in  Art.  2  (7),  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN  which 
adopted  the  same  notion  with  some  minor  changes.  28  According  to  Art.  2  (7)  of 
the  UN  Charter,  domestic  jurisdiction-concerns  the  sovereignty  of  a  state,  legally 
protected  from  any  intervention,  when  a  given  state  exercises  its  authority  over  its 
national  affairs  within  its  territorial  frontiers.  29  This  does  not  mean  however,  that 
a  state  has  under  international  law  a  sovereign  right  to  exercise  jurisdiction  in 
whatever  circumstances  it  chooses,  because  practising  sovereign  rights  without 
any  limitations  or  control  may  affect  the  rights  of  other  states.  30 
Domestic  jurisdiction  thus  relates  to  those  matters  which  international  law 
has  left  for  internal  regulation  by  a  state.  31  Although  the  Norwegian  Loans  case  is 
not  the  best  example  to  be  mentioned  here  because  it  involved  a  self  judging 
reservation,  however,  it  can  be  cited  merely  to  clarify  that  the  Court  can  exclude  a 
28  Art.  15  (8)  on  the  one  hand,  provides  that:  "if  the  disputes  between  the  parties  is  claimed  by  one 
of  them,  and  is  found  by  the  Council  to  arise  out  of  a  matter  which  by  international  law  is  solely 
within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  that  party,  the  Council  shall  so  report,  and  shall  make  no 
recommendation  as  to  its  settlement.  "  Art.  2  (7)  on  the  other  hand,  provides  that:  "Nothing 
contained  in  the  present  Charter  shall  authorize  the  United  Nations  to  intervene  in  matters  which 
are  essentially  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  any  State  or  shall  require  the  Members  to  submit 
such  matters  to  settlement  under  the  present  Charter.  "  For  further  details  about  the  historical 
background  of  these  two  Articles  see  UNCIO,  vol.  3,  (1945)  p.  14;  also  see  Simma,  Bruno,  The 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations,  (a  commentary),  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  (1995)  p.  142. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  Simma,  The  Charter  of  the  United  Nations);  and  Brierly,  J.  L.,  Matters  of 
Domestic  Jurisdiction,  VI  BYbIL  (1925)  p.  p.  8-10. 
29  Shaw,  Malcolm  N.,  International  Law,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  (1997)  p.  454. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  Shaw,  International  Law);  Brownlie,  Ian,  Principles  of  Public  International 
Law,  Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  (1996)  p.  293.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Brownlie,  Public 
International  Law);  Simma,  The  Charter  of  the  United  Nations,  supra  note  28,  p.  76. 
30  Robert  Jennings  &  Arthur  Watt  (eds.  ),  Oppenheim's  International  Law,  vol.  1,  London: 
Longman,  (1996)  p.  457.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Oppenheim's  International  Law). 
31  Waldock,  Humphrey,  The  Plea  of  Domestic  Jurisdiction  before  International  Legal  Tribunals, 
XXX  BYbIL  (1954)  p.  p.  97-98;  Kelsen,  Hans,  Compulsory  Adjudication  of  International  Disputes, 
37  AJIL  (1943)  p.  405;  Arangio-Ruiz,  Gaetano,  The  Plea  of  Domestic  Jurisdiction  before  the 
International  Court  of  Justice:  Substance  or  Procedure?,  in  Vaughan  Lowe,  and  Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice  (eds.  ),  Fifty  Years  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice:  Essays  in  honour  of  Sir 
Robert  Jennings,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  (1996)  p.  p.  454-455. Chapter  Five  234 
dispute  falling  under  national  law  and  thus  considers  disputes  that  are  related  to 
international  law.  In  this  case  the  ICJ  excluded  the  dispute,  as  falling  under  the 
national  law  of  Norway,  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court.  This  gives  a  clear 
indication  that  any  dispute  not  related  to  international  law  but  related  to  national 
law  should  be  excluded  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  32  but  when  the  Court 
finds  that  a  particular  part  of  a  dispute  falls  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  a 
state,  the  Court  will  not  be  prevented  form  deciding  the  rest  of  the  case  if  other 
conditions  exist.  In  such  a  case  the  Court  will  exclude  only  that  part  of  dispute 
which  falls  under  the  domestic  jurisdiction  and  decide  the  remaining  part  as 
falling  under  its  jurisdiction.  This  may  happen  if  a  dispute  includes  matters 
related  to  the  value,  validity,  interpretation  or  application  of  an  international 
treaty.  33  Furthermore,  when  a  state  claims  that  a  dispute  falls  under  its  domestic 
jurisdiction,  this  does  not  mean  the  Court  has  to  terminate  the  proceedings  and 
decide  that  it  has  no  right  to  continue  considering  the  case.  It  is  the  duty  of  the 
Court  to  discuss  the  matter  in  depth  and  then  decide  either  the  dispute  falls  within 
its  jurisdiction  or  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  a  state.  In  the  Interpretation 
of  Peace  Treaties  case,  the  ICJ  decided:  34 
"The  interpretation  of  the  terms  of  a  treaty  for  this  purpose  could  not 
be  considered  as  a  question  essentially  within  the  domestic 
jurisdiction  of  a  State.  It  is  a  question  of  international  law  which,  by 
its  very  nature,  lies  within  the  competence  of  the  Court.  " 
32  Certain  Norwegian  Loans,  (France  v.  Norway),  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1957)  p.  p.  36-37;  also 
see  Fitzmaurice,  The  Law  and  Procedure,  supra  note  3,  p.  p.  104-106. 
33  See  for  example,  Nationality  Decrees  Issued  in  Tunis  and  Morocco,  Advisory  Opinion,  PCIJ 
(1923)  Ser.  B,  No.  4,  p.  p.  28,29,30,31;  Interpretation  of  Peace  Treaties  with  Bulgaria,  Hungary 
and  Romania  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1950)  p.  70. 
34  Interpretation  of  Peace  Treaties,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1950)  p.  70. Chapter  Five  235 
Despite  the  great  importance  of  the  subject  of  domestic  jurisdiction,  no 
provision  dealing  with  it  is  found  in  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  or  in  the  draft 
Statute  of  the  ACJ.  Consequently,  it  might  be  desirable  to  include  this 
fundamental  point  in  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  by  adding  a  new  Article  dealing 
with  it  or  including  it  in  the  draft  Statute,  in  order  to  make  clear  that  the  power  of 
the  ACJ  in  deciding  a  dispute  does  not  encroach  upon  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of 
states  parties  to  a  case.  35  Arab  states  are  very  sensitive  in  matters  relating  to 
domestic  jurisdiction,  especially  with  respect  to  matters  which  affect  their 
independence,  sovereignty  or  territorial  integrity.  So  it  might  be  desirable  to 
prevent  Arab  states  as  parties  to  the  Statute  of  the  ACJ  from  determining 
themselves  whether  or  not  a  matter  falls  within  their  domestic  jurisdiction.  The 
Court  itself  should  tackle  this  matter  explicitly  with  reference  to  its  Statute.  36 
Furthermore,  if  cases  are  frequently  submitted  to  the  ACJ,  Arab  states  must  be 
made  to  abstain  from  making  any  self  judging  reservations  to  the  determination  of 
matters  which  are  essentially  within  their  domestic  jurisdiction,  because  such 
reservations  might  result  in  refusal  to  submit  a  particular  case  to  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Court  on  the  basis  that  the  dispute  is  claimed  to  fall  within  the  domestic 
jurisdiction  of  a  state.  37 
ss  Art.  22  (4)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  provides  that:  "The  Court  shall  decide  in  any  dispute 
regarding  its  jurisdiction",  but  we  do  not  think  this  is  enough  to  solve  any  problem  which  may 
appear  in  the  future  regarding  domestic  jurisdiction. 
36  Foda,  The  Projected  Arab  Court,  supra  note  16,  p.  199. 
31  Ibid.,  p.  200. Chapter  Five  236 
5.1.4.  Necessary  Consent  of  States 
Unlike  national  courts,  international  courts,  including  the  ACJ,  are  competent 
to  consider  only  cases  which  are  submitted  to  them  by  the  consent  of  the  parties 
for  settlement.  In  other  words,  no  dispute  can  be  settled  by  the  ACJ  without  the 
consent  of  the  parties.  Accordingly,  when  the  matter  of  consent  is  disputed  by  one 
state  party  to  the  case,  the  Court  would  then  have  to  examine  the  matter,  and  if  it 
is  satisfied  that  consent  is  not  available,  it  would  then  decide  that  it  has  no 
jurisdiction.  38  This  principle  is  confirmed  by  international  practice.  In  the  Corfu 
Channel  case  the  ICJ  affirmed  the  necessity  of  consent  by  the  parties  in  the  dispute 
and  treated  it  as  the  basis  of  its  jurisdiction: 
"Under  the  regime  of  the  Charter,  the  rule  holds  good  that  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  as  of  the  Permanent 
Court  of  International  Justice  before  it,  depends  on  the  consent  of  the 
States  parties  to  a  dispute.  "  39 
Once  the  consent  is  given  by  a  state,  it  has  no  right  to  withdraw  it  while  the 
case  is  pending,  especially  if  the  other  state  has  acted  in  reliance  on  that  consent  . 
40 
One  may  then  ask,  whether  the  consent  of  a  state  is  required  in  contentious  cases 
only  or  equally  in  advisory  cases.  The  Peace  Treaties  case  gives  us  the  answer  to 
]B  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note,  2,  p.  583;  Shahabuddeen,  Mohamed,  The 
International  Court  of  Justice:  The  Integrity  of  an  Idea,  19  CLB  (1993)  p.  p.  739-740;  Fachiri, 
Alexander,  P.,  The  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice:  Its  Constitution,  Procedure  and 
6Vork,  Germany:  Fotokop  Wilhelm  Weihert  KG,  (1980)  p.  70.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Fachiri,  The 
Permanent  Court  of  Justice). 
39  Corfu  Channel  case,  (United  Kingdom  v.  Albania),  Preliminary  Objections,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1947-48) 
p.  31;  similarly  see  Status  of  Eastern  Carelia  case,  Advisory  Opinion,  PCIJ  (1923)  Ser.  B,  No.  5, 
p.  27;  and  Rights  of  Minorities  in  Upper  Silesia  (Minority  Schools),  Judgment,  PCIJ  (1928)  Ser. 
A,  No.  15,  p.  22;  also  see  Ambatielos  case,  (Greece  v.  United  Kingdom),  Jurisdiction,  dissenting 
opinion  of  judge  Basdevant,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1952)  p.  66;  Monetary  Gold  Removed  form  Rome  in  1943, 
(Italy  v.  France,  United  Kingdom  and  United  States  of  America),  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1954) 
p.  32,  in  which  the  Court  in  this  case  concluded  that:  "the  Court  can  only  exercise  jurisdiction  over 
a  State  with  its  consent"  is  "a  well  established  principle  of  international  law  embodied  in  the 
Court's  Statute.  ";  also  Cf.  dissenting  opinion  of  judge  Chagla  in  the  Case  Concerning  Right  of 
Passage  Over  Indian  Territory,  (Portugal  v.  India),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1957)  p.  180. 
'0  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  586. Chapter  Five  237 
this  question  by  affirming  that  the  consent  is  only  required  in  contentious  cases 
but  not  for  advisory  opinions.  The  ICJ  drew  the  distinction  between  contentious 
and  advisory  cases  and  ruled:  4' 
"Another  argument  that  has  been  invoked  against  the  power  of  the 
Court  to  answer  the  questions  put  to  it  in  this  case  is  based  on  the 
opposition  of  the  Governments  of  Bulgaria,  Hungary  and  Romania  to 
the  advisory  procedure.  The  Court  cannot,  it  is  said,  give  the 
Advisory  Opinion  requested  without  violating  the  well-established 
principle  of  international  law  according  to  which  no  judicial 
proceedings  relating  to  a  legal  question  pending  between  States  can 
take  place  without  their  consent. 
The  objection  reveals  a  confusion  between  the  principles  governing 
contentious  procedure  and  those  which  are  applicable  to  Advisory 
Opinions. 
The  consent  of  States,  parties  to  a  dispute,  is  the  basis  of  the  Court's 
jurisdiction  in  contentious  cases.  The  situation  is  different  in  regard 
to  advisory  proceedings  even  where  the  Request  for  an  Opinion 
relates  to  a  legal  question  actually  pending  between  States.  The  Court 
reply  is  only  of  an  advisory  character:  as  such,  it  has  no  binding 
force.  It  follows  that  no  State,  whether  a  Member  of  the  United 
Nations  or  not,  can  prevent  the  giving  of  an  Advisory  Opinion  which 
the  United  Nations  considers  to  be  desirable  in  order  to  obtain 
enlightenment  as  to  the  course  of  action  it  should  take.  The  Court's 
Opinion  is  given  not  to  the  States,  but  to  the  Organ  which  is  entitled 
to  request  it;  the  reply  of  the  Court,  itself  an  "organ  of  the  United 
Nations",  requests  its  participation  in  the  activities  of  the 
Organization,  and,  in  principle,  should  not  be  refused.  " 
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  particular  form  required  for  a  state  to  express 
its  consent.  In  the  Corfu  Channel  case  the  ICJ  said:  42 
"While  the  consent  of  the  parties  confers  jurisdiction  on  the  Court, 
neither  the  Statute  nor  the  Rules  require  that  this  consent  should  be 
expressed  in  any  particular  form.  " 
5.2.  Jurisdiction  Ratione  Personae 
In  the  present  section  reference  will  be  made  to  those  entities  which  have  the 
right  to  appear  before  the  ACJ.  According  to  general  principles  of  international 
41  Interpretation  of  Peace  Treaty  with  Bulgaria,  Hungary  and  Romania  case,  First  Phase,  ICJ 
Rep.,  (1950)  p.  71. 
42  Corfu  Channel  case,  (United  Kingdom  v.  Albania),  Preliminary  Objection,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1948) 
p.  27;  for  further  discussion  see  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  p.  573-575. Chapter  Five  238 
law,  states,  international  organisations  and  individuals  are  subjects  of  international 
law.  This  leads  us  to  ask  whether  all  such  entities  have  the  right  to  settle  their 
disputes  before  the  ACJ  or  not. 
5.2.1.  States 
As  a  starting  point  it  is  to  be  understood  that  the  ACJ  follows  the  same 
provision  as  that  adopted  by  the  ICJ  and  its  predecessor  the  PCIJ  that  only  states 
can  be  parties  to  contentious  cases  before  the  Court.  43  This  prevents  international 
organisations,  on  the  one  hand,  and  individuals  on  the  other  from  being  parties  to 
cases.  Therefore,  before  discussing  the  status  of  a  state  in  the  Pact  of  the  Arab- 
League  and  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  it  is  important  to  present  some  relevant 
information  regarding  the  UN  Charter  and  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  in  order  to 
understand  the  differences  in  the  position  of  a  state  before  these  two  Courts. 
Accordingly,  we  will  discuss  the  status  of  states  in  the  Charter  of  the  UN  and  the 
Statute  of  the  ICJ  before  comparing  the  same  point  with  the  Pact  of  the  Arab 
League  and  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ. 
5.2.1.1.  The  Status  of  States  in  the  Charter  of  the  UN  and  the  Statute 
of  the  ICJ 
Basically,  the  ICJ  is  open  to  three  kinds  of  states:  (1)  states  which  are 
members  of  the  UN;  (2)  states  which  are  not  members  of  the  UN,  but  are  parties 
to  the  Statute;  and  (3)  states  which  are  not  members  of  the  UN,  but  are  not 
43  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  605. 
44  Gross,  Leo,  The  International  Court  of  Justice:  Consideration  of  Requirements  for  Enhancing  its 
Role  in  the  International  Legal  Order,  65  AJIL  (1971)  p.  p.  302-303;  Waldock,  Humphrey,  The 
International  Court  of  Justice  As  Seen  From  Bar  and  Bench,  LIV  BYbIL  (1983)  p.  1. Chapter  Five  239 
parties  to  the  Statute.  45  The  Court  cannot  accept  any  other  category  of  states  to  be 
parties  to  a  case,  if  a  state  does  not  fall  into  one  of  the  above  mentioned 
categories.  This  means  the  Court  has  to  assure  that  a  particular  party  to  a  dispute 
is  deemed  to  have  the  attributes  of  statehood.  For  example,  in  the  Application  of 
the  Convention  on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  the  Crime  of  Genocide  case, 
the  ICJ  had  to  consider  whether  either  states  had  a  right  to  appear  before  the  Court 
in  the  action  as  the  statehood  of  both  countries  was  disputed  at  that  time.  46  States 
that  belong  to  one  of  the  above  mentioned  categories  can  appear  before  the  Court 
according  to  the  stipulations  of  its  Statute.  47 
A.  Members  of  the  United  Nations 
According  to  Arts.  3  and  4  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN,  membership  in  the 
global  organisation  is  of  two  kinds,  original  membership  and  members 
subsequently  admitted.  These  two  kinds  of  membership  can  be  given  only  to 
states.  48  However,  only  few  provisions  can  be  found  in  the  Charter  or  in  the 
Statute  referring  to  members  in  connection  with  the  Court,  in  spite  of  the  strong 
links  between  the  UN  and  the  ICJ,  especially  in  legal  matters.  49  Art.  93  (1)  of  the 
"  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  concept  of  state  as  a  subject  of  international  law  is  outside  our  present 
study.  For  more  details  about  this  matter  see  Crawford,  James,  The  Criteria  for  Statehood  in 
International  Law,  XLVIII  BYbIL  (1976-77)  p.  p.  107-110;  Shaw,  International  Law,  supra 
note  29,  p.  139;  Brownlie,  Public  International  Law,  supra  note  29,  p.  71;  Oppenheim's 
International  Law,  supra  note  30,  p.  119. 
46  Application  of  the  Convention  on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  the  Crime  of  Genocide, 
(Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  v.  Yugoslavia  Serbia  and  Montenegro),  Provisional  Measures,  ICJ  Rep., 
(1993)  p.  325. 
47  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  606. 
'e  For  further  details  about  membership  in  the  United  Nations  see  White,  N.  D.,  The  Law  of 
International  Organisations,  Manchester:  Manchester  University  Press,  (1996)  p.  p.  58-62; 
Simma,  The  Charter  of  the  United  Nations,  supra  note  28,  p.  p.  155-157;  Rosenne,  The  Law  and 
Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  614. 
49  About  the  relations  between  the  ICJ  and  the  UN  see  Schwebel,  Stephen  M.,  Justice  in 
International  Law:  Selected  Writings  of  Judge  Stephen  M  Schwebel,  Cambridge:  Cambridge Chapter  Five  240 
Charter  provides:  "All  Members  of  the  United  Nations  are  ipso  facto  parties  to 
the  Statute  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice.  "  According  to  Art.  94  (1)  "Each 
Member  of  the  United  Nations  undertakes  to  comply  with  the  decision  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  in  any  case  to  which  it  is  a  party.  "  Under  para.  2  of 
the  same  Article  it  is  stipulated  that:  "If  any  party  to  a  case  fails  to  perform  the 
obligations  incumbent  upon  it  under  a  judgment  rendered  by  the  Court,  the  other 
party  may  have  recourse  to  the  Security  Council.  "  No  distinction  is  made, 
according  to  this  Article,  between  the  states  that  are  parties  to  a  dispute  as  to 
whether  they  are  members  or  non-members  of  the  UN  but  parties  to  the  Statute,  or 
non-members  of  the  UN  and  non-parties  to  the  Statute,  which  means  that  the 
Security  Council  is  competent  to  consider  the  matter  in  either  situation.  50  On  the 
other  hand,  Art.  35  (1)  of  the  ICJ  Statute  explicitly  provides  that  the  Court  will  be 
open  unconditionally  only  to  states  that  are  parties  to  the  Statute.  51 
B.  Non-Members  of  the  United  Nations,  Parties  to  the  Statute 
It  is  possible  for  states  not  members  of  the  UN  to  become  parties  to  the 
Statute  of  the  ICJ  under  conditions  determined  by  the  General  Assembly  upon  the 
University  Press,  (1994)  p.  p.  14-26.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Schwebel,  Justice  in  International 
Law). 
so  Engel,  Salo,  States  Parties  to  the  Statute  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  in  Leo  Gross  (ed.  ), 
The  Future  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  vol.  1,  New  York:  Oceana  Publications,  INC., 
(1976)  p.  288.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Engel,  States  Parties  to  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ). 
s1  This  Article,  as  we  mentioned  before,  was  taken  from  Art.  34  of  the  1920  Statute  of  the  PCIJ 
`only  States  or  Members  of  the  League  of  Nations  can  be  parties  in  cases  before  the  Court',  in 
which  the  provision  of  Art.  34  of  the  1920  was  also  obtained  from  Art.  24  of  the  1899  Convention 
for  the  Pacific  Settlement  of  International  Disputes  which  refer  to  "the  signatory  power"  as  the 
parties  who  may  have  "recourse  to  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration.  "  For  more  details  see 
Hudson,  The  Permanent  Court,  supra  note  14,  p.  392;  Fachiri,  The  Permanent  Court  of  Justice, 
supra  note  38,  p.  62;  The  International  Court  of  Justice  (ed.  ),  The  International  Court  of  Justice: 
Selected  Documents  Relating  to  the  Drafting  of  the  Statute,  Washington:  United  States 
Government  Printing  office,  (1946)  p.  p.  8,32. Chapter  Five  241 
recommendation  of  the  Security  Council.  This  permission  appears  in  the  wording 
of  Art.  93  (2),  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN  which  reads  as  follows: 
"A  State  which  is  not  a  Member  of  the  United  Nations  may  become  a 
party  to  the  Statute  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice  on  conditions 
to  be  determined  in  each  case  by  the  General  Assembly  upon  the 
recommendation  of  the  Security  Council.  " 
These  conditions  were  first  laid  down  as  a  result  of  a  request  made  by 
Switzerland,  with  respect  to  which  the  General  Assembly  adopted  Resolution  No. 
91  (1)  that  prescribed  the  required  conditions: 
"(a)  Acceptance  of  the  provisions  of  the  Statute  of  the  International 
Court  of  Justice; 
(b)  Acceptance  of  all  the  obligations  of  a  Member  of  the  United 
Nations  under  Article  94  of  the  Charter; 
(c)  An  undertaking  to  contribute  to  the  expenses  of  the  Court  such 
equitable  amount  as  the  General  Assembly  shall  assess  from  time  to 
time  after  consultation  with  the  Swiss  Government.  "52 
As  Art.  93  (2)  stipulates,  the  conditions  which  have  to  be  determined  by  the 
General  Assembly  upon  the  recommendation  of  the  Security  Council  are  the  same 
in  each  case.  53  Therefore,  in  the  case  of  Liechtenstein  the  General  Assembly  laid 
down  exactly  the  same  conditions  that  were  laid  down  in  the  case  of 
Switzerland.  54  At  present,  there  are  just  two  states  that  are  not  UN  members  but 
parties  to  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  namely,  Nauru  and  Switzerland.  55  Such  a  state  is 
considered  to  become  a  party  to  the  Statute  on  the  date  it  deposits  its  instrument  of 
acceptance  of  the  above  mentioned  conditions.  The  instrument  of  acceptance  is  to 
52  2  YBICJ(1947-48)  p.  p.  30-31;  reprinted  in  50  YBICJ(1995-96)  p.  68. 
53  UNCIO,  vol.  13,  (1945)  p.  385.  This  expression  `in  each  case'  according  to  Rosenne's 
interpretation  means  "in  each  instance  of  an  application  being  made  by  a  State  wishing  to  become  a 
party  to  the  Statute,  and  does  not  refer  to  each  case  which  such  a  State  might  desire  to  bring  before 
the  Court.  "  see  his  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  617. 
54  4  YBICJ  (1949-50)  p.  p.  32-33. 
55  49  YBICJ(1994-95)  p.  66;  also  see  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  617. Chapter  Five  242 
be  deposited  with  the  Secretary-General  of  the  UN.  56  This  however  does  mean 
that  the  Court  can  refuse  such  a  state  the  right  to  appear  before  it,  even  if  the  state 
has  accepted  the  conditions  laid  down  or  even  when  a  recommendation  has  been 
made  for  it  from  the  Security  Council.  In  other  words,  the  final  decision  to  accept 
a  particular  UN  non-member  state  to  be  a  party  in  a  case,  and  to  double  check 
whether  it  fulfils  the  conditions  required  by  the  Charter  and  the  Statute  is  to  be 
taken  by  the  ICJ  itself  and  not  by  the  General  Assembly  and  Security  Council  or 
any  other  organ  of  the  UN.  "  Rosenne  has  argued  in  this  regard: 
"(a)  each  organ  of  the  United  Nations  has  the  capacity  to  recognize  a 
political  body  as  a  state  within  the  terms  of  its  own  competence  as 
defined  in  the  Charter,  and  for  the  purposes  of  the  application  of  the 
article  out  of  which  the  demand  for  recognition  as  a  `state'  was 
made;  "58 
The  ICJ,  as  one  of  the  organs  of  the  UN,  59  has,  therefore,  the  capacity  within 
its  jurisdiction  to  decide  whether  one  or  both  of  the  parties  to  a  case  is  a  state. 
This  means  in  other  words,  the  General  Assembly  and  the  Security  Council  are 
competent  to  discuss  the  status  of  a  particular  state  in  matters  relating  to 
membership  in  the  UN,  while  the  ICJ  is  competent  to  discuss  whether  the  parties 
56  49  YBICJ  (1994-95)  p.  65.  It  is  to  be  clear  that  as  far  as  a  non-member  state  of  the  UN  becomes 
party  to  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  it  will  automatically  granted  the  same  privileges  and  obligations 
accorded  to  members  of  the  UN.  For  example,  it  will  be  able  to  vote  for  the  election  of  members 
of  the  ICJ-Art.  4  (3)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ;  participate  at  the  amendment  of  the  Statute  of  the 
ICJ-Art.  69  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ. 
57  See  case  Concerning  Application  of  the  Convention  of  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  the 
Crime  of  Genocide.  (Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  v.  Yugoslavia),  Preliminary  Objections,  ICJ  Rep., 
(1996)  p.  611;  see  also  Hambro,  The  Jurisdiction  of  the  ICJ,  supra  note  19,  p.  144. 
7E  Rosenne,  Shabtai.  Recognition  of  States  by  the  United  Nations,  XXVI  BYbIL  (1949)  p.  439. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  Rosenne,  Recognition  of  States)  Cf.  Conditions  of  Admissions  of  state  to 
Membership  in  the  United  Nations  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1948)  p.  62,  when  the  ICJ  in  its  advisory 
opinion  was  discussing  conditions  of  membership  laid  down  in  Art.  4  (2)  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN 
in  which  it  declared: 
"All  these  conditions  are  subject  to  the  judgment  of  the  Organization.  The  judgment 
of  the  Organization  means  the  judgment  of  the  two  organs  mentioned  in  paragraph  2 
of  Article  4,  and,  in  the  last  analysis,  that  of  its  Members.  " 
S°  Arts.  7  (l)  and  92  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN. Chapter  Five  243 
to  the  case  are  states  or  not.  This  could  also  be  deduced  from  Art.  36  (6)  of  the 
Statute  of  the  ICJ,  in  which  it  is  said  that  the  Court  and  the  Court  alone  can  decide 
questions  concerning  its  jurisdiction.  60 
C.  Non-Members  of  the  United  Nations,  not  Parties  to  the  Statute 
By  Art.  35  (2)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  it  is  also  possible  for  states  which  are 
not  members  to  the  UN  and  not  parties  to  the  Statute  to  submit  their  disputes  to 
the  Court,  but  under  conditions  to  be  observed  by  the  state  concerned  . 
61  The 
difference  between  the  position  of  a  state  not  a  member  of  the  UN  but  party  to  the 
Statute  of  the  ICJ,  and  a  state  not  a  member  of  the  UN  and  not  party  to  the  Statute- 
is  that  in  the  latter  case,  the  Security  Council  has  competence  to  make  a  decision, 
whereas  in  former  case,  the  Security  Council  has  to  make  a  recommendation  and 
the  General  Assembly  has  competence  to  make  a  decision  regarding  to  the 
membership  to  the  UN  but  not  regarding  appearance  before  the  Court.  62  On  15 
October  1946,  the  Security  Council  adopted  a  resolution  in  order  to  implement  the 
provisions  of  Art.  35  (2).  The  resolution  reads  as  follows:  63 
"The  Security  Council  of  the  United  Nations,  in  virtue  of  the  powers 
conferred  upon  it  by  Article  35,  paragraph  2,  of  the  Statute  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  and  subject  to  the  provisions  of  that 
Article,  Resolves  that: 
1.  The  International  Court  of  Justice  shall  be  open  to  a  State  which  is 
not  a  party  to  the  Statute  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  upon 
the  following  condition,  namely,  that  such  State  shall  previously  have 
60  For  further  details  see  Rosenne,  Recognition  of  States,  supra  note  58,  p.  439. 
61  Art.  35  (2)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  reads  as  follows: 
"The  conditions  under  which  the  Court  shall  be  open  to  other  States  [that  is  States 
which  are  not  parties  to  the  Statute]  shall,  subject  to  the  special  provisions  contained 
in  treaties  in  force,  be  laid  down  by  the  Security  Council,  but  in  no  case  shall  such 
conditions  place  the  parties  in  a  position  of  inequality  before  the  Court.  " 
62  Art.  39  (2)  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN;  also  see  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2, 
p"p.  630-632. 
63  Security  Council  Resolution,  No.  9,  (1946),  S.  C.  O.  R.,  1"  session,  Resolution  and  Decisions, 
p.  18;  reprinted  in  49  YBICJ  (1994-95)  p.  p.  66-67. Chapter  Five  244 
deposited  with  the  Registrar  of  the  Court  a  declaration  by  which  it 
accepts  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  in  accordance  with  the  Charter 
of  the  United  Nations  and  with  the  terms  and  subject  to  the  conditions 
of  the  Statute  and  Rules  of  the  Court,  and  undertakes  to  comply  in 
good  faith  with  the  decision  or  decisions  of  the  Court  and  to  accept  all 
the  obligations  of  a  Member  of  the  United  Nations  under  Article  94  of 
the  Charter; 
2.  Such  declaration  may  be  either  particular  or  general.  A  particular 
declaration  is  one  accepting  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  in  respect 
only  of  a  particular  dispute  or  disputes  which  have  already  arisen.  A 
general  declaration  is  one  accepting  the  jurisdiction  generally  in 
respect  of  all  disputes  or  of  a  particular  class  or  classes  of  disputes 
which  have  already  arisen  or  which  may  arise  in  the  future.  A  State, 
in  making  such  a  general  declaration,  may,  in  accordance  with  Article 
36,  paragraph  2,  of  the  Statute,  recognize  as  compulsory,  ipso  facto 
and  without  special  agreement,  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  provided, 
however,  that  such  acceptance  may  not,  without  explicit  agreement, 
be  relied  upon  vis-ä-vis  States  parties  to  the  Statute  which  have  made 
the  declaration  in  conformity  with  Article  36,  paragraph  2,  of  the 
Statute  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice; 
3.  The  original  declarations  made  under  the  terms  of  this  resolution 
shall  be  kept  in  the  custody  of  the  Registrar  of  the  Court,  in 
accordance  with  the  practice  of  the  Court.  Certified  true  copies 
thereof  shall  be  transmitted,  in  accordance  with  the  practice  of  the 
Court,  to  all  States  parties  to  the  Statute  of  the  International  Court  of 
Justice,  and  to  such  other  States  as  shall  have  deposited  a  declaration 
under  the  terms  of  this  resolution,  and  to  the  Secretary  General  of  the 
United  Nations; 
4.  The  Security  Council  reserves  the  right  to  rescind  or  amend  this 
resolution  by  a  resolution  which  shall  be  communicated  to  the  Court, 
and  on  the  receipt  of  such  communication  and  to  the  extent 
determined  by  the  new  resolution,  existing  declarations  shall  cease  to 
be  effective  except  in  regard  to  disputes  which  are  already  before  the 
Court; 
5.  All  questions  as  to  the  validity  or  the  effect  of  a  declaration  made 
under  the  terms  of  this  resolution  shall  be  decided  by  the  Court.  "64 
Rosenne  has  wondered  why  this  resolution  does  not  contain  any  provision 
regarding  the  authority  by  whom  the  declaration  should  be  issued,  the  form  it 
64  According  this  resolution  many  states  have  filed  a  particular  or  general  declaration.  Particular 
declarations  have  been  filed  by  Albania  (1947)  and  Italy  (1952);  general  declaration  by  Cambodia 
(1952),  Ceylon  (1952),  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  (1955,1956,1961,65  and  1971), 
Finland  (1953  and  1954),  Italy  (1955),  Japan  (1951)  Laos  (1952)  and  the  Republic  of  Vietnam 
(1952).  See  50  YBICJ  (1995-96)  p.  69. Chapter  Fire  245 
should  take,  or  if  needed  any  further  procedures  to  bring  it  into  force,  such  as  for 
example,  with  respect  to  ratification.  65 
A  state  not  party  to  the  Statute  is  obliged  to  submit  a  special  instrument  to 
confirm  that  it  accepts  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court.  This  obligation  appears 
explicitly  in  Art.  41  of  the  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ,  which  provides: 
"The  institution  of  proceedings  by  a  State  which  is  not  a  party  to  the 
Statute  but  which,  under  Article  35,  paragraph  2,  thereof,  has 
accepted  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  by  a  declaration  made  in 
accordance  with  any  resolution  adopted  by  Security  Council  under 
that  Article,  shall  be  accompanied  by  a  deposit  of  the  declaration  in 
question,  unless  the  latter  has  previously  been  deposited  with  the 
Registrar.  If  any  question  of  the  validity  or  effect  of  such  declaration 
arises,  the  Court  shall  decide.  " 
The  Lotus  case  between  France  and  Turkey  is  considered  to  be  the  first 
example  dealing  with  this  matter  during  the  lifetime  of  the  PCIJ.  The  Turkish 
government  deposited  a  declaration  with  the  Registrar,  in  the  following  terms:  66 
"The  undersigned,  being  duly  empowered  by  the  Government  of  the 
Turkish  Republic,  hereby  declares,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of 
paragraph  2  of  Article  35  of  the  Rules  of  the  Permanent  Court  of 
International  Justice,  that  he  accepts,  on  behalf  of  that  Government, 
the  aforesaid  Court's  jurisdiction  for  the  dispute  which  has  arisen 
between  the  Government  of  the  Turkish  Republic  and  the 
Government  of  the  French  Republic  as  a  result  of  collision  which 
occurred  on  August  2nd  1926,  between  the  steamships  Boz-Kourt  and 
Lotus,  which  dispute  has  formed  the  subject  of  the  Special  Agreement 
signed  by  the  delegates  of  the  two  Governments  on  October  120,1926, 
and  filed  on  behalf  of  those  Governments  with  the  Registry  of  the 
Court  on  January,  4  1927.  " 
According  to  a  decision  delivered  by  the  PCI1,67  it  is  clear  that  any  state  not  a 
party  to  the  Statute  is  not  obliged  to  deposit  a  special  declaration,  if  it  has  accepted 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  by  a  provision  contained  in  a  convention  or  treaty  in 
65  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2.  p.  p.  634-635. 
66  Lotus  case,  PCIJ,  (1927)  Ser.  C. No.  13,  p.  9. 
67  Certain  German  Interests  in  Polish  Upper  Silesia,  Merits,  Judgment,  PCIJ,  (1926)  Ser.,  A, 
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force,  as  provided  for  in  Art.  36  (1)  of  the  Statute  of  the  PCIJ.  68  It  is  interesting  to 
state,  before  referring  to  the  condition  of  states  in  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  and 
the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  that  Engel  has  criticised  the  tripartite  division  of 
states  for  the  purpose  of  access  to  the  ICJ.  He  preferred  that  access  to  the  Court 
should  be  limited  to  two  kinds  of  states  instead  of  three:  states  members  of  the 
UN  and  parties  to  the  Statute  and  states  not  members  of  the  UN  but  parties  to  the 
Statute.  As  to  states  non-members  of  the  UN  and  non-parties  to  the  Statute,  they 
should  not  be  allowed  to  bring  their  disputes  before  the  Court.  Such  states,  if  they 
want  to  have  access  to  the  Court,  according  to  Engel,  have  to  become  parties  to 
the  Statute.  69 
S.  2.1.2.  The  Status  of  States  in  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  and  the 
Draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ 
Unlike  the  situation  relating  to  the  Charter  of  the  UN  and  the  Statute  of  the 
ICJ,  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  and  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  allow  only 
independent  Arab  states  that  are  members  to  the  Arab  League  to  have  the  right  to 
be  parties  to  the  Statute  of  the  Court.  This  may  produce  unacceptable  and 
complicated  results,  because  non-Arab  states  not  members  of  the  Arab  League  are, 
as  a  general  rule  automatically  excluded  from  becoming  parties  to  the  Statute.  In 
other  words,  if  a  non-Arab  state  wishes  to  be  party  to  the  Statute  of  the  ACJ  its 
application  will  be  refused  because  it  is  not  a  member  of  the  Arab  League.  Thus, 
68  Hambro,  The  Jurisdiction  of  the  ICJ,  supra  note  19,  p.  148;  Hudson,  The  Permanent  Court, 
supra  note  14,  p.  391;  for  more  details  about  the  concept  of  conventions  and  treaties  in  force  see 
Fachiri,  The  Permanent  Court  ofJustice,  supra  note  38,  p.  p.  72-75. 
69  Engel,  States  Parties  to  the  Statute  of  the  ICI,  supra  note  50,  p.  p.  306-307. Chapter  Five  247 
according  to  this  limitation,  the  right  of  intervention  before  the  ACJ  is  accorded 
only  to  states  that  are  parties  to  the  Statute.  It  is  also  important  to  know  what  will 
be  the  legal  position  of  a  state  that  for  some  reason  has  lost  its  membership  of  the 
Arab  League.  Will  such  a  state  still  be  permitted  to  have  the  right  to  appear  before 
the  Court? 
A.  Limitation  for  States  that  can  Appear  before  the  ACJ 
Membership  according  to  Art.  1,  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  is  available 
only  for  independent  Arab  states  which  desire  to  become  members  in  this  regional 
organisation.  70  Accordingly,  every  member  to  the  Arab  League  is  ipso  facto  partyto 
the  Statute  of  the  ACJ.  This  provision  is  laid  down  in  Art.  2  of  the  draft  Statute 
of  the  ACJ  which  reads  as  follows: 
"Member  states  of  the  League  of  Arab  States  are  ipso  facto  parties  to 
the  present  Statute.  " 
On  the  other  hand,  Art.  21  (1),  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  considers  that 
only  states  that  are  parties  to  the  Statute  can  be  parties  to  cases,  or  in  other  words 
have  the  right  to  submit  their  disputes  to  the  Court.  Art.  21  (1)  reads: 
"States  which  are  parties  to  this  Statute  have  the  right  to  appear 
before  the  Court  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Article  22  of 
this  Statute.  " 
It  is  noteworthy  that  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  follows  the  same  provisions 
adopted  by  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  when  granting  only  to  states  the  right  to  appear 
before  the  Court,  simply  because  this  Court,  like  the  ICJ,  has  been  established  to 
decide  disputes  between  states  and  not  for  other  purposes.  7'  In  addition  to  states 
70  For  more  details  see  above,  chapter  1,  p.  p.  23-27. 
71  Similarly,  Rosenne,  The  World  Court,  supra  note  2,  p.  83;  see  also  Shukri,  Muhammad  A., 
Nahwa  Mahkamat  'Adl  'Arabiyah  Jadidah,  (Towards  a  New  Arab  Court  Justice),  2  Qadaya 
Arabiyah,  (1980)  p.  p.  16-17;  Musalhi,  Muhammad  at  Husaine,  Mashru'  Mahkamat  a!  'Ad!  a! Chapter  Five  248 
parties  to  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  by  virtue  of  their  membership  in  the  Arab 
League,  it  was  suggested  by  some  member  states  of  the  Arab  League,  during  the 
discussions  of  1979  draft  Statute,  states  that  are  not  members  to  the  Pact  of  the 
Arab  League  should  be  able  to  adhere  to  the  ACJ  Statute,  when  they  desire  to  do 
so.  This  idea  did  not  satisfy  the  experts  involved  in  drafting  the  Statute  for  two 
reasons:  (1)  the  ACJ  is  considered  to  be  an  Arab  Court,  therefore,  only  Arab 
states  should  have  the  right  to  be  parties  to  its  Statute;  (2)  the  Arab  League 
Council  cannot  guarantee  the  enforcement  of  the  decision  of  the  Court  with 
respect  to  non-member  states.  72 
It  is  submitted  that  the  nature  of  the  ACJ  as  an  Arab  Court  would  not  be 
affected  if  non-Arab  states  were  permitted  to  be  parties  to  its  Statute.  Its  Arab 
characteristics  will  exist  even  if  non-Arab  states  were  allowed  to  be  parties  to  its 
Statute.  It  is  believed  that  the  real  reason  of  excluding  non-Arab  states  from  the 
partnership  to  the  Statute  of  the  ACJ  is  not  because  the  nature  and  the  character  of 
the  Court  would  be  affected,  but  because  Arab  states  dread  that  this  idea  may 
create  more  political  than  legal  problems  with  non-Arab  states.  Therefore,  they 
thought  that  the  best  and  safest  solution  to  adopt  was  to  grant  only  Arab  states 
such  a  right.  Furthermore,  according  to  Shukri's  opinion,  it  would  be  possible,  as 
an  alternative,  for  both  members  of  the  Arab  League  parties  to  the  Statute  as  well 
'Arabiyah,  (The  Projected  Arab  Court  of  Justice),  Riyadh:  Dar  an  Nashir  bi  al  Markaz  at  `Arabi  lid 
Dirasat  al  Amniyah  wat  Tadreeb,  (1991)  p.  p.  45-46. 
72  See  comments  of  Experts  Committee  on  the  1979  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  Documents  of 
Secretary-General 
of  the  League  of  Arab  States,  Tunis  office,  (1979)  Doc.  3.  (hereinafter  cited  as: 
comments  of  Experts  Committee);  also  see  Ben  Miled,  The  Competence  of  the  ACJ,  supra  note 
22,  p.  13;  Dachraoui  Achouak,  La  Cour  Arabe  de  Justice:  Etude  de  L'Avant-Projet  de  Statut, 
(Arab  Court  of  Justice:  Study  of  the  Draft  Statute),  Tunisia:  Memoire  Pour  le  D.  E.  A.  en  Sciences 
Politiques,  (1982)  p.  p.  82-83.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Dachraoui,  Arab  Court  of  Justice). Chapter  Five  249 
as  non-members  to  the  Arab  League  not  parties  to  the  Statute,  to  be  granted  a  right 
of  recourse  to  the  Security  Council  of  the  UN,  instead  of  the  Arab  League 
Council,  for  the  enforcement  of  the  decision  of  the  ACJ  when  one  of  them  does 
not  comply  with  its  decision  or  not  apply  it  in  good  faith,  simply  because  Art.  95 
of  the  UN  Charter  does  not  prevent  members  of  the  UN  "from  entrusting  the 
solution  of  their  differences  to  other  tribunals  by  virtue  of  agreements  already  in 
existence  or  which  may  be  concluded  in  the  future",  and  because  the  creation  of 
the  ACJ  does  not  contradict  with  the  Charter  of  the  UN.  It  becomes  possible  then 
for  any  parties  to  a  dispute  settled  by  the  ACJ  to  ask  for  the  Security  Council's 
help  in  the  matter  of  enforcement  of  a  decision  of  this  Court.  73 
On  the  other  hand,  non-member  states  not  parties  to  the  draft  Statute  are 
permitted  to  appear  before  the  Court,  without  being  parties  to  the  Statute,  if  they 
fulfil  the  following  conditions:  (1)  the  Arab  League  Council  agrees  that  non- 
member  states  may  become  parties  to  a  particular  case;  (2)  permission  is  granted 
for  such  states  only  with  respect  to  a  dispute  pertaining  to  the  interpretation  and 
implementation  of  bilateral  or  multilateral  treaties  signed  with  any  Arab  states 
73  Shukri,  Muhammad  A.,  Mahkamat  at  'AdI  at  'Arabiyah  at  Murtaqabah,  (The  Expected  Arab 
Court  of  Justice),  4  JAA  (1981)  p.  77.  It  is  outside  the  scope  of  this  study  to  consider  the 
enforcement  of  the  judgments  of  the  ACJ.  However  we  found  it  is  important  to  state  in  brief  that 
this  Court  will  face  a  serious  problem  regarding  the  enforcement  of  its decisions  even  if  a  decision 
has  been  delivered  for  states  parties  to  the  draft  Statute.  No  provision  can  be  found  in  the  Pact  of 
the  Arab  League  dealing  with  this  problem.  The  only  reference  is in  Art.  44  (4)  of  the  draft  Statute 
which  permits  the  party  to  the  case  to  have  recourse  to  the  League  Council  if  the  other  party 
refrains  from  implementing  the  judgment  of  the  Court.  The  League  Council,  according  to  this 
Article,  has  to  take  the  necessary  measures  capable  of  implementing  the  decision.  The  question 
which  may  arise  here  is  does  the  League  Council  according  to  the  Pact  have  enough  authority  to 
implement  its  decision,  and  therefore  how  it  will  treat  the  problem  that  may  arise  regarding  the 
refusal  to  apply  the  decision  of  the  ACJ  in  good  faith.  If  the  draftsmen  need  to  solve  this  problem, 
they  should  reform  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  first  and  include  the  necessary  provision  to  deal 
with  this  problem.  For  further  details  see  Foda,  The  Projected  Arab  Court,  supra  note  16, 
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parties  to  the  Statute  and;  (3)  the  relevant  states  deposit  with  the  Secretary- 
General  of  the  Arab  League  a  declaration  that  they  accept  the  compulsory 
jurisdiction  of  the  ACJ  and  shall  abide  by  the  implementation  of  its  judgment 
without  any  need  for  a  special  agreement.  Whenever  such  a  state  accepts  these 
conditions  and  decides  to  refer  to  the  ACJ  to  settle  a  dispute,  it  would  then  be 
accorded  the  same  rights  and  privileges  provided  for  by  the  Statute  regarding 
states  which  are  parties  to  it.  74  This  means  states  not  members  to  the  Pact  of  the 
Arab  League,  as  a  general  rule,  are  not  permitted  to  be  parties  to  the  Statute  of  the 
ACJ,  but  they  are,  as  an  exceptional  condition,  allowed  to  be  parties  in  particular 
cases  when  the  above  mentioned  conditions  are  fulfilled.  75 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  in  addition  to  their  membership  of  the  Arab 
League,  all  Arab  states,  at  present,  are  members  of  the  UN;  most  of  them,  because 
Islam  is  their  official  religion,  are  members  in  the  OIC;  some  of  them,  as  African 
states,  are  members  of  the  OAU;  others,  the  Gulf  States,  are  members  of  the 
GCC.  What  is  very  important  to  note  is  that  not  a  single  provision  in  the  present 
draft  Statute  pays  any  attention  to  such  a  complicated  situation  in  the  Arab  region. 
74  Art.  21  (2,3)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  provides: 
"2.  States  which  are  not  parties  to  this  Statute  may  (with  the  consent  of  the  League 
Council)  resort  to  the  Court  to  decide  disputes  pertaining  to  the  interpretation  and 
implementation  of  bilateral  or  multilateral  treaties  signed  with  any  Arab  states  party 
to  the  Statute.  Such  states  shall  declare  that  they  accept  the  Court's  compulsory 
jurisdiction  and  shall  abide  by  the  implementation  of  its  judgments  and  decisions 
without  the  need  for  a  special  agreement.  The  declaration  shall  be  deposited  with  the 
Secretary-General  of  the  League  of  Arab  States. 
3.  States  not  parties  to  this  Statute  when  resorting  to  the  Court,  shall  have  the  same 
rights  and  privileges  provided  for  by  this  Statute  regarding  states  which  are  parties  to 
it,  and  the  Court  shall  determine  the  expenses  to  be  borne  by  such  states.  " 
79  It  should  be  said  that  the  ACJ  is  not  the  only  regional  Court  to  exclude  non-parties  to  its  Statute 
from  settling  their  disputes  before  it;  for  example,  Art.  21  (a)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  IICJ 
provides  that:  "Member  States  of  the  Organization  of  the  Islamic  Conference  alone  have  the  right 
to  appear  before  the  Court.  "  The  same  provision  has  been  adopted  by  the  Protocol  of  the  ECHR  in Chapter  Five  251 
It  is  expected  that  Arab  draftsmen  will  include  provisions,  whether  in  the  Pact  or 
in  the  draft  Statute,  to  oblige  members  of  the  Arab  League  parties  to  the  Statute  to 
appeal,  first  of  all,  to  the  ACJ,  in  any  justiciable  dispute  that  may  arise  between 
them,  otherwise  how  will  this  Court  be  activated? 
B.  Limitation  of  Intervention  before  the  ACJ 
It  is  clear  that  the  draft  Statute  has  followed  the  corresponding  provisions  of 
the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  when  granting  states,  and  states  only,  the  right  to  appear 
before  the  ACJ.  On  the  other  hand,  it  appears  that  only  two  categories  of  states 
are  authorised  to  adjudicate  before  the  ACJ.  This  limitation  generates  the, 
question  as  to  what  is  the  position  of  states  that  are  not  members  of  the  Arab 
League  and  not  parties  to  the  Statute;  do  they  possess  the  right  of  intervention 
before  the  ACJ?  In  other  words,  does  the  restriction  on  states  competent  to  appear 
before  the  ACJ  affect  the  position  of  states  that  are  not  parties  to  the  Statute  when 
they  wish  to  intervene  in  a  given  case?  76 
Art.  39  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  comparable  with  the  relevant  content 
of  the  ICJ  Statute,  distinguishes  between  two  kinds  of  intervention:  77  (1) 
`discretionary  intervention'  which  can  be  practised  by  any  particular  state 
which  Art.  5  provides  that:  "This  Protocol  shall  be  open  to  signature  by  Member  States  of  the 
Council  of  Europe,  signatories  to  the  Convention,  who  may  become  parties  to  it....  " 
76  The  concept  of  intervention  in  inter  state  arbitral  procedure  was  first  proposed  by  the 
Netherlands  delegations  at  the  1899  Peace  conference  and  then  the  idea  was  adopted  when  the 
PCIJ  was  created  (Art.  62  of  its  Statute)  and  with  minor  changes  in  the  ICJ  (Art.  62  of  its  Statute). 
For  general  reading  about  intervention  see  Hudson,  The  Permanent  Court,  supra  note  14, 
p.  p.  419-430;  Miller,  John  T.,  Intervention  in  Proceedings  Before  the  International  Court  of 
Justice,  in  Leo  Gross  (ed.  ),  The  Future  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  vol.  2,  New  York: 
Oceana  Publications,  INC.,  (1976)  p.  p.  550-571;  Rosenne,  Shabtai,  Intervention  in  the 
International  Court  of  Justice,  London:  Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers,  (1993)  p.  p.  14-38. 
77  Cf.  Arts.  62,63  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ. Chapter  Five  252 
believing  that  it  has  an  interest  in  a  case  that  may  be  affected  by  a  decision  of  the 
Court;  the  state  in  question  must  submit  a  request  to  intervene  for  consideration  by 
the  Court;  (2)  `intervention  as  of  right',  available  for  other  parties  to  convention 
whose  construction  is  issue  before  the  Court.  78  Para.  1  of  Art.  39  of  the  draft 
Statute  of  the  ACJ  deals  with  discretionary  intervention.  It  states  that  if  a  state 
party  to  the  Statute  has  an  interest  which  may  be  affected  by  the  decision  of  the 
Court,  that  state  can  request  to  intervene.  Art.  39  (1)  reads  as  follows: 
"If  a  state  party  to  the  Statute  which  is  not  party  to  the  case  considers 
that  it  has  an  interest  which  may  be  affected  by  the  decision  in  the 
case,  it  may  request  the  Court  to  allow  it  to  intervene  before  the 
closure  of  the  pleadings.  Such  an  application  shall  be  decided  by  the 
Court.  " 
It  appears  that  the  Arab  draftsmen,  when  drafting  this  Article,  did  not  insert 
the  word  `legal'  to  qualify  the  relevant  interest,  as  was  done  in  the  wording  of  Art. 
62  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ.  However,  this  interest  cannot  be  defined  as  other  than 
that  of  a  legal  nature.  79  Para.  3  of  the  same  Article  deals  with  intervention  as  of 
right.  It  provides: 
"If  the  subject  matter  of  the  case  is  related  to  the  interpretation  of  a 
multilateral  agreement  to  which  some  of  the  parties  to  the  agreement 
are  not  parties  to  the  case,  the  Registrar  shall,  upon  the  Court's 
consent,  notify  these  parties  of  the  case  and  the  applications  filed  with 
the  Court,  and  such  parties  have  the  right  to  intervene.  " 
When  comparing  para.  1  of  Art.  39  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  with  Art. 
62  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  it  can  be  seen  that  intervention  in  the  latter  is  granted 
78  For  further  details  about  those  two  kinds  of  intervention  see  Chinkin,  C.  M.,  Third  Party 
Intervention  before  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  80  AJIL  (1986)  p.  p.  496-498.  (hereinafter 
cited  as:  Chinkin,  Third  Party  Intervention);  Ruda,  J.  M.,  Intervention  before  the  International 
Court  of  Justice,  in  Vaughan  Lowe,  and  Malgosia  Fitzmaurice  (eds.  ),  Fifty  Years  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice:  Essays  in  honour  of  Sir  Robert  Jennings,  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University  Press,  (1996)  p.  p.  487-490,498-500. 
79  Cf.  Art.  23  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  IICJ  in  which  the  text  did  not  ignore  the  importance  of  the 
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to  all  states  claiming  a  justification  for  it,  whereas  the  possibility  of  intervention  in 
the  ACJ  is  limited  just  to  states  parties  to  the  draft  Statute.  This  means,  unlike  the 
draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  in  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  there  is  no  restriction  applicable 
to  a  state  when  it  desires  to  intervene-  in  a  particular  case.  In  this  regard  Chinkin 
argued:  80 
"The  short  answer  to  this  question  is  that  only  states  may  request 
intervention,  in  line  with  the  rule  that  only  states  may  be  parties  to 
contentious  proceedings  before  the  International  Court.  Furthermore, 
only  those  states  qualify  which  satisfy  the  prerequisites  of  Article  62 
or  63.  However,  there  is  no  restriction  in  either  article  to  states  that 
are  members  of  the  United  Nations  or  parties  to  the  Statute  of  the 
Court.  " 
One  may  say  that  this  solution  is  quite  logical  because  it  reflects,  in  a  way,  the 
regional  characteristics  of  the  ACJ.  The  main  purpose  of  the  creation  of  the  ACJ 
is  to  settle  disputes  arising  between  Arab  states  that  are  members  of  the  Arab 
League.  The  context  is  not  same  as  that  for  the  ICJ,  which  is  considered  to  be  the 
international  court  for  settling  disputes  between  any  states.  81  Some  have  argued 
that  if  non-Arab  states  are  allowed  to  intervene,  especially  at  the  beginning  of  the 
operation  of  the  ACJ,  delays  could  be  generated  in  the  proceedings,  thus  affecting 
the  interests  of  the  Arab  states  parties  to  the  cases.  For  this  reason,  it  is  better  for 
the  ACJ  first  to  develop  real  authority  within  a  limited  competence,  and  thereafter 
the  Statute  of  the  ACJ  may  benefit  by  amending  the  relevant  provisions  to  extend 
intervention  rights  to  all  states.  82 
go  Chinkin,  Third  Party  Intervention,  supra  note  78,  p.  p.  503-504. 
81  Abi-Saab,  Georges,  The  International  Court  as  a  World  Court,  in  Vaughan  Lowe,  and  Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice  (eds.  ),  Fifty  Years  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice:  Essays  in  honour  of  Sir 
Robert  Jennings,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  (1996)  p.  p.  3-4;  Hudson,  The 
Permanent  Court,  supra  note  14,  p.  392. 
82  Ben  Miled,  The  Competence  of  the  ACJ,  supra  note  22,  p.  p.  14-15. Chapter  Five  254 
Such  an  approach  may  not  solve,  however,  the  problem  which  may  arise 
before  the  ACJ  if  a  non-Arab  state  not  party  to  the  Statute  desires  to  intervene 
before  the  Court.  The  limitation  will  automatically  prevent  non-member  states  to 
request  to  intervene  in  a  case  before  the  ACJ,  simply  because  such  a  request 
cannot  find  any  legal  basis  in  the  Statute  of  this  Court.  If  we  assume  that  a  dispute 
similar  to  that  of  the  continental  shelf  dispute  between  Tunisia  and  Libya83  which 
was  referred  to  the  ICJ,  Malta  would  then  be  unable  to  request  the  ACJ  to  grant 
leave  to  intervene  as  it  did  before  the  ICJ.  The  ACJ  would  definitely  refuse  any 
request  by  Malta  to  intervene,  not  because  it  has  no  legal  interest  as  the  ICJ 
decided  but  because  it  was  not  a  party  to  the  Statute.  84  This  makes  clear  how  the 
ACJ  could  face  considerable  legal  problems  should  a  case  similar  to  the 
aforementioned  continental  shelf  case  arise  before  it. 
The  ACJ  would  in  addition,  face  another  legal  problem  when  a  third  party 
desires  to  intervene  as  a  result  of  the  application  of  the  wording  of  Art.  39  (3)  of 
the  draft  Statute.  Firstly,  this  paragraph  does  not  clearly  provide  whether  the 
consent  of  the  League  Council  is  needed  for  the  purpose  of  intervention.  Such 
consent  is  necessary  when  any  state  not  party  to  the  Statute  resorts  to  the  Court  to 
decide  a  dispute  pertaining  to  the  interpretation  and  implementation  of  treaties 
83  Case  Concerning  the  Continental  Shelf,  (Tunisia  v.  Libyan  Arab  Jamahiriya),  Judgment,  ICJ 
Rep.,  (1982)  p.  18. 
84  Case  Concerning  the  Continental  Shelf,  (Tunisia/Libyan  Arab  Jamahiriya),  Application  by 
Malta  for  Permission  to  Intervene,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1981)  p.  19,  [para.  33]  in  which  the  Court  declared: 
"This  being  so,  the  very  character  of  the  intervention  for  which  Malta  seeks 
permission  shows,  in  the  view  of  the  Court,  that  the  interest  of  a  legal  nature  invoked 
by  Malta  cannot  be  considered  to  be  one  which  may  be  affected  by  the  decision  in 
the  case  within  the  meaning  of  Article  62  of  the  Statute.  " Chapter  Five  255 
signed  with  any  Arab  state  party  to  the  Statute.  85  It  is  submitted  that  the  draftsmen 
did  not  intend  to  put  a  third  party  in  a  better  position  than  an  original  party  to  the 
case.  It  is  assumed  that  if  the  consent  of  the  League  Council  is  required  for  the 
original  party,  it  would  be  then  required  also  for  a  third  party.  Secondly,  the  ACJ 
may  face  a  difficulty  regarding  the  notification  to  states  of  cases  related  to  the 
interpretation  of  a  multilateral  agreement  to  which  some  of  the  parties  to  the 
agreement  are  not  parties  to  the  case.  As  we  know  that  there  are  hundreds  of 
treaties  and  conventions  have  been  concluded  between  member  states  of  the  Arab 
League,  parties  to  the  Statute,  with  non-Arab  states  not  members  to  the  League  not 
allowed  to  be  parties  to  the  Statute.  There  is  no  specific  provision  in  the  draft 
Statute  allowing  the  ACJ  to  ask  international  organisations  to  present  relevant 
information  to  the  Court.  86  This  means  that  when  the  ACJ  realises  that  a 
particular  third  state  has  not  been  notified,  but  that  it  desires  to  make  a  request  to 
the  Court  for  intervention,  the  Court  then  would  have  to  allow  it  to  invoke  its  right 
even  after  the  closing  of  the  pleadings,  which  would  delay  the  procedures  of  the 
case.  87 
C.  Withdrawal  from  the  Arab  League,  Suspension  and  Expulsion 
What  if,  for  any  reason,  the  membership  of  the  Arab  League  of  an  Arab  state 
is  withdrawn,  suspended  or  expelled.  Would  its  right  of  access  to  the  Court 
continue  to  exist?  Usually,  withdrawal,  suspension  or  expulsion  of  membership 
83  Art.  21  (2)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ. 
86  This  provision  could  be  found  in  Art.  34  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  and  Art.  22  (a)  of  the  draft 
Statute  of  the  IICJ. 
87  It  is  to  be  noted  that  Art.  39  (2)  of  the  draft  Statute  allows  the  Court  in  some  exceptional  cases 
even  after  the  closure  of  the  pleadings  to  accept  an  application  to  intervene  prior  to  the  hearing  oral 
pleadings.  In  such  event  the  case  shall  be  opened  again  for  deliberation. Chapter  Five  256 
of  a  particular  member  state  means  the  end  of  the  relationship  between  the  state 
and  the  organisation.  88  Accordingly,  it  can  be  concluded  that  if  the  draft  Statute  of 
the  ACJ  is  signed  and  ratified  as  a  separate  treaty,  then  losing  membership  of  the 
Arab  League  for  any  reason  should  not  affect  the  privilege  of  an  Arab  state  to 
appear  before  the  Court.  In  other  words,  there  would  be  no  link  between 
membership  in  the  Arab  League  and  access  to  the  ACJ.  On  the  other  hand, 
however,  if  the  draft  Statute  is  not  open  for  signature  and  ratification 
independently  but  is  treated  as  a  part  of  the  Pact,  then  any  Arab  state  signing  the 
Pact  as  a  member  to  the  Arab  League  and  then  losing  its  membership  would  also 
lose  its  right  to  appear  before  the  Court.  Foda  argued  in  this  respect  as  follows:  89 
"It  seems  to  us,  from  the  outset,  to  be  more  appropriate  that  the 
Statute  of  the  Court  should  be  attached  a  Protocol  of  Signature  which 
might  be  signed  and  ratified  as  a  separate  treaty,  in  order  that  the 
rights  and  membership  in  the  Court  should  be  separated  from  the 
membership  and  the  dictates  of  politics  in  the  Arab  League.  This 
would  also  serve  the  purpose  whereby  a  Member  State  of  the  League 
and  of  the  Court  which  contemplates  withdrawal  from  the  League, 
could  still  remain  a  party  to  the  Statute  of  the  Court.  " 
5.2.2.  International  Organisations 
Disputes  may  arise  not  only  between  states,  but  in  addition  between  states 
and  organisations,  or  between  two  organisations.  Therefore,  one  may  ask  whether 
the  Arab  draftsmen  should  not  also  develop  the  ratione  personae  jurisdiction  of 
the  ACJ  by  allowing  Arab  intergovernmental  organisations  to  have  access  to  the 
Court.  90  By  Art.  21  (1)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  only  states  can  be  parties  in 
88  Similarly  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  p.  623-628. 
89  Foda,  The  Projected  Arab  Court,  supra  note  16,  p.  194. 
9°  It  is  not  our  aim  to  discuss  the  concept  of  international  organisations  as  a  subject  of  international 
law.  In  this  section  we  will  try  to  clarify  how  far  international  organisations  should  be  granted  the 
right  to  have  access  to  the  ACJ.  For  further  details  about  international  organisations  as  a  subject  of 
international  law  see  Amerasinghe,  Chittharanjan.  F.,  Principles  of  the  Institutional  Law  of 
International  Organisations,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  (1996)  p.  12;  Cassese, Chapter  Five  257 
contentious  proceedings  before  this  Court.  The  Article  follows  the  same  provision 
of  para.  1,  of  Art.  34  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ.  However,  this  exclusion  does  not 
mean  international  organisations  cannot  be  parties  to  cases  that  may  be  brought 
before  another  ad  hoc  international  arbitration  tribunal  if  an  organisation  has  a 
dispute  with  a  state  or  with  another  international  organisation.  91 
No  doubt  the  increasing  number  of  international  organisations,  whether 
regional  or  international,  and  their  effective  role  in  settling  international  disputes 
leads  to  a  justified  claim  that  they  should  be  granted  the  right  to  adjudicate  before 
the  ACJ.  A  comparable  suggestion  was  made  by  the  Institute  of  International  Law- 
in  1954,  when  it  recommended  that  Art.  34  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  should  be 
amended  to  keep  the  Court  open,  in  addition  to  states,  to  international 
organisations.  The  recommendation  reads  as  follows:  92 
"it  is  a  matter  of  urgency  to  widen  the  terms  of  Article  34  of  the 
Statute  so  as  to  grant  access  to  the  Court  to  international  organizations 
of  States  of  which  at  least  a  majority  are  Member  of  the  United 
Nations  or  Parties  to  the  Statute  of  the  Court.  " 
Antonio,  International  Law  in  a  Divided  World,  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  (1994)  p.  85; 
Van  Dervort,  Thomas  R.,  International  Law  and  Organization:  An  Introduction,  London:  SAGE 
Publications  Ltd.,  (1998)  p.  365;  Morgenstern,  Felice,  Legality  in  International  Organisations, 
XLVIII  BYbIL  (1976-77)  p.  p.  241-257. 
91  For  example,  in  1967,  an  ad  hoc  arbitration  was  held  between  the  United  Kingdom  Atomic 
Energy  Authority  and  the  Commission  of  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Authority  relating  to  the 
liability  to  income  tax  of  officials  of  the  commission  seconded  to  work  on  a  constructive  project  in 
the  United  Kingdom.  For  further  details  see  Commission  of  the  European  Atomic  Energy 
Community  v.  United  Kingdom  Atomic  Energy  Authority  case,  44  ILR  (1972)  p.  409.  Another 
example  could  be  mentioned  here.  Article  20  (Annex  VI)  of  the  Statute  of  the  International 
Tribunals  for  the  Law  of  the  Sea  allows  other  entities  than  states  to  appear  before  the  Court.  This 
Article  reads  as  follows:  "The-Tribunals  shall  be  open  to  entities  other  than  States  parties,  in  any 
case  expressly  provided  for  in  part  XI  or  in  any  case  submitted  pursuant  to  any  other  agreement 
conferring  jurisdiction  of  the  Tribunals  which  is  accepted  by  all  the  parties  to  that  case.  " 
92  45  Annuaire  IDI,  (1954-II)  p.  298;  also  some  international  lawyers  supported  the  same  idea,  for 
example,  see  Sztucki,  Jerzy,  International  Organizations  as  Parties  to  Contentious  Proceedings 
before  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  in  A.  S.  Muller,  D.  Raid  and  J.  M.  Thurdnszky  (eds.  ),  The 
International  Court  of  Justice:  Its  Future  Role  After  Fifty  Years,  The  Hague:  Martinus  Nijhoff 
Publishers,  (1997)  p.  p.  148-150. Chapter  Five  258 
The  question  raises,  when  and  how  it  becomes  possible  to  grant  public 
international  organisations  the  right  to  access  to  the  Court,  whether  in  the  case  of 
the  ICJ  or  the  ACJ.  The  argument  in  favour  of  recognising  the  ius  standi  of 
international  organisations  before  the  ICJ  derives  from  the  recognition  of  their 
international  personality.  The  Advisory  Opinion  of  the  ICJ  in  the  Reparation  for 
Injuries  case  (1949)  is  considered  as  the  leading  judicial  authority  on  the 
personality  of  international  organisations.  In  this  case  a  question  arose  whether 
the  UN  could  make  a  claim  for  compensation  under  international  law,  and 
therefore,  if  it  had  the  legal  capacity  to  make  such  a  claim.  The  question  put  to  the 
Court  was:  93 
"in  the  event  of  an  agent  of  the  United  Nations  in  the  performance  of 
his  duties  suffering  injury  in  circumstances  involving  the 
responsibility  of  a  State,  has  the  United  Nations,  as  an  organisation, 
the  capacity  to  bring  an  international  claim  against  the  responsible  de 
jure  or  de  facto  government  with  a  view  to  obtaining  the  reparation 
due  in  respect  of  the  damage  caused  (a)  to  the  United  Nations,  (b)  to 
the  victim  or  to  persons  entitled  through  him.  " 
The  Court  answered  this  legal  questions  in  the  affirmative:  94 
"In  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  the  Organization  was  intended  to 
exercise  and  enjoy,  and  is  in  fact  exercising  and  enjoying,  functions 
and  rights  which  can  only  be  explained  on  the  basis  of  the  possession 
of  a  large  measure  of  international  personality  and  the  capacity  to 
operate  upon  an  international  plane.  It  is  at  present  the  supreme  type 
of  international  organization,  and  it  could  not  carry  out  the  intentions 
of  its  founders  if  it  was  devoid  of  international  personality... 
Accordingly,  the  Court  has  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
Organization  is  an  international  person.  That  is  not  the  same  thing  as 
saying  that  it  is  a  State,  which  it  certainly  is  not,  or  that  its  legal 
personality  and  rights  and  duties  are  the  same  as  those  of  a  State.  Still 
less  is  it  the  same  thing  as  saying  that  it  is  a  `super-State',  whatever 
that  expression  may  mean.  It  does  not  even  imply  that  all  its  rights 
and  duties  must  be  upon  the  international  plane,  any  more  than  all  the 
rights  and  duties  of  a  State  must  be  upon  that  plane.  What  it  does 
93  Preparation  for  Injuries  Suffered  in  the  Service  of  the  United  Nations,  Advisory  Opinion,  ICJ 
Rep.,  (1949)  p.  p.  176-177. 
94 
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mean  is  that  it  is  a  subject  of  international  law  and  capable  of 
possessing  international  rights  and  duties,  and  that  it  has  capacity  to 
maintain  its  rights  by  bringing  international  claims.  " 
It  is  however  to  be  understood  that  when  states  establish  an  international 
organisation  they  have  to  specify  clearly  its  purposes  and  therefore,  the 
organisation's  legal  personality  must  then  be  treated  as  being  relative  to  those 
purposes.  This  is  affirmed  sufficiently  in  the  Preparation  advisory  opinion  of  the 
ICJ  when  the  Court  said:  95 
"Whereas  a  State  possesses  the  totality  of  international  rights  and 
duties  recognized  by  international  law,  the  rights  and  duties  of  an 
entity  such  as  the  Organization  must  depend  upon  its  purposes  and 
functions  as  specified  or  implied  in  its  constituent  documents  and 
developed  in  practice.  " 
However,  does  that  mean  international  organisations  can  refer  to  the  Court  in 
contentious  proceedings  as  well  as  advisory  proceedings?  Hambro  has  argued  as 
follows:  96 
"One  must  conclude  that  in  the  present  state  of  international  law, 
international  organizations  are  not  admitted  as  parties  before  the 
Court  in  contentious  cases.  " 
It  is,  however,  clear  that  this  right  has  been  granted  just  to  the  UN  and  its 
specialised  agencies.  Under  the  provisions  of  Art.  34  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ, 
only  the  UN  and  its  specialised  agencies  have  the  right  of  access  to  the  Court  for 
advisory  opinions:  other  public  international  organisations  created  outside  the  UN 
system  are  excluded  from  this  provision.  This  means  that  they  have  no  right  to 
95  Ibid.,  180. 
96  Hambro,  The  Jurisdiction  of  the  ICJ,  supra  note  19,  p.  161;  similarly  see  Seidl-Hobenveldern, 
Ignas,  Access  of  International  Organizations  to  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  in  A.  S.  Muller, 
D.  Raid  and  J.  M.  Thuränszky  (eds.  ),  The  International  Court  of  Justice:  Its  Future  Role  After 
Fifty  Years,  The  Hague:  Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers,  (1997)  p.  189. Chapter  Five  260 
appear  before  the  ICJ  in  advisory  cases.  This  has  led  some  international  lawyers 
to  criticise  this  provision  and  consider  it  as  discriminatory.  97 
The  failure  of  many  proposals  presented  at  the  San  Francisco  Conference  in 
1945,  in  favour  of  allowing  international  organisations  to  have  access  to  the  Court, 
led  some  delegations  in  the  Committee  of  Jurists  held  at  Washington  in  1945,  to 
recognise  the  importance  of  international  organisations  in  international  relations. 
The  United  States  of  America  consequently  proposed  adding  a  new  paragraph  to 
Art.  34  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  to  grant  international  organisations  some  duties  in 
order  to  help  the  Court  exercise  its  judicial  functions.  98  In  the  application  of  Art: 
34  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  international  organisations  may  be  asked  to  give  the 
Court  any  information  deemed  necessary  to  cases  before  it.  99  Art.  34  provides: 
"2.  The  Court,  subject  to  and  in  conformity  with  its  Rules,  may 
request  of  public  international  organizations  information  relevant  to 
cases  before  it,  and  shall  receive  such  information  presented  by  such 
organizations  on  their  own  initiative; 
3.  Whenever  the  construction  of  the  constituent  instrument  of  public 
international  organization  or  of  an  international  convention  adopted 
thereunder  is  in  question  in  a  case  before  the  Court,  the  Registrar  shall 
so  notify  the  public  international  organization  concerned  and  shall 
communicate  to  it  copies  of  all  the  written  proceedings.  " 
It  is  clear  that,  according  the  above  mentioned  Article,  the  Court  can  ask  only 
for  relevant  information  from  international  organisations.  Any  other  organisation 
not  qualified  as  a  public  international  organisation  is  excluded  from  access  to  the 
Court.  100  This  happened  when  the  ICJ  during  the  course  of  the  proceedings  in  the 
97  Ibid.,  192. 
98  UNCIO,  vol.  14,  (1945)  p.  p.  133,323;  also  see  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2, 
p.  p.  639-640. 
99  The  same  provisions  were  also  be  found  in  the  Statute  of  the  PCIJ  (Art.  26). 
100  UNCIO,  vol.  14,  (1945)  p.  134;  Hambro,  The  Jurisdiction  of  the  ICJ,  supra  note  19,  p.  162; 
Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  p.  653-654. Chapter  Five  261 
Asylum  case,  refused  to  accept  information  from  the  International  League  of 
Rights  of  Man  because  it  was  not  considered  as  public  international  organisation 
within  the  meaning  of  Art.  34  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ.  101 
It  appears  that  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  will  also  grant  Arab  regional 
organisations  created  within  the  Arab  League  system  the  right  to  request  from  the 
Court  advisory  opinions.  This  can  only  mean  that  such  regional  organisations  will 
be  indirectly  excluded  from  appearing  before  the  ACJ  in  contentious  cases. 
During  the  discussion  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  1979,  Bahrain  and  the  United 
Arab  Emirates  suggested  that  at  least  Arab  international  organisations  created- 
within  the  Arab  League  system  should  be  granted  the  possibility  to  submit  their 
disputes  before  the  Court  in  contentious  cases.  Unfortunately,  this  suggestion  was 
rejected  and  the  matter  remained  unfavourable  for  organisations.  102  No  clear 
reason  has  been  found  as  to  why  the  suggestion  was  rejected.  If  the  rejection  was 
made  because  organisations  may  irritate  states  by  bringing  disputes  against  them 
before  the  Court,  extending  the  ratione  personae  jurisdiction  of  the  ACJ  to 
organisations  would  not  harm  the  interests  of  Arab  states  because  most  of  the 
relevant  organisations  are  under  the  direct  control  of  the  states  parties  to  the 
Statute. 
5.2.3.  Individuals 
It  is  generally  accepted  by  international  lawyers  that  individuals  are  an 
important  subject  of  international  law;  however,  this  does  not  mean  that  they 
101  Asylum  case,  ICJ  Pleadings,  vol.  [1,  p.  227;  also  see  4  YBICJ(1949-50)  p.  90. 
102  See  comments  of  Expert  Committee,  Doc.  3,  supra  note  72;  for  more  discussion  see 
Dachraoui,  Arab  Court  of  Justice,  supra  note  72,  p.  83. Chapter  Five  262 
should  have  the  right  to  sue  before  the  ICJ.  103  This  approach  has  not  satisfied  all 
international  lawyers  who  support  the  idea  that  individuals  should  be  granted  the 
right  to  appear  before  the  World  Court.  This  dissatisfaction  arose  because  neither 
the  debates  of  Advisory  Committee  of  Jurists  of  1920  nor  the  Advisory 
Committee  of  Jurists  of  1945  permitted  individuals  to  have  access  to  the  PCIJ  or 
ICJ  alongside  states.  104  This  negative  position  towards  individuals  has  been 
strongly  criticised.  Janis  for  example,  has  argued  that:  105 
"Opening  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ICJ  to  individuals  is  probably  the  best 
and  perhaps  the  only  means  for  ensuring  its  effective  utilization.  The 
very  reasons  that  argue  against  governments  and  international 
organizations  using  the  ICJ  are  turned  on  their  heads  when  individuals 
are  involved.  " 
He  supported  his  idea  by  referring  to  the  practice  of  the  European 
Communities.  Their  regional  Court,  the  European  Court  of  Justice,  is  accessible 
to  individuals  to  appear  before  it.  He  suggested  that:  106 
103  Partsch,  Karl  Josef,  Individuals  in  International  Law,  8  EPIL  (1985)  p.  316;  Higgins,  Rosalyn, 
Conceptual  Thinking  About  the  Individual  in  International  Law,  in  Richard  Falk  [et.  al]  (eds.  ), 
International  Law:  A  Contemporary  Perspective,  London:  Westview  Press,  (1985)  p.  478; 
Mullerson,  Rein  A.,  Human  Rights  and  the  Individual  as  Subject  of  International  Law:  A  Soviet 
View,  I  EJIL  (1990)  p.  36;  Janis,  Mark  W.,  Individuals  as  a  Subject  of  International  Law,  17 
CILJ,  (1984)  p.  p.  61-64;  Hambro  declared  in  his  The  Jurisdiction  of  the  ICJ,  supra  note  19, 
p.  p.  163-164  that: 
"it  is  clear  from  the  wording  of  Art.  34  of  the  Statute  that  individuals  cannot  be 
admitted  to  plead  before  the  Court.  This,  however,  does  not  mean  that  individuals 
cannot  in  certain  circumstances  be  subject  of  international  law,  neither  does  it  mean 
that  individuals  cannot  bring  claims  in  other  circumstances  and  before  other 
international  tribunals.  " 
104  See  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice,  Advisory  Committee  of  Jurists,  Proces-verbaury 
of  Proceedings  of  the  Committee,  (16  June-24  July,  1920,  League  of  Nations  Publication,  1920) 
p.  206;  see  also  UNCIO,  vol.  14,  (1945)  p.  p.  132-136. 
105  Janis,  Mark  W.,  Individuals  and  International  Court,  in  A.  S.  Muller,  D.  Rai(  and  J.  M. 
Thuranszky  (eds.  ),  The  International  Court  of  Justice:  Its  Future  Role  After  Fifty  Years,  The 
Hague:  Martinus  Nijhoff  Publishers,  (1997)  p.  209. 
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"the  International  Court  of  Justice  (should)  follow  in  the  wake  of  the 
newer  European  regional  international  law  courts  and  permit,  under 
some  circumstances,  individuals  suits  against  States  and  International 
Institutions.  Although  this  could  be  accomplished  in  many  ways,  it 
might  be  useful  if  I  were  to  put  forward  a  possible  set  of  amendments 
to  the  ICJ  Statute  in  hopes  of  stimulating  debate.  " 
Referring  to  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  we  assume  it  has  been  thought  wise 
by  the  Arab  draftsmen,  at  least  in  this  stage,  to  apply  the  provision  of  the  ICJ 
regarding  the  position  of  individuals  in  relation  to  the  Court,  because  Arab 
governments  do  not  wish,  at  least  at  present,  to  grant  individuals  the  right  to 
appear  before  the  ACJ.  The  situation  seems  to  have  been  the  same  since  the  first 
draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  was  prepared  by  the  Three-man  Committee.  Foda  has 
made  the  following  comment  on  this  matter  by  arguing:  107 
"It  seems  impractical  to  recommend  that  individuals  be  given  standing 
as  plaintiffs  before  the  projected  Arab  Court.  It  could  be  easily 
objected  to  as  unwise  and  premature  in  the  early  stages  of  the  work  of 
this  Court.  " 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  exclusion  of  individuals  in  the  present  draft 
Statute  may  involve  a  considerable  legal  problem  in  case  the  ACJ  succeeds  to  the 
functions  of  the  Arab  Court  of  Investment  (ACI).  Strengthening  economic 
relations  has  been  one  of  the  objectives  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  and  the 
Collective  Security  Treaty.  An  Economic  Council  was  created  within  the  Arab 
League  system  with  the  aim  to  facilitate,  organise  and  coordinate  Arab  states' 
activities  in  the  economic  field.  108  Accordingly,  a  United  Convention  for  Arab 
107  Foda,  The  Projected  Arab  Court,  supra  note  16,  p.  202. 
108  See  above  chapter  1,  p.  p.  12-14. Chapter  Five  264 
Capital  Investment  in  Arab  Countries  was  concluded  between  Arab  states  and 
entered  into  force  in  1981.109 
The  United  Convention  comprises  seven  chapters  and  one  annex.  Chapter  six 
regulates  the  settlement  of  disputes  relative  to  investment  (Arts.  25-36). 
According  to  Art.  25,  disputes  regarding  the  interpretation  and  application  of  the 
United  Convention  are  to  be  resolved  either  by  conciliation,  arbitration,  or 
recourse  to  the  ACI.  Arts.  28  (1)  and  46  explicitly  provide  that  in  addition  to  the 
creation  of  the  ACI,  the  United  Convention  is  linked  to  the  expected  creation  of 
the  ACJ  and  envisages  transferring  to  it  all  the  competences  of  the  ACI.  110  This 
means  that  the  drafters  of  the  United  Convention  have  planned  to  create  a 
temporary  judicial  organ,  namely,  the  ACI  whose  functions  will  terminate  as  soon 
as  the  ACJ  is  created.  The  most  important  provision  in  this  respect  in  the  United 
Convention  appears  in  the  wording  of  Art.  29  which  permits,  in  addition  to  states, 
public  companies  and  private  persons  to  appear  before  the  ACI. 
When  drafting  the  1979  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  the  expert  committee  of  member 
states  was  aware  of  the  problem  and  suggested  the  inclusion  of  a  new  chapter  in 
the  draft  Statute  of  the  projected  ACJ  clarifying  its  relation  to  the  United 
Convention.  "'  According  to  this  suggestion,  it  should  have  been  specified  that 
109  Hereinafter  cited  as:  '  The  United  Convention.  For  full  text  of  this  convention  see  League  of 
Arab  States  (Department  of  Legal  Affairs),  Majmu'at  al  Mu'ahadat  wal  Ittifagiyat,  (Collection  of 
Treaties  and  Conventions),  al  Qahirah,  (1985)  p.  p.  598-615. 
10  Art.  28  (1)  on  the  one  hand,  provides  that  "till  the  creation  of  the  Arab  Court  of  Justice,  an 
Arab  Court  of  Investment  shall  be  established.  "  Art.  46  on  the  other  hand,  provides  that 
"competence  of  the  Court  will  revert  to  the  Arab  Court  of  Justice  when  it  is  created.  " 
11  See  comments  of  Experts  Committee,  Doc.  3,  supra  note  72;  also  see  Ben  Miled,  The 
Competence  of  the  ACJ,  supra  note  22,  p.  25;  Dachraoui,  Arab  Court  of  Justice,  supra  note  72, 
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the  competence  of  the  ACI  would  be  transferred  to  the  ACJ  which  would  then 
make  use  of  the  new  competence  related  to  individuals  and  previously  accorded  to 
the  former  ACI  under  the  United  Convention.  Despite  this  fact  the  suggestion 
was  rejected  and  neither  the  1979  draft  Statute  nor  the  present  draft  Statute  of 
1995  contain  any  provision  relative  to  the  succession  from  the  ACI  to  the  ACJ. 
Do  the  provisions  which  appear  in  the  United  Convention  oblige  the  Arab  judges 
in  the  ACJ  to  accept  public  companies  or  individuals  as  parties  to  disputes  relative 
to  investment,  especially  as  all  parties  to  the  United  Convention  are  members  of 
the  Arab  League  and  parties  to  the  Statute  of  the  ACJ?  112  If  the  Arab  judges 
refuse  to  allow  public  companies  or  individuals  to  appear  before  it,  they  will 
breach  a  Convention  in  force  concluded  and  ratified  by  the  same  states  that  are 
parties  to  the  Statute  of  the  ACJ.  This  would  be  a  complicated  matter.  If  the 
Court  accepts  its  competence  to  admit  individuals  to  the  Court,  it  will  contradict 
the  ratione  personae  jurisdiction  of  the  Statute  of  the  ACJ  which  only  permits 
states  to  be  parties  to  a  contentious  cases.  The  Arab  judges  will  then  have  two 
choices,  either  to  extend  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ACJ  to  include  any  public 
companies  or  individuals  or  require  that  states  must  seise  the  Court  on  behalf  of  its 
own  individuals  or  public  companies.  '  13 
112  It  is  to  be  understood  that  there  is  no  problem  in  accepting  any  dispute  relative  to  an  investment 
matter  by  the  ACJ.  The  problem  is  allowing  public  companies  or  individuals  (Arab  investors)  to 
have  access  to  the  Court  directly  in  contentious  cases. 
"'  This  solution  was  adopted  in  many  cases  by  the  ICJ  in  which  states  presented  dispute  on  behalf 
of  its  national  persons  or  companies.  As  examples  of  cases  concerning  the  interests  of  individuals, 
Ambatielos  case,  (Greece  v.  United  Kingdom),  Preliminary  Objections,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1952)  p.  28;  the 
Nottebohm  case,  (Liechtenstein  v.  Guatemala),  Preliminary  Objections,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1953)  p.  I11; 
on  the  other  hand,  company  cases  have  been  numerous  and  include  the  Anglo-Iranian  Oil  Co.  case, 
(United  Kingdom  v.  Iran),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1952)  p.  93;  the  Barcelona  Traction,  Light  and  Power 
Company,  Limited,  (Belgium  v.  Spain),  Preliminary  Objections,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1964)  p.  6;  and 
Interhandel  case,  (Switzerland  v.  United  States  of  America),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1959)  p.  6. Chapter  Five  266 
It  is  not  possible  to  predict  which  direction  the  ACJ  will  adopt;  the  only 
persons  who  will  be  able  to  give  a  clear  answer  will  be  the  Arab  judges. 
Hopefully  Arab  states  will  reach  a  compromise  in  this  complicated  legal  problem 
confronting  the  ACJ.  In  the  beginning  an  explicit  provision  could  have  been 
included  in  the  draft  Statute  for  solving  the  problem.  It  is  submitted  here  that 
public  companies  and  individuals  should  be  granted  directly  the  right  to  appear 
before  the  ACJ  in  contentious  cases  only  in  disputes  mentioned  in  the  United 
Convention  related  to  investment  matters.  This  solution  would  not  affect  the 
independence  and  sovereignty  of  Arab  states.  When  the  Arab  draftsmen  take  into 
consideration  this  suggestion,  they  will  repeat  an  idea  supported  by  most 
contemporary  international  lawyers,  namely,  that  individuals  should  be  granted  the 
right  to  appear  before  the  ICJ.  This  would  not  harm  the  sovereignty  of  Arab  states 
because,  the  right  which  individuals  are  to  be  granted  will  be  limited  just  to 
disputes  relating  to  matters  of  investment  mentioned  in  the  United  Convention. 
5.3.  Jurisdiction  Ratione  Materiae 
As  already  mentioned  above,  the  necessity  of  consent  by  states  in  every  case 
submitted  to  the  ACJ,  is  considered  to  be  an  important  requirement.  However, 
this  does  not  mean  that  states  parties  to  a  dispute  have  to  express  their  consent  in 
every  case  brought  before  the  Court.  It  would  be  possible  for  them  to  give  an  ad 
hoc  consent  in  each  case  as  a  compromise,  or  a  general  consent  given  in  advance 
when  a  state  becomes  party  to  a  bilateral  or  multilateral  treaty  which  contains  a 
compromissory  clause  providing  for  reference  to  the  Court  of  all  disputes  that  may 
arise  concerning  its  interpretation  or  application,  or  by  making  a  unilateral Chapter  Five  267 
declaration  known  as  an  optional  clause  declaration,  by  which  a  state  would 
accept  the  Court's  jurisdiction  as  compulsory.  114  In  the  present  section 
information  will  be  given  about  these  three  ways  in  which  states  can  submit  their 
disputes  to  the  ACJ. 
5.3.1.  Compromise 
This  is  the  first  method  by  which  the  parties  may  submit  a  case  to  the  Court. 
It  consists  of  a  special  agreement  between  two  parties  who  choose  to  submit  a 
particular  case  to  the  Court.  The  parties  accept  the  Court's  jurisdiction  relating  to 
an  existing  dispute,  which  means  the  agreement  of  the  parties  comes  after  the. 
beginning  of  a  dispute.  Once  the  compromise  is  accepted,  the  Court  can  consider 
the  case.  115  Rosenne  defines  this  method  as  "an  agreement  by  which  two  or  more 
114  Similarly  see  Fitzmaurice,  The  Law  and  Procedure,  supra  note  3,  p.  p.  111-112;  Oellers- 
Frahm,  Karin,  International  Court  of  Justice,  2  EPIL  (1995)  p.  1089. 
115  Only  eleven  cases  were  instituted  by  special  agreement  or  compromise  in  the  period  of  the 
PCIJ  while,  since  1947  there  are  around  11  case  brought  before  the  ICJ  by  this  method.  On  the 
one  had,  cases  submitted  to  the  PCIJ  are  as  follows:  Interpretation  of  Paragraph  4  of  the  Annex 
following  Article  169  of  the  Treaty  of  Neuilly  case,  Chamber  of  Summary  Procedure,  PC/J  (1924) 
Ser.  A,  No.  3;  Lotus  case,  Judgment,  PCIJ,  (1927)  Ser.  A,  No.  10;  Serbian  Loans  case, 
Judgment,  PCIJ  (1929)  Ser.  A,  No.  20;  Brazilian  Loans  case,  Judgment,  PCIJ  (1929)  Ser.  A, 
No.  21;  Territorial  Jurisdiction  of  the  International  Commission  of  the  River,  Order,  PCIJ  (1929) 
Ser.  A,  No.  23;  Free  Zones  of  Upper  Savoy  and  the  District  of  Gex  case,  Order  of  6  December 
1930,  PCIJ  (1930)  Ser.  A,  No.  24,  and  PCIJ  (1932)  Ser.  A/B,  No.  46;  Delimitation  of  the 
Territorial  Waters  Between  Castellorozo  and  Anatolia  case,  Order,  (discontinued),  PCIJ  (1933) 
Ser.  A/B,  No.  51;  Lighthouses  case  between  France  and  Greece,  Judgment,  PCIJ  (1934)  Ser. 
A/B,  No.  62;  Oscar  Chinn  case,  Judgment,  PCIJ  (1934)  Ser.  A/B,  No.  63;  Lighthouses  in  Crete 
and  Samos  case,  (discontinued),  PCIJ(1937)  Ser.  A/B,  No.  71;  Borchgrave  case,  (discontinued), 
PCIJ  (1937)  Ser.  A/B,  No.  72,  and  (1938)  Ser.  A/B,  No.  73.  On  the  other  hand,  cases  submitted 
to  the  ICJ  are  as  follows:  Corfu  Channel  case,  (United  Kingdom  v.  Albania),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1949) 
p.  4;  Asylum  case,  (Colombia  v.  Peru),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1950)  p.  226;  Minquiers  and  Ecrehos  case, 
(France/United  Kingdom),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1953)  p.  47;  Sovereignty  over  Certain  Frontier  Land  case, 
(Belgium/Netherlands),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1959)  p.  209;  North  Sea  Continental  Shelf  case,  (Federal 
Republic  of  Germany/Denmark;  Federal  republic  of  Germany/  Netherlands),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1969)  p.  3; 
Continental  Shelf  case,  (Tunisia/Libyan  Arab  Jamahiriya),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1982)  p.  18;  Delimitation  of 
the  Maritime  Boundary  in  the  Gulf  of  Maine  Area  case,  (Canada/United  States  of  America),  ICJ 
Rep.,  (1982)  p.  3,  (this  case  referred  to  a  chamber);  Continental  Shelf  case,  (Libyan  Arab 
Jamahiriya/Malta),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1985)  p.  13;  Frontier  Dispute  case,  (Burkina  Faso/  Republic  of 
Mali),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1986)  p.  554,  (this  case  referred  to  a  chamber);  Land,  Island  and  Maritime 
Frontier  Boundary  Dispute  case,  (El  Salvador/Honduras:  Nicaragua  intervening),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1990) Chapter  Five  268 
states  agree  to  refer  a  particular  and  defined  case  or  matter  to  the  Court  for 
decision.  "  116  Some  international  lawyers  consider  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ICJ  based 
on  a  special  agreement  (compromise)  to  be  the  most  effective  method  for  the 
settlement  of  an  international  dispute.  Scott  and  Carr,  for  example,  have  stated  in 
this  respect: 
"it  seems  that  the  only  safe  way  to  get  states  before  the  Court  is  by 
their  agreement  at  the  time  of  the  actual  dispute.  Other  methods  all 
carry  a  reasonable  probability  of  failure.  " 
They  further  state: 
"It  is  axiomatic  that  problems  of  jurisdiction  or  compliance  rarely 
arise  when  states  make  a  special  agreement  to  submit  their  dispute  to 
the  Court.  "  117 
In  a  compromise  the  parties  have  their  respective  ideas  about  their  dispute,  so 
that  when  they  refer  the  case  to  the  ICJ  they  can  explicitly  define  the  dispute 
which  the  Court  has  to  consider;  when  they  do  so,  the  ICJ  is  not  competent  to  go 
further.  "8  In  the  Continental  Shelf  case,  for  example,  the  ICJ  stated  that  "when 
proceedings  are  instituted  by  special  agreement  it  must  not  exceed  the  jurisdiction 
conferred  upon  it  by  the  parties,  but  at  the  same  time,  it  must  also  exercise  that 
jurisdiction  to  its  full  extent.  "'  19  The  consent  to  submit  a  case  to  the  ICJ  may  also 
be  expressed  by  accepting  a  recommendation  addressed  to  the  states  concerned  by 
the  Security  Council  under  the  provisions  of  Arts.  33  and  36  of  the  Charter  of  the 
p.  92,  (this  case  referred  to  a  chamber);  Territorial  Dispute  case,  (Libyan  Arab  Jamahiriya/Chad), 
ICJ  Rep.,  (1990)  p.  149;  Kasikili/Sedudu  Island,  Order,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1996)  p.  63. 
116  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  663;  and  his  The  World  Court,  supra  note  2, 
p.  p.  85-86. 
117  Scott,  Gary  L.,  and  Carr,  Craig  L.,  The  ICJ  and  Compulsory  Jurisdiction:  The  Case  for  Closing 
the  Clause,  81  AJIL  (1987)  p.  67.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Scott  and  Carr,  The  ICJ  and  Compulsory 
Jurisdiction). 
118  Fachiri,  The  Permanent  Court  of  Justice,  supra  note  38,  p.  73. 
119  Continental  Shelf  case,  (Libyan  Arab  Jamahiriya/Malta),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1985)  p.  23. Chapter  Five  269 
UN.  120  This  does  not  mean,  on  the  other  hand,  that  consent  in  this  kind  of  cases 
(compromise)  need  be  given  in  any  special  form.  It  may  be  expressed  explicitly  or 
implicitly.  This  was  affirmed  by  the  decision  of  the  ICJ  in  the  Corfu  Channel 
case,  when  the  Court  stated:  121 
"While  the  consent  of  the  parties  confers  jurisdiction  on  the  Court, 
neither  the  Statute  nor  the  Rules  require  that  this  consent  should  be 
expressed  in  any  particular  form... 
Furthermore,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  the  acceptance  of 
jurisdiction,  as  in  the  present  case,  from  being  effected  by  two 
separate  and  successive  acts,  instead  of  jointly  and  beforehand  by  a 
special  agreement.  As  the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice 
has  said  in  its  judgment  No.  12,  of  April  260'  1928,  page  23:  "The 
acceptance  by  a  State  of  the  Court's  jurisdiction  in  a  particular  case  is 
not,  under  the  Statute,  subordinated  to  the  observance  of  certain 
forms,  such  as,  for  instance,  the  previous  conclusion  of  a  special 
agreement.  " 
In  such  a  case  the  ICJ  exercises  jurisdiction  by  virtue  of  the  principle  of 
forum  prorogatum.  This  term  was  defined  by  Lauterpacht  as  follows: 
"Exercise  of  jurisdiction  by  virtue  of  the  principle  of  forum 
prorogatum  takes  place  whenever,  after  the  indication  of  proceedings 
by  joint  or  unilateral  application,  jurisdiction  is  exercised  with  regard 
either  to  the  entire  dispute  or  to  some  aspects  of  it  as  the  result  of  an 
agreement,  express  or  implied,  which  is  given  by  either  or  both  parties 
and  without  which  the  Court  would  not  be  in  the  position  to  exercise 
jurisdiction.  ￿  122 
The  agreement  of  the  parties  must  not  be  ambiguous,  as  it  appears  to  have 
been  in  the  Anglo-Iranian  case.  There  the  ICJ  made  clear  that  for  it  to  be 
competent  to  hear  the  case,  the  principle  of  forum  prorogatum  should  be  based  on 
120  In  the  Corfu  Channel  case,  Albania  declared  that  it  accepted  the  recommendation  of  the 
Security  Council  to  submit  the  dispute  to  the  ICJ.  See  Corfu  Channel  case,  (United  Kingdom  v. 
Albania),  ICJ  Rep.,  Order,  (1947)  p.  p.  4-5. 
121  Ibid.,  p.  p.  27-28. 
122  Lauterpacht,  Hersch,  The  Development  of  International  Law  by  the  International  Court, 
London:  Stevens  and  Sons  Limited,  (1958)  p.  103.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Lauterpacht,  The 
Development  of  International  Law);  similarly  see  individual  opinion  of  Elihu  Lauterpacht  as  a 
judge  ad  hoc  in  the  Genocide  Convention  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1993)  p.  325;  for  further  definition  of 
the  term  forum  prorogatum  see  Alexandrov,  Stanimir  A.,  Reservations  in  Unilateral  Declarations 
Accepting  the  Compulsory  Jurisdiction  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  London:  Martinus 
Nijhoff  Publishers,  (1995)  p.  3. Chapter  Five  270 
an  act  or  declaration  of  the  Iranian  government  including  an  element  of  agreement 
regarding  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court.  This  happened  when  the  United  Kingdom 
submitted  that  the  Iranian  government  had  by  its  actions  conferred  jurisdiction 
upon  the  Court  on  the  basis  of  the  principle  of  forum  prorogatum.  The  Court 
disagreed  by  stating: 
"The  principle  of  forum  prorogatum,  if  it  could  be  applied  to  the 
present  case,  would  have  to  be  based  on  some  conduct  or  statement  of 
the  Government  of  Iran  which  involves  an  element  of  consent 
regarding  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court.  But  the  Government  of  Iran 
has  consistently  denied  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court.  "123 
Compromise  is  mentioned  in  Art.  22  (1)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  which 
provides: 
"The  Court's  jurisdiction  shall  encompass  the  following  disputes: 
1.  Disputes  states  which  are  parties  to  the  Statute  agree  to  submit  to 
the  Court.  These  disputes  shall  include  all  matters  provided  for  in  the 
Arab  League  Pact  or  treaties  in  force  concluded  between  them.  "124 
When  this  Article  is  read  and  compared  with  the  wording  of  Art.  36  (1)  of  the 
Statute  of  the  ICJ,  the  following  points  become  clear:  (1)  the  Arab  draftsmen 
realised  that  no  case  could  be  considered  by  the  Court  without  the  consent  of  the 
parties,  so  they  limited  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ACJ  just  to  those  disputes  that  states 
have  agreed  to  submit  to  the  Court.  This  can  be  seen  clearly  as  they  avoided  using 
the  term  `all  cases',  as  the  international  drafters  used  in  Art.  36  (1)  of  the  Statute 
of  the  ICJ.  125  (2)  It  is  to  be  understood  that  the  expression  "treaties  in  force"  used 
in  Art.  22  (1)  of  the  ACJ  Statute  should  be  interpreted  in  the  same  way  as  in 
12'  Anglo-Iranian  Oil  Co.  case,  (United  Kingdom  v.  Iran),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1952)  p.  114. 
124  Cf.  Art.  36  (1)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ;  also  Art.  25  (a)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  I  ICJ. 
125  It  is  worth  mentioning  here  that  when  drafting  Art.  36  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  disagreement 
arose  between  delegations  at  the  Washington  Committee  of  Jurists  regarding  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Court.  Was  it  to  be  competent  in  all  cases  or  just  to  those  cases  submitted  to  it  by  the  parties. 
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Art.  36  (1)  of  the  ICJ  Statute,  to  mean  that  a  treaty  used  as  an  instrument  for 
accepting  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  should  be  in  force  at  the  time  when  the 
proceedings  are  instituted.  126  It  is  hoped  that  the  ACJ  would  be  as  liberal  as  the 
ICJ  regarding  the  lack  of  formality  and  rigidity  within  the  concept  of 
compromise.  127 
5.3.2.  The  Compromissory  Clause 
The  Compromissory  Clause  is  considered  as  the  second  method  of  conferring 
jurisdiction  under  a  treaty  in  force,  bilateral  or  multilateral.  Art.  22  (2)  of  the  draft 
Statute  of  the  ACJ  refers  to  this  practice  when  it  provides: 
"The  Court's  jurisdiction  shall  encompass  the  following  disputes: 
2.  Disputes  arising  from  bilateral  and  multilateral  agreements  which 
provide  for  submission  to  the  Court.  " 
This  provision  also  appears  in  the  wording  of  Art.  36  (1)  of  the  Statute  of  the 
ICJ  which  refers  to  particular  situations  provided  for  the  Charter  of  the  UN,  or 
current  treaties  and  conventions  in  force.  128  In  such  a  situation,  where  the 
difficulties  in  interpretation.  See  UNCIO,  vol.  14,  (1945)  p.  841;  also  see  for  further  discussion 
Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  p.  658-659. 
126  Fachiri,  The  Permanent  Court  of  Justice,  supra  note  38,  p.  p.  73-74;  Hudson,  The  Permanent 
Court,  supra  note  14,  p.  p.  435-436;  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  661. 
127  Ben  Miled,  The  Competence  of  the  ACJ,  supra  note  22,  p.  31. 
128  Since  1946  the  following  case  have  been  referred  to  the  ICJ  on  the  basis  of  a  compromissory 
clause:  Protection  of  French  Nationals  and  Protected  Persons  in  Egypt  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1950) 
p.  59,  discontinued;  Ambatielos  case,  Preliminary  Objections,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1952)  p.  28;  Haya  de  la 
Torre  case,  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1951),  p.  71;  Electricitede  Beyrouth  Company  case,  ICJ  Rep., 
(1954)  p.  107,  discontinued;  Barcelona  Traction,  Light  and  Power  Company,  two  cases,  ICJ  Rep., 
(1961)  p.  9  and  ICJ  Rep.,  (1964)  p.  6,  the  first  discontinued;  Compagnie  du  Port,  des  Quais  et  des 
Entrepöts  de  Beyrouth  and  the  Societe  Radio-Orient,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1960)  p.  186,  discontinued;  South 
West  Africa  case,  two  cases  jointed,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1961)  p.  13  and  ICJ  Rep.,  (1966)  p.  6;  Northern 
Cameroons  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1963)  p.  15;  Appeal  Relating  to  the  Jurisdiction  of  the  ICAO  Council, 
ICJ  Rep.,  (1972)  p.  46;  Fisheries  Jurisdiction  case,  two  cases,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1972)  p.  12  and  ICJ 
Rep.,  (1972)  p.  30;  Nuclear  Tests  case,  in  part,  two  cases,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1973)  p.  99  and  ICJ  Rep., 
(1973)  p.  135;  Trial  of  Pakistani  Prisoners  of  War  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1973)  p.  328,  discontinued; 
Aegean  Sea  Continental  Shelf  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1978)  p.  3;  United  States  Diplomatic  and  Consular 
Staff  in  Tehran  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1980)  p.  73,  discontinued  after  judgment  on  the  merits;  Military 
and  Paramilitary  Activities  in  and  against  Nicaragua,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1986)  p.  14,  in  part,  discontinued 
after  judgment  on  the  merits;  Elettronica  Sicula  S.  p.  A.  (ELSI)  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1989)  p.  15; Chapter  Five  272 
jurisdiction  of  the  Court  is  defined  according  to  the  compromissory  clause,  a 
unilateral  request  from  one  state  party  to  a  dispute  is  enough  to  give  the  Court 
competence  to  decide  the  case.  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  case  be  submitted  to  the 
Court  jointly  by  the  two  parties  at  the  same  time,  as  the  agreement  of  the 
defendant  will  have  been  given  in  advance.  In  other  words,  any  dispute  arising 
between  parties  to  a  treaty  relating  to  its  application  or  interpretation  can  be 
referred  to  the  Court  by  any  party  to  the  treaty.  129  The  ICJ  has  affirmed  this  by 
stating: 
"The  appraisal  of  the  conduct  of  [the  respondent]  in  the  light  of  [the] 
relevant  provisions  of  the  Treaty  pertains  to  the  application  of  the  law 
rather  than  to  its  interpretation,  and  the  Court  will  therefore  undertake 
this  in  the  context  of  its  general  evaluation  of  the  facts  established  in 
relation  to  the  applicable  law.  "130 
The  main  differences  between  submitting  cases  to  the  ICJ  on  the  basis  of  a 
compromise  or  compromissory  clause  may  be  summarised  in  three  points:  (1) 
with  a  compromise  the  litigation  is  commenced  as  soon  as  the  parties  reach  the 
special  agreement  by  which  they  declare  their  willingness  to  accept  the 
Border  and  Tranborder  Armed  Actions,  two  cases,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1987)  p.  182  and  ICJ  Rep.,  (1988) 
p.  69,  the  first  discontinued  early,  the  second  discontinued  after  a  Phase  of  Jurisdiction  and 
Admissibility;  Aerial  Incident  of  3  July  1988  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1996)  p.  9,  discontinued;  Passage 
through  the  Great  Belt  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1992)  p.  348,  in  part,  discontinued;  Questions  of 
Interpretation  and  Application  of  the  1971  Montreal  Convention  arising  from  the  Aerial  Incident 
at  Lockerbie,  two  cases,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1992)  p.  3  and  ICJ  Rep.,  (1992)  p.  114,  pending;  Case 
Concerning  Oil  Platforms  case,  !  CJ  Rep.,  (1996)  p.  803,  pending,  and  Application  of  the 
Convention  on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  the  Crime  of  Genocide  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1996) 
p.  595,  pending. 
129  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  665;  Charney,  Jonathan  I,  Compromissory 
Clause  and  the  Jurisdiction  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  81  AJIL  (1978)  p.  p.  855-856; 
similarly  see  Morrison,  Fred  L.,.  Treaties  as  a  Source  of  Jurisdiction,  Especially  in  U.  S.  Practice,  in 
Lori  F.  Damrosch  (ed.  ),  The  International  Court  of  Justice  At  a  Crossroads,  New  York: 
Transnational  Publishers,  Inc.,  (1987)  p.  58.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Morrison,  Treaties  as  a  Source 
of  Jurisdiction);  Waldock,  C.  H.  M.,  Decline  of  the  Optional  Clause,  XXXII  BYbIL,  (1955-56) 
p.  245.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Waldock,  Decline  the  Optional  Clause). 
130  Military  and  Paramilitary  Activities  in  and  against  Nicaragua  case,  (Nicaragua  v.  United 
States  of  America),  Merits,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1986)  p.  117,  [para.  225]. Chapter  Five  273 
jurisdiction  of  the  Court.  A  compromissory  clause  initiates  proceedings  by  a 
unilateral  filing  of  an  application;  131  (2)  with  a  compromise,  as  mentioned  above, 
the  parties  explicitly  define  the  matter  that  the  ICJ  should  consider;  the  Court 
cannot  go  further.  A  compromissory  clause  involves  more  flexibility  for  the  Court 
to  deal  with  the  dispute.  It  has  more  freedom  to  define  the  matter  which  needs  to 
be  considered;  and  (3)  with  a  compromise,  both  states  parties  to  the  dispute  wish 
to  have  recourse  to  the  Court  in  order  to  resolve  their  dispute,  whereas,  concerning 
a  compromissory  clause,  the  defendant  state  in  some  circumstances,  political  or 
other,  may  be  unhappy  to  appear  before  the  Court.  132 
5.3.3.  Optional  Clause 
Four  main  points  fall  under  this  title  and  help  clarify  the  system  of  Optional 
Clause  in  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ.  They  are:  (1)  origins  and  definitions,  (2) 
form  of  declarations,  (3)  reservations  and  conditions  that  may  be  made  with 
reference  to  optional  clause,  and  (4)  the  condition  of  reciprocity. 
A.  Origins  and  Definitions 
It  would  be  desirable  if  Arab  states  agreed  among  themselves  to  create  a 
Court  with  a  compulsory  jurisdiction  enshrined  in  its  Statute.  However,  this 
cannot  be  achieved,  because  strong  political  influences  always  object  to  the 
establishment  of  any  international  court  with  compulsory  jurisdiction.  The  Arab 
draftsmen,  when  drafting  the  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  were  aware  of  this  negative 
factor,  and  the  alternative  choice  they  had  was  to  create  a  system  by  which  the 
131  See  Arts.  38-39  of  the  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ. 
132  Morrison,  Treaties  as  a  Source  of  Jurisdiction,  supra  note  129,  p.  59. Chapter  Five  274 
jurisdiction  of  the  Court  would  be  optional  unless  states  declared  that  they 
accepted  it  as  compulsory.  They  adopted  an  optional  clause  or  unilateral 
declaration  approach,  133  which  means  that  "a  case  can  be  instituted  unilaterally 
against  any  other  state  which  has  made  a  similar  declaration  that  is  in  force  on  the 
day  the  proceedings  are  instituted.  "  Once  this  declaration  is  expressed  a  state 
accepts  the  jurisdiction  of  the  given  Court  as  compulsory.  134  Most  international 
lawyers  at  present  prefer  to  use  the  term  "optional  clause"  instead  of  "unilateral" 
declaration,  because  it  is  optional  for  states  to  elect  to  use  it  when  they  make  such 
declaration.  '  35 
"'  It  is  worth  mentioning  here  that  the  system  of  Optional  Clause  has  played  a  considerable  role  in 
the  settlement  of  justiciable  disputes  submitted  to  the  two  World  Courts,  the  PCIJ  and  the  ICJ. 
Since  1946  the  following  cases  have  been  submitted  to  the  ICJ  on  the  basis  of  optional  clause: 
Fisheries  Jurisdiction  case,  Merits,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1974)  p.  4;  Anglo-Iranian  Oil  Co.,  Preliminary 
Objections,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1952)  p.  93;  Rights  of  Nationals  of  the  United  Slates  of  America  in 
Morocco  case,  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1952)  p.  176;  Nottebohm  case,  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1955) 
p.  4;  Certain  Norwegian  Loans  case,  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1957)  p.  9;  Interhandel  case, 
Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1959)  p.  6;  Application  of  the  Convention  of  1902  Governing  the 
Guardianship  of  Infants  case,  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1958)  p.  55;  Right  of  Passage  over  Indian 
Territory  case,  Preliminary  Objections,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1957)  p.  125;  Aerial  incident  of  27  July  1955, 
Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1959)  p.  127;  Temple  of  Preach  Vihear  case,  Merits,  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep., 
(1962)  p.  6;  Nuclear  Tests  case,  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1974)  p.  457;  Arbitral  Award  of  31  July 
1989  case,  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1991)  p.  53;  Military  and  Paramilitary  Activities  in  and  against 
Nicaragua  case,  discontinued  after  judgment  on  merits  with  compensation  phase  outstanding,  ICJ 
Rep.,  (1984)  p.  392;  Border  and  Transborder  Armed  Actions  case,  two  cases,  one  discontinued, 
the  second  discontinued  after  judgment  on  Preliminary  Objections,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1988)  p.  69; 
Maritime  Delimitation  between  Guinea-Bissau  and  Senegal  case,  discontinued,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1995) 
p.  423;  Maritime  Delimitation  in  the  Area  between  Greenland  and  Jan  Mayen  case,  Judgment, 
ICJ  Rep.,  (1993)  p.  38;  Certain  Phosphate  Lands  in  Nauru  case,  discontinued  after  judgment  on 
preliminary  objections,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1992)  p.  240;  Case  concerning  Application  of  the  Convention 
on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  the  Crime  of  Genocide,  Preliminary  Objections,  ICJ  Rep., 
(1996)  p.  595;  Fisheries  Jurisdiction  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1996)  p.  58. 
14  Rosenne,  The  World'Court,  supra  note  2,  p.  90;  also  see  Szafarz,  Renata,  Changing  State 
Attitudes  Towards  the  Jurisdiction  of  the  International  Cour  of  Justice,  in  Arie  Bloed  and  Pieter 
Van  Dijk  (eds.  ),  Forty  Years  International  Court  of  Justice,  equity  and  equality,  Utrecht:  Europa 
Instituut,  (1988)  p.  8.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Szafarz,  States  Attitudes  Towards  Jurisdiction); 
similarly  see  Lawson,  Ruth  C.,  The  Problem  of  the  Compulsory  Jurisdiction  of  the  World  Court,  46 
AJiL  (1952)  p.  p.  221-224. 
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The  original  idea  of  the  system  of  the  optional  clause  was  tabled  at  the  Hague 
Peace  Conferences  of  1899  and  1907.136  It  was  tabled  again  when  the  Statute  of 
the  PCIJ  was  discussed  in  1920,  and  the  question  of  compulsory  jurisdiction  over 
legal  disputes  was  under  consideration.  Compulsory  jurisdiction  was  strongly 
rejected  by  the  great  powers  of  that  period;  an  alternative  solution  was  suggested 
by  the  Brazilian  delegate  to  make  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  as  a  general  rule, 
optional  unless  any  state  declared  it  would  accept  jurisdiction  as  compulsory. 
This  suggestion  was  adopted  by  the  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations  and 
inserted  in  Art.  36  of  the  Statute  of  the  PCIJ.  Since  then  the  system  of  the  optional. 
clause  has  prevailed.  137  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  expression  `optional 
clause'  is  not  expressly  used  in  the  PCIJ  Statute,  and  hence  the  Permanent  Court 
usually  used  the  term  compulsory  jurisdiction  in  its  decisions.  138 
When  the  1920  Statute  of  the  PCIJ  was  redrafted  in  1945,  the  question  of 
compulsory  jurisdiction  was  raised  again.  It  appears  that  the  majority  of 
delegations  in  the  Washington  Committee  of  Jurists  were  in  favour  of  the 
inclusion  of  the  term  compulsory  jurisdiction  in  the  new  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  but  in 
the  end  it  was  agreed  that  Art.  36  of  the  Statute  of  the  PCIJ  needed  no  amendment 
and  the  matter  remained  as  it  was.  The  report  of  the  Washington  Committee  of 
136  For  historical  background  see  Gross  Leo,  Compulsory  Jurisdiction  under  the  Optional  Clause: 
History  and  Practice,  in  Lori  F.  Damrosch  (ed.  ),  The  International  Court  of  Justice  at  a 
Crossroads,  New  York:  Transnational  Publishers,  Inc.,  (1987)  p.  19. 
137  UNCIO,  vol.  14,  (1945)  p.  p.  840-843; 840-843;  Lloyd,  Loma,  A  Springboard  for  the  Future:  A 
Historical  Examination  of  Britain's  Role  in  Shaping  the  Optional  Clause  of  the  Permanent  Court  of 
International  Justice,  79  AJIL  (1985)  p.  p.  28-31;  Hudson,  The  Permanent  Court,  supra  note  14, 
p.  189;  Fachiri,  The  Permanent  Court  of  Justice,  supra  note  38,  p.  p.  95-97;  Hambro,  The 
Jurisdiction  of  the  ICJ,  supra  note  19,  p.  135. 
138  For  example,  see  Phosphates  in  Morocco  case,  Judgment,  PCIJ(1938)  Ser.  A/B,  No.  74,  p.  21; 
Panevezys-Saldutiskis  Railway  case,  Judgment,  PCIJ  (1939)  Ser.  AB,  No.  76,  p.  5;  Electricity 
Company  of  Sofia  and  Bulgaria  case,  Judgment,  PCIJ(1939)  Ser.  AB,  No.  77,  p.  76. Chapter  Five  276 
Jurists  clarified  the  problems  that  prevented  the  creation  of  a  Court  with  a 
compulsory  jurisdiction:  139 
"Judging  from  the  preferences...  indicated,  it  does  not  seem  doubtful 
that  the  majority  of  the  Committee  was  in  favour  of  compulsory 
jurisdiction,  but  it  has  been  noted,  that,  in  spite  of  this  predominant 
sentiment,  it  did  not  seem  certain,  nor  even  probable,  that  all  the 
nations  whose  participation  in  the  proposed  international  organization 
appears  to  be  necessary,  were  now  in  a  position  to  accept  the  rule  of 
compulsory  jurisdiction,  and  that  the  Dumbarton  Oaks  Proposals  did 
not  seem  to  affirm  it;  some,  while  retaining  their  preferences  in  this 
respect,  thought  that  the  counsel  of  prudence  was  not  to  go  beyond  the 
procedure  of  the  optional  clause  inserted  in  Article  36...  Placed  on 
this  basis,  the  problem  was  found  to  assume  a  political  character  and 
the  committee  thought  that  it  should  defer  it  to  the  San  Francisco 
Conference.  " 
So  the  system  of  the  optional  clause  has  been  more  or  less  the  same  with. 
some  development.  It  is  clear  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  have  adopted  the  same 
terms  and  provisions  of  the  system  of  optional  clause  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ 
when  drafting  Art.  22  (3)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  therefore,  the  same 
interpretation  of  Art.  36  of  the  ICJ  Statute  should  be  applied  to  Art.  22  (3).  The 
Article  reads  as  follows:  '40 
"The  states  which  are  parties  to  the  present  Statute  may  at  any  time 
declare  that  they  recognise  as  compulsory  ipso  facto  and  without 
special  agreement,  in  relation  to  any  other  state  accepting  the  same 
obligation,  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  in  all  legal  disputes 
concerning: 
A)  the  interpretation  of  international  treaties; 
B)  the  existence  of  any  fact  which,  if  established,  would 
constitute  a  breach  of  an  international  obligation; 
C)  the  determination  of  the  nature  or  extent  of  the  reparation  to 
be  made  for  the  breach  of  an  international  obligation; 
D)  any  question  of  international  law.  " 
This  Article  can  be  divided  into  four  parts  for  a  better  understanding  of  its 
text.  Firstly,  the  phrase  `ipso  facto  and  without  special  agreement'  was  interpreted 
139  UNCIO,  vol.  14,  (1945)  p.  840. 
140  Cf.  Art.  36  (2  and  3)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ;  a  similar  conception  is  also  adopted  by  the  draft 
Statute  of  the  IICJ  in  Art.  26  (A). Chapter  Five  277 
in  the  decision  of  the  ICJ  in  the  Right  of  Passage  case,  to  mean  that  as  soon  as  a 
state  deposits  its  declaration  with  the  Secretary-General  in  accordance  with  Art.  36 
(4)  of  the  Statute,  it  becomes,  automatically,  party  to  the  system  of  optional  clause 
in  relation  to  other  states  which  declare  that  they  accept  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Court.  141  In  the  case  of  the  ACJ,  once  a  state  party  to  the  Statute  deposits  its 
declaration  with  the  Secretariat-General  of  the  Arab  League,  that  state  should 
become  also  party  to  the  system  of  the  optional  clause.  In  other  words,  the 
optional  clause  affects  both  states  that  at  a  specific  moment  are  parties  to  the 
system;  other  states  that  may  become  party  to  it  at  some  future  date  also  become 
included  within  this  network  of  relations.  142  The  logic  underpinning  this  approach 
appears  explicitly  in  the  decision  of  the  ICJ  in  the  Right  of  Passage.  The  ICJ 
ruled:  143 
"A  State  accepting  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  must  expect  that  an 
Application  may  be  filed  against  it  before  the  Court  by  new  declarant 
State  on  the  same  day  on  which  that  State  deposits  with  the  Secretary- 
General  its  Declaration  of  Acceptance.  It  is  on  the  very  day  that  the 
consensual  bond,  which  is  the  basis  of  the  Optional  Clause,  comes 
into  being  between  the  State  concerned. 
Secondly,  only  states  parties  to  the  Statute,  whether  in  the  case  of  the  ICJ  or 
in  the  ACJ,  can  join  the  system  of  the  optional  clause,  because  the  wording  of  both 
Articles,  36  (2)  of  the  ICJ  Statute  and  22  (3)  of  the  draft  ACJ  Statute,  start  by 
saying  "The  states  parties  to  the  present  Statute  may  at  any  time  declare.  "  44 
141  Right  of  Passage  over  Indian  Territory  case,  (Portugal  v.  India),  Preliminary  Objections,  ICJ 
Rep.,  (1957)  p.  146;  also  see  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  735. 
142  Cf.  Anglo-Iranian  Oil  Co.  case,  (United  Kingdom  v.  Iran),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1952)  p.  106;  also  see 
Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  735. 
143  Right  of  Passage  over  Indian  Territory  case,  Preliminary  Objections,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1957)  p.  146. 
14  This  is  also  affirmed  by  the  decision  delivered  by  the  ICJ  in  the  Certain  Phosphate  Lands  in 
Nauru  case,  (Nauru  v.  Australia),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1992)  p.  246,  when  the  Court  recalled  that 
declarations  made  according  to  Art.  36  (2),  'can  only  relate  to  disputes  between  States.  ' Chapter  Five  278 
When  states  not  parties  to  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  or  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ 
wish  to  have  recourse  to  the  Court,  they  have  to  follow  the  provisions  of  Art.  21 
(2)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  or  Art.  35  (2)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ.  The 
term  `any  other  state'  in  para.  3,  of  Art.  22  of  the  draft  Statute,  must  be  interpreted 
to  mean  "any  other  state  that  itself  is  a  party  to  the  Statute  not  any  other  states  at 
large.  "  145  It  further  means  that  states  parties  to  the  Statute  have  no  obligation  to 
accept  compulsory  jurisdiction  in  relation  to  states  that  are  not  parties  to  the 
Statute.  146  No  problem  will  be  faced  by  the  ACJ  when  applying  this  paragraph, 
because  from  the  beginning  the  Court,  unlike  the  ICJ,  is just  open  to  the  limited 
number  of  states  which  are  members  of  the  Arab  League.  Accordingly,  as  a 
logical  result  non-member  states  have  no  right  to  appear  before  the  Court,  and 
cannot  join  the  system  of  optional  clause.  147  Non-member  states,  when  desiring  to 
accept  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  as  compulsory,  have  to  conclude  an  explicit 
agreement  without  being  party  to  the  optional  clause  system.  148 
Thirdly,  `accepting  the  same  obligation'  was  clearly  interpreted  in  the 
decision  of  the  ICJ  in  the  Right  of  Passage  case,  when  the  Court  said:  1'9 
"it  is  not  necessary  that  the  `same  obligation'  should  be  irrevocably 
defined  at  the  time  of  the  deposit  of  the  Declaration  of  Acceptance  for 
the  entire  period  of  its  duration.  That  expression  means  no  more  than 
that,  as  between  States  adhering  to  the  Optional  Clause,  each  and  all 
of  them  are  bound  by  such  identical  obligations  as  may  exist  at  any 
time  during  which  the  acceptance  is  mutually  binding.  " 
145  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  p.  738-739;  Hambro,  Edvard,  Some 
Observations  on  the  Compulsory  Jurisdiction  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  XXV  BYbIL 
(1948)  p.  135.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Hambro,  Some  Observations  on  the  Jurisdiction  of  the  ICJ). 
146 
147 
148 
149 
Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  739. 
Cf  the  Phosphate  Lands  in  Nauru  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1992)  p.  246. 
Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  739. 
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Fourthly,  the  last  phrase  of  this  paragraph  is  limited  to  disputes  that  the 
optional  clause  could  impose  on  them  with  reference  to  legal  disputes  only.  The 
ACJ,  in  the  same  way  the  ICJ,  is  only  competent  to  consider  legal  disputes. 
Political  disputes  lie  outside  the  scope  of  the  jurisdiction  of  these  courts.  They 
may  be  settled  by  political  methods.  Legal  disputes  in  the  case  of  the  ACJ  could 
be  assumed  to  include  the  four  categories  enumerated  in  Art.  22  (3)  of  its  draft 
Statute.  The  four  categorises  concern  (a)  the  interpretation  of  international 
treaties,  (b)  the  existence  of  any  fact  which,  if  established,  would  constitute  a 
breach  of  an  international  obligation,  (c)  the  determination  of  the  nature  or  extent 
of  the  reparation  to  be  made  for  the  breach  of  an  international  obligation,  (d)  any 
question  of  international  law.  150  Consequently,  any  disputes  falling  within  one  of 
these  categories  listed  in  this  paragraph,  would  ipso  facto  be  'legal'.  151  Therefore, 
any  declaration  concerning  any  dispute  not  falling  under  these  categorises,  will  not 
be  a  legal  dispute.  Waldock  has  argued  on  this  point:  152 
"The  new  Statute  [the  Statute  of  the  ICJ]  however,  appears  to  exclude 
the  possibility  of  making  a  declaration  which  does  not  comprise  the 
four  listed  classes  of  legal  disputes.  " 
B.  Form  of  Declarations 
Is  there  any  particular  form  by  which  an  Arab  state  has  to  make  its 
declaration?  In  the  case  of  the  PCIJ  and  the  ICJ,  there  was  and  respectively  is  no 
specific  form  required  for  a  declaration.  It  is  left  to  a  state  to  choose  what  form  it 
150  Cf.  Hudson,  The  Permanent  Court,  supra  note  14,  p.  p.  456-460;  Fachiri,  The  Permanent  Court 
of  Justice,  supra  note  38,  p.  97;  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  745. 
151  Oda,  Shigeru,  The  International  Court  of  Justice  Viewed  From  The  Bench  (1976-1993),  244 
Recueil  Des  Cours  (1993)  p.  p.  39-40.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Oda,  The  International  Court  of 
Justice);  Gordon,  Legal  Disputes,  supra  note  17,  p.  p.  217-218. 
152  Waldock,  Decline  of  the  Optional  Clause,  supra  note  129,  p.  p.  247-248. Chapter  Five  280 
wishes  to  use  provided  its  aim  is  clearly  expressed.  153  The  only  requirement 
needed  is  to  deposit  such  a  declaration  with  the  Secretary-General  of  the  UN,  who 
has  to  transmit  copies  of  it  to  states  parties  to  the  Statute  and  to  the  Court's 
Registrar.  154  In  addition,  there  was  and  is  no  condition  as  to  the  language  to  use 
for  declarations  accepting  the  compulsory  jurisdiction  of  the  two  courts. 
Basically,  declarations  have  been  made  in  either  English  or  French,  but  sometimes 
in  other  languages  such  as  Spanish,  Portuguese  or  Bulgarian,  with  translation  into 
English  or  French.  155  In  its  decision  in  Temple  of  Preah  Vihear  case,  the  ICJ 
declared:  '56 
"The  only  formality  required  [in  the  case  of  an  acceptance  of  the 
compulsory  jurisdiction]  is  the  deposit  of  the  acceptance  with  the 
Secretary-General  of  the  United  Nations  under  paragraph  4  of  Article 
36  of  the  Statute...  for  the  rest-as  regards  form-paragraph  2  of  Article 
36  merely  provides  that  States  parties  to  the  Statute  "may  at  any  time 
declare  that  they  recognize  a  compulsory  ...  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Court",  etc.  The  precise  form  and  language  in  which  they  do  this  is 
left  to  them;  and  there  is  no  suggestion  that  any  particular  form  is 
required,  or  that  any  declarations  not  in  such  form  will  be  invalid. 
No  doubt  custom  and  tradition  have  brought  it  about  that  a  certain 
pattern  of  terminology  is  normally,  as  a  matter  of  fact  and 
convenience,  employed  by  countries  accepting  the  compulsory 
jurisdiction  of  the  Court;  but  there  is  nothing  mandatory  about  the 
employment  of  this  language.  Nor  is  there  any  obligation, 
notwithstanding  paragraphs  2  and  3  of  Article  36,  to  mention  such 
matters  as  periods  of  duration,  condition  or  reservations,  and  there  are 
acceptances  which  have  in  one  or  more,  or  even  in  all,  of  these 
respects  maintained  silence.  " 
With  reference  to  the  ACJ,  it  seems  that  neither  the  draft  Statute  nor  the  draft 
Rules  of  the  Court  provide  any  condition  to  regulate  the  form  of  declaration. 
IS'  Hudson,  Manley  0.,  The  Twenty-forth  Year  of  the  World  Court,  40  AJIL  (1946)  p.  34; 
Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  p.  751-752;  also  see  Right  of  Passage  case,  !  CJ 
Rep.,  (1957)  p.  146. 
154  Art.  36  (4)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ. 
155  For  example,  see  50  YBICJ(1995-96)  p.  p.  85,88,93,105,114.  It  is  however  to  be  noted  that 
according  to  Art.  39  (1)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  the  official  languages  of  the  Court  shall  be  French 
and  English. 
156  Temple  ofPreah  Vihear  case,  Preliminary  Objections,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1961)  p.  31. Chapter  Five  281 
Nevertheless,  practically  it  should  be  expressed  in  Arabic  because  all  parties  to  the 
Statute  are  Arab  states  and  Arabic  is  the  official  language  of  the  Court.  '"  The 
only  condition  is  in  para.  3,  of  Art.  22  of  the  draft  Statute,  which  stipulates,  similar 
to  the  approach  in  the  case  of  the  ICJ,  that  the  declaration  has  to  be  deposited  with 
the  Secretariat-General  of  the  Arab  League.  This  paragraph,  however,  does  not 
oblige  the  Secretariat-General  of  the  Arab  League  to  circulate  a  declaration  to 
states  parties  to  the  Statute  and  the  Registrar  of  the  Court  as  soon  as  the 
declaration  is  deposited,  unlike  the  procedure  laid  down  in  para.  4,  of  Art.  36  of 
the  Statute  of  the  ICJ: 
"such  declarations  shall  be  deposited  with  the  Secretary-General  of 
the  United  Nations,  who  shall  transmit  copies  thereof  to  the  parties  to 
the  Statute  and  to  the  Registrar  of  the  Court.  " 
It  may  be  assumed  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  did  not  include  this  paragraph 
because  they  found  it  unnecessary.  The  legal  act  which  to  be  effected  by  an  Arab 
state,  when  making  its  declaration,  is  to  deposit  it  with  the  Secretariat-General, 
and  as  soon  as  it  does  so,  it  becomes  party  to  the  optional  clause  system 
independently  from  whether  the  Secretariat-General  circulates  it  to  the  states 
parties  to  the  Statute  and  the  Registrar  of  the  Court  or  not,  or  whether  the  other 
states  party  to  the  system  know  about  that  declaration  or  not.  Rosenne  has 
noted:  158 
15'  Art.  24  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  provides:  "Arabic  shall  be  the  official  language  of  the 
Court.  " 
138  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  755;  similarly  see  Right  of  Passage  over 
Indian  Territory  case,  (Portugal  v.  India),  Preliminary  Objections,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1957)  p.  146.  It  is  to 
be  clear  that  in  the  case  of  the  PCIJ,  there  was no  similar  stipulation  obliging  the  Secretary-General 
of  the  League  of  Nations  to  transmit  the  declaration  to  the  states  parties  and  to  the  Registrar  of  the 
Court.  It  is  however  to  be  noted  that  paragraph  4,  was  inserted  to  Art.  36,  at  the  San  Francisco 
Conference  without  any  further  interpretation  to  clarify  why  delegates  adopted  this  provision.  See 
UNCIO,  vol.  13,  (1945)  p.  284.  Cf.  comments  of  Hudson  on  this  matter  in  his  The  Permanent 
Court,  supra  note  14,  p.  449. Chapter  Five  282 
"as  soon  as  a  State  party  to  the  Statute  deposits  a  declaration  with  the 
Secretary-General,  it  may  invoke  the  compulsory  jurisdiction  against 
every  other  States  party  to  the  Statute  which  is  likewise  bound  by  its 
acceptance  of  the  compulsory  jurisdiction,  and  vice  versa.  It  is 
immaterial  whether  those  states  know  that  the  declaration  has  been 
deposited.  " 
C.  Reservations  and  Conditions 
Before  going  into  further  details  on  conditions  or  reservations  that  may  be 
attached  to  declarations,  it  is  worthwhile  to  clarify  the  difference  between  the  two 
terms  "condition"  and  "reservation"  in  order  to  know  whether  the  difference 
between  them  may  lead  to  different  results.  According  to  the  distinction  adopted 
by  the  ICJ  in  the  Interhandel  case  and  Nicaragua  case,  the  Court  recognised  a. 
difference  between  them.  A  condition,  according  to  the  ICJ's  definition,  refers  to 
the  formal  aspects  of  a  declaration  as  an  instrument,  such  as  its  duration, 
ratification  or  other  national  act.  A  reservation  may  refers  to  the  scope  of  the 
jurisdiction  accepted  by  the  state  making  the  declaration.  159  It  is  an  accepted  rule 
before  the  ICJ  that  states  can  include  in  their  declarations  whatever  conditions  or 
reservations  they  wish.  In  the  Nicaragua  case,  the  ICJ  clearly  determined  that:  160 
"in  making  the  declaration  a  State  is  equally  free  either  to  do  so 
unconditionally  and  without  limit  of  time  for  its  duration,  or  to  qualify 
it  with  conditions  or  reservations.  " 
In  the  case  of  conditions,  the  Court  has  no  power  to  make  any  further 
interpretation  to  conditions  on  declarations.  With  reference  to  reservations,  the 
ICJ  has  more  freedom  interpret  them,  accept  or  reject  any  reservation  that  may 
affect  the  system  of  the  optional  clause,  nevertheless  declarations  "must  be 
159  Interhandel  case,  (Switzerland  v.  United  States  of  America),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1959)  p.  23;  Military 
and  Paramilitary  Activities  in  and  against  Nicaragua  case,  (Nicaragua  v.  United  States  of 
America),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1984)  p.  418,  [para.  60]. 
160  Military  and  Paramilitary  Activities  in  and  against  Nicaragua  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1984)  p.  418; 
also  see  UNCIO,  vol.  13,  (1945)  p.  557. Chapter  Five  283 
interpreted  as  it  stands,  having  regard  to  words  actually  used.  "  161  In  other  words, 
the  Court  can  challenge  the  validity  of  a  reservation  and  its  content  and  scope  in 
each  case  when  it  is  included  in  a  particular  declaration.  This  competence  of  the 
ICJ  has  its  parallel  in  the  wording  of  para.  4,  of  Art.  22  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the 
ACJ,  which  authorises  the  Court  to  decide  any  dispute  regarding  its  jurisdiction.  162 
This  judicial  control  covers  the  power  of  the  Court  to  interpret  declarations 
together  with  any  reservations  attach  to  them.  Rosenne  has  said:  163 
"But  lex  specialis  governing  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  provides  for 
a  measure  of  compulsory  judicial  control,  through  the  machinery  of 
Article  36,  paragraph  6,  of  the  Statute,  not  merely  over  the  question 
whether  the  concrete  dispute  comes  within  the  terms  of  the 
declarations  but  also  over  the  preliminary  question  of  the  validity  of 
reservation  included  in  a  declaration  accepting  the  compulsory 
jurisdiction  and  its  compatibility  with  the  purposes  of  Article  36, 
paragraph  2,  at  all  events  if  such  a  decision  is  required  for  the 
decision  in  the  case.  The  existence  of  this  measure  of  judicial  control, 
coupled  with  the  general  power  of  the  Court  to  interpret  the 
declarations,  is  an  important  safeguard  against  the  detrimental  effects 
of  reservations.  " 
Since  its  creation,  the  ICJ  has  not  declared  that  a  reservation  has  no  legal 
effect.  However,  in  the  opinion  of  some  international  lawyers,  the  Court  could  do 
this  especially  with  respect  to  self  judging  domestic  jurisdiction  reservations.  164 
According  to  para.  (3/D)  of  Art.  22  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  states  parties  to 
this  Statute  are  free  to  accept  the  system  of  optional  clause,  and  if  they  accept, 
161  Anglo-Iranian  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1952)  p.  105;  also  see  Norwegian  Loans  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1957) 
p.  27. 
162  The  same  provision  is  also  found  in  Art.  36  (6)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ. 
163  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  770. 
164  For  example,  see  Briggs,  Herbert  W.,  Reservations  to  the  Acceptance  of  Compulsory 
Jurisdiction  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  93  Recueil  Des  Cours,  (1958)  p.  311;  Waldock, 
Decline  the  Optional  Clause,  supra  note  129,  p.  272;  Judge  H.  Lauterpacht  in  his  dissenting 
opinion  in  the  Norwegian  Loans  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1957)  p.  p.  43-66;  and  his  dissenting  opinion  in 
the  Interhandel  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1959)  p.  p.  101-119;  also  see  Judge  S.  Schwebel  in  his  dissenting 
opinion  in  the  Nicaragua  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1984)  p.  601. Chapter  Five  284 
they  also  have  various  choices;  they  may  accept  it  unconditionally  or  with 
reservations  or  under  certain  conditions.  The  relevant  paragraph  reads  as  follows: 
"The  declarations  referred  to  above  may  be  made  unconditionally,  or 
on  a  condition  which  limits  them  to  a  certain  matter  or  a  specific 
period,  or  on  a  condition  of  reciprocity  on  the  part  of  several  or 
certain  states.  " 
As  the  ACJ  has  not  yet  been  created,  reference  to  international  practice 
becomes  necessary  in  order  to  determine  the  types  of  declarations  that  may  be 
made  by  states.  During  the  early  period  of  the  PCIJ,  states  parties  to  its  Statute  did 
not  recognise  the  immediate  termination  of  a  declaration.  They  mostly  accepted 
the  compulsory  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  for  a  fixed  time,  renewable  upon 
expiration.  However,  in  1929  the  concept  of  immediate  termination  of  a 
declaration  was  introduced  when  Great  Britain  included  it  in  its  declaration;  this 
practice  was  adopted  by  some  other  states.  165  In  the  practice  of  the  ICJ, 
declarations  including  conditions  of  duration  are  normally  divided  into  three 
types:  (1)  declarations  valid  for  a  fixed  period,  such  as  those  by  Bulgaria,  Costa 
Rica,  Denmark,  El  Salvador,  Finland,  Mexico,  Nauru,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand, 
Norway,  Poland  and  Sweden;  (2)  declarations  valid  until  notice  of  termination  is 
given,  as  practised  by  such  as  Australia,  Austria,  Barbados,  Belgium,  Cambodia, 
Cameron,  Cyprus,  Gambia,  India,  Japan,  Kenya,  Liberia,  Malta,  Mauritius, 
Pakistan,  Philippines,  Portugal,  Somalia,  Sudan,  Swaziland  and  United  Kingdom; 
(3)  declarations  which  do  not  contain  any  reference  to  duration  or  are  made  for  an 
165  Oda,  The  International  Court  of  Justice,  supra  note  151,  p.  42. Chapter  Five  285 
indefinite  or  unlimited  period,  such  as  by  Botswana,  Egypt,  Honduras,  Malawi, 
Nigeria,  Togo,  Senegal  and  Uganda.  166 
It  is  believed  that  specifying  the  entry  into  force  of  a  declaration  is  a  very 
important  matter  every  state  has  to  consider,  because  the  entry  into  force  of  a 
declaration  determines  the  specified  time  or  date  the  obligation  of  the  declaring 
states  begins.  Accordingly,  as  seen  above,  some  states  include  a  particular  date  in 
their  declarations  for  their  entry  into  force,  others  stipulate  that  the  obligation, 
regarding  their  declaration,  starts  from  the  date  of  signature,  or  make  the  date  of 
the  deposit  of  the  declaration  to  the  Secretary-General  as  the  operative  date;  some 
others  consider  their  obligation  to  start  from  the  date  of  ratification.  A  problem 
arises  when  a  particular  state  does  not  include  in  its  declaration  any  specific  period 
or  clear  statement  as  to  the  time  of  its  entry  into  force.  In  such  a  case,  the  solution 
is  to  consider  such  a  declaration  as  having  entered  into  force  from  either  the 
moment  of  signature  or  ratification  or  from  the  moment  it  has  been  deposited  with 
the  Secretary-General  of  the  UN.  167  Furthermore,  states,  in  addition  to  their 
freedom  to  indicate  a  specific  period  for  the  validity  of  their  declarations,  also 
have  full  competence  to  make  modifications,  or  amendments  to  their  declarations. 
In  the  Military  and  Paramilitary  Activities  in  and  Against  Nicaragua  case,  the  ICJ 
declared:  168 
166  Cf.  50  YBICJ  (1995-96)  p.  p.  81-121;  Szafarz,  States  Attitudes  Towards  Jurisdiction,  supra 
note  134,  p.  17. 
167  Hambro,  Some  Observations  on  the  Jurisdiction  of  the  ICJ,  supra  note  145,  p.  p.  140-141; 
similarly  Hudson,  The  Permanent  Court,  supra  note  14,  p.  450. 
168  Military  and  Paramilitary  Activities  in  and  against  Nicaragua  case,  (Nicaragua  v.  United 
States  of  America),  Jurisdiction  and  Admissibility,  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1984)  p.  418,  [para.  59]; 
also  see  Nuclear  Tests  case,  (Australia  v.  France),  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1974)  p.  267,  [para.  3]; 
Nuclear  Tests  case,  (New  Zealand  v.  France),  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1974)  p.  472,  [para.  46]. Chapter  Five  286 
"However,  the  unilateral  nature  of  declarations  does  not  signify  that 
the  State  making  the  declaration  is  free  to  amend  its  scope  and  the 
contents  of  its  solemn  commitments  as  it  pleases.  " 
Neither  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  nor  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  contain  any 
condition  obliging  states  which  have  made  a  declaration  not  to  terminate  them 
after  a  limited  time.  In  other  words,  a  state  which  accepts  the  optional  clause 
system  by  an  express  declaration,  still  has  full  freedom  to  withdraw  from  the 
system  at  any  time  it  desires.  It  is  here  submitted  that  the  notice  given  in  advance 
by  a  state  is  not  sufficient  or  an  obligatory,  because  when  a  particular  state  express 
its  wish  that  it  wants  to  withdraw  from  the  optional  clause  system  it  can  simply  act 
according  to  its  wish  without  considering  its  action  as  breaching  to  the  Statute  or 
the  Rules  of  the  Court.  Therewith  the  possibility  is  given  to  criticise  the  system  of 
the  optional  clause  contained  in  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ.  It  seems  that  the 
Arab  draftsmen  did  not  realise,  when  adopting  the  provision  of  Art.  36  (2,3  and  4) 
of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  that  this  Article  has  been  strongly  criticised  by 
international  lawyers.  It  would  be  therefore  justly  expected  that  they  avoid 
copying  the  exact  wording  of  this  Article,  or  at  least  to  redraft  it  by  including  new 
provisions  to  make  the  system  of  the  optional  clause  more  effective.  One  of  the 
best  known  criticisms  of  the  system  of  the  optional  clause  has  been  that  by 
Waldock,  who  said: 
"indeed,  the  letter  of  the  Statute  might  be  claimed  to  permit  a  State  to 
make  a  declaration  today,  file  an  Application  in  a  particular  case 
immediately  afterwards,  and  tomorrow  give  notice  to  terminate  the 
declaration.  "169 
169  Waldock,  Decline  of  the  Optional  Clause,  supra  note  129,  p.  281;  he  gives  an  example  to 
support  his  criticism  from  the  practice  of  States.  He  said:  "on  19  December  1955,  Portugal  made 
a  declaration  valid  for  twelve  months  and  thereafter  until  notice  of  termination  is  given,  deposited 
the  declaration  with  the  Secretary-General  on  the  same  day,  and  with  three  days  had  filed  an 
Application  against  India  in  regard  to  alleged  Portuguese  rights  of  passage  over  Indian  territory.  " 
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Similarly,  Scott  and  Carr  have  criticised  the  optional  clause  system  by 
pointing  out  that  "the  efficacy  of  the  Court  remains  threatened  as  long  as  the 
Optional  Clause  exists.  "  170  The  best  solution  to  the  system  of  the  optional  clause 
may  be  found  in  the  proposal  presented  by  the  Institute  of  International  Law, 
which  proposed  that  Art.  36  (2)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  should  be  amended: 
"In  order  to  maintain  the  effectiveness  of  the  engagements 
undertaken,  it  is  highly  desirable  that  declarations  accepting  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice  in  virtue  of  Article  36 
paragraph  2,  of  the  Statute  of  the  Court  should  be  valid  for  a  period 
which,  in  principle,  should  not  be  less  than  five  years.  Such 
declarations  should  also  provide  that  on  the  expiration  of  each  such 
period  they  will,  unless  notice  of  denunciation  is  given  not  less  than 
twelve  months  before  the  expiration  of  the  current  period,  be  tacitly 
renewed  for  a  new  period  of  not  less  than  five  years.  "171 
It  is  desirable  that,  at  very  least,  Arab  draftsmen  should  follow  this  proposal 
and  redraft  Art.  22  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  to  include  such  an  obligation  in 
the  system  of  the  optional  clause.  It  worth  mentioning  here  that  despite  the 
absence  of  any  provisions  obliging  states  not  to  terminate  their  declarations  after  a 
limited  time,  the  ICJ  in  its  judgment  in  the  Military  and  Paramilitary  Activities 
made  clear  that  a  reasonable  period  of  notice  must  be  given  before  the  termination 
of  a  declaration  when  it  ruled:  172 
"But  the  right  of  immediate  termination  of  declarations  with 
indefinite  duration  is  far  from  established.  It  appears  from  the 
requirements  of  good  faith  that  they  should  be  treated,  by  analogy, 
according  to  the  law  of  treaties,  which  requires  a  reasonable  time  for 
withdrawal  from  or  termination  of  treaties  that  contain  no  provision 
regarding  the  duration  of  their  validity.  Since  Nicaragua  has  in  fact 
170  Scott  and  Carr,  The  ICJ  and  Compulsory  Jurisdiction,  supra  note  117,  p.  66. 
171  48  Annuaire  IDI  (1959)  p.  382;  reprinted  in  English  in  54  AJIL  (1960)  p.  p.  136-137; 
similarly,  the  former  Secretary-General  of  the  UN,  Boutros  Ghali,  suggested  in  his  1992  report  `An 
Agenda  for  Peace'  that,  in  order  to  reinforce  the  ICJ:  "All  Member  States  should  accept  the 
general  jurisdiction  of  the  International  Court  under  Article  36  of  its  Statute,  without  any 
reservations,  before  the  end  of  the  UN  Decade  of  International  Law  in  the  year  2000.  "  DPI/1247, 
para.  39  (a). 
172  Military  and  Paramilitary  Activities  in  and  against  Nicaragua,  (Nicaragua  v.  United  States  of 
America),  Jurisdiction  and  Admissibility,  Judgment,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1984)  p.  420,  [para.  63]. Chapter  Five 
not  manifested  any  intention  to  withdraw  its  own  declaration,  the 
question  of  what  reasonable  period  of  notice  would  legally  be 
required  does  not  need  to  be  further  examined:  it  need  only  be 
observed  that  from  6  to  9  April  would  not  amount  to  a  `reasonable 
time"'. 
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D.  The  Condition  of  Reciprocity 
The  concept  of  the  condition  of  reciprocity  appears  in  the  wording  of  para.  3 
(D)  of  Art.  22  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  which  states  explicitly  that 
declarations  "may  be  made  unconditionally  or  on  condition  of  reciprocity  on  the 
part  of  several  or  certain  states.  "  When  states  accept  the  compulsory  jurisdiction 
of  the  ICJ  they  usually  use  different  formulations  to  include  in  their  acceptance  a 
reference  to  a  condition  of  reciprocity;  they  can  also  exclude  this  condition  if  they 
so  wish.  173  This  delimits  the  effect  of  the  system  of  the  optional  clause. 
Therefore,  reciprocity  may  mean  that  a  reservation  made  by  one  state  party  to  the 
dispute  may  abrogate  the  effect  of  the  broader  declaration  made  by  the  other  party 
to  the  dispute.  Thus,  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  is  reduced  to  cover  only 
disputes  where  the  declarations  of  the  two  parties  coincide.  174  In  the  Interhandel 
case,  the  ICJ  adopted  a  similar  definition  of  reciprocity  when  stated: 
"Reciprocity  in  the  case  of  Declarations  accepting  the  compulsory 
jurisdiction  of  the  Court  enables  a  Party  to  invoke  a  reservation  to  that 
acceptance  which  it  has  not  expressed  in  its  own  Declaration  but 
which  the  other  Party  has  expressed  in  its  Declaration.  For  example, 
Switzerland,  which  has  not  expressed  in  its  Declaration  any 
reservation  ratione  temporis,  while  the  United  States  has  accepted  the 
compulsory  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  only  in  respect  of  disputes 
subsequent  to  August  26',  1946,  might,  if  in  the  position  of 
Respondent,  invoke  by  virtue  of  reciprocity  against  the  United  States 
the  American  reservation  if  the  United  States  attempted  to  refer  to  the 
Court  a  dispute  with  Switzerland  which  had  arisen  before  August  26  'h, 
173  Hudson,  The  Permanent  Court,  supra  note  14,  p.  465;  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra 
note  2,  p.  759;  Hambro,  Some  Observations  on  the  Jurisdiction  of  the  ICJ,  supra  note  145, 
p.  p.  133-136;  also  see  his  The  Jurisdiction  of  the  I  CJ,  supra  note  19,  p.  p.  125,185. 
174  Eyffinger,  Arthur,  The  International  Court  of  Justice  1946-1.996,  London:  Kluwer  Law 
International,  (1996)  p.  131;  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  p.  759-760. Chapter  Five  289 
1946.  This  is  the  effect  of  reciprocity  in  this  connection.  Reciprocity 
enables  the  State  which  has  made  wider  acceptance  of  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  Court  to  rely  upon  the  reservation  to  the  acceptance  laid  down 
by  the  other  party.  There  the  effect  of  reciprocity  ends.  It  cannot 
justify  a  State...  in  relying  upon  a  restriction  which  the  other 
party  ... 
has  not  included  in  its  own  Declaration.  "175 
It  may  be  concluded  from  what  has  been  said  above  that  the  optional  clause 
system  can  be  an  important  tool  that  states  may  use  under  the  ACJ  with  great 
confidence.  However,  in  the  case  of  the  ACJ  it  is  still  not  possible  to  know  what 
the  situation  will  be,  how  states  parties  to  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  will  act,  or 
in  other  words,  to  what  extent  the  expected  success  of  the  system  of  optional 
clause  will  be  realised  in  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ.  Will  Arab  states  become. 
involved  this  system  as  soon  as  the  ACJ  is  created,  or  will  this  optional  method 
not  be  seen  as  satisfactory  and,  therefore,  not  be  used  at  all?  A  definite  answer 
about  the  success  of  the  system  of  the  optional  clause  in  the  ACJ  draft  Statute 
cannot  be  yet  given,  because  the  recourse  to  this  system  by  Arab  states  depends  on 
many  circumstances.  The  only  thing  that  can  be  said  is  that  Arab  states  will  be 
very  sensitive  when  considering  whether  or  not  to  accept  this  system,  and  their 
position  on  it  will  not  be  better  than  that  in  the  case  of  the  ICJ.  Since  the  creation 
of  the  ICJ  only  three  Arab  states  members  of  the  Arab  League,  have  approved  the 
optional  clause  system,  namely,  Egypt,  Sudan  and  Somalia.  176  This  may  be  a  clear 
indication  as  to  the  probable  position  of  Arab  states  and  the  fears  that  may 
motivate  them  to  reject  compulsory  jurisdiction  for  the  judicial  settlement  of  their 
disputes. 
175  Interhandel  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1959)  p.  23. 
176  50  YBICJ(1995/96)p.  p.  90,114,115. Chapter  Five  290 
5.4.  Advisory  Jurisdiction 
Beside  its  function  in  contentious  cases,  the  ACJ  can  also  give  opinions  on 
legal  questions  when  requested  to  do  so  by  authorised  organs  of  the  Arab  League. 
By  Art.  50  of  the  draft  Statute,  the  League  Council  has  the  authority  to  request 
advisory  opinions  on  legal  questions,  and  at  the  same  time  this  Article  empowers 
the  League  Council  to  confer  authority  upon  other  organs  of  the  Arab  League  to 
request  opinions  on  legal  questions  arising  within  the  scope  of  their  activities  . 
177 
This,  however,  requires  us  to  distinguish  between  contentious  and  advisory 
jurisdiction.  With  respect  to  the  former,  the  International  Court  has  to  render  a 
binding  judgment  based  on  law,  whereas  concerning  the  later,  the  Court  gives  only 
non-binding  opinions.  In  contentious  cases,  only  states  have  the  right  to  appear 
before  the  Court,  while  the  situation  relating  to  advisory  opinions  is  not  the 
same.  178  In  his  dissenting  opinion  ICJ  judge  Milovan  Zoricic  stated: 
"It  is  clear  that  any  advisory  opinion  is,  in  its  legal  nature,  different 
from  a  judgment.  In  a  judgment,  which  is  always  the  result  of  a 
contentious  case,  the  Court  decides  all  the  issues  in  dispute,  the 
judgment  is  unappealable  and  becomes  res  judicator,  so  that  rights  and 
obligations  of  the  States  are  legally  and  definitively  established. 
Advisory  opinions,  on  the  other  hand,  are  given  at  the  request  of  an 
international  organ  authorised  to  ask  for  them,  the  Court  gives  its 
answer  to  the  question  put  to  it,  but  the  opinion  possesses  no  binding 
force.  This  is  certainly  the  difference  between  a  judgment  and  an 
1"  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  original  idea  of  the  advisory  jurisdiction  was  found  in  Art.  14  of 
the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  and  then  this  idea  was  transferred  to  the  Charter  of  the  UN 
and  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ.  For  more  details  see  Keith,  Kenneth  J.,  The  Extent  of  the  Advisory 
Jurisdiction  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  Leyden:  A.  W.  Sijthoff,  (1971)  p.  p.  13-15. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  Keith,  The  Extent  of  the  Advisory  Opinion);  Pomerance,  Michla,  The 
Advisory  Function  of  the  International  Court:  In  the  League  and  U.  N.  Eras,  London:  The  Johns 
Hopkins  University  Press,  (1973)  p.  p.  5-14;  Oda,  The  International  Court  of  Justice,  supra 
note  151,  p.  90;  Hudson,  The  Permanent  Court,  supra  note  14,  p.  p.  483-484. 
17$  UNCIO,  vol.  13,  (1945)  p.  p.  233-235;  and  vol.  14,  p.  415;  also  see  Rosenne,  The  Law  and 
Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  985;  Status  of  Eastern  Carelia  case,  PCIJ  (1923)  Ser.  E,  No.  4,  p.  76; 
Interpretation  of  Peace  Treaties,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1950)  p.  71;  Certain  Expenses  of  the  United  Nations 
(Article  17,  paragraph  2,  of  the  Charter),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1962)  168;  Application  of  Article  VI,  Section 
22,  of  the  Convention  on  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  of  the  United  Nations,  ICJ  Rep., 
(1989)  p.  188. Chapter  Five 
advisory  opinion,  regarded  from  a  formal  and  strictly  legal  point  of 
view.  "  179 
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Four  main  points  will  be  discussed  in  order  to  clarify  the  concept  of  advisory 
jurisdiction  in  the  ACJ  draft  Statute:  (1)  bodies  authorised  to  request  advisory 
opinions,  (2)  subject  matter  of  request,  (3)  the  power  of  the  ACJ  regarding 
advisory  opinions  and  (4)  scope  of  advisory  opinions. 
5.4.1.  Bodies  Authorised  to  Request  Advisory  Opinions 
In  the  fulfilment  of  its  advisory  opinion  function,  the  ACJ  will  not  only  apply 
the  same  sources  of  law  but  also  the  same  procedure  applicable  to  contentious 
cases.  This  appears  in  the  wording  of  Art.  50  (3)  of  the  draft  Statute  which 
provides  that:  "the  Rules  of  the  Court  shall  determine  the  procedural  Rules  to  be 
followed  for  requesting  advisory  opinions.  "  Para.  4  of  the  same  Article  provides 
that  "the  Court  shall,  upon  exercising  the  function  of  issuing  advisory  opinions, 
apply  whatever  it  deems  fit  from  the  provisions  of  this  Statute  and  its  Rules.  "  As 
no  single  provision  can  be  found  in  the  draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ  regulating  the 
advisory  opinion  competence,  it  can  be  concluded  that  the  procedure  which  will 
apply  for  contentious  cases  will  also  be  applied  for  advisory  opinions.  However, 
ratione  personae,  the  competence  of  the  ACJ  with  regard  to  advisory  opinions,  is 
different  from  contentious  jurisdiction  as  states  are  not  allowed  to  request  advisory 
opinions.  It  is  therefore,  important  to  clarify  why  states  are  not  competent  to 
request  advisory  opinions  and  which  organs  will  be  able  to  request  advisory 
opinions. 
'"'9  Interpretation  of  Peace  Treaties  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1950)  p.  101. Chapter  Five  292 
A.  Exclusion  of  States  from  Advisory  Opinions 
States  parties  to  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  are  denied  the  right  to  request 
any  advisory  opinion.  180  This  is  clear  from  the  wording  of  Art.  50  which  defines 
the  entities  that  can  apply  for  advisory  opinions;  states  are  not  mentioned.  When 
comparing  this  point  with  judgments  of  the  PCIJ  or  its  successor  the  ICJ,  it 
becomes  clear  that  these  two  Courts  also  did  not  allow  states  to  request  advisory 
opinions.  The  PCIJ  in  the  Silesia  case  confirmed  that  its  advisory  opinions  were 
destined  for  international  organisations  and  not  for  states:  181 
"It  is  true  that  this  Article,  which  is  referred  to  in  the  Preamble  of  the 
Statute  of  the  Permanent  Court  of  Justice,  provides  that  the  Court  may 
give  advisory  opinions  at  the  request  of  the  Council  or  Assembly  of 
the  League  of  Nations:  a  request  of  this  kind  directly  submitted  by  a 
State  will  not  be  considered..  But...  it  is  evident  that  the  applicant 
State  could  not  have  intended  to  obtain  an  advisory  opinion  for  which 
it  was  not  entitled  to  ask.  " 
The  situation  remained  the  same  when  the  ICJ  was  created.  It  was  affirmed 
that  states  were  not  allowed  to  ask  the  Court  directly  for  advisory  opinions.  The 
consequence  of  this  was  applied  in  the  decision  in  the  Peace  Treaties  case,  which 
is  considered  to  be  the  leading  case  in  this  respect:  182 
"It  follows  that  no  State,  whether  a  Member  of  the  United  Nations  or 
not,  can  prevent  the  giving  of  an  Advisory  Opinion  which  the  United 
Nations  considers  to  be  desirable  in  order  to  obtain  enlightenment  as 
to  the  course  of  action  it  should  take.  The  Court's  Opinion  is  given 
not  to  the  States,  but  to  organ  which  is  entitled  to  request  it;  the  reply 
of  the  Court,  itself  an  "organ  of  the  United  Nations",  represents  its 
participation  in  the  activities  of  the  Organization,  and,  in  principle 
should  not  be  refused.  " 
180  Similarly  in  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  states  also  have  no  right  to  ask  the  Court  directly  for  advisory 
opinions.  This  right  is  only  granted  to  international  organisations.  See  Hambro,  The  Jurisdiction 
of  the  [CJ,  supra  note  19,  p.  196. 
181  Certain  German  Interests  in  Polish  Upper  Silesia,  Jurisdiction,  Judgment,  PC!  J  (1925)  Ser.  A, 
No.  6,  p.  21. 
182  Interpretation  of  Peace  Treaties  with  Bulgaria,  Hungary  and  Romania  case,  (First  Phase),  ICJ 
Rep.,  (1950)  p.  71. Chapter  Five  293 
Thus,  the  ACJ  will  be  able  to  grant  Arab  states  the  right  to  request  advisory 
opinions.  183  Consequently,  it  can  be  said  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  failed  when  they 
adopted  the  relevant  provision  of  the  ICJ  by  excluding  states  from  asking  advisory 
opinions.  It  is  believed  that  the  exclusion  of  states  from  seeking  advisory  opinion 
directly  from  the  Court  is  due  to  the  consideration  that  opinions  are  not  of 
practical  use  for  states.  If  a  state  wishes  to  settle  a  legal  dispute,  it  can  have 
recourse  to  the  contentious  procedure  of  the  Court.  184  Furthermore,  if  states  were 
granted  a  right  to  request  advisory  opinions,  especially  in  the  case  of  the  ICJ,  this 
could  delay  proceedings  before  this  Court  as  a  world  Court;  the  subject  matter  of 
an  opinion  would  generate  a  large  amount  of  questions  submitted  by  states  to  the 
ICJ,  which  result  that  the  Court  may  not  be  able  to  deal  with  that  large  amount  of 
questions. 
Regarding  the  ACJ,  the  matter  is  rather  different.  If  Arab  states  were  allowed 
to  request  the  Court  for  advisory  opinions,  this  would  increase  the  number  of 
opinions  generated  and  be  an  advantage  for  the  growth  of  Arab  law  as  special 
international  law  more  adapted  to  the  regional  character  of  the  ACJ.  185  Similarly, 
Lauterpacht  argued: 
"the  development  of  international  law  by  international  tribunals  is,  in 
the  long  run,  one  of  the  important  conditions  of  their  continued 
successful  functioning  and  of  their  jurisdiction.  For  Governments 
have  often  manifested  an  inclination  to  make  the  scope  of  obligatory 
183  Art.  23  (2)  of  the  draft  Statute  provides  that  the  ACJ  may  be  guided  by  the  judgment  of  other 
Courts  when  deciding  any  case.  Therefore,  it  is  expected,  at  least  in  our  opinion,  that  the  ACJ  will 
follow  the  same  jurisprudence  of  the  ICJ  or  PCIJ  in  this  matter. 
1S4  Pratap,  Dharma,  The  Advisory  Jurisdiction  of  the  International  Court,  Oxford:  At  the 
Clarendon  Press,  (1972)  p.  p.  84-85.  (hereinafter  cited  as:  Pratap,  The  Advisory  Jurisdiction). 
185  Ben  Miled,  The  Competence  of  the  ACJ,  supra  note  22,  p.  68;  similarly,  see  Szasz,  Paul  C., 
Enhancing  the  Advisory  Competence  of  the  Word  Court,  in  Leo  Gross  (ed.  ),  The  Future  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice,  vol.  2,  New  York:  Oceana  Publications,  INC.,  (1979)  p.  511. 
(hereinafter  cited  as:  Szasz,  Advisory  Competence  of  the  World  Court). Chapter  Five  294 
jurisdiction  conferred  upon  international  tribunals  dependent  upon  the 
existence  of  clear  rules  of  international  law.  "186 
Moreover,  cases  which  may  be  expected  to  be  brought  before  the  ACJ  as  a 
regional  court  would  not  be  as  numerous  compared  with  the  ICJ  as  a  World-wide 
Court.  It  is  therefore  submitted  thät  the  Arab  draftsmen  committed  a  great 
mistake  by  denying  states  the  right  to  request  advisory  opinions.  International 
lawyers  have  criticised  this  exclusion  in  the  ICJ  Statute  and  many  proposals  have 
been  made  to  the  effect  that  states  should  be  granted  the  right  to  request  advisory 
opinions  from  the  ICJ,  but  all  such  proposals  have  been  rejected.  187 
According  to  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  Arab  states  are  not  only  prevented 
from  requesting  advisory  opinions,  but  also  are  not  allowed  to  participate  in 
advisory  cases.  In  comparison,  Art.  66  (2),  of  the  ICJ  Statute  permits  states  to 
submit  written  and  oral  arguments  when  a  question  is  referred  to  the  Court  for  an 
advisory  opinion.  The  Arab  draftsmen  have  not  paid  attention  to  this  important 
provision,  and  have  therefore  not  included  any  corresponding  provision  which 
deals  with  this  matter  in  the  draft  Statute.  Art.  50  (5)  of  the  draft  Statute  states 
that  the  Court  has  to  notify  only  the  Secretary-General  and  the  organ  requesting 
the  opinion  about  the  date  of  the  session  during  which  the  advisory  opinion  is  to 
be  discussed.  Thus,  participation  in  proceedings  dealing  with  an  advisory  opinion 
is  not  available  for  states.  188 
186  Lauterpacht,  The  Development  of  International  Law,  supra  note  122,  p.  p.  6-7. 
187  For  examples  see,  Pratap,  The  Advisory  Jurisdiction,  supra  note  184,  p.  511. 
188  Cf  para.  I  of  Art.  66  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  in  which  it  explicitly  provides  that  "the  Registrar 
shall  forthwith  give  notice  of  the  request  for  an  advisory  opinion  to  all  States  entitled  to  appear 
before  the  Court.  "  The  same  provision  also  to  be  found  in  Art.  43  (b)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the 
IICJ. Chapter  Five  295 
B.  Organs  Allowed  to  Request  an  Advisory  Opinion 
By  Art.  50  (1)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  the  League  Council  is 
empowered  to  request  the  Court  to  provide  advisory  opinions  on  legal  questions. 
Para.  2  enumerates  organs  that  may  enjoy  a  similar  right  if  authorised  by  the 
League  Council,  namely,  (1)  the  Secretary-General,  (2)  the  Specialised  Councils 
of  the  League  including  Ministerial  Councils  and  (3)  Specialised  Arab 
organisations  established  within  the  Arab  League  system. 
By  comparison,  Art.  65  (1)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  does  not  include  any 
reference  to  councils  or  agencies  that  may  request  the  Court  for  an  opinion,  but  it 
refers  to  the  Charter  of  the  UN.  189  Para.  I  of  Art.  96  of  the  Charter  provides  that 
the  General  Assembly  or  the  Security  Council  can  ask  the  Court  independently 
and  as  of  right  for  advisory  opinions.  Para.  2  stipulates  that  other  organs  of  the 
UN,  specialized  agencies,  if  authorised  by  the  General  Assembly,  may  also  request 
advisory  opinions  of  the  Court  on  legal  questions  arising  within  the  scope  of  their 
activities.  190  The  General  Assembly,  acting  on  the  basis  of  the  wording  of  Art.  96 
(2)  of  the  UN  Charter,  has  authorised  four  organs  of  the  UN  and  sixteen 
specialised  organisations  to  ask  for  advisory  opinions.  191 
189  This  Article  reads  as  follows:  "The  Court  may  give  an  advisory  opinion  on  any  legal  question 
at  the  request  of  whatever  body  may  be  authorized  by  or  in  accordance  with  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations  to  make  such  request.  " 
19°  According  to  Art.  57  (1)  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN,  specialised  agencies  are  defined  as  those 
international  agencies  "established  by  intergovernmental  agreement  and  having  wide  international 
responsibilities,  as  defined  in  their  basic  instruments,  in  economic,  social,  cultural,  educational, 
health,  and  related  field"  According  to  Art.  63  (1)  of  the  Charter,  they  are  linked  to  the  UN 
through  the  Economic  and  Social  Council.  It  is  therefore  possible  for  the  General  Assembly  to 
authorise  other  international  organisations  which  already  exist  or  are  to  be  created,  to  ask  for 
advisory  opinions.  See  Resolution  of  the  General  Assembly  No.  196  (1II),  of  3  December  1948, 
p.  28;  and  No.  957  (X),  of  8  November  1955,  p.  35. 
191  The  four  organs  of  the  UN  are  Economic  and  Social  Council;  Trusteeship  Council  as  a 
principal  organ  in  addition  to  two  non-principal  organs  such  as  the  Interim  Committee  of  the Chapter  Five  296 
The  most  important  point  included  in  para.  2  of  Art.  50  of  the  draft  Statute  of 
the  ACJ  is  the  right  given  to  the  Secretary-General  to  request  the  Court  to  provide 
an  advisory  opinion.  The  Secretary-General  in  any  organisation,  whether  regional 
or  international,  is  the  chief  administrative  officer  in  control  of  most  of  its 
activities.  '  92  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  have  successfully  provided, 
explicitly,  that  the  Secretary-General,  but  not  the  Secretariat-General,  shall  be 
granted  a  right  to  request  an  advisory  opinion  even  if  this  right  is  conditional  upon 
authorisation  by  the  League  Council.  Undoubtedly,  the  League  Council  can  be 
expected  to  refuse  to  authorise  such  a  right  to  the  Secretary-General.  In 
comparison,  this  matter  is  not  as  clear  within  the  framework  of  the  UN,  because  of 
the  lack  of  an  authoritative  interpretation  of  para.  2  of  Art.  96  of  the  UN  Charter. 
In  both  the  UN  Charter  and  the  Arab  League  Pact,  the  Secretary-General  acts  as 
part  of  the  Secretariat-General.  The  question  in  the  context  of  the  UN  Charter  is 
whether  to  authorise  the  Secretary-General  or  the  Secretariat  to  request  an 
opinion.  193  Arab  draftsmen,  from  the  beginning,  settled  this  legal  question  by 
stating  explicitly  that  the  Secretary-General  but  not  the  Secretariat-General  can  be 
General  Assembly;  Committee  on  Applications  for  Review  of  Administrative  Tribunals 
Judgments.  The  16  specialised  agencies  are  the  International  Labour  Organisation  (ILO);  the 
Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  (FAO);  the  United  Nations  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Organization  (UNESCO);  the  World  Health  Organization  (WHO);  the  International  Bank  for 
Reconstruction  and  Development  (IBRD);  the  International  Finance  Corporation  (IFC);  the 
International  Development  Association  (IDA);  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF);  the 
International  Civil  Aviation  Organization  (ICAO);  the  International  Telecommunication  Union 
(ITU);  the  International  Fund  for  Agricultural  Development  ([FAD);  the  World  Meteorological 
Organization  (WMO);  the  International  Maritime  Organization  (IMO);  the  World  Intellectual 
Property  Organization  (WIPO);  the  United  Nations  Industrial  Development  Organization 
(UNIDO)  and  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA).  See  50  YBICJ  (1995-96) 
p.  p.  75-76;  49  YBICJ  (1994-95)  p.  p.  71-72;  see  also  Schwebel,  Justice  in  International  Law, 
supra  note  49,  p.  p.  66-67;  and  in  his  Was  The  Capacity  to  Request  an  Advisory  Opinion  Wider  in 
The  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice  than  in  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  LXII  BYbIL 
(1991)  p.  113. 
192  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  333. 
193  Schwebe  I,  Justice  in  International  Law,  supra  note  49,  p.  867. Chapter  Five  297 
authorised  to  ask  for  advisory  opinions.  194  Many  attempts  have  been  made  to 
grant  the  Secretary-General  of  the  UN  the  authorisation  to  request  advisory 
opinions.  For  instance,  when  a  review  of  the  role  of  the  ICJ  took  place  in  the 
General  Assembly  in  1971,  Iraq  declared  that:  195 
"[t]he  possibility  of  authorising  the  Secretary-General  of  the  United 
Nations  to  request  the  advisory  opinion  of  the  Court  in  certain  cases  is 
worth  considering.  " 
These  attempts  have  not  succeeded  and  the  Secretary-General  has  not  been  so 
authorised. 
Under  the  wording  of  para.  2  of  Art.  50  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ, 
specialised  councils,  including  specialised  ministerial  councils,  are  also  allowed  to 
apply  to  the  ACJ  for  advisory  opinions,  but  no  further  reference  to  this  point  is 
made  in  the  paragraph  to  clarify  the  status  of  councils.  These  councils  find  their 
legal  basis  in  the  term  of  Arts.  2  and  4  of  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League. 
At  present  about  eleven  Councils  have  been  established  within  the  Arab 
League  system  and  they  may  be  authorised  by  the  League  Council  to  request  the 
Court  to  issue  an  advisory  opinion.  Relating  to  this  point  the  following  question 
may  be  raised:  Could  the  Councils  created  under  the  provisions  of  the  Collective 
Security  Treaty  be  treated  as  Councils  falling  under  the  provision  of  para.  2  of  Art. 
194  Cf.  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  673;  Pratap,  The  Advisory  Jurisdiction, 
supra  note  184,  p.  p.  72-73. 
195  Review  of  the  Role  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  Report  of  the  Secretary-General,  UN 
Doc.  A/8382,  para.  299  (15  September  1971).  Also  see  the  Philippines  proposals  to  amend  Art.  96 
of  the  Charter  of  the  UN  which  was  presented  to  the  Special  Committee  on  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations  and  on  Strengthening  the  Role  of  the  Organisation.  This  proposal  read  as  follows: 
"The  General  Assembly,  the  Security  Council,  or  the  Secretary-General  may  request  the 
International  Court  of  Justice  to  give  an  advisory  opinion  on  any  legal  question.  "  UN  Doc. 
A/32/33,  (1976)  p.  190;  also  Cf.  Szasz,  Advisory  Competence  of  the  World  Court,  supra  note  185, 
p.  541;  Keith,  The  Extent  of  the  Advisory  Opinion,  supra  note  177,  p.  38;  Schwebel,  Justice  in 
International  Law,  supra  note  49,  p.  p.  75-81. Chapter  Five  298 
50  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ;  if  so,  could  they  be  authorised  to  apply  to  the 
ACJ  for  advisory  opinions?  As  the  ACJ  has  not  yet  been  created  it  is  not  possible 
to  predict  which  Specialised  Councils,  be  they  under  the  provisions  of  the  Arab 
League  Pact  or  the  Collective  Security  Treaty,  will  be  so  authorised,  but  para.  2  of 
Art.  50  provides  that  Specialised  Ministerial  Councils  too  may  authorised  by  the 
League  Council.  It  is  submitted  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  did  not  limit  the  number 
of  organs  that  can  exercise  the  right  of  requesting  advisory  opinions.  Giving 
specialised  ministerial  councils  such  a  right  may  cause,  however,  some  problems, 
if  all  of  them  are  authorised  by  the  Arab  League  Council;  the  problem  may  be  one 
of  a  conflict  of  jurisdiction  between  different  councils.  Regular  meetings  are  now 
held  at  the  ministerial  level  to  deal  with  most  subjects  that  may  strengthen  inter- 
Arab  relations.  The  ministerial  level  include  interior  ministers,  information 
ministers,  economic  ministers,  information  ministers  etc.  It  is  submitted  that  if 
any  legal  question  needs  to  be  submitted  to  the  Court's  opinion,  it  should  be 
submitted  to  the  Court  by  the  Secretary-General,  not  by  the  ministerial  council 
involved. 
Furthermore,  the  reference  to  specialised  Arab  organisations  in  the  wording 
of  para.  2  of  Art.  50  is  restricted  to  organisations  created  within  the  Arab  League 
system.  This  means  that  other  Arab  organisations  created  outside  the  Arab  League 
are  not  allowed  to  request  advisory  opinions  from  the  Court.  Since  the  creation  of 
the  Arab  League  in  1945,  many  Arabic  regional  organisations  have  been  created  in 
order  to  regulate  relations  between  the  Arab  states  within  the  framework  of  the 
League  in  different  fields,  such  as  the  Organisation  of  Administrative  Science; Chapter  Five  299 
the  Arab  Union  of  Telecommunications;  the  International  Arab  Organisation  for 
Social  Defence  against  Crime;  the  Arab  League  Educational,  Cultural  and 
Scientific  Organisation;  the  Arab  Organisation  for  Health;  the  Arab  Organisation 
for  Agricultural  Development;  the  Arab  Satellite  Communication  Organisation; 
the  Arab  Postal  Union;  the  Arab  Sates  Broadcasting  Union;  the  Arab  Labour 
Organisation  and  the  Organisation  of  Youth  Welfare.  196 
It  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  ACJ,  when  accepting  any  legal  question 
submitted  to  it  by  any  of  the  above  mentioned  organs  or  councils,  should  consider 
two  main  points:  (1)  that  an  applicant  organ  or  council  has  an  authorisation  from- 
the  League  Council,  (2)  that  the  given  question  falls  within  the  scope  of  the 
activities  of  the  authorised  body.  197  Therefore,  if  the  Court  finds  that  a  given 
question  does  not  fall  within  the  functions  of  an  authorised  body,  it  is  entitled  not 
to  respond.  For  the  sake  of  comparison,  the  words  of  the  ICJ  in  case  concerning 
the  Legality  of  the  Use  by  a  State  of  Nuclear  Weapons  in  Armed  Conflict,  may  be 
cited:  198 
"For  all  these  reasons,  the  Court  considers  that  the  question  raised  in 
the  request  for  advisory  opinion  submitted  to  it  by  the  WHO  does  not 
arise  `within  the  scope  of  [the]  activities'  of  that  organization  as 
defined  by  its  constitution.....  " 
5.4.2.  The  Subject-matter  of  Requests 
Art.  50  (1)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  limits  the  subject-matter  of 
requested  advisory  opinions  only  to  a  `legal  question'  without  giving  any  further 
196  For  further  details  about  these  organisations  see  Shihab,  Mufeed  M.,  Jami'at  ad  Dowal  a! 
'Arabiyah:  Mithaquha  wa  Injazatuha,  (The  League  of  Arab  States:  its  Charter  and 
Implementations),  at  Qahirah:  Ma'had  at  Buhuth  wad  Dirasat  at  `Arabiyah,  (1978)  p.  p.  270-365. 
197  Similarly  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2,  p.  986. 
198  Legality  of  the  Use  by  a  State  of  Nuclear  Weapons  in  Armed  Conflict  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1996) 
p.  84,  [para.  31]. Chapter  Five  300 
definition:  "The  League  Council  may  request  the  Court  to  provide  its  advisory 
opinion  on  any  legal  question.  "  Therefore,  it  becomes  necessary  to  refer  to  the 
practice  of  the  ICJ  to  understand  what  "legal  question"  means. 
A.  Legal  and  Political  Questions 
The  main  reason  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  makes  clear  that  advisory 
opinions  can  only  be  asked  on  legal  questions  is  to  avoid  requests  for  opinions  on 
political  questions.  In  other  words,  the  ACJ  can  only  give  an  advisory  opinion 
based  on  law,  and  hence  has  no  right  to  give  opinions  ex  aequo  et  bono  as  in 
contentious  cases)  However,  a  clear  distinction  between  the  two  notions 
`political'  and  `legal'  is  not  easy,  and  in  many  ways  the  distinction  would  depend 
on  the  way  the  request  is  made.  In  his  separate  opinion  in  the  Namibia  advisory 
opinion,  Judge  Nervo  declared:  200 
"The  question  put  to  the  Court  by  the  Security  Council  can  be  said  to 
intertwined  with  certain  political  problems,  but  the  actual  wording  of 
such  question,  asking  the  Court  what  are  the  legal  consequences  for 
States  of  the  continued  presence  of  South  Africa  in  Namibia,  indicates 
that  the  position  is  in  fact  a  legal  one  even  if  it  may  have  a  political 
aspect.  In  the  nature  of  things  it  could  not  be  otherwise.  The  line 
between  political  and  legal  question  is  often  vague.  Examining  the 
close  inter-relation  between  the  political  and  legal  factors  in  the 
development  of  international  law,  Dr.  Rosenne  makes  the  following 
comments: 
`The  interrelation  explains  the  keenness  with  which  elections  of 
member  of  the  Court  are  conducted...  But  that  interrelation  goes 
further.  It  explains,  the  conflict  of  ideologies  prevalent  today 
regarding  the  Court.  '  (Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice  of  the 
International  Court,  Vol.  1,  p.  4.  )" 
199  Greig,  D.  W.,  The  Advisory  Jurisdiction  of  the  International  Court  and  the  Settlement  of 
Disputes  Between  States,  15  ICLQ  (1966)  p.  325;  Pratap,  The  Advisory  Jurisdiction,  supra 
note  184,  p.  86. 
200  Legal,  Consequences  for  States  of  the  Continued  Presence  of  South  Africa  in  Namibia  (South 
West  Africa)  Notwithstanding  Security  Council  Resolution  276  (1970),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1971)  p.  103. Chapter  Five  301 
The  fact  that  political  motivation  is  often  at  the  root  of  requests  for  opinions 
is  not  very  important,  as  long  as  the  Court  can  answer  the  question  using  law,  by 
giving  a  legal  basis  to  its  opinion.  This  has  been  shown  clearly  in  the  opinion 
delivered  by  the  ICJ  in  the  Conditions  of  Admission  case,  when  the  Court 
declared:  201 
"It  has  nevertheless  been  contended  that  the  question  put  must  be 
regarded  as  a  political  one  and  that,  for  this  reason,  it  falls  outside  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Court.  The  Court  cannot  attribute  a  political 
character  to  a  request  which,  framed  in  abstract  terms,  invites  it  to 
undertake  an  essentially  judicial  task,  the  interpretation  of  a  treaty 
provision.  It  is  not  concerned  with  the  motives  which  may  have 
inspired  this  request,  nor  with  the  considerations  which,  in  the 
concrete  case  submitted  for  examination  to  the  Security  Council, 
formed  the  subject  of  the  exchange  of  views  which  took  place  in  that 
body.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  Court  to  envisage  the  question  submitted  to 
it  only  in  the  abstract  form  which  has  been  given  to  it;  nothing  which 
is  said  in  the  present  opinion  refers,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  to 
concrete  cases  or  to  particular  circumstances.  " 
The  political  background  of  this  request  for  an  opinion  is  obvious.  The 
General  Assembly,  asking  for  this  opinion,  did  not  want  a  clarification  on  a 
particular  legal  question,  but  was  facing  a  difficult  situation  with  one  of  its 
members,  the  Soviet  Union,  which  as  a  member  of  the  Security  Council 
systematically  used  its  veto  to  oppose  states  asking  to  become  members  of  the 
UN.  The  question  regarding  application  for  membership  had  led  then  to  a  real 
fight  between  the  East  and  West  blocs.  A  political  matter  was  hidden  behind  the 
request  for  an  opinion,  but  the  ICJ  did  not  consider  it  and  gave  to  its  advisory 
opinion  a  legal  basis  with  reference  to  Art.  4  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN  regarding 
the  admission  of  new  members. 
201  Conditions  of  Admission  of  A  State  to  Membership  in  the  United  Nations  (Article  4  of  the 
Charter),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1948)  p.  61. Chapter  Five  302 
In  the  case  of  Expenses  of  the  UN,  the  ICJ  had  to  answer  the  question 
whether  member  states  were  legally  obliged,  under  threat  of  sanction,  to  give 
money  for  UN  peace  keeping?  Should  the  cost  of  these  operations  be  considered 
as  an  expense  of  the  Organisation  as  defined  by  Art.  17  (2)  of  the  Charter  of  the 
UN?  Some  states  answered  it  negatively,  but  did  not  oppose  the  suggestion  of 
consulting  the  Court,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  matter  appeared  to  be  more 
political  than  legal  and  may  not  have  fallen  under  its  competence.  The  Court 
decided  expenses  were  authorised  by  Resolutions  of  the  GA  of  the  UN  as  the 
Organisation's  expenses  as  defined  in  the  Art.  17  (2)  of  the  Charter.  202  The  ICJ 
made  a  distinction  between  the  `political  character'  of  a  question  and  its  `political 
importance'.  It  has  been  considered  that  most  of  the  interpretations  of  the  UN 
Charter  have  a  political  importance,  however,  a  political  character  could  not  be 
attributed  to  a  request  regarding  a  judicial  task,  such  as  the  interpretation  of  a 
conventional  obligation.  203 
Most  of  the  questions  submitted  to  the  Court  for  advisory  opinions  have  been 
born  in  a  political  context;  but  the  Court  has  always  distinguished,  in  the  request, 
between  the  political  background  and  the  topic  of  the  request  that  has  to  be  legal. 
Such  a  distinction  between  the  political  motivation  and  the  legal  motivation  of  a 
request  may  appear  trivial,  if  reality  were  not  taken  into  consideration.  The 
jurisprudence  of  the  ICJ  is  constant  on  the  matter,  as  confirmed  by  its  advisory 
202  Certain  Expenses  of  the  United  Nations  (Article  17,  paragraph  2,  of  the  Charter),  ICJ  Rep., 
(1962)  p.  p.  179-180. 
203  Ibid.,  p.  155. Chapter  Five  303 
opinion  on  the  Interpretation  of  the  Agreement  between  WHO  and  Egypt.  04  The 
facts  were  simple:  the  General  Manager  of  WHO  referred  a  question  to  the  Court 
in  order  to  gain  advice  as  to  when  the  WHO  could  transfer  its  Regional  Office 
from  the  territory  of  Egypt  without  regard  to  the  provisions  of  Section  37  of  the 
Agreement  between  the  WHO  and  Egypt  of  250'  March  1951.  This  transfer  would 
be  done  without  breaching  Section  37  of  the  agreement  of  250'  March  1951 
between  the  WHO  and  Egypt.  The  agreement  stated  that  privileges  and 
immunities  would  be  extended  by  Egypt  to  the  WHO,  and  Section  37  refers  to 
potential  revision  or  denunciation  of  the  agreement,  which  provided  that  two 
years'  notice  would  be  required  for  one  of  the  parties  to  denounce  the  agreement. 
When  the  legal  question  was  referred  to  the  Court  for  an  advisory  opinion,  the 
judicial  question  was:  what  are  the  judicial  principles  and  rules  applicable  to  the 
matter  of  knowing  what  conditions  of  transfer  are  applicable  to  take  the  regional 
office  out  of  Egypt?  205  The  real  point  was  not  based  on  law,  but  on  a  political 
quarrel  without  any  link  to  health  matters.  In  his  separate  opinion,  Judge  Gros 
said:  "Such  being  the  factual  situation,  the  legal  `cause'  for  the  request  for 
transfer  of  the  Alexandria  office  is  a  political  decision  by  a  group  of  member 
States  of  the  WHO.  "206 
In  this  case,  a  majority  of  member  states  of  the  WHO  wished  to  see  the 
regional  office  of  the  organisation  transferred  to  another  country.  207  There  was  a 
204  Interpretation  of  the  Agreement  of  25  March  1951  between  WHO  and  Egypt,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1980) 
p.  73. 
205  Ibid.,  p.  89,  [para.  36]. 
206  Ibid,  p.  99. 
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major  disagreement  between  the  host  state,  Egypt,  and  other  states  in  the  region 
which  the  advisory  opinion  of  the  ICJ  did  not  consider.  The  Court  examined 
whether  Section  37  of  the  agreement  was  applicable  and  expounded  only  the  legal 
principles  and  rules  applicable  to  a  transfer  in  answering  the  request:  what  are  the 
legal  consequences  of  the  reciprocal  obligations  between  Egypt  and  the 
organisation  if  one  of  them  wished  the  office  to  be  transferred?  208  When  giving  its 
opinion,  the  Court  identified  the  legal  principles  and  rules  which  would  impose 
some  obligations  on  the  parties  and  did  not  consider  the  fact  that  the  quarrel  was 
linked  to  a  political  dispute  which  started  with  the  `Camp  David'  agreement  in 
1978  between  Egypt  and  Israel.  209 
B.  Legal  Questions  and  Questions  of  Fact 
As  already  mentioned,  the  ACJ  has  only  the  competence  to  give  opinions  on 
legal  questions.  One  may  ask,  what  if  a  question  of  fact  appears  before  the  Court; 
does  it  have  the  competence  to  deal  with  it?  The  answer  is  not  known  yet, 
because  the  ACJ  is  not  yet  established,  but  if  it  were  to  follow  the  practice  of  the 
ICJ  or  its  predecessor  the  PCIJ,  it  would  then  refuse  to  deal  with  questions  of  fact 
in  advisory  matters.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  jurisprudence  of  the  two  world 
courts,  the  PCIJ  and  the  ICJ,  has  been  constant  on  this  point. 
During  the  period  of  the  PCIJ,  the  question  of  fact  referred  to  it  concerned  the 
Status  of  Eastern  Carelia'  which  was  a  territory  under  Soviet  control.  210  Despite 
the  peace  treaty  of  Dorpat  in  1920  which  provided  for  independence  for  East 
208  Ibid.,  p.  95,  [para.  48]. 
209  Ibid.,  p.  97. 
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Carelia,  the  Soviet  Union  put  down  every  efforts  of  resistance.  Finland  then 
applied  to  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations,  claiming  that  the  matter  should 
be  submitted  to  the  PCIJ  for  an  advisory  opinion.  Did  the  peace  treaty  involve  an 
international  engagement  between  the  Soviet  Union  and  Finland  as  parties?  The 
Soviet  government  declared  that  the  matter  of  Eastern  Carelia  was  purely  a  matter 
of  Soviet  domestic  jurisdiction  and  refused  to  continuance  any  discussion  of  it. 
The  PCIJ,  invoking  legal  reasons  did  not  give  an  opinion.  It  considered  that  the 
lack  of  essential  material  information  necessary  to  give  an  opinion  on  question  of 
fact  was  decisive.  The  refusal  of  the  Soviet  government  to  supply  the  necessary 
information  prevented  it  from  giving  an  opinion.  The  Court  did  not  attempt  to 
discuss  the  subject,  as  the  Soviet  Union  as  a  directly  involved  party  refused  to 
deliver  the  required  factual  details.  The  Court  thus  refused  to  reach  a  decision  on 
a  question  of  fact  if  this  question  was  the  topic  of  the  request.  211  This  does  not 
mean  that  the  Court  does  not  attach  any  importance  to  the  facts  of  the  situation. 
This  was  the  situation  in  the  opinion  of  the  ICJ  on  the  legal  consequences  of  the 
presence  of  South  Africa  in  Namibia:  212 
"The  Reference  in  this  provision  [Article  96  of  the  Charter]  to  legal 
questions  cannot  be  interpreted  as  opposing  legal  to  factual  issues. 
Normally,  to  enable  a  court  to  pronounce  on  legal  questions,  it  must 
also  be  acquainted  with,  take  into  account  and,  if  necessary,  make 
findings  as  to  the  relevant  factual  issues.  " 
South  Africa  argued  that  the  question  was  not  a  legal  question  according  to 
Art.  96  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN,  considering  the  importance  of  factual  matters 
211  Ibid.,  p.  28. 
212  Legal  Consequences  for  States  of  the  Continued  Presence  of  South  Africa  in  Namibia  (South 
West  Africa)  notwithstanding  Security  Council  Resolution  276,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1971)  p.  27;  for  further 
details  see  Keith,  The  Extent  of  the  Advisory  Opinion,  supra  note  177,  p.  82. Chapter  Five  306 
relevant  for  the  opinion.  Before  saying  that  South  Africa  had  breached  its 
obligations  in  Namibia,  the  ICJ  had  to  make  a  concise  analysis  of  the  facts,  to 
assess  the  lack  of  validity  in  measures  taken  by  South  Africa  regarding  Namibia. 
In  its  opinion  regarding  Western  Sahara,  the  Court  confirmed  what  it  had  already 
said  earlier:  it  had  to  establish  facts  in  order  to  evaluate  their  legal  significance.  213 
Once  the  facts  are  ascertained  and  analysed  the  Court  can  then  attach  to  them  a 
legal  significance  and  then  answer  the  question  addressed  to  it  legal  terms.  In  this 
case,  the  Court  said:  214 
"The  Court  therefore  considers  that  the  information  and  evidence 
before  it  are  sufficient  to  enable  it  to  arrive  at  a  judicial  conclusion 
concerning  the  facts  which  are  relevant  to  its  opinion  and  necessary 
for  replying  to  the  two  questions  posed  in  the  request.  " 
C.  Pending  Legal  Questions  between  one  or  more  States 
Neither  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  nor  its  draft  Rules  mention  the  particular 
issue  of  a  pending  legal  question.  Why  is  it  important  to  discuss  this  point  of 
pending  legal  questions  in  the  context  of  the  advisory  jurisdiction  of  the  ACJ?  It 
is  submitted  that  the  Court  cannot  give  its  opinion  without  the  consent  of  the 
parties,  and  it  also  cannot  give  its  opinion  without  a  request  admitted  to  it  from  an 
authorised  organ.  215  The  PCIJ  pointed  to  this  problem  in  the  Status  of  Eastern 
Carelia  case,  when  Finland  requested  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  to  ask 
the  Court  about  the  dispute  between  Finland  and  Russia  regarding  Carelian 
independence.  The  Court  concluded  that  giving  an  advisory  opinion  would  be 
comparable  with  judging  a  dispute  between  two  states,  because  the  question 
Zia  Western  Sahara,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1975)  p.  p.  19-20. 
214  Ibid.,  p.  29. 
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addressed  to  the  Court  was  not  of  one  abstract  law.  It  directly  involved  the 
essential  point  of  conflict  between  Russia  and  Finland,  and  could  not  be  answered 
without  a  previous  inquiry.  It  declared:  216 
"The  question  put  to  the  Court  is  not  one  of  abstract  law,  but  concerns 
directly  the  main  point  of  controversy  between-  Finland  and  Russia, 
and  can  only  be  decided  by  an  investigation  into  the  facts  underlying 
the  case.  Answering  the  question  would  be  substantially  equivalent  to 
deciding  the  dispute  between  the  parties.  " 
In  the  Interpretation  of  Peace  Treaties  advisory  opinion,  the  incompetence  of 
the  Court  was  pointed  out,  and  it  was  argued  that  the  opinion  concerned  a  dispute 
between  states  some  of  whom  had  not  agreed  to  the  competence  of  the  Court. 
Bulgaria,  Hungary  and  Romania  were  not  then  member  states  of  the  UN. 
However,  the  Court  rejected  this  argument  and  affirmed  that  in  an  advisory  case, 
its  competence  was  not  dependent  on  the  agreement  of  states  as  in  a  contentious 
case,  even  if  the  request  of  an  advisory  question  concerned  a  legal  question 
actually  pending  between  states.  The  Court  explained  this  by  the  fact  that  the 
answer  given  was  only  advisory  and  so  could  not  have  any  compulsory  effect.  It 
did  not  address  its  opinion  to  the  states,  but  to  the  organisation  qualified  for  asking 
it.  In  its  opinion,  the  Court  announced:  217 
"Another  argument  that  has  been  invoked  against  the  power  of  the 
Court  to  answer  Questions  put  to  it  in  this  case  is  based  on  the 
position  of  the  Governments  of  Bulgaria,  Hungary  and  Romania  to  the 
advisory  procedure.  The  Court  cannot,  it  is  said,  violating  the  well- 
established  principle  of  international  law  according  to  which  no 
pending  between  States  can  take  place  without  their  consent.  This 
objection  reveals  a  confusion  between  the  principles  governing 
contentious  procedure  and  those  which  are  applicable  to  Advisory 
Opinions.  " 
216  Status  of  Eastern  Carelia,  Advisory  Opinion,  PCIJ,  (1923)  Ser.  B,  No.  5,  p.  p.  28-29. 
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In  conclusion,  it  is  expected  that  the  ACJ  will  follow  the  practice  of  the  two 
World  Courts,  the  PCIJ  and  ICJ,  regarding  the  subject-matter  of  the  request 
advisory  opinions.  Only  legal  questions  submitted  to  the  projected  ACJ  by  any 
authorised  entity  will  engage  the  consideration  of  the  Court,  while  political 
questions  will  be  outside  the  competence  of  this  Court.  The  same  could  be  said 
regarding  questions  of  fact,  the  ACJ  has  to  refuse  to  deal  with  these  kind  of 
questions. 
5.4.3.  The  Competence  of  the  ACJ  Regarding  Advisory  Opinions 
The  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  does  not  give  any  details  on  this  point.  It  just. 
states  that  the  Court,  when  exercising  its  advisory  jurisdiction,  will  apply  whatever 
it  deems  suitable  among  the  provisions  of  the  Statute  and  the  Rules  of  the 
Court.  218  Therefore,  it  is  meaningful  to  refer  to  the  precedents  set  by  the  judges  of 
the  PCIJ  and  ICJ,  all  the  more  as  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  is  unclear.  It  will  be 
the  Arab  Judge's  role  to  ascertain  and  define  the  scope  of  the  ACJ's  advisory 
jurisdiction.  219  Nonetheless  at  present,  the  only  model  available  to  clarify  the 
matter  is  found  in  precedents  established  by  the  PCIJ  and  the  ICJ  in  addition  to  the 
interpretations  given  in  the  advisory  opinions  delivered  by  its  judges. 
A.  Assessment  Competence  given  to  the  ACJ 
Art.  65  (1)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ  provides  that  the  Court  `may'  not  `must' 
give  an  advisory  opinion  on  any  legal  question.  This  means  the  Court  has  no 
compulsory  obligation  to  answer  a  request  for  advisory  opinion.  It  has  discretion 
218  Art.  50  (4)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ. 
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to  decide  the  given  points  in  each  case.  Despite  this  freedom  allowed  by  its 
Statute,  the  ICJ  has  announced  that  decisive  reasons  would  be  required  for  the 
Court  not  to  give  an  answer  to  the  requested  advice.  220 
The  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  is  not  clear  on  this  point  because  the  wording  of 
Art.  50  refers  to  the  entities  that  can  request  the  Court  for  an  advisory  opinion,  but 
neither  this  nor  any  other  Article  provides  clearly  for  the  power  of  the  Court  to 
accept  or  reject  advisory  opinion  requests.  Therefore,  with  due  regard  to  the  fact 
that  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  is  based,  concerning  most  of  its  Articles,  on  the 
provisions  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  Art.  50  of  the  draft  Statute  should  not  be 
interpreted  differently  from  Art.  65  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ.  If  the  ACJ  was 
obliged  to  respond  to  advisory  opinion  requests,  the  wording  of  Art.  50  should 
have  been  imperative. 
It  is  believed  that  the  Arab  judges  will  be  quite  free  to  receive  and  accept 
advisory  opinion  requests.  Even  if  they  were  to  reject  an  advisory  opinion  request, 
they  would  have  to  justify  this  refusal  as  ICJ  judges  have  to  22'  The  ICJ  judges,  as 
mentioned  before,  have  refused  to  accept  a  request  when  it  concerned  a  point 
mainly  relevant  to  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  states,  or  when  the  question  asked 
was  not  legal  in  nature,  or  if  the  judges  would  have  to  evaluate  the  content  of  a 
220  Interpretation  of  Peace  Treaties  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1950)  p.  71;  Reservations  to  the  Convention 
on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  the  Crime  of  Genocide  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1951)  p.  19;  Certain 
Expenses  of  the  United  Nations  (Article  17,  paragraph  2,  of  the  Charter),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1962)  p.  155. 
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pending  dispute.  Although  not  obliged  to  answer,  the  ICJ  judges  have  always 
justified  refusals.  Dillard,  in  his  separate  opinion  declared:  222 
"Article  65  of  the  Court's  Statute  confers  on  it  ample  discretion  to 
refuse  to  render  an  advisory  opinion.  There  is  no  logical 
inconsistency,  therefore,  in  holding  that  while  there  was  no  dispute 
within  the  intended  meaning  and  application  of  Article  32  there  may 
yet  be  such  elements  of  controversy  and  complicated  factual  issues  as 
to  warrant  the  Court  in  refusing  on  the  ground  of  propriety  from 
responding  to  the  request  for  an  opinion.  The  jurisprudence  of  the 
Court,  especially  as  revealed  in  the  Administrative  Tribunal  case  (ICJ 
Reports  1956,  p.  86)  and  the  Certain  Expenses  case  (ICJ  Reports 
1962,  p.  155)  suggests  that  this  discretionary  power  will  not  be 
exercised  unless  there  are  "compelling  reasons"  for  doing  so.  The 
reasons  in  this  instance  are  not  sufficiently  compelling.  " 
The  ICJ  uses  its  right  of  assessment  as  soon  as  the  request  is  lodged  with  the 
Court.  Under  Art.  62  (2)  of  its  Statute,  the  matter  on  which  the  advice  is  sought 
must  be  worded  clearly.  In  most  cases,  however,  the  Court  has  had  to  determine 
the  scope  of  the  question  referred  to  it  and  sometimes  interpret  it.  In  doing  so,  the 
ICJ  has  asserted  itself  the  right  to  interpret  the  Charter  of  the  UN,  as  part  of  the 
regular  practice  of  its  judicial  attributions,  because  both  Art.  65  of  the  Statute  and 
Art.  96  of  the  Charter  provide  that  an  advisory  opinion  can  be  given  on  any  legal 
matter,  and  interpreting  the  UN  Charter  is definitely  a  legal  matter.  223 
B.  Assimilating  Contentious  and  Advisory  Procedures 
A  desire  to  include  such  a  possibility  is  clearly  found  in  Art.  50  of  the  draft 
Statute  of  the  ACJ.  The  Article  set  up  a  general  rule  to  the  effect  that  the  Court 
222  Legal  Consequences  for  States  of  the  Continued  Presence  of  South  Africa  in  Namibia  (South 
West  Africa)  Notwithstanding  Security  Council  Resolution  276  (1970),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1971)  p.  156. 
223  In  Conditions  of  Admission  of  a  State  to  Membership  in  the  United  Nations,  (Article  4  of  the 
Charter),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1948)  p.  61,  the  Court  states: 
"it  has  been  maintained  that  the  Court  cannot  reply  to  the  question  put  because  it 
involves  an  interpretation  of  the  Charter.  Nowhere  is  any  provision  to  be  found 
forbidding  the  Court,  `the  principal  judicial  organ  of  the  United  Nations',  to 
exercise  in  regard  to  Article  4  of  the  Charter,  a  multilateral  treaty,  an  interpretive 
function  which  falls  within  the  normal  exercise  of  its  judicial  powers.  " Chapter  Five  311 
can  apply  any  of  provisions  of  the  Statute  and  the  Rules  when  it  exercises  its 
advisory  jurisdiction.  Does  Article  50  allow  the  Arab  judges  to  apply  a  rule  of 
contentious  procedure  in  the  sphere  of  advisory  jurisdiction?  Art.  50  should  be 
interpreted  as  not  being  categorical  in  this  respect;  it  gives  the  ACJ  the  possibility 
to  apply  or  not  to  apply  contentious  procedure  rules  with  a  large  scope  of 
assessment.  It  is  surprising  that  the  draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ  do  not  contain  a 
provision  to  regulate  the  advisory  jurisdiction  of  the  Court.  In  contrast,  Art.  102 
(2)  of  the  1978  Rules  of  the  ICJ,  for  example,  mentions  explicitly  this  point  when 
it  provides: 
"the  Court  shall  also  be  guided  by  the  provisions  of  the  Statute  and  of 
these  Rules  which  apply  in  contentious  cases  the  extent  to  which 
recognize  them  to  be  applicable.  For  this  purpose,  it  shall  above  all 
consider  whether  the  request  for  the  advisory  opinion  relates  to  a  legal 
questions  actually  pending  between  two  or  more  States.  " 
5.4.4.  Scope  of  Advisory  Opinions 
Is  an  advisory  opinion  binding?  Does  it  impose  any  obligations  upon  the 
parties  in  the  same  way  as  a  judgment  in  contentious  case  does?  Neither  the 
Statute  of  the  ICJ  nor  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  include  any  provisions  regarding 
this  question.  This  is  surprising,  all  the  more  as  both  Statutes  are  very  clear  about 
contentious  jurisdiction.  Art.  44  (2)  of  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  provides:  224 
"The  decision  of  the  Court  shall  be  binding  upon  the  parties  and 
within  the  scope  of  the  resolved  dispute.  " 
This  means  the  decision  of  the  ACJ  will,  in  contentious  cases  have  only 
relative  authority,  and  will  be  obligatory  only  upon  the  parties  concerned;  but  its 
opinions  will  have  only  optional  consequences  in  which  the  entity  which  has 
224  The  same  provision  could  be  found  in  Art.  59  of  the  Statute  of  the  [CJ  in  which  it  provides  that: 
"The  decision  of  the  Court  has  no  binding  force  except  between  the  parties  and  in 
respect  of  the  particular  case.  " Chapter  Five  312 
requested  the  opinion  has  the  right  to  comply  with  it  or  not.  International  lawyers 
are  practically  unanimous  in  their  view  that  advisory  opinions  are  not  legally 
binding.  225  Hudson  argued  in  this  regard: 
"Advisory  Opinion  of  the  Court  is  what  it  purports  to  be.  It  is 
advisory.  It  is  not  in  any  sense  a  judgment  under  Article  60  of  the 
Statute,  nor  it  is  a  decision  under  Article  59.  [Then  he  added]: 
Through  the  authority  of  the  Court  is  not  be  lightly  disregarded,  it 
gives  to  the  Court's  opinion  only  a  moral  value.  The  fact  the  none  of 
the  opinions  given  by  the  Court  has  been  ignored  by  the  Council,  and 
the  fact  that  many  of  them  have  been  the  bases  of  decisions  taken  by 
the  Council,  do  not  serve  to  give  legal  force  to  the  opinion  itself.  "226 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  possible  for  any  body  authorised  by  the  UN  General 
Assembly  to  request  an  advisory  opinion  from  the  ICJ  and  accept  it  as  binding. 
This  may  happen  when  a  particular  organisation  is  one  of  the  parties  and  a  state  is 
another,  and  both  conclude  a  bilateral  treaty  or  constituent  instrument,  in  which 
they  include  their  advance  acceptance  of  an  advisory  opinion.  227  In  its  opinion  in 
the  Administrative  Tribunals  case,  the  ICJ  declared: 
"Under  Article  XII  of  the  Statute  of  the  Administrative  Tribunals,  the 
Opinion  thus  requested  will  be  "binding".  Such  effect  of  the  Opinion 
goes  beyond  the  scope  attributed  by  the  Charter  and  by  the  Statute  of 
the  Court  on  advisory  opinion.  However,  the  provision  in  question  is 
nothing  but  a  rule  of  conduct  for  Executive  Board,  a  rule  determining 
the  action  to  be  taken  by  it  on  the  Opinion  of  the  Court.  It  in  no  wise 
affects  the  way  in  which  the  Court  functions;  that  continues  to  be 
determined  by  it  Statute  and  Rules.  Nor  does  it  affect  the  reasoning 
by  which  the  Court  forms  its  opinion  or  the  content  of  the  Opinion 
itself.  "228 
225  For  example,  see  Pratap,  Advisory  Jurisdiction,  supra  note  184,  p.  227;  Ago,  Roberto,  Binding 
Advisory  Opinion  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  85  AJIL  (1991)  p.  440;  Hambro,  Edvard, 
The  Authority  of  Advisory  Opinions  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  8  ICLQ  (1954)  p.  5. 
226  Hudson,  The  Permanent  Court,  supra  note  14,  p.  p.  511-512;  Cf.  Judge  Lauterpacht  in  his 
separate  opinion,  in  the  Judgment  of  the  Administrative  Tribunals  of  the  ILO  upon  Complaints 
Made  against  Unesco  case,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1956)  p.  47. 
227  Pratap,  The  Advisory  Jurisdiction,  supra  note  184,  p.  47;  Hambro,  Some  Observations  on  the 
Jurisdiction  of  the  ICJ,  supra  note  145,  p.  150;  Rosenne,  The  Law  and  Practice,  supra  note  2, 
p.  683. 
228  Administrative  Tribunals  of  the  International  Labour  Organisation  upon  Complain  made 
Against  the  United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific  Cultural  Organization,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1956) 
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The  ACJ  could  follow  the  same  precedent  set  by  the  ICJ  in  this  regard,  all  the 
more  so  as  there  are  a  considerable  number  of  conventions  and  treaties  between 
different  organisations  and  states  concluded  within  the  framework  of  the  Arab 
League  mentioning  this  point.  For  example,  Art.  10  of  the  agreement  on  Civil 
Aviation  between  Arab  States  confers  future  jurisdiction  on  the  ACJ  regarding 
appeals  from  a  decision  made  by  the  Civil  Aviation  Council,  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  this  agreement  does  not  say  whether  the  ACJ  will  have  a  contentious  or 
advisory  jurisdiction.  So  it  would  be  necessary  for  the  ACJ  to  give  an  advice  to 
the  parties  when  they  have  recourse  to  it  for  a  solution  because  the  Civil  Aviation 
Council  cannot  be  a  party  to  a  contentious  case.  The  opinion  could  be  treated  as 
binding  on  the  basis  of  the  previous  acceptance  of  the  parties  to  the  Arab  Civil 
Aviation  Agreement. 
If  advisory  opinions  were  non-binding  in  character,  would  the  ACJ  be  obliged 
to  treat  its  previous  opinions  as  binding  in  subsequent  opinions?.  In  other  words, 
if  an  authorised  body  requests  the  ACJ  to  give  an  opinion  on  a  particular  matter, 
similar  to  one  on  which  the  Court  has  already  issued  an  earlier  opinion,  will  the 
Court  be  guided  by  its  previous  answer?  As  the  draft  Statute  does  not  mention 
this  point,  the  only  way  to  find  an  answer  is  by  referring  to  existing  international 
practice.  In  his  dissenting  opinion,  Koretsky  stated  that  the  ICJ  is  bound  by  its 
Review  of  Judgment  No.  273  of  the  United  Nations  Administrative  Tribunals,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1982) 
p.  336,  [para.  25];  Application  For  Review  of  Judgment  No.  333  of  the  United  Nations 
Administrative  Tribunals,  ICJ  Rep.,  (1987)  p.  32,  [para.  26]. Chapter  Five  314 
previous  opinions,  especially  if  the  same  legal  conditions  re-emerge  in  a  new 
question  referred  to  it  for  opinion.  He  argued:  229 
"In  discussing  the  meaning  of  the  principle  of  res  judicata,  and  its 
applicability  in  international  judicial  practice,  its  significance  is  often 
limited  by  the  statement  that  a  given  judgment  could  not  be 
considered  as  binding  upon  other  States  or  in  other  disputes.  One 
may  sometimes  easily  fail  to  take  into  consideration  the  fact  that  res 
judicata  has  been  said  to  be  not  only  pro  obligatione  habetur,  but  pro 
veritate  as  well.  And  it  cannot  be  said  that  what  today  was  for  the 
Court  a  veritas,  will  tomorrow  be  a  non-veritas.  A  decision  binds  not 
only  the  parties  to  a  given  case,  but  the  Court  itself.  One  cannot 
forget  that  the  principle  of  immutability,  of  the  consistency  of  final 
judicial  decision,  which  is  so  important  for  national  courts,  is  still 
more  important  for  international  courts.  The  practice  of  the 
Permanent  Court  and  of  this  Court  shows  the  great  attention  they  pay 
to  former  judgments,  their  reasons  and  opinions.  Consideration  must 
be  given  even  to  the  question  whether  an  advisory  opinion  of  the 
Court,  which  is  not  binding  for  the  body  which  requested  it,  is  binding 
for  the  Court  itself  not  vi  rationis  but  ratione  vis  as  well.  " 
It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  ACJ  will  anchor  coherence  and  logic  in  its 
jurisprudence  and  avoid  contradictions  from  one  case  to  another.  It  should  not 
ignore  its  previous  advisory  opinions  and  should  re-affirm  them  as  long  as 
circumstances  remain  the  same.  At  the  same  time  it  should  take  into  consideration 
in  every  single  opinion  it  delivers  the  current  needs  for  the  development  of  Arab 
international  law  and  international  law. 
229  South  West  Africa  case,  (Ethiopia  v.  South  Africa;  Liberia  v.  South  Africa),  ICJ  Rep.,  (1966) 
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1.  The  ACJ,  like  the  ICJ  and  its  predecessor  the  PCIJ,  can  decide  contentious 
cases  and  give  advisory  opinions  on  any  legal  question  submitted  to  it  by  any 
authorised  organ  of  the  Arab  League.  It  was  expected  that  this  Court  would  have 
compulsory  jurisdiction  to  decide  cases,  but  this  idea  was  strongly  rejected  by 
most  states  members  of  the  Arab  League.  Therefore,  the  optional  jurisdiction  is 
the  only  choice  available  under  the  projected  ACJ  draft  Statute.  Optional 
jurisdiction  means  that  no  case  can  be  decided  by  the  Court  unless  the  parties  to 
the  dispute  agree. 
2.  It  seems  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  have  followed  the  same  provisions  that 
regulate  the  jurisdiction  ratione  personae  of  the  ICJ.  This  means,  only  states 
have  locus  standi  and  may  be  party  to  a  contentious  case.  International 
organisations  and  individuals  are  automatically  excluded  from  such  a  right. 
International  organisations  are  only  allowed  to  ask  the  Court  legal  questions  in 
advisory  opinions  while  individuals  can  only  become  parties  to  disputes  in 
contentious  cases  if  a  dispute  is  submitted  to  the  Court  through  their  respective 
governments.  Arab  states  cannot  ask  the  Court  for  advisory  opinions,  this  right  is 
limited  only  to  the  authorised  international  organisations  created  within  the  Arab 
League  system,  provided  the  questions  lie  within  the  scope  of  their  activities. 
3.  As  a  result  of  the  regional  characteristic  of  the  ACJ,  its  draft  Statute  has 
adopted  a  new  provision  that  governs  the  states  which  can  be  parties  to  the  Statute. 
It  is  clear  that  only  states  members  of  the  Arab  League  are  ipso  facto  parties  to  the Chapter  Five  316 
Statute.  Non-member  states  cannot  become  parties  to  the  Statute,  a  difference 
from  that  provided  for  in  ICJ  Statute.  Non-member  states  can,  under  certain 
conditions,  appear  before  the  Court  without  being  parties  to  the  Statute  of  the 
ACJ,  but  only  in  disputes  relating  the  interpretation  or  application  of  a  treaty 
concluded  with  one  or  more  states  that  are  members  of  the  Arab  League. 
4.  It  seems  that  the  Arab  draftsmen  were  similarly  influenced  in  adopting  the 
provision  regulating  jurisdiction  ratione  materiae  of  the  ICJ.  Thus,  in  three  ways 
Arab  states  can  submit  their  disputes  to  the  ACJ,  (1)  by  special  agreement  or 
compromise,  (2)  by  a  compromissory  clause  in  bilateral  or  multilateral  treaty  or 
(3)  by  accepting  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  as  compulsory  in  one  or  in  a  number 
of  disputes  by  using  the  optional  clause  system.  It  cannot  be  predicted  which  of 
the  above  three  possibilities  will  be  primarily  used  in  the  case  of  the  ACJ,  but  the 
only  thing  that  can  be  said  is:  only  three  Arab  states  have  accepted  the  optional 
clause  system  with  respect  to  the  ICJ,  namely,  Egypt,  Sudan  and  Somalia.  It  is 
expected  that  Arab  states  will  most  frequently  use  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court 
(ACJ)  on  the  basis  of  special  agreements  (compromise),  because,  as  stated  earlier, 
there  the  parties  have  a  clear  picture  of  the  dispute  to  be  referred  to  the  Court.  The 
Court,  in  turn,  will  be  dependent  on  the  agreement  which  sets  the  limits  of  its 
jurisdiction  for  that  particular  case. Final  Conclusion 
I 
The  League  of  Arab  States  created  in  1945  by  seven  independent  Arab  states, 
as  the  first  model  of  regional  international  organisations  in  the  world,  has  aimed  at 
strengthening  the  relations  between  its  member  states  in  various  fields  and  to 
support  other  Arab  states  gain  independence  from  foreign  rule.  However,  its 
founding  states  have  failed  to  include  in  its  Pact  an  effective  system  for  the 
settlement  of  disputes.  They  have  chosen  only  mediation  as  a  political  method  to 
be  used  to  a  limited  extent,  in  addition  to  arbitration  as  a  quasi-judicial  method.  - 
Concerning  the  creation  of  an  Arab  Court  of  Justice  (ACJ),  as  a  judicial  organ,  the 
only  mention  of  it  in  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  is  in  Art.  19  which  permits  the 
future  establishment  of  such  a  Court,  if  a  two-thirds  majority  vote  by  member 
states  is  obtained. 
Subsequently,  member  states  of  the  Arab  League  realised  that  the  creation  of 
an  ACJ  within  the  League's  system  was  a  very  important  requirement,  especially 
for  justiciable  disputes  that  can  be  solved  only  by  using  judicial  methods. 
Accordingly,  several  attempts  were  made  from  the  beginning  of  the  1950s  up  to 
the  1990s  to  create  the  Court,  either  by  making  a  major  reform  to  the  original  Pact 
of  the  Arab  League  or  by  proposing  new  Articles  to  be  included  in  the  Pact,  in 
addition  to  proposed  draft  Statutes  for  the  projected  Court.  Unfortunately, 
different  legal  and  political  motives  have  always  caused  delays  or  the  shelving  of 
those  attempts  which  have  been  not  found  the  true  support  of  member  states 
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The  present  thesis  has  concentrated  on  the  last  (1995)  draft  Statute,  which  has 
been  influenced  in  most  of  its  Articles  by  the  Statute  of  the  International  Court  of 
Justice  (ICJ)  at  The  Hague  as  well  as  other  international  courts  such  as,  for 
example,  the  European  Court  of  Justice  (ECJ).  Furthermore,  in  the  draft  Statute  of 
the  ACJ  Islamic  Shariah  as  a  foundation  for  Muslim  legal  systems  has  also  been 
included  in  addition  to  international  law.  The  inclusion  of  Islamic  Shariah  serve 
two  main  purposes:  (1)  its  application  to  the  qualification  of  judges  of  the  ACJ 
and  (2)  its  application  in  cases  that  may  be  brought  before  the  Court  in  addition  to 
the  sources  of  international  law. 
When  discussing  these  two  points  related  to  Islamic  Shariah,  it  appears  that 
the  draftsmen  have  not  been  fully  successful  in  this  matter.  Their  failure  relates  to 
the  way  they  included  Islamic  Shariah  in  the  draft  Statute.  They  did  not  specify 
when  and  how  it  is  to  be  applied,  in  addition  to  other  principles  and  rules  of 
international  law.  The  inclusion  of  Islamic  Shariah  in  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ 
can  be  a  wise  proposition  if  it  is  well  tackled,  defined  and  clarified,  because  it  can 
be  capable  to  deal  in  parallel  with  international  law  related  international  disputes. 
The  Arab  draftsmen  required  that  judges  of  the  ACJ  should  be  qualified  in 
Islamic  Shariah  and  international  law,  without  going  into  any  further  details.  It 
appears  that  Muslim  jurists  have  their  own  views  on  this  matter:  the  judiciary  in 
Islamic  thought  is  considered  to  be  a  religiously  inspired  matter  and,  therefore, 
whoever  is  appointed  as  a  judge  should  possess  a  number  of  relevant 
qualifications,  otherwise  his  appointment  as  well  as  his  decisions  may  be  null  and 
void.  The  leading  Hadith  that  supports  this  approach  is  when  the  Prophet  said: Final  Conclusion  319 
"Judges  are  of  three  types,  one  of  whom  will  go  to  Paradise  and  two  to  Hell.  The 
one  who  will  go  to  Paradise  is  a  man  who  know  what  is  right  and  gives  judgment 
accordingly;  but  a  man  who  knows  what  is  right  and  acts  tyrannically  in  his 
judgment  will  go  to  Hell;  and  a  man  who  gives  judgment  for  people  when  he  is 
ignorant  will  go  to  Hell.  " 
Eight  types  of  qualifications  are  needed  in  judges  according  Muslim  jurists. 
The  possession  of  the  first  three  is  unanimously  agreed  by  jurists  and  should  be 
present  in  every  person  appointed  as  a  judge.  They  are:  Islam,  adulthood,  and 
sanity.  However,  jurists  disagree  about  the  other  five:  Some  consider  them. 
necessary  for  a  person  to  be  qualified  as  a  judge  while  others  consider  them 
unnecessary.  The  qualification  in  question  are:  freedom,  defect-free  senses  (able 
bodied),  attainment  of  independent  reasoning  (ijtihad),  manhood  and  probity.  The 
question  that  arises  here  as  to  what  is  intended  by  the  draftsmen  of  the  ACJ  draft 
Statute  by  the  term  "qualifications".  If  Muslim  views  prevail,  then  the  religious 
nature  of  the  judge's  office  will  play  a  very  important  role  in  appointing  judges. 
This  would  result  in  the  exclusion  of  candidates  from  the  appointment  to  this 
position  in  the  ACJ  because  they  are,  for  example,  considered  to  be  non-Muslims. 
When  comparing  this  approach  with  the  practice  that  is  normally  followed 
when  appointing  judges  of  the  ICJ,  it  is  seen  that  political  motives  always  play  a 
role.  It  is  thus  not  necessary  that  every  candidate  elected  to  this  position  is 
suitably  qualified.  In  addition,  the  lack  of  the  definition  of  the  term  `to  be 
qualified  in  international  law'  has  led  national  groups  to  recommend  some 
candidates  for  election  as  judges  from  acting  diplomats  or  politicians,  for  example, Final  Conclusion  320 
as  a  person  qualified  to  hold  the  office  of  judge  without  having  any  knowledge  of 
international  law. 
Again  when  the  Arab  draftsmen  have  included  Islamic  Shariah  as  a  source  to 
be  applied  in  addition  to  the  other  sources  of  international  law,  they  did  not  clarify 
the  concept  of  Islamic  Shariah.  In  particular,  they  did  not  specify  its  scope  or  how 
its  sources  are  to  be  apply  alongside  other  sources  of  international  law.  Shall  it 
enjoy  any  priority  in  application?  All  these  and  other  questions  were  expected  to 
be  answered  by  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  but  unfortunately,  no  answers  were 
given. 
Islamic  Shariah  has  its  own  sources  of  legislation.  The  Quran  is  the  supreme 
authority  in  Islam  and  is  the  primary  legal  source,  the  second  source  being  the 
Sunnah  of  the  Prophet,  His  sayings,  deeds  and  approvals.  All  application  of 
Islamic  Shariah  must  start  from  these  two  divine  primary  sources.  Ijtihad  or 
(reasoning),  is  exerting  one's  reason  to  reach  judgments  on  the  basis  of  the  Quran, 
and  the  Sunnah.  This  is  another  important  source  that  can  be  invoked  by  those 
very  specialised  qualified  jurists  to  find  solutions  to  legal  matters  affecting 
Muslim  life.  For  this  reason,  it  was  necessary  that  Islamic  Shariah  should  have 
been  explicitly  defined  and  distinguished  from  international  law,  because  each 
legal  system  has  its  own  nature  and  is  based  on  different  sources  of  law. 
Despite  a  progressive  proposal  nothing  new  has  been  included  in  the  ACJ 
draft  Statute  regarding  its  jurisdiction.  The  Court  has  only  optional  jurisdiction 
depending  on  the  approval  of  the  parties  to  disputes.  The  ACJ  would  deliver 
binding  judgments  in  contentious  cases  and  has  the  power  to  give  advisory Final  Conclusion  321 
opinions  on  legal  questions  submitted  to  it  by  authorised  organs  of  the  Arab 
League.  As  in  the  case  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ,  only  states  can  appear  before  the 
ACJ  with  respect  to  contentious  cases.  The  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  includes 
additional  limitations  on  states  qualified  to  appear  before  it  as  it  is  specified  that 
only  Arab  states  parties  to  the  Statute  have  this  right.  Non-member  Arab  states, 
which  cannot  become  parties  to  the  Statute,  would  have  a  right  to  recourse  to  the 
Court  only  if  they  are  parties  to  bilateral  or  multilateral  treaties  concluded  with 
one  or  more  Arab  states  parties  to  the  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  in  relation  to  a  dispute 
regarding  the  interpretation  or  application  of  a  treaty,  provided  the  treaty  provides 
for  such  recourse.  Arab  international  organisations  and  individuals  are  also 
excluded  from  contentious  cases.  On  the  other  hand,  Arab  states  parties  to  the 
draft  Statute  cannot  directly  request  the  Court  for  an  advisory  opinions.  This  right 
is  only  granted  to  some  organs  and  specialised  organisations  established  within  the 
Arab  League  system,  if  they  are  accordingly  authorised  by  the  League  Council. 
There  is  nothing  new  in  the  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ  which  develops  the  system  of 
ratione  materiae  jurisdiction  of  the  Court.  Cases,  as  with  the  ICJ,  can  be 
submitted  to  the  projected  ACJ  either  by  special  agreement  (compromise), 
compromissory  clause,  or  by  unilateral  declaration  (optional  clause). 
II 
The  Arab  League  with  its  projected  ACJ  can  both  play  a  considerable  role  in 
the  settlement  of  disputes  in  the  Arab  region  if  they  are  given  the  respect  and 
support  of  the  Arab  states  themselves.  It  is  now  time  to  reconsider  not  only  the 
creation  of  the  ACJ,  but  also  the  whole  Pact  of  the  Arab  League,  because  many 
crucial  events  have  happened  since  1945.  All  the  Arab  states  have  become Final  Conclusion  322 
independent,  the  international  political  strategy  of  Arab  states  in  the  League  has 
changed  in  many  fields.  Thus,  a  thorough  review  of  the  Pact  is  more  than  needed 
in  order  to  reflect  new  views  and  to  respond  to  new  needs.  A  reformed  Pact 
should  include  a  chapter  dealing  with  the  projected  ACJ,  just  like  the  Charter  of 
the  United  Nations  does  concerning  the  ICJ.  It  would  also  be  important  to 
enumerate  explicitly  the  main  organs  of  the  Arab  League  in  order  to  avoid  any 
lack  of  misunderstanding  in  interpreting  this  point  when  the  League  Council 
wishes  to  authorise  such  an  organ  to  request  the  Court  for  an  advisory  opinion. 
Concerning  the  1995  draft  Statute  of  the  ACJ,  it  appears  that  it  was  mostly. 
influenced  by  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ.  However,  in  some  matters  the  Arab 
draftsmen  have  not  succeeded  to  produce  a  suitable  system  to  serve  the  Arab 
states  needs.  One  of  the  most  important  legal  problems  ignored  by  the  Arab 
draftsmen  is  that  of  the  relationship  between  the  ICJ  as  a  World  Court,  and  the 
ACJ  as  a  regional  Court.  Neither  the  draft  Statute  nor  the  draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ 
oblige  Arab  states  to  have  recourse  to  the  ACJ  as  a  first  obligatory  choice  before 
they  submit  the  dispute  to  the  World  Court  (the  ICJ).  A  conflict  in  jurisdiction 
between  these  two  Courts  may  generate  legal  problems,  especially  if  one  Arab 
state  desires  to  submit  its  dispute  to  the  ACJ  while  the  other  wants  to  submit  it  to 
the  ICJ.  Furthermore,  what  would  be  the  reaction  of  the  ICJ  if  a  party  to  a  dispute 
rejects  ICJ's  jurisdiction  by  claiming  that  the  ACJ  has  competence?  How  will  the 
ICJ  act  if  such  reservation  is  expressed  before  it,  despite  the  fact  that  the  two 
Statutes,  the  ICJ  Statute  and  the  ACJ  Statute,  each  grants  its  Court  the  competence 
to  decide  any  dispute  concerning  their  respective  jurisdictions?  It  is  hence Final  Conclusion  323 
strongly  recommended  that  the  ACJ  Statute  should  include  a  provision  obligating 
Arab  states  to  have  recourse  to  the  ACJ  as  a  Court  of  first  instance  in  order  to 
settle  their  justiciable  disputes.  The  ICJ  could  then  in  some  circumstances,  be 
used  as  a  Court  of  appeal  reviewing  the  decision  rendered  by  the  ACJ.  If  such 
provision  is  included,  Arab  states  parties  to  the  Statute  of  the  ACJ  will  then  be 
obliged  to  have  recourse  to  this  Court  to  settle  their  justiciable  disputes  rather  then 
to  refer  to  any  other  international  court  or  tribunal.  Furthermore,  such  a  provision 
will  settle  any  expected  conflict  of  jurisdiction  that  may  arise  between  the  ACJ 
and  the  ICJ. 
It  is  also  recommended  that  the  concept  of  the  qualifications  of  judges  in  the 
draft  Statute  should  be  reconsidered.  If  Arab  states  decide  to  keep  the  present 
provisions  which  stipulate  that  judges  of  the  Court  must  be  qualified  in  Islamic 
Shariah,  then  the  redrafting  of  Art.  6  of  the  draft  Statute  must  include  a  deletion  of 
`and'  in  order  to  make  it  possible  for  the  Court  to  comprise  judges  qualified  in 
Islamic  Shariah  and  other  judges  qualified  in  international  law.  This  will  help 
solve  the  legal  problem  that  may  arise  when  interpreting  this  Article  and  which 
results  in  the  following  two  points: 
(1)  for  those  who  are  qualified  in  Islamic  Shariah,  the  principles  of  Islamic 
Shariah  would  apply  and  to  those  qualified  in  international  law,  the  practice  of  the 
ICJ  would  apply.  This  may  help  to  select  candidates  according  to  their  personal 
qualifications  and  not  according  to  political  desires.  If  Arab  states  can  be  assured 
that  the  personal  qualifications  of  judges  have  been  taken  into  account  in  this Final  Conclusion  324 
matter,  then  the  ACJ  will  comprise  a  high  quality  of  members.  This  should 
increase  the  number  of  cases  that  may  be  submitted  to  it. 
(2)  making  a  clear  distinction  between  the  role  of  Islamic  Shariah  and  the 
role  of  international  law  would  help  avoid  clashes  when  the  appointment  of  judges 
does  not  satisfying  the  requirements  in  one  of  the  two  systems.  For  example,  a 
non-Muslim  person  could  be  appointed  as  a  judge,  especially  with  respect  to  cases 
to  which  principles  of  Islamic  Shariah  would  apply.  This  would  also  be  a  problem 
to  consider  when  a  non-Muslim  ad  hoc  judge  is  appointed. 
Regarding  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ACJ,  reference  may  be  made  to  the  practice- 
of  the  ICJ  enabling  a  state  freely  to  make  any  reservations  or  conditions  in  its 
declaration  under  Art.  36  (2)  of  the  Statute  of  the  ICJ.  Therefore,  it  is  expected 
also  that  the  same  thing  will  happen  when  the  ACJ  is  created  and  its  states  parties 
decide  to  use  its  optional  clause  system.  This  is  because  Art.  22  of  the  draft 
Statute  of  the  ACJ  permits  Arab  states  to  make  declarations  either  unconditionally 
or  with  conditions  and  reservations.  It  is  recommended  that  the  optional  clause 
system  of  the  ACJ  is  reconsidered,  and  the  League  Council  authorised  to  draft  a 
model  clause  or  clauses  limiting  the  freedom  of  states  to  invoke  reservations  and 
conditions  they  desire.  This  should  strengthen  the  effective  role  of  the  Court's 
jurisdiction. 
It  is  also  worth  reconsidering  the  scope  of  ratione  materiae  jurisdiction  of  the 
ACJ  by  granting  Arab  intergovernmental  organisations  the  right  to  appear  before 
the  Court  in  contentious  cases.  It  is  also  recommended  to  grant  Arab 
intergovernmental  organisations  created  outside  the  Arab  League  the  right  to Final  Conclusion  325 
request  the  Court  for  an  advisory  opinion,  and  member  states  too  should  be 
authorised.  However,  if,  for  political  reasons,  this  approach  is  rejected,  then  an 
alternative  choice  could  be  to  include  a  clear  provision  in  the  draft  Statute  or  in  the 
reformed  Pact  of  the  Arab  League  giving  the  League  Council  the  right  to  establish 
a  new  committee,  or  authorise  one  of  the  existing  committees,  to  request  advisory 
opinions  on  behalf  of  states  or  Arab  intergovernmental  organisations. 
The  most  important  potential  problem  that  has  not  been  discussed 
comprehensively  in  this  thesis,  and  which  is  recommended  for  effort  by  future 
researchers  discussing  the  ACJ  as  a  regional  Court,  is  the  enforcement  of 
decisions  rendered  by  this  Court.  It  is  clear  that  the  League  Council  will  not  be 
able  to  enforce  a  decision  delivered  by  the  Court  which  either  party  has  not 
accepted.  This  incapability  will  remain  even  if  the  present  Pact  of  the  Arab 
League  is  reformed  and  further  powers  are  granted  to  the  League  Council. 
Political  motives  always  play  a  role  when  the  matter  of  the  enforcement  of 
decisions  by  any  international  court  or  tribunal  arises.  So,  the  best  recommended 
solution  would  be  to  follow  the  practice  of  the  member  states  of  the  European 
Union  by  including  a  clear  provision  in  their  domestic  laws  to  guarantee  the 
binding  nature  and  reliable  enforcement  of  ACJ  decisions. 
Additionally,  it  is  important  to  draft  a  new  Article  for  the  present  draft  Statute 
of  the  ACJ  in  order  to  make  clear  that  the  right  to  appear  before  the  Court  by 
states  parties  to  the  Statute  remains  even  if  that  state  loses  its  membership  in  the 
Arab  League.  It  is  submitted  that  if  the  draft  Statute  is  signed  and  ratified  as  a 
separate  treaty,  Arab  states  that  sign  this  treaty  will  remain  parties  to  it,  even  if Final  Conclusion  326 
they  lose  their  membership  of  the  Arab  League.  However,  if  the  draft  Statute  is 
not  open  for  signature  independently  but  is  treated  as  a  part  of  the  Arab  League 
Pact,  then  if  any  state  loses  its  membership  of  the  Arab  League,  automatically  it 
will  lose  its  participation  in  the  Statute  of  the  ACJ. 
It  is  submitted  here  that  despite  all  criticisms  that  might  be  said  on  the  draft 
Statute  and  draft  Rules  of  the  ACJ,  or  to  its  structure,  composition  and 
jurisdiction,  the  ACJ  becomes  an  important  organ  that  must  to  be  created  within 
the  Arab  League  system.  Its  creation  becomes  not  only  a  legal  necessity  but,  in 
addition,  a  national  requirement  of  all  Arab  states  members  of  the  Arab  League.  It. 
is  believed,  especially  according  to  the  present  circumstances  in  the  Arab  world, 
that  Arab  states  have  no  choice  but  to  go  forward  and  with  great  confidence 
towards  this  judicial  legal  organ,  even  if  it  grants  only  optional  jurisdiction.  It  is 
further  believed  that  the  ACJ  which  comprises  Arab  judges  will  be  more  capable 
to  interpret  the  Pact  of  the  Arab  League,  develop  Arab  and  Muslim  international 
law  and  fill  the  gap  between  the  two  international  legal  systems  of  Islamic 
international  law  and  public  international  law.  This  Court  will  have  more  ability 
to  understand  Arab  disputes  and  find  the  suitable  legal  solution  for  them. Annex  I 
Pact  of  the  League  of  Arab  States 
Article  1 
The  League  of  Arab  states  is 
composed  of  the  independent  Arab 
states  which  have  signed  this  Pact. 
Any  independent  Arab  state  has  the 
right  to  become  a  member  of  the 
League.  If  it  desires  to  do  so,  it  shall 
submit  a  request  which  will  be 
deposited  with  the  Permanent 
Secretariat  General  and  submitted  to  the 
Council  at  the  first  meeting  held  after 
submission  of  the  request. 
Article  2 
The  League  has  as  its  purpose  the 
strengthening  of  the  relations  between 
the  member  states,  the  coordination  of 
their  policies  in  order  to  achieve 
cooperation  between  them  and  to 
safeguard  their  independence  and 
sovereignty;  and  a  general  concern  with 
the  affairs  and  interests  of  the  Arab 
countries.  It  has  also  as  its  purpose  the 
close  cooperation  of  the  member  states, 
with  due  regard  to  the  organisation  and 
circumstances  of  each  state,  on  the 
following  matters: 
A.  Economic  and  financial  affairs, 
including  commercial  relations, 
customs,  currency,  and  questions 
of  agriculture  and  industry. 
B.  Communications;  this  includes 
railroads,  roads,  aviation, 
navigation,  telegraphs  and  posts. 
C.  Cultural  affairs. 
D.  Nationality,  passports,  visas, 
execution  of  judgments  and 
extradition  of  criminals. 
E.  Social  affairs. 
F.  Health  affairs. 
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Article  3 
The  League  shall  possess  a  Council 
composed  of  the  representatives  of  the 
member  states  of  the  League;  each  state 
shall  have  a  single  vote,  irrespective  of 
the  number  of  its  representatives, 
It  shall  be  the  task  of  the  Council  to 
achieve  the  realisation  of  the  objectives 
of  the  League  and  to  supervise  the 
execution  of  agreements  which  the 
member  states  have  concluded  on  the 
questions  enumerated  in  the  preceding 
Article,  or  on  any  other  questions. 
It  likewise  shall  be  the  Council  task 
to  decide  upon  the  means  by  which  the 
League  is  to  cooperate  with  the 
international  bodies  to  be  created  in  the 
future  in  order  to  guarantee  security  and 
peace  and  regulate  economic  and  social 
relations. 
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Article  4 
For  each  of  the  questions  listed  in 
Article  2  there  shall  be  set  up  a  special 
committee  in  which  the  member  states 
of  the  League  shall  be  represented. 
These  committees  shall  be  charged  with 
the  task  of  laying  down  the  principles 
and  extent  of  cooperation.  Such 
principles  shall  be  formulated  as  draft 
agreements  to  be  presented  to  the 
Council  for  examination  preparatory  to 
their  submission  to  the  aforesaid  states. 
Representatives  of  other  Arab  countries 
may  take  part  in  the  work  of  the 
aforesaid  committees.  The  Council 
shall  determine  the  conditions  under 
which  these  representatives  may  be 
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permitted  to  participate  and  the  rules 
governing  such  representation. 
Article  5 
Any  resort  to  force  in  order  to 
resolve  disputes  between  two  or  more 
member  states  of  the  League  is 
prohibited.  If  there  should  arise  among 
them  a  difference  which  does  not 
concern  a  states'  independence, 
sovereignty,  or  territorial  integrity,  and 
if  the  parties  to  the  dispute  have 
recourse  to  the  Council  for  the 
settlement  of  this  difference,  the 
decision  of  the  Council  shall  then  be 
enforceable  and  obligatory. 
In  such  case,  the  States  between 
whom  the  difference  has  arisen  shall 
not  participate  in  the  deliberations  and 
decisions  of  the  Council. 
The  Council  shall  mediate  in  all 
differences  which  threaten  to  lead  to 
war  between  two  member  states,  or  a 
member  state  and  a  third  state,  with  a 
view  to  bringing  about  their 
reconciliation. 
Decisions  of  arbitration  and 
mediation  shall  be  taken  by  majority 
vote. 
Article  6 
In  case  of  aggression  or  threat  of 
aggression  by  one  state  against  a 
member  state,  the  state  which  has  been 
attacked  or  threatened  with  aggression 
may  demand  the  immediate 
convocation  of  the  Council 
The  Council  shall  by  unanimous 
decision  determine  the  measures 
necessary  to  repulse  the  aggression.  If 
the  aggressor  is  a  member  state,  his 
vote  shall  not  be  counted  in  determining 
unanimity. 
If,  as  a  result  of  the  attack,  the 
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government  of  the  State  attacked  finds 
itself  unable  to  communicate  with  the 
Council,  the  state's  representative  in  the 
Council  shall  request  the  convocation 
of  the  Council  for  the  purpose  indicated 
in  the  foregoing  paragraph.  In  the  event 
that  this  representative  is  unable  to 
communicate  with  the  Council,  any 
member  state  of  the  League  shall  have 
the  right  to  request  the  convocation  of 
the  Council. 
Article  7 
Unanimous  decisions  of  the  Council 
shall  be  binding  upon  all  member  states 
of  the  League;  majority  decisions  shall 
be  binding  only  upon  those  states  which 
have  accepted  them. 
In  either  case  the  decisions  of  the 
Council  shall  be  enforced  in  each 
member  state  according  to  its  respective 
laws. 
Article  8 
Each  member  state  shall  respect  the 
systems  of  government  established  in 
the  other  member  states  and  regard 
them  as  exclusive  concerns  of  those 
states.  Each  shall  pledge  to  abstain 
from  any  action  calculated  to  change 
established  systems  of  government. 
Article  9 
States  of  the  Arab  League  which 
desire  to  establish  closer  cooperation 
and  stronger  bonds  than  are  provided 
for  by  this  Pact  may  conclude 
agreements  to  that  end. 
Treaties  and  agreements  already 
concluded  or  to  be  concluded  in  the 
future  between  a  member  state  and 
another  state  shall  not  be  binding  or 
restrictive  upon  other  members. 
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Article  10 
The  permanent  seat  of  the  League  of 
Arab  States  is  established  in  Cairo.  The 
Council  may,  however,  assemble  at  any 
other  place  it  may  designate. 
Article  11 
The  Council  of  the  League  shall 
convene  in  ordinary  session  twice  a 
year,  in  March  and  in  September.  It 
shall  convene  in  extraordinary  session 
upon  the  request  of  two  member  states 
of  the  League  whenever  the  need  arises. 
Article  12 
The  League  shall  have  a  permanent 
Secretariat  General  which  shall  consist 
of  a  Secretary-General,  Assistant 
Secretaries  and  appropriate  number  of 
officials. 
The  Council  of  the  League  shall 
appoint  the  Secretary-General  by  a 
majority  of  two  thirds  of  the  states  of 
the  League.  The  Secretary-General, 
with  the  approval  of  the  Council,  shall 
appoint  the  Assistant  Secretaries  and 
the  principal  officials  of  the  League. 
The  Council  of  the  League  shall 
establish  an  administrative  regulation 
for  the  functions  of  the  Secretariat 
General  and  matters  relating  to  the  staff. 
The  Secretary-General  shall  have  the 
rank  of  Ambassador  and  the  Assistant 
Secretaries  that  of  Ministers 
Plenipotentiary. 
The  first  Secretary-General  of  the 
League  is  named  in  an  annex  to  this 
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Article  13 
The  Secretary-General  shall  prepare 
the  draft  of  the  budget  of  the  League 
and  shall  submit  it  to  the  Council  for 
approval  before  the  beginning  of  each 
fiscal  year. 
The  Council  shall  fix  the  share  of  the 
expenses  to  be  borne  by  each  state  of 
the  League.  This  may  be  reconsidered 
if  necessary. 
Article  14 
The  members  of  the  Council  of  the 
League  as  well  as  the  members  of  the 
committees  and  the  officials  who  are  to 
be  designated  in  the  administrative 
regulation  shall  enjoy  diplomatic 
privileges  an  immunity  when  engaged 
in  the  exercise  of  their  functions. 
The  buildings  occupied  by  the 
organs  of  the  League  shall  be 
inviolable. 
Article  15 
The  first  meeting  of  the  Council 
shall  be  convened  at  the  invitation  of 
the  head  of  the  Egyptian  Government. 
Thereafter  it  shall  be  convened  at  the 
invitation  of  the  Secretary-General. 
The  representatives  of  the  member 
states  of  the  League  shall  alternately 
assume  the  presidency  of  the  Council  at 
each  of  its  ordinary  sessions 
Article  16 
Except  in  cases  specifically  indicated 
in  this  Pact,  a  majority  vote  of  the 
Council  shall  be  sufficient  to  make 
enforceable  decisions  on  the  following 
matters: 
A.  Matters  relating  to  personnel. 
B.  Adoption  of  the  budget  of  the 
League. 
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C.  Establishment  of  the  admin- 
istrative  regulations  for  the 
Council,  the  committees  and 
the  Secretariat  General. 
D.  Decisions  to  adjourn  the 
sessions. 
Article  17 
Each  member  state  of  the  League 
shall  deposit  with  the  Secretariat 
General  one  copy  of  treaty  or  agreement 
concluded  or  to  be  concluded  in  the 
future  between  itself  and  another 
member  state  of  the  League  or  a  third 
state. 
Article  18 
If  a  member  state  contemplates 
withdrawal  from  the  League,  it  shall 
inform  the  Council  of  its  intention  one 
year  before  such  withdrawal  is  to  go 
into  effect. 
The  Council  of  the  League  may 
consider  any  State  which  fails  to  fulfill 
its  obligations  under  the  Pact  as  having 
become  separated  from  the  League,  this 
to  go  into  effect  upon  a  unanimous 
decision  of  the  states,  not  counting  the 
state  concerned. 
Article  19 
This  Pact  may  be  amended  with  the 
consent  of  two  thirds  of  the  states 
belonging  to  the  League,  especially  in 
order  to  make  firmer  and  stronger  the 
ties  between  the  member  states,  to 
create  an  Arab  Court  of  Justice,  and  to 
regulate  the  relations  of  the  League  with 
any  international  bodies  to  be  created  in 
the  future  to  guarantee  security  an 
peace. 
Final  action  on  an  amendment 
cannot  be  taken  prior  to  the  session 
following  the  session  in  which  the 
motion  was  initiated. 
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If  a  state  does  not  accept  such  an 
amendment  it  may  withdraw  at  such 
time  as  the  amendment  goes  into  effect, 
without  being  bound  by  the  provisions 
of  the  preceding  Article. 
Article  20 
This  Pact  and  its  annexes  shall  be 
ratified  according  to  the  basic  laws  in 
force  among  the  High  contracting 
parties. 
The  instruments  of  ratification  shall 
be  deposited  with  the  Secretariat 
General  of  the  Council  and  the  Pact 
shall  become  operative  as  regards  each 
ratifying  State  fifteen  days  after  the 
Secretary-General  has  received  the 
instruments  of  ratification  from  four 
states. 
This  Pact  has  been  drawn  up  in 
Cairo  in  the  Arabic  language  on  this  8 
Rabi'  al  Thani  1364,  A.  H.  (March  22, 
1945),  in  one  copy  which  shall  be 
deposited  in  the  safe  keeping  of  the 
Secretariat  General. 
An  identical  copy  shall  be  delivered 
to  each  state  of  the  League. 
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Draft 
Statute  of  the  Arab  Court  of  Justice 
Chapter  One 
Organisation  of  the  Court 
Article  1 
1.  The  Arab  Court  of  Justice 
established  by  the  Pact  of  the 
League  of  Arab  States  shall  be 
the  principal  judicial  organ  of 
the  League,  and  shall  function  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions 
of  this  Statute  and  its  Rules. 
2.  The  permanent  seat  of  the 
League  of  Arab  States  shall  be 
the  permanent  seat  of  the  Court. 
3.  The  Court  may,  when  necessary, 
decide  to  sit  and  exercise  its 
functions  elsewhere  whenever 
the  Court  considers  it  desirable. 
Article  2 
Member  states  of  the  League  of  Arab 
States  are  ipso  facto  parties  to  the 
present  Statute. 
Article  3 
The  Court  shall  frame  Rules  for 
carrying  out  its  functions,  and  specify 
the  procedures  to  be  followed.  It  shall 
also  lay  down  regulations  pertaining  to 
administrative  and  financial  affairs  in 
accordance  with  the  current  Rules  of 
the  League. 
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Article  4 
1.  The  Court  shall  have  an 
independent  budget  which  will 
be  annexed  to  the  budget  of  the 
League  Secretariat  General. 
Payment  from  such  budget  shall 
be  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions  of  the  Court's 
financial  regulations. 
Contributions  of  the  member 
states  to  the  budget  of  the  Court 
shall  be  equal  to  the  percentage 
contributed  by  each  state  to  the 
budget  of  the  League. 
2.  The  Court  shall  make  a  draft  of 
its  budget  and  submit  it  to  the 
League  Secretary-General,  who 
shall  submit  it  to  the  League 
Council,  pursuant  to  the 
administrative  and  financial 
Rules  provided  for  in  the 
League's  regulation. 
Article  5 
1.  The  Court  shall  appoint  its 
Registrar  and  a  sufficient 
number  of  employees  to  assist 
him.  The  administrative  and 
financial  Rules  provided  for  in 
Article  3  shall  specify  their 
rights,  duties,  positions  and 
remunerations. 
2.  Before  carrying  out  his  duties, 
the  Registrar  shall  take  the 
following  oath  before  the  Court: 
"I  swear  by  Allah  Almighty  that 
I  will  perform  the  duties  of  my 
office  faithfully,  honourably  and 
impartially,  and  observe  the 
confidentiality  of  the  Court's 
activities". 
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Chanter  Two 
Court  Judges,  their  Selection,  and 
Organisation  of  their  Duties 
Article  6 
The  Court  shall  be  composed  of  a 
body  of  independent  Judges  who  are 
citizens  of  member  states,  and  are 
persons  of  high  moral  character,  who 
possess  the  qualifications  required  in 
their  respective  countries  for 
appointment  to  the  highest  judicial 
office,  or  are  jurisconsults  of  recognised 
competence  in  Islamic  Shariah  (Islamic 
Law)'  and  International  Law. 
Article  7 
1.  The  Court  shall  consist  of  seven 
Judges  elected  from  candidates. 
2.  Each  member  state  shall  be 
entitled,  upon  the  invitation  of 
the  League's  Secretary-General, 
to  nominate  one  of  its  citizens,  at 
least  two  months  before  the  date 
of  the  election. 
3.  Elections  shall  be  run  according 
to  the  League's  Council 
decision,  by  secret  ballot,  from  a 
list  of  persons  which  shall  be 
prepared  by  the  League's 
Secretary-General  containing  the 
names  of  the  candidates  in 
alphabetical  order. 
337 
'i  WI  J-"  i 
ýý  ý)t:::  *i  oLAi 
ä.,.  5lr.  JI  öAU 
ýýja1J  ý°'X'  ý  ý'ý'l..  d-º  ;  JWº  UL-I 
cirSl,  cä)I  ý.  ýL:  ll 
-)I  L) 
. 
ýý.  111  ý),;  1n11ý 
b,  l..  Jl  öAll 
.  üY-&  11.1  ,;  1!  '  ý1'' 
Z)i  JSJ  -2 
Jý, 
r1-J 
.;  ￿,  L-,  U 
ýI  j.  r,  5ý.....  11  ýºý,;  yl,  yl,;.;;  yl  ý.:  ý  -3 
Lm..  iý,  ä..,.  5l'+  ýý  cä,  ý.  "l.  ýl  ý 
J.. 
ä_5lhd,  l  ý  ýýýý 
c.  -;  ii  a.  '1'  Ij"`^:  '. 
ýI 
1  Italics  added. Annexe  2 
Article  8 
No  more  than  one  Judge  of  the  same 
nationality  may  be  appointed  as  a 
member  of  the  Court.  If  a  nominee  is  a 
national  of  more  than  one  Arab  state,  he 
shall  be  deemed  to  possess  the 
nationality  of  the  state  which  nominates 
him  as  a  candidate. 
Article  9 
A  candidate  shall  be  considered 
elected  if  he  obtains  the  greatest 
number  of  votes  in  the  ballot.  In  event 
of  an  equality,  the  eldest  shall  be 
considered  as  elected. 
Article  10 
1.  The  Judges  shall  be  elected  for  a 
six  years'  renewable  term. 
2.  The  terms  of  three  Judges 
elected  in  the  first  election  shall 
expire  at  the  end  of  three  years. 
3.  Judges  whose  term  of  office  is  to 
expire  at  the  end  of  the  above- 
mentioned  period  shall  be 
selected  by  lot  drawn  after  the 
end  of  the  first  election,  by  the 
Secretary-General. 
4.  The  Court  shall  elect  its 
President  and  Vice-President  for 
a  two  years'  term,  renewable  for 
a  similar  duration. 
Article  11 
1.  Each  Judge  shall  take  the 
following  oath  before  taking  up 
the  duties  of  his  office: 
"I  swear  by  Allah  Almighty  that 
I  will  perform  the  duties  of  my 
office  faithfully,  honourably  and 
impartially". 
2.  Oath  taking  shall  be  in  an  open 
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session  before  the  Court. 
3.  Oath  taking  shall  be  recorded  in 
a  special  register,  prepared 
specially  for  such  purpose, 
which  shall  deposited  with  the 
Secretariat  General. 
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Article  13 
Judges  whose  term  of  office  expires 
shall  continue  to  decide  cases  in  which 
the  pleadings  have  been  closed  and  is 
pending  judgment. 
Article  14 
1.  During  his  term  of  office,  no 
Judge  may: 
A)  exercise  any  political  or 
administrative  function,  taking 
up  any  duty  in  his  capacity  as 
an  agent,  counsel  or  advocate, 
or  engage  in  any  other 
occupation  of  a  professional 
nature. 
B)  participate  in  the  decision  of 
any  case  he  has  previously 
taken  part  in  as  agent,  counsel, 
advocate  or  expert  for  one  of 
its  parties,  or  any  case  which 
has  been  previously  laid  before 
him  in  his  capacity  as  a 
member  of  a  national  or 
international  Court  or  a 
commission  of  inquiry  or  in 
any  other  capacity. 
2.  If  doubt  is  raised  regarding  the 
compliance  of  any  Judge  with 
the  provisions  of  the  previous 
paragraph,  the  matter  shall  be 
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settled  by  the  decision  of  the 
Court. 
3.  A  Judge  whose  term  of  office 
expires  may  not,  within  three 
years,  work  with  any  body  that 
was  a  principal  or  intervening 
party  in  a  case  in  whose  decision 
that  Judge  participated.  In  a  case 
of  breach,  the  issue  shall  be 
submitted  to  the  Court  to  take 
the  appropriate  action. 
However,  an  exception  may  be 
made  on  the  basis  of  a  reasoned 
decision. 
Article  15 
Judges  of  the  Court  may  not  be 
dismissed. 
Article  16 
The  office  of  a  Judge  shall  be 
deemed  vacant  in  each  of  the  following 
cases: 
1.  death; 
2.  resignation; 
3.  relieved  from  office. 
The  Secretary-General  of  the  League 
shall  forthwith  inform  member  states 
immediately  that  an  office  has  become 
vacant  and  seek  nominations  according 
to  the  provisions  of  Article  17  of  this 
Statute. 
Article  17 
1.  If  a  Judge  wishes  to  resign,  he 
shall  submit  his  resignation  in 
writing  to  the  President,  who 
should  inform  the  League 
Secretary-General  and 
accordingly  this  position  falls 
vacant. 
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2.  If  a  Judge  ceases  to  be  able  to 
carry  out  his  duties,  he  may  not 
be  relieved  except  by  the 
unanimous  agreement  of  the 
remaining  Judges.  Upon  the 
issuance  of  a  reasoned  decision 
concerning  his  releived  from  his 
office  and  its  communication  to 
the  League  Secretary-General, 
his  office  shall  be  deemed 
vacant. 
3.  If  the  office  of  a  Judge  becomes 
vacant  prior  to  the  expiry  of  his 
term,  a  successor  shall  be  elected 
for  the  remaining  period  and  by 
the  same  procedure. 
Article  18 
1.  A  Judge  of  the  nationality  of 
each  of  the  parties  may  not  be 
prevented  from  examining  a  case 
submitted  to  the  Court. 
2.  If  a  Judge  is  a  national  of  a  state 
which  is  a  party  to  the  dispute, 
all  the  other  parties  may  select  a 
Judge  ad  hoc  to  participate  in  the 
decision  of  the  case  in  question. 
3.  If  no  Judge  in  the  Court  is  a 
national  of  one  of  the  parties, 
each  party  may  select  a  Judge  ad 
hoc. 
4.  Should  there  be  several  parties 
in  the  same  interest,  they  shall  be 
considered  one  party  with  regard 
to  the  provisions  of  paragraphs  2 
and  3  of  this  Article.  Any  doubt 
upon  this  point  shall  be  settled 
by  the  decision  of  the  Court. 
5.  A  Judge  ad  hoc  shall  fulfil  the 
conditions  required  by  Articles 
6,11  and  14  of  this  Statute,  and 
may  participate  in  meetings, 
proceedings  and  in  deciding 
judgments  on  an  equal  footing 
with  the  original  Judges. 
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Article  19 
1.  If,  for  some  special  reason,  a 
Judge  considers  that  he  should 
not  take  part  in  the  decision  of  a 
particular  case,  he  shall  so 
inform  the  President.  The 
President  shall  accordingly 
notify  the  Court. 
2.  If  the  President  or  any  of  the 
Judges  considers  that  for  some 
special  reason  one  of  the  Judges 
should  not  take  part  in  the 
decision  of  a  particular  case,  the 
President  shall  notify  the 
relevant  Judge,  stating  the 
reasons  on  which  this  challenge 
is  based.  If  the  President  and  the 
impugned  Judge  disagree,  the 
Court  shall  decide  in  accordance 
with  the  majority  of  the 
remaining  members. 
3.  If  there  is  a  reason  to  prevent  the 
President  or  Vice-President  from 
participating  in  a  particular  case, 
the  Court  shall  decide  this  matter 
by  the  unanimous  agreement  of 
its  remaining  members. 
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Article  20 
A  Judge  ad  hoc  who  was  selected, 
shall  be  treated,  with  regard  to 
remuneration,  on  the  same  basis  as  a 
Court  Judge  for  the  duration  in  which 
he  exercises  his  functions. 
Chapter  Three 
Judicial  Competence  of  the  Court 
Article  21 
1.  States  which  are  parties  to  this 
Statute  have  the  right  to  appear 
before  the  Court  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  Article  22 
of  this  Statute. 
2.  States  which  are  not  parties  to 
this  Statute  may  (with  the  con- 
sent  of  the  League  Council)  re- 
sort  to  the  Court  to  decide  dis- 
putes  pertaining  to  the  interpre- 
tation  and  implementation  of 
bilateral  or  multilateral  treaties 
signed  with  any  Arab  states 
party  to  the  Statute.  Such  states 
shall  declare  that  they  accept  the 
Court's  compulsory  jurisdiction 
and  shall  abide  by  the  implemen- 
tation  of  its  judgments  and  deci- 
sions  without  the  need  for  a 
special  agreement.  This  decla- 
ration  shall  be  deposited  with  the 
Secretary-General  of  the  League 
of  Arab  States. 
3.  States  not  parties  to  this  Statute 
when  resorting  to  the  Court, 
shall  have  the  same  rights  and 
privileges  provided  for  by  this 
Statute  regarding  states  which 
are  parties  to  it,  and  the  Court 
shall  determine  the  expenses  to 
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be  borne  by  such  states. 
Article  22 
The  Court's  jurisdiction  shall 
encompass  the  following  disputes: 
1.  Disputes  states  which  are 
parties  to  the  Statute  agree  to 
submit  to  the  Court.  These 
disputes  shall  include  all 
matters  provided  for  in  the 
Arab  League  Pact  or  treaties 
in  force  concluded  between 
them. 
2.  Disputes  arising  from 
bilateral  and  multilateral 
agreements  which  provide  for 
submission  to  the  Court. 
3.  The  states  which  are  parties 
to  the  present  Statute  may  at 
any  time  declare  that  they 
recognise  as  compulsory  ipso 
facto  and  without  special 
agreement,  in  relation  to  any 
other  state  accepting  the  same 
obligation,  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Court  in  all  legal  disputes 
concerning: 
A)  the  interpretation  of  inter- 
national  treaties; 
B)  the  existence  of  any  fact 
which,  if  established, 
would  constitute  a  breach 
of  an  international  obliga- 
tion; 
C)  the  determination  of  the 
nature  or  extent  of  the  repa- 
ration  to  be  made  for  the 
breach  of  an  international 
obligation; 
D)  any  question  of  interna- 
tional  law. 
The  declarations  referred  to 
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above  may  be  made 
unconditionally,  or  on  a  condition 
which  limits  them  to  a  certain 
matter  or  a  specific  period,  or  on 
a  condition  of  reciprocity  on  the 
part  of  several  or  certain  states.  A 
declaration  shall  be  deposited 
with  the  Secretariat  General. 
4.  The  Court  shall  decide  in  any 
dispute  regarding  its  jurisdiction. 
Article  23 
1.  The  Court  shall  decide  cases 
submitted  to  it  in  accordance 
with  the  Arab  League  Pact, 
principles  of  international  law 
and  pursuant  to  the  following 
legal  sources: 
A)  the  rules  approved  expressly 
by  parties  to  a  dispute  or 
contained  in  bilateral  and 
multilateral  treaties  signed  by 
them. 
B)  the  principles  and  provisions 
of  Islamic  Shariah  (Islamic 
Law).  2 
C)  the  rules  of  international 
custom. 
D)  the  established  general 
principles  of  law. 
2.  The  Court  may  be  guided  by  the 
judgments  of  other  Courts  and 
the  opinions  of  senior  Shariah 
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and  law  scholars  from  various 
States. 
3.  The  Court  may  decide  a  case  ex 
aequo  et  bono,  if  the  parties 
expressly  agree  thereto. 
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Article  24 
1.  Arabic  shall  be  the  official 
language  of  the  Court. 
2.  The  Court  may  allow  parties  to 
the  dispute  to  submit 
memoranda  or  documents  in  any 
other  language,  provided  that 
they  are  accompanied  by  an 
official  translation  into  Arabic. 
Article  25 
1.  The  full  Court  shall  decide  cases 
brought  before  it.  A  quorum  of 
five  Judges  shall  suffice  to 
constitute  the  Court,  provided 
that  the  President  or  whoever 
represents  him  participates. 
2.  The  Court  may,  with  the  consent 
of  parties  to  the  dispute,  form  a 
special  Chamber  dealing  with  a 
particular  case  because  of  its 
technical  nature  or  the  need  to 
follow  summary  procedures. 
3.  The  Chamber  shall  be  formed  of 
at  least  three  Judges  and  its 
meetings  shall  not  be  valid 
unless  all  its  members  are 
present. 
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In  all  cases  a  judgment  shall  be 
considered  as  rendered  by  the  Court. 
Article  26 
The  Court  shall  issue  its  judgments 
and  decisions  by  a  majority  of  the 
Judges  sitting  for  deciding  the  case.  In 
the  case  of  an  equality  of  votes,  the 
President  or  whoever  represents  him 
shall  have  a  casting  vote,  where 
otherwise  provided. 
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Article  27 
1.  In  accordance  with  the 
provisions  of  Article  21  of  this 
Statute,  cases  shall  be  brought 
before  the  Court: 
A)  by  all  the  parties  to  the 
dispute  when  they  so  agree, 
or; 
B)  by  one  of  the  parties,  who 
shall,  in  such  a  case,  submit  a 
written  application  to  the 
Court's  Registrar. 
C)  The  Rules  of  the  Court  shall 
state  the  procedures  required 
for  the  progress  of  cases. 
They  shall  also  designate  to 
the  litigants  the  manner  and 
date  of  applications  and  the 
procedure  to  be  followed. 
2.  Parties  to  a  dispute  shall 
designate  the  subject  matter  of 
the  dispute  and  its  parties. 
3.  The  Registrar  shall  serve  the 
statement  of  claims  on  all  the 
concerned  parties  in  the  dispute. 
He  shall  communicate  it  to  the 
League  Secretary-General,  who 
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shall  transmit  it  to  member 
states. 
Article  28 
1-  The  respondent  state  may,  with 
the  normal  procedure  of  filing  a 
case  or  in  the  first  counter- 
memorial  in  response  to  the 
original  case,  file  a  counter- 
claim  against  the  applicant  state. 
2-  A  counter-claim  shall  not  be 
accepted  by  the  Court  unless  it  is 
directly  related  to  the  original 
case  and  within  the  Court's 
jurisdiction. 
Article  29 
The  Court  shall  have  the  power  to 
indicate,  if  it  considers  that 
circumstances  so  require,  any 
provisional  measures  which  ought  to  be 
taken  to  preserve  the  respective  right  of 
either  party.  The  Registrar  shall 
communicate  the  decision  to  the  parties 
of  the  dispute  and  the  League  Secretary- 
General,  who  shall  notify  the  member 
states. 
Article  30 
Parties  to  the  dispute  may  be 
represented  before  the  Court  by  agents 
and  they  may  be  assisted  by  counsel, 
advocates  and  experts. 
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Article  31 
1.  Procedures  before  the  Court 
shall  be  conducted  orally  and  in 
writing. 
2.  The  Rules  for  written  procedure 
'w  l;  -1öýllI Annexe  2 
shall  be  as  follows: 
A)  The  written  proceedings  shall 
consist  of  the  communication 
to  the  Court  and  to  the 
parties  of  memorials, 
counter-memorials  and,  if 
necessary,  replies;  also  all 
papers  and  documents  in 
support. 
B)  The  Court  shall,  after 
consultation  with  the  parties 
to  dispute,  determine  the 
manner  and  dates  for  the 
submission  of  written 
documents  in  accordance 
with  its  Rules. 
C)  Written  documents  shall  be 
deposited  with  the  Registrar 
who  shall  send  a  copy  of 
each  document  submitted  by 
any  of  the  parties  to  the  other 
parties  after  certifying  that  it 
is  a  copy  of  the  original. 
3.  The  oral  proceedings  shall 
include  whatever  may  be  stated 
by  the  parties  to  the  dispute  in 
the  Court  sittings,  including 
explanations,  deliberations  and 
the  spoken  words  of  witnesses 
and  experts. 
Article  32 
The  Court  shall  communicate  all 
matters  concerning  the  dispute  to  the 
states  which  are  parties  to  the  present 
Statute. 
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Article  33 
The  Court  may,  at  any  stage  of  the 
case,  ask  the  parties  to  the  dispute  to 
submit  any  documents,  data  or  answers 
to  any  questions  put  to  them. 
Article  34 
1.  The  Court  may  carry  out  any 
inquiry  it  deems  necessary  and  it 
may  entrust  some  of  its  members 
with  such  inquiry. 
2.  The  Court  may  entrust  an  expert, 
an  advisory  office  or  any  other 
organisation  to  provide  expert 
evidence  or  submit  an  opinion 
on  any  matter  related  to  the  case. 
3.  If  the  Court  decides  to  carry  out 
a  field  inquiry,  it  shall  notify  the 
concerned  states  or  authorities 
thereof. 
Article  35 
The  Court  shall  be  entitled  not  to 
accept  new  memoranda  or  documents 
submitted  by  a  party  to  the  dispute  after 
the  expiration  of  time-limits  determined 
by  the  Court.  However,  the  Court  may 
accept  such  memoranda  and  documents 
if  the  parties  to  the  dispute  so  agree. 
Article  36 
The  applicant  state  or  states  may 
discontinue  the  proceedings  at  any  stage 
of  examination  before  the  judgment  is 
pronounced,  unless  any  of  the  parties  to 
the  dispute  object. 
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Article  37 
The  parties  to  the  dispute  may 
submit  an  agreement  settling  the 
dispute  at  any  stage  of  the  case  before 
judgment  is  pronounced.  Such 
agreement,  which  shall  be  recorded  in 
the  minutes  of  the  Court's  hearings, 
shall  constitute  a  judgment  for  ending 
the  dispute. 
Article  38 
Whenever  one  of  the  parties  to  the 
dispute  does  not  appear  before  the 
Court  or  fails  to  defend  its  case,  the 
other  party  may  request  the  Court  to 
decide  in  favour  of  its  claim. 
Article  39 
1.  If  a  state  party  to  the  Statute 
which  is  not  party  to  the  case 
considers  that  it  has  an  interest 
which  may  be  affected  by  the 
decision  in  the  case,  it  may 
request  the  Court  to  allow  it  to 
intervene  before  closure  of  the 
pleadings.  Such  anapplication 
shall  be  decided  by  the  Court. 
2.  In  some  exceptional  cases  and 
after  closing  the  pleadings,  the 
Court  may  decide  to  accept  an 
application  to  intervene  prior  to 
the  hearing  at  which  the 
judgment  will  be  pronounced, 
and  in  such  event  the  case  shall 
be  opened  again  for  pleadings. 
3.  If  the  subject  matter  of  the  case 
is  related  to  the  interpretation  of 
a  multilateral  agreement  to 
which  some  of  the  parties  to  the 
agreement  are  not  parties  to  the 
case,  the  Registrar  shall,  upon 
the  Court's  consent,  notify  these 
parties  of  the  case  and  the 
applications  filed  with  the  Court, 
and  such  parties  have  the  right  to 
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intervene. 
4.  If  the  Court  admits  an 
application  to  intervene,  the 
intervening  party  shall  become  a 
party  to  the  dispute,  and  the 
Court's  judgment  shall  be 
binding  upon  it  to  the  extent  that 
the  judgment  is  related  to  the 
issues  causing  it  to  intervene. 
Article  40 
1.  The  hearing  in  Court  shall  be 
public,  unless  the  Court  motu 
proprio  or  upon  the  request  of 
one  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute 
decides  that  it  shall  be  held 
behind  closed  doors.  The 
hearing  shall  be  under  the 
control  of  the  President  or,  if  he 
is  unable  to  preside,  of  the  Vice- 
President;  if  neither  is  able  to 
preside,  the  senior  Judge  present 
shall  preside. 
2.  Minutes  shall  be  made  at  each 
hearing  and  signed  by  the 
Registrar  and  the  President,  such 
minutes  alone  shall  be  authentic. 
Article  41 
1.  The  President  shall  declare, 
upon  closure  of  pleadings,  that 
the  case  is  pending  judgment. 
2.  The  deliberations  of  the  Court 
remain  secret.  Only  Judges  who 
have  heard  the  oral  pleadings 
shall  take  part  therein. 
Article  42 
1.  The  judgment  shall  be  delivered 
at  a  public  sitting  on  a  date 
decided  by  the  Court. 
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2.  The  judgment  shall  include  the 
date  it  was  issued,  the  subject 
matter  of  the  case,  the  parties  to 
the  dispute,  their  claims,  a 
summary  of  their  defence,  the 
names  of  the  Judges  who  took 
part  and  their  signatures  and  the 
reasons  on  which  the  judgment 
is  based. 
3.  The  draft  judgment  signed  by  the 
bench  that  has  delivered  it  shall 
be  deposited  in  the  case  file. 
The  authentic  copy  of  the 
judgment  shall  be  signed  by  the 
President  and  Registrar.  Copies 
shall  be  given  to  the  concerned 
parties  and  shall  be  circulated 
among  member  states. 
Article  43 
1.  If  the  judgment  does  not 
represent  in  whole  or  in  part  the 
unanimous  opinion  of  the 
Judges,  the  dissenting  Judge  may 
record  his  opinion  in  writing. 
2.  Judges  who  support  the 
judgment  for  reasons  other  than 
those  contained  therein  may 
record  their  individual  opinions 
in  writing. 
3.  In  all  events,  all  dissenting  or 
individual  opinions  shall  be 
attached  to  the  judgment. 
Article  44 
1.  Subject  to  the  provisions  of 
Article  45,  judgments  of  the 
Court  shall  be  final,  binding  and 
without  appeal. 
2.  The  decision  of  the  Court  shall 
be  binding  upon  the  parties  and 
within  the  scope  of  the  resolved 
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dispute. 
3.  A  judgment  shall  become 
binding  from  the  date  of  its  issue 
and  the  parties  shall  implement 
it  in  good  faith. 
4.  If  one  of  the  parties  refrains 
from  implementing  the 
judgment,  the  other  party  may 
have  recourse,  through  the 
League  Secretary-General,  to  the 
League  Council  to  take  the 
necessary  measures  capable  of 
implementing  it. 
Article  45 
An  application  for  revision  of  a 
judgment  may  be  made  if  it  is  based 
upon  the  discovery  of  some  fact  of  such 
a  nature  as  be  a  decisive  factor,  which 
fact  was,  when  the  judgment  was  given, 
unknown  to  the  Court  and  also  to  the 
party  claiming  revision,  always 
provided  that  such  ignorance  was  not 
due  to  negligence. 
Article  46 
1.  The  application  for  revision 
must  be  made  within  six  months 
from  the  date  of  the  discovery  of 
the  new  fact. 
2.  Any  application  for  revision 
made  after  the  lapse  of  five  years 
from  the  judgment  shall  not  be 
accepted. 
3.  The  Court  shall,  within  three 
months  from  the  date  thereof, 
issue  a  judgment  admitting  or 
dismissing  an  application  for 
revision,  and  shall  communicate 
it  to  the  parties  concerned. 
4.  Unless  otherwise  decided  by  the 
Court,  the  implementation  of  the 
judgment  may  not  be  suspended 
as  a  result  of  an  application  for 
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revision. 
Article  47 
In  the  event  of  a  dispute  regarding 
the  meaning  of  the  judgment  and  the 
scope  of  its  implementation,  the  Court 
shall  interpret  it  upon  the  request  of  one 
of  the  parties. 
Article  48 
The  Court  shall,  by  its  decision  or 
upon  the  request  of  any  party,  rectify 
such  errors  as  may  occur  in  its 
judgments. 
Article  49 
Unless  the  Court  decides  otherwise, 
each  party  shall  bear  the  costs 
pertaining  to  its  case. 
Chapter  Five 
Advisory  Opinions 
Article  50 
1.  The  League  Council  may  request 
the  Court  to  provide  its  advisory 
opinion  on  any  legal  question. 
2.  Upon  the  approval  of  the  League 
Council,  the  Secretary-General 
and  any  of  the  other  Specialised 
Councils  of  the  League, 
including  the  Specialised 
Ministerial  Councils  and  the 
Specialised  Arab  Organisations 
established  within  the  Arab 
League,  may  request  the  Court  to 
provide  an  advisory  opinion 
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concerning  legal  questions 
falling  within  its  jurisdiction. 
3.  The  Rules  of  the  Court  shall 
determine  the  procedural  Rules 
to  be  followed  for  requesting 
advisory  opinions. 
4.  The  Court  shall,  upon  exercising 
the  function  of  issuing  advisory 
opinions,  apply  whatever  it 
deems  fit  from  the  provisions  of 
this  Statute  and  its  Rules. 
5.  The  advisory  opinions  of  the 
Court  shall  be  issued  in  a  public 
sitting  with  a  majority  of  the 
Judges  sitting  in  accordance  with 
the  measures  stated  in  Article  26 
of  this  Statute.  The  organ 
requesting  the  advisoryopinion 
and  the  League  Secretary- 
General  must  be  notified  of  the 
date  of  the  sitting. 
Chanter  Six 
Immunities  and  Privileges 
Article  51 
1.  The  Court  shall  enjoy,  in  the 
member  states,  such  immunities 
and  privileges  as  may  be 
required  for  achieving  its 
purposes  and  performing  its 
functions. 
2.  The  Court's  Registrar,  officers, 
experts,  witnesses  and 
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representatives  of  parties 
appearing  before  the  Court  shall 
enjoy  such  immunities  and 
privileges  as  may  be  necessary  to 
safeguard  their  independence 
and  freedom  while  performing 
their  functions  and  duties. 
3.  The  Convention  on  the 
Privileges  and  Immunities  of  the 
League  of  Arab  states  shall 
apply  concerning  the 
implementation  of  paragraphs  I 
and  2  of  this  Article. 
Article  52 
1.  Judges  in  the  member  states 
shall  enjoy  the  same  privileges 
and  diplomatic  immunities 
accorded  to  diplomatic  envoys  in 
accordance  with  international 
agreements,  particularly  the 
Vienna  Convention  of  1961. 
2.  Immunity  may  be  removed  from 
a  Judge  by  a  reasoned  decision 
taken  by  the  unanimous  opinion 
of  other  Judges  if  sufficient 
measures  for  its  removal  warrant 
it. 
Chapter  Seven 
Amendment 
Article  53 
Member  states,  the  Court  and  the 
Secretary-General  of  the  League  of 
Arab  States  may,  if  necessary  and 
subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  League 
Pact,  propose  amendments  to  the 
Statute  of  the  Court. 
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Draft 
Rules  of  the  Arab  Court  of  Justice 
Part  One 
Organisation  of  the  Court 
Chanter  One 
Formation  of  the  Court  and  Its 
Chambers 
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Article  1 
1.  The  first  annual  term  of  the 
Court  shall  commence  from  the 
date  of  the  session  on  which  the 
Court  is  convened  after 
finalising  the  method  of  its 
constitution  to  decide  cases. 
2.  Members  of  the  Court  shall  take 
up  their  duties  with  effect  from 
the  first  day  of  the  Court's 
annual  term  on  which  the  full 
Court  meets.  The  terms 
provided  for  in  Article  10  of  the 
Statute  shall  be  calculated  with 
effect  from  that  date. 
Article  2 
1.  Following  the  first  constitution 
of  the  Court,  the  Court's 
members  shall  elect  for  a  two- 
year  term,  the  President  and 
Vice-President,  by  an  absolute 
majority  and'  in  a  secret  vote 
conducted  during  the  first 
meeting  of  the  Court.  They  shall 
take  up  their  duties  immediately 
after  being  elected;  they  may  be 
re-elected. 
2.  If  the  President  or  Vice- 
President  ceases  to  be  a  member 
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or  if  either  of  them  resigns  his 
office  before  the  expiration  of 
his  term,  the  Court  shall  elect  his 
successor  to  complete  the  term 
of  his  predecessor.  Such 
resignation  shall  be  effective 
from  the  date  of  its  notification 
to  the  Secretary-General. 
Article  3 
1.  The  President  shall  administer 
the  Court's  affairs,  preside  at  its 
meetings,  supervise  over  its 
secretariat  and  represent  the 
Court  with  regard  to 
administrative  matters. 
2.  In  the  event  of  the  absence  of  the 
President,  or  if  he  is  otherwise 
unable  to  attend,  the  Vice- 
President  shall  take  up  the  duties 
of  the  presidency.  If  the 
President  and  Vice-President  are 
unable  to  be  present,  or  if  both 
are  absent,  the  senior  Judge  shall 
preside. 
Article  4 
1.  In  case  of  a  party  to  a  dispute 
choosing  its  Judge  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  Article  18 
of  the  Statute  of  the  Court,  the 
applicant  state  shall  notify  the 
Registrar  thereof  prior  to  the 
commencement  of  pleadings. 
The  name  of  such  Judge  shall  be 
announced  when  it  so  declares 
wishes  or  during  the  time-limit 
specified  by  the  Court.  The 
Registrar  shall  notify  the  other 
parties  to  comment  on  this 
choice  within  the  period  fixed  by 
the  President. 
If  there  is  any  doubt  or 
objection  in  this  concern,  the 
Court  shall  decide  after  hearing 
explanations. 
2.  If  the  Court  realises  that  there 
are  several  parties  in  the  same 
359 
ný..  ýý1 
`r;,;  "ý:,  ý.,  ac  ;,  ý,.  c.  L$:.;  I 
a.  J 
ý:  1Ui  ö.  5lU 
Z).  r-ý  r4ut  -I 
ýý--ý- 
ýrYý 
^-q 
ýL'  iýiý  ý;  ýý,  li  {Lg.  "  ý;  t..  _: 
1i 
LýJ:, 
a.  Jlr  j  ji  LL- 
..,; 
L'j  j.  _.;, 
1L,  &,  " 
: LL"y.  rrý 
L.  g,  lýc 
ýý  ý;  i,.  ýjºi  . x,.  i 
,  Lý-,  i  ;  1L,  3  -1 
18  öýL_ll 
ýCJ 
l__ä  b 
CLSJJi  wi-'ll 
Jxl  ýº  L+:  -P-)  ý)ýLp! 
L,  rý  Jxr 
.  a..  S.  ý-  i 
j  :.  4t4 Annexe  3 
interest,  who  have  not  appointed 
a  Judge  holding  their  nationality, 
a  date  shall  be  designated  for 
them  to  choose  a  Judge  who 
represents  them  all.  If  the  fixed 
date  lapses  and  they  have  not 
declared  their  choice,  the  Court 
shall  continue  in  its  composition 
to  decide  the  case. 
3.  A  Judge  so  chosen  shall  take  the 
same  oath  taken  by  the  original 
Judges  of  the  Court  before  the 
Court  in  the  first  sitting 
following  his  selection. 
Article  5 
If  a  member  is  deemed  incompetent 
on  the  grounds  of  not  having  the 
required  qualifications,  the  President 
shall  convene  a  meeting  and  the 
member  shall  be  allowed  to  defend 
himself.  A  vote  shall  be  conducted  in 
his  absence  but  he  cannot  be  removed 
except  by  a  unanimous  vote. 
Article  6 
1.  If  the  Court  decides  to  form  one 
or  more  Chambers,  it  shall 
determine  the  categories  of  cases 
which  fall  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  such  a  Chamber,  the  number 
of  its  members,  and  the  duration 
and  date  of  commencing  its 
functions. 
2.  The  Chamber  of  Summary 
Procedures  shall  be  formed 
annually  and  shall  consist  of 
three  Judges  and  two  substitutes 
who  shall  be  elected  by  secret 
ballot  and  by  an  absolute 
majority. 
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Article  7 
The  Court  may  decide  to  disolve  any 
of  its  Chambers  provided  the  progress 
of  its  functions  is  not  affected.  The  said 
Chamber  shall  finish  all  the  cases 
before  it. 
Article  8 
1.  If  the  Court  decides  to  form  a 
Chamber  for  deciding  a 
particular  case,  the  President 
shall  consult  the  concerned 
parties  regarding  the 
composition  of  such  a  Chamber. 
A  report  in  this  regard  shall  be 
prepared  for  the  Court. 
2.  This  Chamber  shall  be  presided 
over  by  the  President  and,  in  his 
absence,  by  the  Vice-President. 
If  neither  are  present,  the  senior 
member  shall  preside. 
Article  9 
If  the  term  of  office  of  a  Chamber 
member  expires  prior  to  the  decision  is 
rendered  in  a  case  laid  before  him,  he 
shall  continue  his  duties  until  the  case  is 
decided,  irrespective  of  the  stage  of  the 
case. 
Article  10 
In  addition  to  official  holidays  the 
Court  shall,  by  its  own  decision, 
determine  its  members'  vication. 
However,  the  President  may,  if 
necessary,  request  a  member  to  cut 
short  his  leave. 
Article  11 
If  the  necessary  quorum  is  not 
complete,  the  President  shall  delay  the 
meeting  until  the  legal  quorum  is 
satisfy. 
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Article  12 
1.  The  Court  shall  delibrate  cases 
and  advisory  opinions  laid 
before  it  in  special  session  in 
which  experts  may  take  part  if 
they  are  asked  to.  However, 
such  experts  will  not  be  entitled 
to  vote  during  the  deliberations. 
2.  A  reasoned  note  must  be  stated 
in  writing  by  each  Judge 
participating  during  the 
deliberations. 
3.  The  Court's  decision  shall  be 
based  on  the  opinions  expressed 
during  the  final  discussions  in 
accordance  with  the  majority. 
Judges  shall  vote  in  inverse  of 
seniority. 
4:  Deliberations  shall  be 
confidential  and  the  details 
thereof  shall  not  be  recorded. 
Only  the  subject  of  discussions, 
the  votes  taken,  and  names  of 
concurring  and  dissenting 
members  shall  be  recorded. 
Article  13 
Unless  the  Court  decides  otherwise, 
the  foregoing  rules  shall  apply  to 
administrative  issues. 
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administrative  staff  and  support  service 
employees,  who  shall  carry  out  their 
duties  under  the  supervision  and 
direction  of  the  Court  President. 
Article  15 
1.  The  Court  shall  select  a 
Registrar  and  a  Deputy-Registrar 
from  a  list  of  nominees  proposed 
by  the  members  of  the  Court. 
This  list  shall  include  details  of 
age,  nationality,  university 
qualifications,  abilities  and 
previous  practical  experience. 
They  shall  be  selected  by  secret 
ballot  and  by  an  absolute 
majority.  Their  term  of  office 
shall  be  for  a  renewable  period 
of  two  years  and  may  be 
extended  further. 
2.  If  it  occurs  that  the  Registrar, 
before  the  lapse  of  his  term,  is 
unable  to  discharge  his  duties, 
the  Deputy-Registrar  shall  take 
up  his  duties  until  the  Court 
chooses  a  new  Registrar. 
3.  If  both  the  Registrar  and  Deputy- 
Registrar  are  absent,  the  Court 
President  shall  appoint  someone 
from  among  the  staff  to  take  up 
their  duties. 
4.  Before  taking  up  their  duties,  the 
Registrar  and  Deputy-Registrar 
shall  take  the  oath  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  Article  5 
of  the  Court  Statute. 
Article  16 
1.  The  Registrar  shall  be  a  channel 
of  communications  to  and  from 
the  Court.  He  shall  verify  dates 
of  communications  and 
notifications,  address  the 
relevant  bodies  and  to  deal  with 
any  queries  related  to  the  Court 
work. 
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2.  The  Registrar  shall  be  present,  in 
person  or  represented  by  his 
Deputy,  at  the  meatings  of  the 
Court  and  of  its  Chambers, 
prepare  minutes  of  meetings  and 
make  any  necessary 
arrangements  for  translation  into 
Arabic.  He  shall  sign 
judgments,  advisory  opinions 
and  orders  issued  by  the  Court 
and  deal  with  all  inquiries 
concerning  the  Court  and  its 
work. 
3.  The  Registrar  shall  be 
responsible  for  the  archives, 
accounts  and  all  administrative 
work. 
4.  The  Registrar  shall  issue 
instructions  and  orders  related  to 
his  office  after  having  them 
approved  by  the  President. 
5.  The  Registrar  shall,  under  the 
President's  supervision,  be 
responsible  for  the  preparation, 
printing  and  publication  of  the 
Court  judgments,  advisory 
opinions  and  orders  after 
arranging  them  in  groups. 
6.  The  Court  shall  approve  the 
annual  work  plan  of  the 
Registrar  and  Court  staff  and 
shall  designate  their  duties  in 
accordance  with  the  President's 
proposals. 
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Part  Two 
Proceedings 
Chanter  One 
Institution  of  Proceedings 
Article  17 
Procedures  provided  for  in  these 
Rules,  and  the  general  principles  of 
proceedings  which  are  not  expressly 
stated  therein  shall  be  applied,  provided 
that  the  latter  do  not  contravene  the 
provisions  of  the  Statute  and  Rules  of 
the  Court. 
The  Court  may  adopt  other 
procedural  rules  which  the  parties  to  the 
case  may  propose  and  the  Court  may 
deem  more  appropriate  to  the 
circumstances  of  the  dispute. 
Article  18 
An  application  shall  include  as  far  as 
possible  the  details  of  the  applicant,  the 
subject  of  the  dispute  and  a  statement  of 
its  legal  grounds,  and  the  Court's 
jurisdiction  regarding  the  subject  of  the 
dispute  and  its  nature  whenever  it  is 
possible,  together  with  a  succinct 
statement  of  the  facts  and  grounds  on 
which  the  claims  are  based.  The 
necessary  supporting  documents  shall 
be  attached  therewith. 
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representative  approved  by  the  Court  or 
by  any  other  duly  authorised  person, 
and  shall  be  deposited  with  the 
Secretariat  of  the  Court  accompanied  by 
the  number  of  photocopies  specified  by 
the  Registrar.  The  copies  must  be 
certified  by  the  Registrar  as  copies  of 
the  original  and  shall  be  communicated 
to  the  parties. 
Article  20 
1.  A  list  showing  the  serial  number, 
date  and  content  of  each 
document  shall  be  attached  with 
the  documents  submitted  to  the 
Court,  together  with  as  many 
photocopies  of  the  list  as  the 
number  of  litigants.  The  original 
of  the  list  and  the  documents 
shall  be  kept  in  the  file  of  the 
case. 
2.  Documents  may  be  submitted  in 
a  foreign  language  accompanied 
by  a  certified  Arabic  translation. 
Article  21 
1.  If  the  case  is  instituted  by  means 
of  an  application,  the  Registrar 
shall,  not  later  than  one  month 
from  the  date  thereof, 
communicate  a  copy  of  the 
application  and  its  enclosures  to 
the  respondent. 
2.  If  the  case  is  instituted  by  a 
special  agreement  between  the 
two  parties,  the  Registrar  shall 
notify  the  other  party  of  the 
institution  of  such  proceedings. 
3.  The  Registrar  shall,  notify  the 
parties  of  the  date  on  which  a 
Court  hearing  is  to  take  place  at 
least  ten  days  before  such  date. 
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Article  22 
The  Registrar  shall  communicate  to 
all  members  of  the  Court  copies  of 
proceedings  instituted,  and  he  shall 
communicate  copies  thereof  to  the 
General  Secretariat  of  the  League  of 
Arab  States  and  any  other  state  entitled 
to  appear  before  the  Court. 
Article  23 
1.  In  cases  instituted  by  a  special 
agreement,  the  deposit  of  an 
application  must  be 
accompanied  by  a  statement  of 
the  names  of  the  agents  of  the 
parties.  If  proceedings  are 
instituted  unilaterally  by  one  of 
the  parties,  the  other  party,  upon 
receiving  the  notice  thereof, 
shall  notify  the  Court  as  soon  as 
possible  of  the  name  of  its  agent. 
2.  When  proceedings  are  instituted 
by  an  application,  such 
application  or  the  letter  attached 
therewith  must  contain  the  name 
of  the  agent  of  the  government 
or  the  state  submitting  the 
application.  The  party  against 
which  the  proceedings  are 
instituted  shall,  as  soon  as 
possible  after  receiving  the 
application,  notify  the  Court  of 
the  name  of  its  agent. 
3.  The  statement  of  the  agent's 
name  must  contain  an  address 
for  correspondence  at  the  seat  of 
the  Court  to  which 
communications  may  be  sent. 
Article  24 
When  proceedings  are  instituted  by  a 
state  which  is  not  a  party  to  the  Statute 
of  the  Court,  such  state  shall  have  to 
declare  to  the  Court  that  it  is  bound  by 
the  terms  relating  to  its  acceptance  of 
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the  Court's  jurisdiction,  and  shall  also 
submit  to  the  Registrar  the  documents 
which  prove  such  declaration  when  it 
notifies  the  Court  of  the  appointment  of 
its  agent. 
Chanter  Two 
Proceedings  and  Hearing  the  Case 
Article  25 
1.  At  the  start  of  proceedings  in  a 
case,  the  Court  shall  ascertain 
whether  the  parties  and  their 
representatives  are  entitled  to 
appear  before  it  and,  unless  they 
are  so  entitled  the  case  shall  not 
be  prceeded. 
2.  The  President  may  invite  the 
agents  of  parties  as  soon  as  they 
are  appointed  to  discuss 
procedural  issues  relating  to  the 
case. 
In  the  light  of  the  information 
obtained  from  this  discussion, 
the  Court  shall  make  the 
necessary  orders  to  determine 
the  manner  and  the  time-limits 
of  the  pleadings.  Taking  this 
determination  into  account,  any 
agreement  between  the  parties 
may  be  observed,  unless  this 
may  result  in  an  unjustified 
delay  in  deciding  the  case. 
3.  The  Court  may,  upon  the  request 
of  the  relevant  party,  extend  the 
fixed  dates  and,  after  hearing  the 
other  party,  consider  any  action 
taken  after  such  a  date  as  a  valid 
procedure  if  it  is  justified.  Such 
powers  shall  be  exercised  by  the 
President  when  the  Court  is  not 
sitting. 
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Article  26 
1.  When  the  Registrar  arranges  for 
the  printing  of  documents  for  a 
party  at  his  own  expense  in  order 
to  submit  them  to  the  Court,  this 
party  shall  send  the  said 
documents  in  advance  of  the 
fixed  date  to  enable  the  time- 
limits  to  be  met.  The  printing  is 
under  the  responsibility  of  the 
party  in  question. 
2.  The  correction  of  errors  in 
documents  which  have  been 
filed  shall  be  made  at  any  time 
with  the  consent  of  the  other 
party  and  by  leave  of  the 
President. 
Article  27 
1.  Procedures  in  a  case  begun  by 
means  of  an  application  shall 
commence  with  a  memorial 
submitted  by  the  applicant 
followed  by  a  Counter-Memorial 
by  the  respondent.  The  Court 
may  authorise  that  there  shall  be 
a  Reply  by  the  applicant  and  a 
Rejoinder  by  the  respondent. 
2.  In  cases  begun  with  the 
notification  of  a  special 
agreement,  the  number  and  order 
of  memorials  shall  be 
determined  by  the  agreement.  If, 
however,  it  does  not  so 
determine,  each  party  may  file  a 
Memorial  and  a  Counter- 
Memorial  simultaneously  unless 
the  Court  decides  otherwise. 
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Article  28 
1.  The  original  Memorial  shall 
contain  a  statement  of  the 
disputed  facts  and  a  statement  of 
law  and  the  party's  opinion 
thereon.  A  Counter-Memorial 
shall  contain  an  admission  or 
denial  of  the  facts  stated  in  the 
Memorial,  together  with  a 
statement  of  any  additional  facts 
or  observations  concerning  the 
legal  questions  of  the  dispute 
and  the  party's  opinion  thereon. 
2.  The  Reply  and  Rejoinder 
permitted  by  the  Court  shall  not 
repeat  the  statements  previously 
made  but  must  focus  on  the 
issues  still  in  dispute. 
3.  A  pleading  shall  contain  the 
opinion  and  proofs  of  the  party 
filing  it.  There  shall  be  annexed 
to  every  pleading  such 
documents  that  may  be  relevant 
to  the  dispute  which  shall  be 
deposited  with  the  Registrar. 
Article  29 
Copies  of  the  pleadings  and  annexes 
in  each  case  shall  be  communicated  by 
the  Registrar  to  the  Judges  and  parties; 
and  the  Court  may  authorise  the 
Registrar  to  make  the  case  documents 
accessible  to  any  concerned  parties. 
Article  30 
Upon  closure  of  the  written 
procedures,  the  case  shall  be  ready  for 
oral  pleadings. 
Article  31 
Priority  in  dealing  with  cases  shall 
be  determined  on  the  basis  of  whether 
or  not  the  written  proceedings  are 
complete  and  in  accordance  with  its 
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order  on  the  General  list  of  cases. 
However,  the  Court  may  decide  to 
depart  from  this  rule. 
Article  32 
The  commencement  date  of  oral 
pleadings  in  cases  ready  for  hearing 
shall,  upon  the  closure  of  written 
pleadings,  be  determined  by  a  Court 
decision  of  the  Court  or  by  a  decision 
issued  by  the  President  when  the  Court 
is  not  sitting. 
The  Court  may  decide  to  postpone 
hearings  in  the  case  if  circumstances  so 
require. 
Article  33 
The  Court  shall,  after  consultation 
with  the  parties,  determine  the  method 
to  be  followed  in  the  pleadings,  the 
number  of  persons  who  will  be  pleading 
and  the  manner  of  presenting  evidence 
and  the  questioning  of  witnesses  and 
experts. 
Article  34 
If  the  case  is  ready  for  oral 
pleadings,  the  parties  may  agree  to 
request  the  postponement  of  the 
hearings  and  the  President  may  so 
agree.  In  the  event  of  disagreement,  the 
Court  shall  decide  with  regard  to  the 
postponement. 
Article  35 
No  new  documents  may  be  accepted 
from  a  party  after  the  closure  of  the 
written  proceedings  without  the  consent 
of  the  other  party.  The  Court  may,  after 
hearing  the  parties,  permit  any  party  to 
submit  new  documents.  The  procedure 
applied  to  documents  filed  within  the 
fixed  dates,  regarding  their  deposit, 
circulation  and  consideration  shall  be 
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followed  with  new  documents. 
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Article  36 
Each  party  shall,  in  sufficient  time 
before  the  commencement  of  oral 
pleadings,  produce  for  the  Registrar 
such  information  as  may  be  relevant  to 
the  evidence  on  which  its  case  is based 
or  the  evidence  the  other  party  is 
demanded  to  produce. 
The  Court  may  decide  to  start  the 
oral  pleadings  before  or  after  the  parties 
submit  their  evidence,  and  the  parties 
may,  in  all  cases,  comment  on  any 
evidence  produced. 
Article  37 
Oral  pleadings  shall,  as  for  as 
possible  and  within  the  permitted  time, 
focus  on  the  substantive  issues  of  the 
case  and  ignore  details  contained  within 
written  documents. 
The  Court  may,  at  any  time  whether 
before  or  during  the  oral  pleadings, 
specify  to  the  parties  any  issue  to  be 
discussed,  and  may  also  put  any 
question  or  demand  any  explanation 
from  the  agents  and  advocates. 
Article  38 
Each  Judge  may  ask  questions  after 
making  his  intentions  known  to  the 
President  presiding  over  the  sitting. 
Agents  and  advocates  may  answer 
such  questions  either  immediately  or 
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subsequently  in  the  same  sitting  or  in 
another  hearing  but  always  before  the 
closure  of  pleadings. 
Article  39 
Witnesses  may  be  cross-examined 
and  questioned  by  agents  and  advocates 
under  the  supervision  of  the  President. 
They  may  also  be  questioned  by  the 
President  and  the  members  of  the 
Court. 
Article  40 
The  parties'  discussions,  demands, 
waivers,  undertakings  or  reconciliation 
shall  be  recorded  in  the  minutes  of  the 
sitting. 
Article  41 
The  Court  may  decide  either 
proprio  motu  or  at  the  request  of  a 
party,  to  issue  the  requisite  interlocutory 
orders  concerning  matters  such  as  the 
appointment  of  experts,  hearing  of 
witnesses,  reviewing  files  and 
visitation. 
It  may  instruct  the  parties  to  produce 
documents  they  have  in  their  possession 
which  are  required  to  decide  the 
dispute. 
Article  42 
Before  taking  up  his  duties,  every 
expert  shall  take  the  following  oath 
before  the  President: 
"I  swear  by  Allah  Almighty  that 
I  will  perform  my  duty 
honorably  and  faithfully". 
The  Court  shall  determine  the  limits 
of  his  responsibilities,  estimate  his 
3  73 
a...  lýl  ý.  ý,  ý.  11º 
ýºýýJºc1y'L.  ýIýtXSfUvý-'ý 
L_g,  $,  _,  T.  ý;  al:  jºI 
j 
yLp  JW  J--s  ! -W 
V!  '`X`JIj  4wUl  ö.  )lll 
L:,. 
CJ- 
Lýý  ý,  --ý  ý"--aýý  ýýºý  . ýr  ýý 
I 
ýL.  lb 
,i 
ýL:.  il;  "  ý"  ýýa11  vlýl 
ý 
J'Al  -i'ýjL,  - 
ýý,  ýºýý  -,  -i?  ozai 
ji 
º>;  L.  ,,  a.,  Q;  ýº  ýº,  byý  .  u-i  ý  ,. 
lb 
Le)  ;,..  L.  g.  lc  L-,  I,  º-ý 
.  ýLý;  yl,  uLd,  UJ 
Lý  ýýLbýll, 
J.  ý,  aJ  L"  ý,  aý  ,  v11bj(I  ý;  1;  ýi  Lýý 
.  L;  -tCaJI  L3  JalU  ä.,  "j\J  c,  la::,,...  " 
ä,  JL:  II  ý,...  JI 
oj,,,  4wi  a4i 
ý,  ýý...  ý;  ý-ºýýý 
ýý.  äLAI-I  j.  a,  a.  ýL Annexe  3 
remuneration  and  specify  the  manner  to 
be  followed  for  depositing  this 
remuneration  with  the  CourtTreasury 
to  his  account. 
Article  43 
Before  testifying,  every  witness  shall 
take  the  following  oath: 
"I  swear  by  Allah  Almighty  that 
I  will  say  the  truth  and  nothing 
but  the  truth". 
Article  44 
If  the  Court  decides  it  necessary  to 
conduct  an  inquiry  for  the  elucidation 
of  certain  material  points,  the  Court 
itself  may  conduct  it  or  delegate  one  of 
its  Members  to  do  so. 
Article  45 
Minutes  shall  be  prepared  for  each 
Court  meeting  and  signed  by  the 
Registrar  and  the  President  and  shall  be 
treated  as  an  authentic  proof  of  its 
contents. 
Chapter  Three 
Objections,  Submissions, 
Intervention  and 
Counter-Claims 
Article  46 
1.  An  objection  may  be  made  at 
any  stage  of  the  case  before  the 
case  is  declared  pending  the 
passing  of  judgment  as  long  as  it 
is  related  to  the  ordare  public. 
The  Court  may  proprio  motu 
decide  thereon. 
2.  Any  objection  to  the  jurisdiction 
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of  the  Court  or  the  admissibility 
of  the  application  or  any  other 
objection  shall  be  made  within 
the  time-limit. 
3.  The  Court  shall  issue  a  decision 
regarding  the  objections  laid 
before  it,  or  the  litigants  may 
agree  that  the  objections  may  be 
determined  with  the  subject- 
matter  of  the  case,  or  that  the 
Court  may  proprio  motu  so 
decide. 
Article  47 
Counter-claims  or  objections  shall 
be  presented  by  means  of  an  application 
and  shall  be  decided  by  the  Court  in  the 
light  of  how  closely  they  are  connected 
to  the  original  proceedings.  If  they  are 
connected,  they  shall  be  included  in  the 
original  proceedings  and  the  same 
procedures  shall  be  followed  therewith. 
Article  48 
An  application  for  permission  to 
intervene  shall  be  filed  with  the 
Registrar  before  the  commencement  of 
oral  proceedings  and  shall  set  out  the 
basis  of  intervention,  a  submission  and 
a  statement  of  the  facts  and  law.  The 
application  shall  be  communicated  to 
the  parties  who  are  entitled  to  comment 
upon  it. 
Article  49 
1.  An  applicant  may  not  file  any 
incidental  applications  during 
the  hearing  of  the  case  unless 
they  are  related  to  the  original 
application  and  deal  with 
circumstances  which  have  arisen 
or  were  discovered  after  the 
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proceedings  were  instituted. 
2.  Interlocutory  applications  shall 
be  subject  to  the  time-limits 
specified  pursuant  to  the 
provisions  of  these  Rules. 
3.  Interlocutory  applications  may 
be  filed  either  by  a  separate 
application  or  orally  during  a 
session  and  in  the  presence  of 
the  other  party,  and  they  shall  be 
recorded  in  the  minutes.  Such 
applications  shall  not  be 
admitted  after  the  closure  of 
proceedings  before  delivery  of 
the  judgment. 
4.  The  Court  may  admit  the 
addition  of  a  number  of  cases  if 
they  are  similar  or  related  and 
connected  with  each  other  in 
order  to  produce  a  single 
judgment  for  them  all. 
Article  50 
The  Court  shall  observe  such  rules 
of  evidence  as  may  be  appropriate  to 
the  nature  of  dispute  laid  before  it,  and 
may,  in  relation  to  evidence  produced 
by  a  party  to  the  case,  transfer  the 
burden  of  proof  to  the  other  party  and 
estimate  the  effect  arising  from  its 
inability  to  do  so. 
Article  51 
1.  The  respondent  may,  during  the 
proceedings  but  before  the 
delivery  of  the  judgment,  accept 
the  claims  of  the  applicant. 
Hence,  the  Court  shall  decide  the 
end  of  the  litigation. 
2.  The  respondent  may  also  be 
reconciled  with  the  applicant.  In 
such  case  the  Court  shall  record 
this  reconciliation  in  the  minutes 
of  the  sitting  and  the 
reconciliation  and  its 
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implications  shall  have  the  same 
effect  as  the  judgment  issued  by 
the  Court. 
3.  If  the  applicant  decides  to 
withdraw  the  case,  he  shall  file  a 
written  application  to  the 
Registrar  and  the  Court  shall 
order  the  suspension  of  the  case 
and  remove  it  from  the  General 
List.  This  is  conditional  on  the 
other  party  accepting  such 
withdrawal  if  he  has  already 
responded  to  the  case,  and  the 
Court  shall  fix  a  date  to  admit  or 
reject  such  an  application. 
Article  52 
The  control  and  running  of  a  meeting 
are  entrusted  to  the  President.  The 
Court  may  proprio  motu  order  the 
omission  of  phrases  which  are  contrary 
to  international  customs  and  norms 
from  any  document  in  the  case. 
Chapter  Four 
Protection  and 
Interim  Measures 
Article  53 
A  written  request  for  provisional 
measures  may  be  filed  at  any  time  with 
the  Registrar.  The  request  shall  specify 
the  motives  and  reasons  thereof,  the 
possible  consequences  if  they  are  not 
granted,  and  the  measures  requested  by 
the  applicant. 
The  Registrar  shall  communicate  an 
authenticated  copy  of  the  submitted 
request  to  the  other  party. 
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Article  54 
The  Court  shall  forthwith  be 
convened  for  the  purpose  of  deciding 
upon  the  measures  requested.  Such  an 
application  shall  have  priority  over  all 
other  cases  and  should  be  dealt  with  as 
a  matter  of  urgency. 
Article  55 
The  President  may  call  upon  the 
parties  to  act  in  such  a  way  as  to  enable 
any  orders  the  Court  may  make  on  the 
request  for  provisional  measures  to 
have  their  appropriate  effect. 
Article  56 
The  Court  may,  proprio  motu  and 
without  a  request  from  the  parties, 
exercise  its  jurisdiction  to  order 
provisional  measures  even  if  they  are  in 
whole  or  in  part  contrary  to  their 
requests.  It  shall  also  be  entitled  to  take 
provisional  measures  to  protect  material 
evidences  from  damage  or 
disappearance,  whether  deliberately  or 
not,  if  the  damage  or  disappearance 
thereof  may  make  it  impossible  to 
prove  the  right  or  rights  of  a  party  to  the 
dispute. 
Article  57 
The  rejection  of  a  request  for 
provisional  measures  shall  not  prevent 
the  applicant  from  making  a  new 
request  in  the  same  case  based  on  new 
facts. 
Article  58 
The  Court  may,  at  the  request  of  a 
party,  order  the  revocation  or 
amendment  of  the  provisional  measures 
previously  taken  if  there  is  a  material 
change  which  justifies  thus.  A  request 
for  revocation  or  amendment  shall  set 
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out  the  reasons  on  which  it  is  based.  In 
all  cases,  the  Court  shall  enable  the 
parties  to  the  case  to  present  their 
observations  concerning  such  a  request. 
Article  59 
The  Court  may  request  such 
information  that  may  be  relevant  to  the 
implementation  of  the  provisional 
measures  determined  by  it. 
Part  Three 
Passing  Judgments 
Article  60 
1.  Upon  completion  of  the 
hearings,  the  President  shall 
declare  that  the  case  is  pending 
the  delivery  of  the  judgment. 
The  Court's  deliberations  shall  be 
secret  and  must  not  be  disclosed.  The 
Judges  shall  base  their  decision  on  the 
opinions  expressed  during  the  final 
discussions. 
Article  61 
Judgments  shall  be  made  by  a 
majority  opinion  and  Judges  shall  vote 
in  accordance  with  their  seniority.  The 
judgment  shall  contain  the  names  of 
members  who  took  part  in  deciding  it, 
the  names  of  litigants  and  their  agents,  a 
summary  of  the  proceedings,  a 
statement  of  facts  and  the  legal  reasons 
in  point  of  law.  Any  Judge  who 
dissents  from  the  majority  may,  if  he  so 
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desires,  issue  a  statement  stating  his 
dissenting  opinion. 
Article  62 
The  draft  judgment  containing  the 
reasons  on  which  it  is  based  on  shall, 
before  the  sitting  in  which  the  judgment 
shall  be  read,  be  deposited  with  the 
President.  If  it  is  not  so  deposited,  the 
judgment  shall  be  void. 
Article  63 
1.  The  judgment  is  delivered  by 
reading  its  operative  clause  or  its 
operative  clause  and  the  grounds 
on  which  it  is  based. 
2.  The  original  copy  of  the 
judgment  containing  the 
proceedings,  reasons  and 
operative  clause  shall  be  signed 
by  the  President  and  the 
Registrar  and  placed  in  the  file 
of  the  case.  Each  of  the  parties 
shall  be  given  a  copy  thereof. 
Article  64 
The  Court  shall,  by  a  decision 
issued  proprio  motu  or  at  the  request  of 
a  party  to  the  case,  rectify  any  material 
clerical  or  arithmetical  errors.  Such 
rectification  shall  be  recorded  by  the 
Registrar  on  the  original  copy  of  the 
judgment  and  signed  together  with  the 
President.  Parties  who  have  been 
previously  given  a  copy  of  the  judgment 
or  the  order  in  which  the  error  occurred 
shall  be  notified  thereof. 
Article  65 
Parties  to  the  case  may  request  the 
Court  to  construe  any  ambiguity  or 
vagueness  in  the  text  of  the  judgment. 
The  normal  procedures  of  filing  a  case 
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shall  be  followed  for  submitting  such  a 
request.  A  decision  regarding  the 
request  for  construing  a  judgment  shall 
be  duly  taken  on  the  condition  that  it 
shall  not  alter  the  judgment. 
Article  66 
The  rules  governing  adjudged  issues 
and  the  probative  effect  of  judgments 
among  parties  shall  be  applied.  A 
judgment  shall  be  effective  and  binding 
upon  the  parties  from  the  day  on  which 
it  is  read. 
Part  Four 
Registers.  Files  and  Documents 
Article  67 
At  the  beginning  of  each  Gregorian 
year  the  following  registers  shall  be 
established: 
I.  A  general  register  (General  List) 
in  which  cases  or  advisory 
opinions  shall  be  recorded  with 
serial  numbers  according  to  their 
filing  dates.  The  following 
details  shall  also  be  recorded: 
subject-matter  of  the  case, 
names  of  parties,  submissions, 
date  of  depositing  applications, 
date  of  communication  to  the 
respondent,  date  of  meeting,  file 
number  in  the  archive,  type  of 
case  or  application,  closure  date 
of  pleadings,  postponements, 
and  the  commencement  date  of 
the  pleadings. 
2.  A  register  for  entering  the 
applications  with  regard  to  the 
distrribution  of  copies  of 
judgments  and  papers.  In  such 
register  applications  shall  be 
entered  and  given  serial 
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numbers.  The  following  details 
shall  also  be  recorded:  the 
number  of  the  general  register, 
name  of  applicant,  judgments  a 
copy  of  which  is  required  and 
the  dates  thereof,  the  date  on 
which  a  copy  of  the  judgment 
was  requested  and  the  date  it 
was  delivered  and  the  signature 
of  recipient. 
3.  A  register  for  filing  cases,  in 
which  the  following  details  shall 
be  stated:  case  number,  date  of 
filing  and  names  of  litigants, 
date  of  judgment  or  the  latest 
procedure  undertaken. 
The  Court  may  decide  to 
establish  other  registers. 
Article  68 
For  each  case  there  shall  be  a  file 
prepared  in  which  every  relevant  paper 
must  be  filed;  specifying  number  of  the 
case,  names  of  its  parties,  name  of  the 
applicant  party,  date  and  time  of  deposit 
of  the  application  and  a  statement  of  the 
deposited  papers  showing  their  serial 
numbers,  and  the  number  of 
appendices.  On  the  outer  cover  of  the 
file  the  following  shall  be  stated:  the 
number  of  the  case  in  the  general 
register,  names  of  its  parties,  subject- 
matter  of  the  case  and  the  stage  of  its 
proceedings. 
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Article  69 
The  case  papers  and  documents 
shall  be  made  accessible  by  the  Court 
official-in-charge  to  litigants  or  their 
representatives,  who  alone  may 
examine  them  at  the  seat  of  the  Court. 
Original  copies  of  documents,  reports 
and  memoranda  must  not  be  removed 
from  the  seat  of  the  Court. 
Article  70 
Documents  may,  after  the  delivery  of 
the  judgment  and  the  depositing  of  its 
draft,  not  be  returned  to  the  parties  who 
have  submitted  them.  If  it  is  necessary 
to  get  them  back  before  the  delivery  of 
the  judgment,  they  may,  by  written 
permission  from  the  President,  be  given 
provided  that  a  date  shall  be  fixed  for 
returning  them. 
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NOTE  ON  ARTICLE  9  OF  THE  STATUTE  OF  THE  PERMANENT  COURT  OF 
INTERNATIONAL  JUSTICE  AND  THE  POSITION  OF  THE  MOSLEM  LEGAL  SYSTEM 
AND  THE  MOSLEM  CIVILISATION  AMONG  THE  MAIN  FORMS  OF  CIVILISATIONS 
AND  PRINCIPAL  LEGAL  SYSTEMS  OF  THE  WORLD  PRESENTED  BY  THE 
DELEGATIONS  OF  THE  MOSLEM  STATES  OF  THE  NEAR  EAST' 
I 
1.  The  Moslem  legal  system  is  a  system  of  unquestionable  originality.  Its 
autonomy  is  evident,  as  a  legal  system  largely  governed  by  the  distinctive 
character  of  a  social  community  very  different  from  that  in  which  other  legal 
systems  have  reached  normative  maturity. 
The  International  Congress  on  Comparative  Law  which  was  held  at  The  Hague 
in  1932  decided  that  Moslem  Law  is  an  entirely  independent  source  of 
comparative  law.  In  1938  when  the  question  of  the  relationship  between  Roman 
Law  and  Moslem  Law  was  brought  to  the  consideration  of  the  Second  Congress 
on  Comparative  Law,  the  Congress  stated  explicitly  that  Moslem  Law  was  an' 
autonomous  legal  system  which  did  not  depend  on  other  established  systems.  The 
body  of  professors  representing  Egypt  at  that  Congress  had  submitted  to  it  a 
memorandum  to  illustrate  this  scientific  as  well  as  historical  data  by  developing  a 
descriptive  research  on  the  scope  of  the  constitutive  elements  of  the  Moslem  legal 
system  and  its  creative  evolution  through  the  normative  activities  of  its 
complementary  sources. 
The  following  is  a  summary  of  the  theories  developed  in  the  above-mentioned 
note. 
II 
2.  One  must  never  confuse  Moslem  religion  with  Moslem  Law.  The  first 
period  of  Islam  had  barely  ended  when  the  advance  of  the  science  of  Law,  as  well 
as  the  development  of  legal  relations,  helped  dissociate  the  intricate  elements 
which  composed  the  general  Moslem  system;  thus,  the  precepts  of  faith  were 
isolated  from  legal  rules.  Faith,  which  is  the  subject  of  a  separate  science:  Al 
Kalam  is  entirely  distinct  from:  Al  Filch,  or  Law,  which  contains  the  precepts  of 
conduct  and  actions.  It  is  true  that  Law  evolved  along  the  general  lines  of  religion, 
but  however  great  the  influence  of  religion,  Law  in  the  mind  of  all  represented  an 
autonomous  discipline  of  a  secular  character,  in  its  finality  at  least. 
In  order  to  clearly  bring  out  this  character  one  must  distinguish  between  two 
periods  in  the  function  of  Moslem  Law;  the  first  one  is  that  in  which  formal 
sources  of  legal  rules  stem  from  the  divine  command,  expressed  directly  in  the 
Koran  or  indirectly  in  the  tradition  of  the  Prophet  "Al  Sunna".  The  second  period 
is  that  of  scientific  development  of  Moslem  Law  through  Cheria's  two 
'  Reprinted  from  Documents  of  the  United  Nations  Conference  on  International  Organisation,  San 
Francisco,  1945  vol.  14,  United  Nations  Committee  of  Jurists,  p.  p.  375-379. Annexe  4  385 
supplementary  sources:  The  consensus  on  "al  Ijma"  and  the  Analogy  or  "Al 
Qiyas" 
3.  It  is  incontestable  that  in  the  first  period  the  Moslem  legal  system 
established  by  the  Koran  and  "Al  Sunna"  had  been  formed  independently  of  any 
outside  influence  of  other  legal  systems.  Its  religious  stamp  as  well  as  a  generality 
of  its  principles  have  clearly  distinguished  it  from  all  the  other  legal  systems  in 
force  in  the  other  countries  during  this  same  period.  As  for  its  religious  stamp  it 
was  in  the  very  nature  of  things.  The  Koran  at  first  dealt  with  religion  and  morals, 
particularly  in  the  first  verses.  Later  one  finds  legal  rules  concerning  not  only 
man's  actions  either  in  the  civil  or  penal  field  but  also  relations  between  nations. 
one  finds  standards  on  war,  peace,  family  organisation,  property,  obligations, 
crimes,  repressive,  punishment,  even  on  judicial  procedure.  All  these  rules  are 
mingled  with  religious  concepts  which  accounts  for  the  religious  or  rather  moral 
influence  which  characterises  Moslem  Law.  Moreover,  this  religious  influence 
was  justified  in  order  to  insure  the  prominence  of  moral  principles  which  are 
recommended  by  religion  and  which  in  the  final  analysis  must  govern  human 
nature.  But  this  religious  influence  does  not  in  any  way  affect  the  legal  character 
of  the  rules  of  the  Islamic  Law,  nor  their  intrinsic  value,  considered  as  a  whole  as 
a  homogenous  and  coherent  normative  system.  A  large  part  of  these  legal  rules 
established  by  the  Koran  and  Sunna  have  been  enacted  to  abrogate  or  modify 
preislam  customs,  in  other  terms  they  constitute  legal  reforms  realised  by  Islam  to 
counter  balance  general  tendencies  in  preislamic  law.  This  part  was  of  purely 
Arabic  formation,  while  the  other  was  in  view  of  the  changing  needs  of  the 
Moslem  community.  Thus,  Moslem  legislation  translates  in  a  truly  remarkable 
way  all  social  transformations  required  by  the  development  and  progress  of  the 
Moslem  community,  welcoming  certain  preislamic  institutions,  correcting 
numerous  points  of  the  preexisting  Law  and  lastly,  formulating  new  principles  in 
consideration  of  the  needs  and  aspirations  of  Islamic  society. 
4.  In  the  second  period  of  the  evolution  of  Moslem  Law,  after  the  Prophet's 
death,  the  divine  sources  cease  to  inspire  the  legal  system  of  Islam,  but  a  purely 
scientific  work  continued  to  fill  the  gaps  of  the  Moslem  legal  order  and  to  insure 
the  development  of  Law  and  its  adaptation  to  social  needs  through  two 
supplementary  sources,  the  Consensus  and  the  Analogy.  These  two  purely  secular 
sources  have  enabled  Moslem  jurists  to  introduce  in  the  legal  system  a  progressive 
element  of  considerable  importance;  it  is  through  these  sources  that  doctrine  and 
jurisprudence  have  shown  a  truly  remarkable  creative  activity  and  have  thus 
formulated  a  rather  important  part  of  the  Islamic  legal  system. 
It  is,  however,  to  be  noted  that  the  normative  activity  expressed  by  the 
supplementary  sources  was  not  of  a  nature  to  prepare  the  Moslem  legal  system  to 
absorb,  at  least  without  restraint,  the  foreign  institutions  or  civilisations.  A  certain 
number  of  these  have  crept  into  the  Moslem  Law,  through  the  channels.  of  one  or 
the  other  of  the  complementary  sources;  even  then,  such  institutions  have  not 
retained  their  individuality.  They  blend  themselves  in  the  Moslem  legal  system 
and  lose  their  own  physiognomy  to  follow  exactly  the  pattern  of  Moslem 
technique. Annexe  4  386 
5.  In  the  field  of  historical  and  rational  data  as  well,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the 
Moslem  Law  is  an  autonomous  legal  system.  Furthermore,  the  technical  structure 
of  Moslem  Law  brings  forth  the  fundamental  differences  which  place  the  Moslem 
system  in  a  class  apart  from  other  legal  systems.  Let  us  not  go  further  without 
noting  that  the  legal  technique  of  Moslem  public  Law  is  thoroughly  different  from 
that  of  European  or  American  institutions  pertaining  to  state  organisation  and  to 
international  or  domestic  relations.  In  this  respect,  one  has  never  doubted  the 
originality  of  this  legal  system.  In  fact  the  Moslem  rules  concerning  the  domestic 
and  international  activities  of  the  State  present  no  similarity  whatsoever  to  those 
belonging  to  codes  of  Occidental  Law.  A  mere  perusal  of  the  Moslem  rules 
dealing  with  peace,  war,  or  international  world  organisation  will  suffice  to 
convince  that  public  law,  be  it  domestic  or  international,  enjoys  among  Moslem 
peoples  a  certain  autonomy,  characteristic  phenomenon  of  Moslem  civilisation. 
To  quote  only  one  of  the  most  typical  examples,  one  can  consider  the  Moslem 
conception  of  Unitarian  State,  this  very  conception  which  accounts  for  the 
existence  of  the  Moslem  world  "Dar  El  Islam"  as  a  political  entity,  which  tends  to 
insure  an  international  organisation  of  a  sui  generis  nature. 
6.  The  Moslem  Law,  public  as  well  as  private,  is  based  on  a  highly  developed 
and  powerful  moralising  concept  which  pervades  the  entire  Moslem  system.  It  is 
true  that  any  legal  system  which  has  reached  a  certain  degree  of  evolution  contains 
a  moral  element.  The  moralising  concept  of  the  Moslem  system,  however,  is  not 
the  result  of  a  slow  evolution,  it  was  born  with  the  fundamental  principles  of  the 
legal  order  and  this  constitutes  an  integral  part  of  it.  One  can  therefore  say  that  it 
has  not  assumed  a  subsidiary  character  and  that  it  has  steadily  retained  its  vigor 
during  the  evolution  of  the  legal  system.  This  moralising  tendency  which 
pervades  the  entire  Moslem  legal  system  and  which  is  explained  by  its  relation  to 
religion,  has  enabled  the  Moslem  jurists  to  elaborate  several  important  theories, 
such  as  that  pertaining  to  the  abuse  of  Law  as  based  on  the  adage  "Hadith"  of  the 
Prophet  asserting  that  "no  one  has  the  right  to  harm  his  neighbour"  and  the  theory 
of  imprevision  conceived  on  the  provisions  of  the  Koran  stating  that  "no  one  is 
held  to  the  impossible".  Another  Koran  text  prohibiting  all  unjust  acquisitions 
contains  the  seed  of  a  range  of  theories  of  public  and  private  Law,  a  justly 
recognised  prerogative  of  the  free  individual,  is  respected  by  Moslem  Law  to  the 
extent  of  being  considered  as  imprescriptible.  There  again  can  be  felt  the 
moralising  tendency  of  Law  throughout  Islam.  Should  we  confine  ourselves  to 
ethics,  we  could  not  pretend  to  destroy  the  rights  of  the  individual  for  the  simple 
reason  that  he  has  not  availed  himself  of  or  exercised  them  for  a  certain  period  of 
time.  But  legal  proceedings  can  be  prescribed;  and  in  this  way,  Moslem  jurists  are 
able  to  conciliate  exalted  moral  principles  and  the  imperious  needs  of  practical  life 
by  an  original  conception  tending  to  separate  right  from  legal  proceedings;  legal 
proceedings  present  themselves  form  independent  in  its  existence,  of  the  right,  the 
defence  of  which  it  insures. 
Such  a  powerful  moralising  conception  will  contribute  to  mitigate  the  rigor  of 
legal  rules;  such  a  system  will  serve  as  a  regulator  capable  of  furnishing  in  the 
settlement  of  international  conflicts  theories  extremely  flexible  and  evolutive. Annexe  4  387 
III 
7.  Article  9  of  the  statute  of  the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice 
states: 
"At  every  election,  electors  shall  bear  in  mind  that  not  only  should  all  the 
persons  appointed  as  members  of  the  Court  possess  the  qualifications  required,  but 
the  whole  body  also  should  represent  the  main  forms  of  civilisation  and  the 
principal  legal  systems  of  the  world.  " 
The  originators  of  the  stature,  in  the  drafting  of  this  article,  must  certainly  have 
envisaged,  among  others,  the  Arabic  civilisation  and  the  legal  system  of  Islam. 
Accordingly,  the  government  of  Near  Eastern  Moslem  States,  in  Letters 
addressed  in  September,  1939,  to  the  Secretary  General  if  the  League  of  Nations, 
pointed  out  that  "the  fact  cannot  be  disputed  that  Moslem  civilisation,  owing  to  its 
glorious  past  as  well  as  to  its  present  effulgence,  constitutes  one  of  the  main  forms 
of  civilisation. 
"On  the  other  hand,  Moslem  Law,  governing  as  it  does  an  important  part  of  the. 
peoples  of  the  world,  is  an  autonomous  legal  system  boasting  its  own  sources, 
structure  and  conceptions.  " Bibliography 
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